Europe & Eurasia NATO Politics & Diplomacy Security & Defense United States and Canada

Issue Brief June 29, 2026 • 1:06 pm ET

Europe’s no-panic playbook for a radically different US foreign policy

By Hans Binnendijk and James J. Townsend Jr.

Bottom lines up front

Trump 2.0 presents a fundamental break in postwar American national security policy.
But it harkens back to trends with deep roots in US history.
NATO and the EU need to make significant, lasting changes in response—quickly, and ideally in coordination with Washington.

Presidents arrive in office with a negotiating style shaped by their personalities and negotiating experience. President Joseph R. Biden’s negotiating style was shaped by his experience from years of bargaining with political colleagues from both parties in the Congress, as senator and later as vice president. His personality as an “old school pol”—informal, backslapping, willing to discuss and to compromise to reach agreement—also shaped his negotiating style.¹

But day-to-day negotiations at the presidential level do not always involve the president personally. High-level talks are usually conducted by the president’s lieutenants, with the president weighing in as needed, especially in the endgame. Negotiations are usually undertaken by an administration team led by a chief negotiator, who is usually a diplomat or political appointee. The team includes members of government agencies within the executive branch who have a stake in the talks and an expertise to bring to the table.

Donald Trump, however, distrusts professional diplomats and has placed the most critical negotiations firmly in the hands of family and close business associates—and for this reason and others, the second Trump administration represents a fundamental reorientation of both American priorities and methods in national security policy.

Trump’s negotiating style could not be more different from Biden’s. It reflects his private sector negotiating experience and his personality. And like much of his presidency, his negotiating style does not follow bureaucratic process or precedent set by other administrations. It is a very personal, hands-on negotiating style where his instinct, honed by the rough and tumble business world of New York City real estate, is his ultimate guide.² He does reach outside the administration to a small circle of trusted interlocutors to ask their opinion on matters, usually to wealthy businessmen like himself who he has known for many years. He is not dependent on an interagency process or National Security Council (NSC) staff to develop negotiating options or background papers that are staffed up from executive departments. He may ask his cabinet members for their view or options and they in turn may ask their departments, but there is not a formal, functioning interagency process that prepares negotiating positions for the NSC staff to present to the president that reflect the views of experts within the bureaucracy.³ “Making a deal” is often an end in itself.

While some of the policy initiatives developed under this unusual process have yielded tangible results, these gains have often come at significant cost to long-standing alliances, deterrence of adversaries, and institutional trust. And although elements of the US system of checks and balances remain operative, domestic political volatility persists and confidence in the administration has eroded, even if broader confidence in the United States endures. How should the United States’ allies, particularly in Europe, adapt to this new reality? Overreaction will not help, but the adjustments required must nonetheless be rapid and sustained. Europe needs the capacity to act more independently while working, where possible, within NATO and other international frameworks.

In his book The Art of the Deal, Trump suggested several rules for a good negotiator many of which he applies to foreign policy including: think big, protect the downside, maximize options, know your market, use your leverage, cultivate media attention, create competition, fight back, be persistent, and be adaptable.⁴

In any negotiation, there are some important tools critical for making a deal. For Trump, the essential tool is leverage: What power does he have to compel his opponent to bend to his will? He wants to hold the cards, and he will accuse his opponent of not having any cards. Another tool is the ability to compromise, which Trump is loath to use unless he can close the deal by making the case that he came out ahead.

When looking to make a deal, Trump’s general approach is transactional. The deal stands alone. No matter the philosophical, ethical or moral issues at play, he is looking for the deal that enhances how he is seen by others. If the deal reflects well on himself, then naturally the deal is also good for the country. In the course of a negotiation, he will not worry about breaking norms, rules or procedures he feels ties his hands unnecessarily. He will also act unpredictably, surprising opponents by saying things publicly that are trial balloons or making statements or tweets that reflect a stream of consciousness, saying things that have not been said during negotiations but are on his mind. While unsettling to others during negotiations, he considers being unpredictable a helpful way to keep his opponents off guard. He is not averse to using threats during negotiations, including military threats. He also can be seductive by using flattery or offering generous sweeteners such as development aid or financial support in return for concessions.⁵

Trump does not always begin with a well thought-out plan but seizes on what he deems as an opportunity and then depends on instinct for his next move. During various stages of the talks, he can be alternatively flexible, demanding, bullying, threatening, play for time, and build a public perception of great progress when there is none, trying to pressure the opponent with false expectations by the public. He seeks to control the public message, using daily interactions with the press and his daily tweets. His administration sticks closely to his talking points. When a negotiation ends, the quicker the better, he will claim success for himself which will be finalized with a signing ceremony and a Sharpie.⁶

The negotiating pattern

This analysis of Trump’s negotiating style leads to a pattern evident in much of his domestic and foreign policy negotiations. In this pattern he:

picks a target based on a historic grievance or emerging opportunity.
sets nearly unreachable goals.
uses all means at his disposal to bully, coerce, cajole, flatter, threaten or attack his opponent to seek negotiating leverage.
sets artificial deadlines for the adversary to comply.
uses public media to gain attention for his cause, often using bold lies to gain public favor.
brings the issue to a crisis.
begins to look for off ramps.
reaches a deal with his adversary which usually falls far short of his original goals.
declares total victory to vindicate his effort.

