WASHINGTON—In their testimony earlier this month at the annual unclassified Worldwide Threats hearings in the House and Senate, leaders of the US intelligence community barely mentioned allies and partners. The intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, released alongside the hearings, similarly sheds little light on how the United States works with allies to achieve shared intelligence objectives. Yet from protecting US troops to preventing terrorist attacks, the United States has almost certainly relied on—or directly benefited from—the intelligence these networks provide.
The US intelligence community’s scant acknowledgement of these critical connections reflects the current US administration’s often dismissive—and at times aggressive—approach toward foreign partners. In the past two weeks, for example, US President Donald Trump criticized NATO members, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, for not supporting the US-Israeli attacks on Iran and for declining to help secure the Strait of Hormuz.
Treating allies this way, however, is not just corrosive to diplomatic relations. It will almost certainly come at a strategic cost. If the United States continues to alienate key partners, it may soon struggle to sustain and resource mutually beneficial intelligence programs, keep pace with rapid technological change, and defend against determined adversaries such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Even with its skilled intelligence community and vast collection capabilities, the United States simply cannot form a comprehensive global intelligence picture on its own.
Intelligence cooperation often continues quietly and in the shadows, even as diplomatic or trade spats dominate headlines. Intelligence professionals pride themselves on this pragmatic approach to their work. Yet evidence suggests that US allies are beginning to reassess the depth of their intelligence cooperation with the United States. Reporting indicates that the United Kingdom, Colombia, and Canada may have stopped or adjusted intelligence-sharing on suspected drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean over concerns about the legality of US military strikes. In October 2025, the Dutch military intelligence chief publicly expressed concerns that the United States might use shared intelligence to violate human rights. These signals are not yet a sea change, but they point to an erosion of the most valuable currency in intelligence-sharing: trust.
Even with its skilled intelligence community and vast collection capabilities, the United States simply cannot form a comprehensive global intelligence picture on its own.
In March 2025, the United States briefly suspended vital intelligence support to Ukraine, sparking an international outcry and shocking NATO allies. More recently, in launching Operation Epic Fury against Iran, Trump apparently caught NATO, Gulf, and Asian allies off guard, reportedly providing no advance warning that operations were imminent. This suggests that US-Israeli plans were executed without real-time coordination with allies. Such apparent willingness to bypass allied information-sharing mechanisms introduces unnecessary risk for both the United States and its partners, especially in complex and untested operational environments. By disrupting expectations of reciprocity with allies and potentially placing intelligence professionals and warfighters in more difficult positions to share information, the US administration may therefore undermine its own long-term interests.
It is important to underscore that US intelligence partnerships with allies are not a single program or activity. The eighteen-member US intelligence community has complex relationships with dozens of countries and partner agencies around the world. For example, the Anglophone “Five Eyes” partnership—comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—conducts intelligence cooperation across a range of collection disciplines. The “Nine Eyes” and “Fourteen Eyes” alliances have further broadened the network to include additional partners. On the military side, the US combatant commands often operate joint interagency task forces that benefit from allied and partner joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, and law enforcement support. But intelligence alliances and networks are only as strong as the commitment of their members—and the unpredictability of US actions risks eroding that commitment.
The consequences could be severe. Allies could limit US access to information by prioritizing regional, linguistic, or other organizing principles for their intelligence alliances. Bilateral intelligence relationships could face restrictions on information-sharing that, in the worst case, would degrade the common operating picture during a crisis. Moreover, countries could seek alternatives to US data platforms or methodologies, especially if they fear their intelligence could be used in unlawful or inappropriate ways by the United States. Specialized bilateral relationships between US and allied intelligence professionals could also weaken through reduced exposure and connectivity, especially as the US intelligence community is reportedly losing key expertise to early retirements and staff cuts. All this comes at a time when perennial intelligence cooperation challenges—bureaucratic hurdles, overclassification, system interoperability, and the rapid pace of artificial intelligence and quantum computing development—demand stronger collaboration between the United States and its allies.
Even under optimal conditions, international cooperation is challenging, but today’s security climate forces countries to work through slights and disputes to keep intelligence flowing. Still, allies may come to view this moment as a welcome chance to reform their intelligence communities, increase their independence, and enhance their capabilities. Such an approach would be different from reducing cooperation due to unhealthy breaks in trust. For example, the United Kingdom’s former head of MI6 argued in a March 23 interview that it is time for a refresh in terms of how it approaches cooperation with US intelligence and its reliance on security guarantees from Washington. The most recent US National Defense Strategy urges allies to provide more funding for intelligence, but it is unclear what those changes might entail or who will compel them.
In the meantime, members of Congress and their staff on intelligence, defense, and appropriations committees will need to help safeguard intelligence activities that deliver value to the United States and its allies, as they may be among the few Americans with sufficient clearance and oversight to detect potential problems. More congressional and parliamentary collaboration is needed on intelligence reform, and NATO can offer some collective accountability mechanisms, as well.