Elections Hungary
Eye on Europe's elections April 6, 2026 • 5:21 pm ET

Your primer on the Hungarian National Assembly elections

By Atlantic Council experts

Hungarians head to the polls on April 12 to elect their next National Assembly in what is shaping up to be the country’s most competitive national election in over a decade. The rise of opposition figure Péter Magyar in this campaign poses the most significant challenge to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party since Orbán assumed office in 2010. An electoral defeat for Orbán could reshape Hungary’s domestic political trajectory and the country’s relations with the rest of Europe.

Ahead of the elections, the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center covers the central campaign issues and dynamics, the leading political players, and what the results could mean for Hungary’s approach to the European Union (EU), Russia’s war in Ukraine, and broader Euro-Atlantic relations.

What is the electoral process?

Hungary’s National Assembly has 199 members elected through a mixed-member majoritarian system in which voters cast two ballots: With one ballot, voters elect 106 members with a first-past-the-post system in single-member districts. The second ballot is cast toward the remaining 93 seats, which are allocated to parties in a closed-list proportional representation system at the national level.

Although the system contains a proportional component, it does not fully compensate for the results in constituency races. Party list totals are calculated not only from list votes, but also from surplus votes counted in district races. This includes votes from both losing candidates and from excess votes cast for winning candidates. This mechanism limits the overall proportionality of the outcome and tends to advantage the largest party, Fidesz, which has been in power since 2010.

—Eva Mulholland is a project assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Who is Viktor Orbán?

Orbán leads the national-conservative Fidesz-Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) alliance, which has dominated Hungarian politics for over a decade. Fidesz is generally characterized as right-wing populist and socially conservative, emphasizing national sovereignty, restrictive immigration policies, and hostility toward European integration. Fidesz is aligned with a broader network of right-wing and nationalist parties in Europe and has positioned itself as a leading voice of what Orbán calls “illiberal democracy.” Orbán draws from the right-wing Hungarian political tradition of the 1930s, including an irredentist platform (particularly toward neighboring states with large ethnic Hungarian populations, such as Romania and Ukraine) that manifests through policies such as extending citizenship and voting rights to diaspora communities and official references to “Greater Hungary.”

Orbán first served as prime minister from 1998 to 2002 and returned to power in 2010, when Fidesz won a two-thirds parliamentary majority that enabled sweeping constitutional and institutional reforms. Since then, Orbán has consolidated political power through constitutional changes, favorable electoral laws, a stacked judiciary, and media restrictions, drawing sustained criticism from the EU and international watchdog organizations over concerns about democratic backsliding and the rule of law. In recent years, Hungary has also faced growing concerns over corruption and economic performance, with critics pointing to the concentration of public procurement and EU funds among politically connected elites. At the same time, high inflation, rising cost-of-living pressures, and slower growth have contributed to increasing public dissatisfaction and economic strain.

Despite these controversies, Orbán has maintained strong domestic support, and Fidesz has won four consecutive parliamentary elections since 2010, often securing large parliamentary majorities.

Eva Mulholland

Who is Péter Magyar?

Magyar leads the Respect and Freedom (Tisza) Party, which has rapidly emerged as the main challenger to Orbán’s long-ruling Fidesz party. Magyar is often labeled as center-right, conservative, and anti-corruption, advocating for closer cooperation with the EU and the restoration of democratic institutions and rule-of-law standards in Hungary. Magyar previously had close ties to the governing establishment and was a member of Fidesz for many years before breaking with the party in 2024. He subsequently launched a new political movement that quickly gained national attention and mobilized large public demonstrations. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, Tisza won nearly 30 percent of the vote, the strongest result for a non-Fidesz party in nearly two decades. Since then, Magyar has emerged as Orbán’s most prominent political rival, campaigning on anti-corruption reforms, improved relations with the EU, and economic stabilization, while seeking to consolidate Hungary’s fragmented opposition ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections.