This style does yield some positive transactional results, but at high cost. It undercuts trust, weakness deterrence, and alienates allies. And it runs the risk that Trump may be forced deliver on his maximum threats.⁷

An example that vividly displays many of these aspects of Trump’s negotiating style was his effort to bring Ukraine and Russia to the negotiating table. He set an excessively high bar, saying that he could end the war in twenty-four hours. To get Russian President Vladimir Putin to the table, he chose honey. He invited Putin to Alaska for a summit. To get Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the table he chose vinegar. To coerce Zelenskyy, the administration in February 2025 orchestrated a public humiliation, berating him for not being more grateful for US support, mocking him for not having any cards in the standoff with Russia, and warning him that he will ultimately lose unless he makes a deal now.

A second example is his negotiation with Iran in the spring of 2026. After the US-Israeli surprise attack which decimated Iran’s top leadership, Trump alternatively threatened to annihilate Iranian civilization and declared that a deal was nearly agreed. Neither was true. Iran’s negotiating position improved as it closed the Strait of Hormuz and its resilient leadership hardened its views. With the June Memorandum of Understanding, Trump appears to have settled for far less than his stated war aims.

A new national security strategy, on paper and in practice

Upon entering office in January 2025, Trump determined not to be constrained in the conduct of foreign policy as he had been during his first term. Key negotiations on Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran were placed in the hands of people close to Trump with experience in negotiating real estate deals.

With the help Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) early in this term, Trump slashed the foreign policy establishment. The NSC system that reviewed policy options up a chain with interagency meetings collapsed with the result that mistakes became more probable. The State Department, the NSC staff, the Defense Department’s civil servants, and the intelligence community were all cut back in size and more importantly cut out of the action.⁸ The US Agency for International Development and several other small agencies were abolished. Only the military planning systems remained on track.

Together these appointments and administrative cuts allowed the Trump negotiating style described above to flourish. He used social media rather than more traditional diplomatic means to conduct his policy, often surprising his own secretary of state. During his first year in office, he shifted America’s position on NATO, Russia, Ukraine, Gaza, Iran, Venezuela, and numerous other areas. He introduced culture wars and high tariffs to the detriment of America’s partners.

These radical shifts seemed uncoordinated until December 2025, when the new Trump National Security Strategy (NSS) was released. That document was concisely written but highly polemical. It rationalized much of the foreign policy conducted during 2025 and radically shifted America’s priorities. But much of its internal logic collapsed when Trump decided in February 2026 to attack Iran for the second time in Operation Epic Fury.

The NSS began by presenting Trump as the savior of American foreign policy, bringing it back from the “brink of catastrophe” in just one year. It sought to align foreign policy with Trump’s general America First theme. It condemned not only the Biden administration’s supposed weakness, but most of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It criticized the liberal international order, unfair trade practices, industrial flight, supply chain dependencies, weak allies, forever wars, constrained energy production, and open borders. It sought to fix each problem.⁹

The NSS presented Trump as the peace president. It began with a bold effort to promote Trump’s candidacy for a Nobel Peace Prize. It gave him credit for settling eight “raging conflicts” during 2025: Cambodia/Thailand, Kosovo/Serbia, the Democratic Republic of Congo/Rwanda, Pakistan/India, Israel/Iran, Egypt/Ethiopia, Armenia/Azerbaijan, and Gaza. The United States did provide useful mediation in many of these conflicts, but as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi noted, the American role was not always critical.

A key related theme of the NSS was non-intervention. It called for no more American domination. It said the affairs of other countries are America’s concern only if their activities directly and clearly threaten America’s interests. It said America’s predisposition is non-intervention. It stressed a focus on core issues, pragmatism, an interest-based “flexible realism,” a muscular but restrained approach, and use of soft power.

