This article is part of a series featuring Atlantic Council experts’ analysis and recommendations on the key challenges facing allies at the upcoming NATO Summit in Ankara, Turkey, and beyond.
WASHINGTON—So far, this year has been difficult for transatlantic unity. In January, US President Donald Trump threatened to seize Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO ally Denmark, prompting a genuine crisis in the Alliance. In March and June, the US president sharply criticized Europeans for what he perceived as equivocation when asked to support Operation Epic Fury against Iran. He called NATO a “paper tiger,” and singled out allied leaders for personal insults. In May, he announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany and cancellation of plans to deploy a deep precision strike battalion to the country. As the July 7-8 NATO Summit in Ankara approaches, many European allies fear that the second half of the year will bring more of the same.
Whether NATO emerges from Ankara stronger or more unstable could hinge on what happens with “NATO 3.0.” Introduced in February, NATO 3.0 is the Trump administration’s vision for a new era for the Alliance. It is defined by reduced US force commitments to European security and increased European military capability. In effect, it calls for a conventional transatlantic defense of Europe led by European allies and backed by a US nuclear deterrent.
The Trump administration wants to show that it is serious about NATO 3.0. Recent weeks have seen a steady stream of official announcements and leaked reports of meaningful and imminent reductions in US military assets in Europe. Reports have emerged of White House plans to decrease troop deployments, remove critical and difficult-to-replace US capabilities from Europe, relinquish senior allied positions to Europeans, and downgrade or curtail US participation in key Alliance meetings.
Beyond these specific changes, NATO 3.0 (and its underpinning document, the National Defense Strategy, or NDS) aims to revise two long-standing principles that have been the foundation of US policy regarding the transatlantic security relationship: first, that the United States has vital interests in Europe; second, that the United States should maintain a robust forward defense against threats. In response to the first, the Trump administration argues that US interests in Europe are diminishing. In response to the second, NATO 3.0 and the NDS seek to minimize if not eliminate the US forward-defense commitment.
In reality, the US commitment in Europe is only a sliver of the United States’ global force posture. The US permanent presence in Europe of around 68,000 personnel is roughly 5 percent of total active-duty US personnel globally. Likewise, when it comes to US capabilities, the vast majority are not based in Europe. For example, only two of the United States’ approximately thirty combat-ready F-35 squadrons are stationed in Europe.
How Europeans see the situation
The Trump administration’s approach toward NATO has cut both ways. Last year at The Hague summit, allies agreed to major spending commitments, which are strengthening the Alliance. At the same time, the US president’s criticisms and threats, as well as European concerns about the potential for a Trump-induced fracturing of the Alliance, are changing European attitudes toward the United States.
Polling suggests that attitudes toward the United States have soured substantially in the past year. In Denmark, for example, a poll conducted in January, at the height of the Greenland episode, showed that 84 percent of Danes viewed the US negatively. This is not an isolated finding. A more recent poll suggested that as few as 11 percent of Europeans view the United States as an ally with shared values and interests. Majorities across the fifteen European nations surveyed said that they believe the United States would not come to their defense if they were attacked.
The temptation is therefore high among European leaders to write off the transatlantic relationship and pursue genuine strategic autonomy from the US once and for all.
That would be a mistake for several reasons.
To begin with, Europe can’t quickly replace many US assets and capabilities. Europe shouldn’t allow careless and wishful talk about strategic autonomy to signal encouragement to the administration to accelerate its plans for withdrawal from the continent. Europe should avoid responding to US withdrawals in a way that renders them irreversible.
Rather, Europeans should come to Ankara ready to demonstrate to their US counterparts the positive-sum contributions that they have made since The Hague. European allies should underscore how shared security challenges continue to affect all allies, and how US engagement in Europe has a global force-multiplier effect. During his recent trip to Washington, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte pointed out how European air bases, for example, supported between four thousand and five thousand US sorties during Operation Epic Fury. Concrete and tangible progress that can be directly linked to shared US and European security interests are key.
European leaders should be prepared to confidently assert their track record. NATO’s own 2025 Annual Report provides valuable details: The burden shift is happening faster than expected, with Europeans growing their spending at faster rates than anticipated. In 2025, European and Canadian spending grew by 20 percent year-on-year. All allies are now hitting the original spending target of 2 percent of economic output on defense. And the United States is no longer the highest per capita defense spender. Norway now tops the charts, with others close behind. This is a narrative that can appeal to Washington’s NATO 3.0 advocates.
Second, in spite of current tensions, Europeans should not forget that transatlantic relations run deep. While Trump clearly harbors some skepticism of the value that NATO brings to the United States, his views on this are not representative of broader US public sentiment and should not be seen as the permanent, irreversible trajectory of US policy toward NATO.
The American public is pro-European and pro-NATO, and so, on the whole, is the US Congress, which broadly opposes troop cuts in Europe. The positive sentiments are strengthening, not weakening. Polling from the Ronald Reagan Institute shows strong majorities of US public support for NATO (68 percent) and support for a US military response if a European ally were attacked (76 percent). Contrary to assumptions, 79 percent of self-described MAGA Republicans agree that the US should have a stronger role in world affairs, including by supporting Ukraine. A June 2026 poll from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs corroborates this, with 68 percent saying the US should maintain or increase its commitment to NATO and broad support for holding steady or adding US troops in Germany (60 percent) and Poland (63 percent). With the midterms approaching, followed immediately by presidential primaries, drastic moves to undermine NATO would be politically risky.
How Europeans can play their cards right
The lesson for European leaders is that they should make the smart, long-term bet on the transatlantic relationship. If the Europeans play their cards right and fulfill their responsibilities as net security providers, the transatlantic relationship could emerge stronger in the long term, more capable and more relevant to the challenges that Europe faces, and still with a robust US security commitment.