Eva Mulholland

Where do Orbán and Magyar stand on key issues?

Hungarian policy on a range of key issues has the potential to change dramatically.

How is this election different from previous elections?

This election will be the first time in sixteen years that Orbán is facing an opponent who could dethrone him. It is important to note that Magyar’s political persona is different from that of any other previous opponents: He was originally in the Fidesz camp, is a right-of-center conservative, and is an exceptionally capable communicator. Also, the Hungarian economy is a laggard in the EU; the mood for change is higher than in any Hungarian national elections since 2010. A simple majority for Tisza, which appears likely, would be a big victory, but even a two-thirds super-majority is within reach for Magyar’s Tisza party, which would be historic.

András Simonyi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and a former Hungarian ambassador to the United States.

How did we get here?

How might Orbán respond to a Magyar victory?

Orbán is more involved in the election campaign than in previous elections, which is a sign he is desperate and feels insecure, despite the optimism he displays in public. It should be noted that the stakes for him and his inner circle (who have financially benefited the most from his regime) are exceptionally high. With a Tisza two-thirds super-majority, nothing would stand in the way of changing the constitution or launching investigations into the Orbán government’s corruption. Orbán’s response to an election loss would likely be defiant, and he would almost certainly demand a recount. He could take his supporters to the street. His calls for US President Donald Trump to visit Budapest in his support already signal his desperation. A visit from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio did not move the needle in Fidesz’s favor, and a forthcoming visit from US Vice President JD Vance in Orbán’s support might even backfire. Reports that Russian intelligence services are seeking to influence the election in Orbán’s favor further highlight his sense of insecurity.

András Simonyi

How has external interest and interference in Hungary played a role throughout the electoral season, and is it likely to have a significant outcome?

Orbán, who started his political career as a champion of Hungarian independence from Soviet control, has transformed himself into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s closest friend among EU and NATO heads of government. In return, Russia is supporting him in the current electoral campaign. One reported pro-Orbán tactic the Russian intelligence service was considering involved staging an assassination attempt against Orbán to generate sympathy and electoral support for him.

Russia is hardly alone in its support for Orbán. European right-wing political leaders have also been supporting Orbán during the election campaign. A dozen of them, including France’s Marine Le Pen, gathered in Budapest on March 23. The Trump administration is also attempting to support Orbán and Fidesz during the electoral campaign through senior-level visits, including Rubio in February and Vance this week.

It is not clear, however, whether this foreign support will help Orbán. Calling on ideological allies in Europe for his political purposes may complicate Orbán’s customary argument that he defends Hungary against Western European domination. Magyar has accused Orbán of “treason” over reports that Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was giving Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov readouts of confidential EU meetings. That is, Magyar is trying to assume the position of defender of Hungarian interests against Moscow, which used to be Orbán’s favorite political posture.

Daniel Fried is the Atlantic Council’s Weiser Family distinguished fellow and a former US ambassador to Poland.

How would Magyar approach Hungary’s foreign relations?

Magyar’s relationship with the EU is excellent, as Tisza is a member of the European People’s Party group, the same European Parliament group as European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen. He will no doubt represent Hungary’s interests in Brussels, but will not be a troublemaker in the EU, wanting to distinguish himself from Orbán. He will want to unblock EU funding for Hungary that has been frozen over rule-of-law concerns. Magyar has been avoiding discussing Ukraine as Orbán built his campaign on anti-Ukraine rhetoric, but his anti-Russian stance is well known. Thus, he should be expected to play a constructive role with Ukraine despite his strong opposition to a fast-track for Ukraine’s EU membership. He is pro-NATO and sees Hungary’s future in the Alliance. He is handling the Trump administration’s clear involvement in support of Orbán with tact, as he has avoided criticism of the US administration. If he is elected, he will want to support a strong transatlantic relationship and strong US-Hungary ties. Europe’s nationalist right is not his natural partner.