Most important, the NSS proposed a radical reorientation of America’s priorities. During the previous quarter-century, America’s priorities could arguably be listed as: 1) the Middle East (as a result of two active “forever wars” against terrorism), 2) Asia (as a result of then President Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia), 3) Europe (as a result prior to 2022 of relative peace and strong partners there), and 4) the Western Hemisphere (where no direct armed threat presented itself). The new NSS priorities reversed much of this list. The new priority order was: 1) The Western Hemisphere, 2) Asia, 3) Europe, and 4) the Middle East. Africa was last in all cases.¹⁰ A new top priority—the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine—was declared which would ensure that the Western Hemisphere would “remain stable, free from hostile incursion, and aligned with US interests”.¹¹ The concept included securing American borders from illegal immigration and drug transit. It stressed pursuing commercial diplomacy, strengthening regional champions, protecting regional resources, and maintaining US pre-eminence. New Trump policies toward Panama, Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico, Honduras, Argentina, Canada, and Greenland all fit within this broad concept.

For Asia, the NSS suggested reinforcement of the First Island Chain to better deter China from attacking Taiwan. It noted the economic importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and of the South China Sea for international shipping. But it focused mostly on America’s economic relationship with China and seemed to walk back the notion that China must be confronted. It noted the economic wealth of America’s Asian partners and that the US cannot do the security job in Asia alone. The NSS was kinder to America’s Asian partners than to its European allies.

Europe was treated as a political problem as well as a security partner. The NSS echoed Vice President JD Vance’s charge that Europe is undermining political liberty by freezing out right wing parties and thus risking “civilizational erasure” and loss of national identity. It noted Trump’s successful effort to have NATO create a five percent of GDP total direct and indirect spending goal. It was not adequately critical of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. It called for the reestablishment of strategic stability in Europe, language favored by Russia. It highlighted the need to mitigate the risk of conflict with Russia. And it rejected a NATO that is perpetually expanding.¹²

The NSS was followed by the National Defense Strategy (NDS) which translated the NSS into defense terms, with of course the same set of priorities. As part of the effort to remake the Defense Department, its name was changed to the Department of War. The NDS sought to strengthen the Department’s war fighting ethos by purging it of so-called ”woke” policies like diversity, equality, and inclusion. It called for deterring China through strength not confrontation. Russia was seen as a persistent but manageable problem. It explored the simultaneity problem in which the US would have to fight two major wars at the same time. With this problem in mind, it focused on burden-shedding, with Europe seen as being “primarily responsible” for its own defense.¹³

A reversion to type

Many elements of Trump 2.0 national security strategy should be recognizable to any student of pre-World War II American diplomacy. Make America Great Again (MAGA) foreign policy harkens back to the future. It is more consistent with the policy constructs of American presidents such as James Monroe, James Polk, Ulysses S. Grant, William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Warren G. Harding than with more contemporary presidents. It favors interests, power, economic coercion, and state sovereignty over values, agreed rules, free trade, and international institutions.

United States intervention at the expense of its neighbors to acquire territory goes back to the birth of the nation. In 1775 Benedict Arnold, with George Washington’s blessing, led a daring but failed expedition to seize Quebec from the British. The US tried and failed again to seize Canada during the War of 1812. In 1846, the US pressured Canada with the slogan “Fifty-Four Forty or Fight” to settle on a boundary line which delivered the Oregon Territory to the United States. More boldly, Polk manufactured an incident on the Rio Grande in 1846 which triggered war with Mexico and the seizure of what is now the American Southwest. Grant pursued a ruthless “might makes right” policy against Native Americans to force them onto poorly endowed reservations.

Intervention more broadly in the Western Hemisphere as an American priority began with the 1823 Monroe Doctrine which declared an end to further European colonization there. In 1898 McKinley oversaw the Spanish American War to end Spanish control over Cuba and subsequently Puerto Rico. In 1904 Roosevelt issued his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine asserting America’s right to act as an international police power to maintain political and economic stability in the region. To expedite building the Panama Canal, Roosevelt successfully encouraged Panamanian independence from Colombia. American interventions and military occupations consistent with the Corollary followed in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. In 1916, after Mexican militia leader Pancho Villa killed American citizens in New Mexico, President Woodrow Wilson sent General John Pershing on a yearlong punitive expedition to Mexico.

America’s desire to remain safe from the deadly balance-of-power politics of early twentieth century Europe is consistent with today’s focus on the Western Hemisphere and a drift away from Europe. At the outset of World War I, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed American neutrality, including the right to trade with all belligerents. After that war, Warren G. Harding won the presidency with the slogan “Return to Normalcy” and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge led the successful effort to defeat ratification of Wilson’s League of Nations, which was seen as entangling. As war again approached, Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts between 1935 and 1939. After war started again in Europe, in September 1939, Charles Lindberg championed the isolationist America First Committee designed to keep America out of the war. It was the failure of these two isolationist efforts to keep the US out of both wars that lead to America’s establishment of the international laws and institutions that we now know as the liberal international order – elements of which Trump has rejected.

