Slovakia will head to the polls on September 30, 2023, for early parliamentary elections following the collapse of the conservative government led by the Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLANO) party’s Eduard Heger. This election has the potential to return populist candidate Robert Fico’s Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD) to power, raising questions about Slovakia’s Euro-Atlantic future and support for Ukraine.

Ahead of the elections, the Europe Center is answering those questions and breaking down the leading parties and issues to know.

How did we get here?

What is the electoral process?

Elections for Slovakia’s National Council are held every four years (except when early elections are called) to appoint the 150-representative body. Slovakia employs a proportional representation system in which parties or coalitions submit a list of candidates ahead of the election, and voters select up to four candidates on one list. To win any seats in the National Council, parties must earn more than five percent of the vote, and coalitions must earn more than seven percent of the vote.

Who is Robert Fico?

Robert Fico leads the center-left Smer-SD party. He has served as Slovakia’s prime minister twice: from 2006 to 2010 and from 2012 to 2018. He resigned in 2018 following the murder of investigative reporter Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová, which led to mass protests in Bratislava against high-level corruption. Kuciak’s last story, published posthumously, alleges business ties between two of Fico’s senior government advisors and businessmen whom Kuciak linked back to the ‘Ndrangheta organized crime syndicate. Despite Smer-SD’s retreat in 2018, Fico’s party has led the polls since March 2023.

What do the polls say?

“The polls are still projecting Fico’s Smer-SD to win the upcoming elections and to succeed in forming the governing majority in the parliament. According to current prospects, Fico would have three different coalition options, including one with a constitutional majority if Smer-SD would be joined by Hlas, the Slovak National Party (SNS), and the We Are Family party.

“Yet, the gap between Smer-SD and main liberal contender Progressive Slovakia (PS) is narrowing, with latest polls indicating a difference between 1 and 3 percent. Importantly, Slovakia is known to have quite an important part of the electorate deciding during the week of elections. Given how tight the race is, it can really go both ways. In particular, people who want to avoid having Fico back—or rather seeing Fico 2.0—are extremely motivated. The question is whether it’ll be enough. Fico and his likes have ground to build upon with the Slovak population, since it is one of the most pro-Russian populations and one of the populations most widely hit by disinformation among the Central and Eastern European countries, rivaled only by Bulgaria.

“If Smer-SD and PS are neck-and-neck in the lead, their abilities to form the government will depend mainly on the performance of the other parties. This is true especially for PS, which has weaker coalition potential compared to Smer-SD. Former President Andrej Kiska recently appealed to electors to distribute votes more among other politically aligned parties, as some are polling around the 5 percent threshold. PS may score a great result but to no avail if partners don’t make it into the parliament. This is what happened to former Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, when he vacuumed up the votes of his partners during 2021 elections.

“If returning to power, Fico will probably remain pragmatic in matters related to the European Union (EU) but less so regarding NATO and transatlantic cooperation. A Fico government may have a direct impact on the NATO battlegroup deployed in Slovakia. These are truly consequential elections. Results can not only change Slovakia’s trajectory but also help reshape the whole region. The group of those challenging support of Ukraine and liberal values will span further across the continent and form a cluster reminiscent of a part of one former empire: Hungary, Slovakia, (to a certain extent) Austria, and parts of the Balkans.”

—Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

What does this election mean for Slovakia’s Euro-Atlantic future?

“Fico—the rightist, EU- and NATO-skeptic political leader—has a strong chance of forming a ruling coalition after September 30. As prime minister, Fico may well act on his campaign rhetoric and pull Slovak support for Ukraine. In his most recent stint as prime minister (2012 to 2018), Fico maintained support for EU sanctions against Russia, imposed after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. However, many observers in the region and in Slovakia say that Fico has since moved further to the right and toward a more openly pro-Russian position, resembling that of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Under Fico’s rule, Slovakia could conceivably join Orbán’s Hungary in nationalist, hard-right, Vladimir Putin-friendly opposition to mainstream European thinking (an odd couple, given that Orbán’s own nationalist agenda has an anti-Slovak element).

“Much will depend on the electoral math: i.e., the number of parliamentary delegates that Fico will need to put together a governing coalition. The chances of a hard-right, NATO- and EU-skeptic shift in Slovak policy would rise should Fico form a coalition with a far-right party. Mitigating factors include Fico’s reputation for cynicism and pragmatic (or transactional) deals. As prime minister, he could, for example, announce no further Slovak weapons transfers to Ukraine without seeking to block EU support for Ukraine. Fico may not want to endanger the significant financial support that Slovakia still receives from the EU.

“Electoral victories by rightist, nationalist parties have occurred throughout Europe. In some cases, e.g., Italy, such governments maintained support for Ukraine and kept a generally NATO- and EU-oriented foreign policy stance. The Biden Administration will probably reach out to a Fico-led government, or any new Slovak government, seeking to find a stable point from which to maintain Slovakia’s generally pro-Western orientation.”

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Who are the parties to watch?

What are the top issues driving voters to the polls?

What does this election mean for Slovakia’s support of Ukraine?

In an interview with Politico, Čaputová warned that the September vote may bring about a government that may chip away at or even reverse Slovakia’s steadfast support for Ukraine. The country supplied Ukraine with its entire fleet of thirteen Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets, making it the second member of NATO to deliver planes for Ukraine’s war effort. It has also given temporary protection to over one hundred thousand Ukrainian refugees, according to the UNHCR’s latest reports. Smer-SD is noted for seeking to end Slovakia’s support to Ukraine.

Experts say that the Slovak public’s changing impressions of Russia and Ukraine reflect the spread of pro-Russian disinformation across the country. According to one such expert, local politicians have adopted the language employed by Russian propaganda, amplifying the impact of disinformation. GLOBSEC Trends 2023 found that a third of Slovaks would vote to leave NATO if a referendum were held in the country, and 69 percent of respondents believe the military aid they’re supplying to Ukraine is “provoking Russia,” as opposed to aiding Ukraine’s self-defense.

Related Experts: Emma Nix, Daniel Fried, and Petr Tůma

Image: A voter casts his ballot paper into a ballot box at the Park Gymnasium polling station during the constitutional referendum.