Israeli settler terrorism demands a tougher US response

A man inspects a damaged house, which Palestinians say was burned by Israeli settlers last night, in Al-Fandaqumiya, near Jenin, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on March 22, 2026. (Photo by Mohammed Torokman via Reuters Connect)

WASHINGTON—Under the cover of the Iran war, lawless violence has exploded in the West Bank.

On February 27, extremist Israeli settlers attacked two left-wing Israeli activists near Nablus, sending them to the hospital. Three days later, extremist Israeli settlers shot and killed Muhammad and Fahim Taha Muammar after the Palestinian brothers confronted the group for destroying an olive grove near the village of Qaryut and reportedly attempting to enter private property. On March 8, extremist Israeli settlers raided the northern village of Khirbet Abu Falah, killing three, bringing the total number of Palestinian civilians killed in the West Bank in the past month to six. On the evening of March 21, Eid al-Fitr, more than one hundred extremist settlers launched at least twenty attacks in the West Bank, setting fire to cars and homes, vandalizing property, and beating Palestinian residents.

To protect the victims of this violence, gain Israeli government cooperation in preventing it, and preserve broader US diplomatic priorities, the United States should draw on a key counterterrorism tool: the designation of perpetrators as specially designated global terrorists (SDGTs).

Although there has been a surge in extremist settler violence since the war with Iran began on February 28, attacks have been steadily increasing for far longer. According to data released by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Shin Bet in January, extremist settlers perpetrated 867 attacks against Palestinians and Israeli security forces in the West Bank in 2025, a 27 percent increase from 2024. According to this data, severe incidents of nationalistic crime (which Israeli national security entities acknowledge as terrorism) increased more than 50 percent from 2024 levels, more than doubling since 2023. In November, after a particularly intense period of attacks against Palestinian civilians, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself acknowledged the unacceptability of the violence and the stain with which such activity threatens to mark the “large community of law-abiding, loyal settlers.” IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir also warned at the time that should “anarchists . . . set the area aflame,” Israeli military resources would need to be “immediately diverted” from other fronts.

Zamir’s characterization of extremist settlers as anarchists (terminology echoed by others, including head of the Israeli Central Command Avi Bluth) highlights a double standard in the IDF’s definitions: Although it classifies “severe incidents” as terrorism, it does not define those who perpetrate those acts of terrorism as terrorists, citing a lack of organizational coherence compared to Palestinian terrorist groups. This distinction, however, is arbitrary, and the IDF’s online materials regarding Palestinian terrorism show no compunction against applying the deed to the individual, calling lone wolf terrorists a “huge challenge.”

Extremist Israeli settler violence readily meets both the academic and policy definitions of terrorism: the deliberate creation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of a political objective (with no organizational threshold). The perpetrators destroy Palestinian property, deface buildings (including houses of worship), and kill and steal livestock. They also harass, injure, and kill Palestinian civilians. These acts are often done with the express goal of instilling fear in the civilian population as a means of securing permanent Jewish sovereignty over the West Bank. As extremist settler violence has climbed, the IDF has had increased tactical success in thwarting Palestinian terror attacks in the West Bank, weakening the claim that Israeli terrorism is merely a reaction to Palestinian provocation. The stark contrast between the IDF’s efficacy against Palestinian as opposed to Israeli terrorism also demonstrates that settlers’ impunity is a product of prioritization and political will, not capacity.

The Trump administration has an appropriate tool at its disposal to prevent such violence: the SDGT designation. As outlined in Executive Order 13224, the secretary of state, in consultation with the secretary of the treasury and attorney general, may designate individuals as SDGTs for having committed or posed a risk of committing acts of terrorism that would adversely affect US national interests.

An SDGT designation would give Netanyahu the political cover to aggressively combat the escalating settler terror threat while sticking close to Trump during this election season.

Designating the individuals behind this violence would be legally sound, since the violence falls not only under widely accepted scholarly definitions of terrorism but also the State Department criteria for an SDGT designation. The designation would similarly be strategically justified in light of the 2025 uptick in terrorist settler attacks and the Israeli government’s increasing willingness to acknowledge the violence’s corrosive impact on Israeli security.

The decision to designate an entity is also a political one, and US policymakers consider much more than the legal criteria for designation when taking such a step. It may seem unlikely that Trump would move to designate extremist Israeli settlers (especially after rolling back Biden-era sanctions on Israeli extremists on day one of his second administration). However, there is clear policy utility for this move, which Trump would have unique political latitude to pursue. Trump has enormous credibility with the Israeli public, thanks to his role in the return of the hostages that remained in Hamas captivity and his participation in strikes against Iran. He also has unprecedented leverage over Netanyahu and thus would be largely insulated from the political repercussions—both in the United States and Israel—that his predecessors would have faced had they attempted this step.