András Simonyi

How would Orbán’s approach to Hungary’s foreign relations change in another term?

Orbán and Fidesz have devoted years to cultivating relations with the MAGA movement and the Trump administration. If he wins, Orbán could try to use his electoral victory to consolidate his place as Trump’s closest ideological ally in Europe. He may continue to align himself with NATO-skeptic, EU-hostile, and anti-Ukraine wings of the MAGA movement. Orbán has escalated fights with Ukraine and has recently blocked EU funding for Kyiv. He has ideological allies in Europe and may deepen his role as the customary holdout on EU consensus on support for Ukraine and other steps to counter Russian aggression. Orbán would take victory as an indication that his ideological alignment with rightist political parties in Europe was working, and thus, he would double down on it.

At the same time, Orbán has demonstrated a skillful ability to fulminate against the EU while accepting its financial support and compromising when faced with pressure from key EU members such as Germany. He had, after some time, joined the EU consensus on sanctions against Russia, until this most recent veto. Whether he will return to this approach of barking loudly while biting sparingly is not clear. If Orbán wins, the Ukrainian government may choose to resume providing Hungary with Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline, halted after an attack damaged it, as EU officials are quietly recommending.

Daniel Fried

What are the parties to watch?

Fidesz-KDNP

Leader: Viktor Orbán

European Parliament group: Patriots for Europe

What is Fidesz-KDNP? Fidesz-KDNP is a national-conservative political alliance that has governed Hungary since 2010 under Orbán. The coalition combines right-wing populism, Christian-conservative social policies, a strong emphasis on national sovereignty, and vehement opposition to immigration. The alliance has promoted what Orbán calls an “illiberal democracy,” prioritizing national identity, family policy, and state authority while maintaining a critical stance toward deeper European integration. Since returning to power in 2010, the alliance has won four consecutive parliamentary elections, often with large parliamentary majorities.

Program priorities:

– Protection of national sovereignty and opposition to deeper EU integration

– Restrictive migration policies and border security

– Pro-family social policies and demographic support programs

– Energy security and maintaining relatively low household utility prices through Russian energy imports

Main campaign themes:

– Defense of Hungarian national interests within the EU

– Opposition to immigration and EU migration quotas

– Criticism of EU climate policies and sanctions on Russia

– Framing elections as a choice between “peace” and involvement in the war in Ukraine

Tisza

Leader: Péter Magyar

European Parliament group: European People’s Party

What is Tisza? Tisza is best characterized as a center-right, pro-European, anti-corruption alternative to Fidesz. Led by Magyar, a former Fidesz insider, the party promises economic reforms and the restoration of democratic institutions. Tisza seeks to attract voters dissatisfied with both the ruling party and the fragmented traditional opposition, positioning itself as a pragmatic reform movement rather than a traditional ideological party.

Program priorities:

– Recover EU funds frozen over rule-of-law concerns to stimulate the economy

– Strengthen anti-corruption institutions and restore judicial independence

– Improve public services and support small businesses

Main campaign themes:

– Restoring Hungary’s relations with the EU and Western allies

– Combating corruption and political patronage networks

– Economic modernization and fiscal stability

– Positioning itself as a credible alternative to the Orbán government

What are the potential outcomes?

Orbán wins

If Orbán wins, the status quo would continue. Hungary would likely continue along a Euroskeptic trajectory, shaped by Orbán’s repressive governance and ongoing economic strain. Should electoral manipulation by Fidesz appear likely, mass protests contesting the results and unrest may occur. If Orbán continues to act as a spoiler within the EU, the bloc may escalate its response, including by considering measures to restrict Hungary’s voting rights on rule-of-law grounds. Orbán may further alter the electoral system to prevent any future close calls.

