WASHINGTON—Spending less time and energy on Iran is a good national security objective. For more than forty-six years, every US administration has devoted significant time and resources to Iran, with minimal return on investment. In a stark departure from President Donald Trump’s first administration, his new National Security Strategy (NSS) reflects this dynamic, making only three scant references to Iran, championing its diminished status, the Israel-Iran cease-fire, and essentially declaring “mission accomplished.”
The Iran portion of the NSS likely reflects the infighting that was evident within the president’s base during the twelve-day Israel-Iran war. Traditional hawks praised the kinetic actions, while restrainers worried that the president was backtracking on his pledge to end “forever wars” in the Middle East. One administration official explained to me that the White House wasn’t sure how to please both Tucker Carlson and Mark Levin, who represent the two ends of the restrainer-hawk spectrum. The end of the twelve-day war—a large-scale attack and immediate diplomatic off-ramp—was an attempt to bridge the gap by declaring victory and moving on.
Unfortunately, it’s likely only a temporary fix, as the core issues remain unresolved, and moving on won’t be as simple as the NSS suggests.
Iran remains a threat
The NSS is right that Iran is weakened. For much of the past two years, Iran has suffered one strategic setback after another on the battlefield. The situation isn’t much better on the international stage, where the United Nations re-imposed sanctions on Iran in September, or at home, where Tehran has shown an inability to deal with several challenges, including an ongoing water crisis.
Even with these setbacks, however, Iran is still a threat to US interests and the regional “partnership, friendship, and investment” that the NSS envisions. Iran retains large quantities of highly enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges, now without any International Atomic Energy Agency oversight. The nuclear risk is heightened by domestic Iranian calls for nuclear breakout in the aftermath of the twelve-day war. While its missile program and support for nonstate proxies have been diminished, Iran did inflict tangible damage on Israel during the twelve-day war, and it could easily restart proxy attacks on US forces in the region. As it rebuilds its other capabilities, Iran continues to project power externally through the Houthis in Yemen. In short, Iran retains the potential to be the hostile regional hegemon the NSS hopes to avoid.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has responded to this reality by reminding the world of the Iranian missile threat and increasingly targeting Iranian proxies. Privately, some Israeli officials and pundits have referred to the twelve-day war as the “first Iran war” and believe that in the next round Israel will more aggressively target Iran’s missile program and the regime itself. If these ideas reflect reality, then a continued cease-fire may be contingent upon Trump holding Netanyahu back from further action. In any event, resumed conflict is possible, if not probable.
What now?
Based on the NSS, the lax implementation of Trump’s “maximum pressure 2.0,” and some of the president’s previous statements on US military action abroad, it’s fair to assume that US-instigated regime change in Iran isn’t on the table. This could change, but if the “America first” and NSS perspectives prevail, then the US goal for Iran will be to focus less time on the country in the future. That leaves three immediate options for the United States to implement the strategy outlined in the new NSS:
- Hope the status quo holds.
- Outsource the Iran problem to Israel.
- Seek a new deal with Iran.
Status quo
If the status-quo cease-fire holds—great. The president will deserve a lot of credit, and it’s what the NSS is counting on. There is a parallel between this perspective and the final two years of the Biden administration’s Iran policy, dubbed by some pundits as “No crisis, no deal.” Yet there are three crucial differences. First, from the Biden administration’s perspective, “No crisis, no deal” was always intended to be a temporary strategy, partially reflecting the US political calendar. Second, for the reasons outlined above, resumed conflict seems likely, making any version of containment less viable. Third, even if Trump wanted to completely disengage from Iran, he largely owns the legacy of the Iranian nuclear file due to his decisions to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and to launch unprecedented strikes on Iran’s nuclear program this June.
Outsource the problem
Outsourcing the problem to Israel is an option. Implementation likely entails a “mow the grass” policy, where the Israelis periodically target Iran militarily to diminish specific threats and place a heavier focus on long-term regime change. It’s a high-risk, high-reward strategy that is reliant on a partner that has shown great military prowess but limited ability to translate battlefield success into long-term strategic gain. And with upwards of forty thousand US troops deployed across the Middle East, it also potentially puts US troops and interests in the crosshairs if a conflict spirals.
Activists from Trump’s “MAGA” base and restrainers, both of whom would like the United States to do far less abroad, should be skeptical based on the results of the twelve-day war. “Let Israel be Israel” was a common refrain from MAGA activists during the initial phases of the war. Yet, ultimately, the war resulted in a significant US investment. The administration has thus far avoided a protracted war, but a renewed conflict risks dragging the United States into a conflict inconsistent with its long-term strategy and at odds with much of Trump’s base.
New deal
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Trump appears to prefer a third option—a new deal. He has repeatedly called for resumed negotiations and has made several high-profile gestures to Iran, including a letter to Iran’s supreme leader in March, and an invitation to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to attend Egypt’s Gaza peace summit in October.
Yet achieving a new deal is an arduous task. Setting aside that Iran is an extremely difficult negotiating partner (a topic for another time), Trump faces several challenges unique to his administration that underscore just how difficult it will be to pivot away from Iran.
- A potential Iran deal could reopen the rift within the Republican Party. Absent capitulation from the Iranian government (a welcome but low-probability occurrence), it’s unlikely that the Netanyahu government will support any deal, putting pro-Trump, anti-JCPOA Republicans in a precarious situation. As Iran talks were starting in April, there was a sense in Washington that Iran was different than the negotiations over ending Russia’s war in Ukraine: Conservatives in the Senate would push back against the president on Iran in ways they hadn’t (at that point) on Russia.
- A new deal needs to be better than the JCPOA (or at least significantly different). When I was in government—including as a member of the Trump administration’s Iran nuclear negotiating team—we were keenly aware that any follow-on deal would be judged against the merits of the JCPOA. The JCPOA, while imperfect and limited in scope, was working when Trump withdrew the United States from it. While no one is advocating for a direct return to the JCPOA—too much time has elapsed, and Iran’s nuclear advances make it impossible—any future deal will rightly be measured against the strengths (highly detailed constraints on Iran’s nuclear program) and weaknesses (sunsets and limited scope) of the accord.
Ultimately, a US pivot away from Iran will be difficult, as understandable as the objective is. All the options have drawbacks and challenges. Yet seeking a durable Iran deal is likely the best option. It won’t be easy either to negotiate with Iran or to sell a deal back home. However, hoping for the best and outsourcing the issue to others increases the risk of the United States getting further bogged down in the Middle East for years to come.