Although a third Intifada did not erupt in the West Bank as many feared after the attacks on October 7, 2023, extremist settler violence has helped keep the territory at a dangerous simmer. It also imperils broader regional progress, including Trump’s own efforts to preserve the cease-fire in Gaza and expand the Abraham Accords and other regional integration mechanisms. Such violence can weaken support for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, should Ramallah be seen as ineffective in preventing terror against the population. Hamas, on the other hand, benefits politically from this violence. As the administration attempts to disarm and dismantle Hamas in Gaza, it should similarly work to buttress the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. An SDGT designation would thus not only be a blow to the extremist settlers perpetrating terrorism against Palestinians; it would also be a blow to Hamas and, critically, the group’s political future beyond Gaza.

The administration recognizes the risks that the situation in the West Bank poses. In October, Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio criticized the Knesset’s vote to formally annex all West Bank settlements, calling the vote an “insult” and “political stunt,” and beginning a period of so-called “Bibi-sitting” by US officials. Three weeks later, after a vicious round of attacks during the height of the olive harvest, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee condemned the violence as terrorism, a particularly significant characterization considering Huckabee’s usual pro-settler positioning. The timing of these officials’ comments, immediately following the Gaza cease-fire deal and as the administration worked toward a United Nations Security Council Resolution, suggests a keen awareness that West Bank activity could torpedo US efforts.

The war with Iran has brought a surge of incidents and reshuffled political incentives for Trump and Netanyahu, together making designation both more necessary and feasible. For Netanyahu, domestic pressure on this issue has been mounting. In a speech this month on the Knesset floor, Yesh Atid Party MK Meirav Cohen lambasted Netanyahu for excusing extremist settlers’ actions, arguing that the egregiousness of recent incidents has broken “the entire facade of denial.” Prominent opposition politician Yair Golan recently warned that “extremist ministers” backing “Jewish terrorism” in the West Bank amounts to an “abandonment of Israel’s security.” Even with war raging overhead, mainstream Israeli media has extensively covered the recent spate of attacks, criticizing the prime minister’s (and other senior political and military officials’) unwillingness to forcefully confront the issue.

Netanyahu is well aware of the incendiary effect of continued terrorism against Palestinians in the West Bank: Last week, even as Iran retaliated and Israelis routinely rushed to shelters, the prime minister held a security assessment at the headquarters of the IDF Central Command, which has responsibility for the West Bank. On Monday, the IDF announced that an infantry battalion previously bound for Lebanon had been diverted to the West Bank, the day after Zamir told Northern Command officers that the fight against Hezbollah “has only begun.” And on Tuesday, Channel 12 Chief Political Analyst Amit Segal reported that after pressure from the Trump administration, the Israeli government is expected to establish a Ministry of Defense unit responsible for combating violence by the “hilltop youth,” the term used to describe the predominantly young men perpetrating the overwhelming majority of the violence.

However, settler terrorism continues not because Israel lacks the resources to combat it, but because laws are simply not enforced. The fact that private pressure from Washington leads to such milquetoast, red-herring steps from Jerusalem underscores the need for public and tangible US policy shifts to truly move the needle.

An SDGT designation would give Netanyahu the political cover to aggressively combat the escalating settler terror threat while sticking close to Trump during this election season. And, it will lower the temperature and lessen the likelihood of a third Intifada, in the service of both Israeli national security and US regional interests. The designation (if coupled with aggressive Israeli action) would also send an important signal to Riyadh of Washington and Jerusalem’s continued commitment to work toward eventual normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Annexation legislation in the Knesset and civilian-perpetrated violence are separate issues, but they reveal the same underlying dynamic. The Israeli government’s official acts threaten to inflame tensions not only due to the confounding new realities they generate on the ground, but also because of the more fundamental problems they signal about Israeli government intentions. Having acknowledged the prevalence of extremist settler violence, rhetorical condemnation without repercussions for perpetrators implicitly expresses actual Israeli policy and intentions.

The same logic applies to US policy: Anything less than a full-throated condemnation of settler terrorism will be interpreted as tacit acceptance of the untenable status quo—a status quo that has resulted in the deaths of nine US citizens since 2022. When the war with Iran ends and Washington attempts to pick up where it left off on its prewar priorities, the situation in the West Bank could be the difference between a fragile postwar moment of opportunity and yet another crisis.