Tisza wins a simple majority

If Tisza wins a simple majority, Magyar would be able to form a new government but would likely be politically or legally constrained by the outgoing Fidesz party. Orbán would be likely to encourage his supporters to engage in large public demonstrations. It would be difficult for Magyar to legally dismantle policies designed to favor Orbán and his inner circle, such as restoring media freedoms and judicial independence, as these would require a two-thirds majority. It is also possible that Orbán would adopt new laws, such as raising the threshold for qualified majorities, to constrain the new government before it enters power. Orbán may seek to delay the transition of power through a variety of legal instruments, including demanding a recount or declaring a state of emergency. The wider Magyar’s margin of victory, the more cautious Orbán is likely to be in contesting the outcome. While Tisza would hold nominal power, Fidesz would retain a significant amount of sway.

Tisza wins a two-thirds majority

If Tisza wins a two-thirds majority, Magyar could implement meaningful change. Tisza could rewrite the constitution and overhaul the legal system. Magyar has promised to restore Hungary to a healthy democracy, removing Orbán allies from key positions of power. It is possible that mid-level government officials and oligarchs would move to support Tisza, further weakening Orbán’s grip on power.

What are the top issues for voters?

The economy

Economic conditions remain a major concern for Hungarian voters after several years of volatility and high inflation. Hungary experienced one of the highest inflation rates in the EU, with year-on-year inflation peaking at 25 percent in early 2023 before gradually declining as monetary policy tightened. Despite this improvement, the economy has struggled to regain momentum, with economic output largely stagnating in recent years, while inflation continues to exceed the central bank’s 3 percent target. Recent Eurobarometer polling indicates that 85 percent of Hungarians consider economic factors to be the largest issues facing the country. Rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living are the top concerns of Hungarian citizens at 43 percent, followed by the economic situation in general at 26 percent and government debt at 16 percent.

Immigration

Immigration remains a central and highly politicized issue in Hungary’s electoral campaigning, despite relatively low levels of migration. Orbán and Fidesz have consistently framed migration as a national security and cultural threat, leveraging anti-immigration rhetoric to consolidate support and define the political opposition. While Hungary hosts relatively low numbers of asylum seekers compared to other EU member states, public attitudes remain shaped by years of government messaging, with majorities expressing concern about migration’s impact on national identity and security. This platform resonates across age groups, with 76 percent of Gen Z and 80 percent of baby boomers in Hungary saying they feel negatively about immigration. Immigration continues to serve as a key mobilizing tool for Fidesz, even as opposition figures, including Magyar, attempt to shift the campaign focus toward governance, corruption, and economic issues.

European integration

European integration remains a central and increasingly contested issue in Hungary’s political landscape. Hungary faces ongoing disputes with Brussels over rule-of-law conditionality, with approximately €17 billion in EU funds currently frozen due to concerns over corruption and judicial independence. While public support for Hungarian membership in the EU and NATO remains strong, at 54 percent and 79 percent respectively, Orbán has frequently framed the EU as a source of Hungary’s economic and political challenges, using tensions with Brussels to reinforce his government’s sovereignty-focused narrative and bolster domestic support. This framing has contributed to declining public trust in EU institutions.

Ukraine

Russia’s war in Ukraine remains a central issue in Hungary’s political debate, with Orbán framing the conflict as a choice between “war and peace” in an effort to position his government as the guarantor of stability. While Hungary has provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, it has consistently opposed military aid and repeatedly delayed or diluted EU sanctions against Russia and financial support packages for Ukraine, citing national economic interests and energy security concerns. This stance has some popular support, as 57 percent of Hungarians oppose financing military equipment for Ukraine and only 41 percent of Hungarians support recognizing Ukraine as an official candidate for EU membership. At the same time, energy dependence on Russia and concerns over inflation continue to shape voter attitudes.

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Related Experts: Daniel Fried and András Simonyi

Image: A young kid waves his Hungarian flag in central Hungary on March 31, 2026. Photo by Daniel Alfoldi/ZUMA Wire via Reuters.