From isolationism to tariffs

High tariffs were a staple of the first 150 years of American economic policy. Early tariffs during the 1790s to 1820s were primarily for revenue generation. The Tariff of 1828 sought to protect northern industry but discriminated against Southern consumers and nearly began the American Civil War early. The McKinley Tariff of 1890 raised rates to record levels again to protect new industries. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 raised rates from 20 to 60 percent, resulted in international retaliation, exacerbated the Great Depression, and promoted political instability in Europe. Most US presidents learned the lesson, using mostly targeted tariffs for specific economic remedies.¹⁴

Discriminatory measures against immigrants also have a long history. For example, the “Know Nothing” (or American) Party operated in the 1840s and 50s, seeking to limit the immigration and rights of the Irish. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act banned immigration of Chinese laborers for a decade and denied those living in the US of US citizenship. The 1917 Immigration Act prohibited immigration from most Asian countries. And the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act created national-origin quotas for immigration.¹⁵

Even the name change from the Department of Defense to the Department of War is a throwback to the pre-World War II era.¹⁶

These early policies to which Trump was returning had mixed results. The United States did expand to the Pacific Ocean under Manifest Destiny but at the expense of America’s neighbors. Washington did manage to provide some stability in the Western Hemisphere, but at the expense of charges of imperialism. High tariffs did raise revenue and protect industry, but they also caused sectional strife and international trade wars. Isolationism prior to the two World Wars did not keep the US out but reduced its influence to stop them. Immigration was controlled but at the expense of major racial and ethnic discrimination.

Successes in the hemisphere

Trump’s greatest successes have thus far come in the Western Hemisphere, his stated top national security priority. Illegal immigration across the Mexican border in 2025 was just a small fraction of what it was during the Biden years. Trump’s successful 2026 effort to snatch the autocrat Nicolás Maduro from Caracas and replace him with Vice President Delcy Rodriguez so far has avoided the regime succession issues that plagued the US de-Baathification effort in Iraq; and have so far created a much healthier bilateral relationship. Setting aside the legal questions, US attacks on likely drug smugglers have disrupted the flow of cocaine to both Europe and the United States.

Chinese influence in the vital Panama Canal was mitigated by the relinquishment of Hong Kong-based CK Hutchinson’s control over two terminals in the Canal Zone, though the final sale remains unsettled. Trump’s oil embargo on Cuba forced that Communist regime to release political prisoners and begin negotiations on further reform. Under pressure from Trump, the Mexican government successfully ordered the operation that killed Jalisco New Generation Cartel leader El Mencho. Even the explosive Trump efforts to gain control of Greenland resulted in a “framework for a future deal” and accelerated NATO preparations for a new “core strategic theater” in the High North.

In 2025, American policies and operations together with Israel initially brought a greater degree of stability to the Middle East. Trump belatedly but successfully organized a cease fire in the Gaza War, supported Israeli efforts to degrade Hezbollah, reduced the Houthi threat in the Red Sea, supported a successful transition in Syria, and with Operation Midnight Hammer significantly reduced Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. The Middle East seemed transformed for the better.

Struggles abroad

Then in February 2026, perhaps because of these successes or because of hubris, Trump joined Israel in Operation Epic Fury to decapitate Iranian leadership, further destroy its nuclear capability, sink its navy, eliminate much of its missile capability, and threaten its oil and energy facilities. Iranian resistance was greater than expected: filling in leadership gaps with hardline generals, closuring the Strait of Hormuz; attacking Gulf oil facilities; and sending oil prices reeling. The American militarily performed admirably, but the political rationale for war and strategic plans for a successful end game appeared elusive. The cease fire MOU signed by Trump is very preliminary and tough negotiations lie ahead. There remain potentially dire consequences for the global economy and for NATO.

US relations with Europe became Trump’s biggest failure as NATO faced its worst crisis since 1949. Initially NATO, under Secretary General Mark Rutte’s leadership, had agreed at its 2025 Hague Summit to increase defense spending to levels insisted on by Trump; a success that had eluded American presidents since the 1950s. But Trump badly overplayed his hand. His effort to stimulate negotiations to end the war in Ukraine placed the US on the side of the military aggressor. He agreed to continue to supply Ukraine with advanced weapons, but only if Europe paid the bill. His bold assertion that the US might seize Greenland united Europe against Washington’s claim on the sovereignty of an ally. Trump attacks on Europe’s political culture challenged the notion of shared transatlantic values. Then the 2026 war on Iran widened the breach even further. Despite the lack of prior consultation, Trump expected European help. When he got criticism instead, he called the allies cowards and threatened to disregard NATO’s common defense clause. At the G-7 summit in June, the leaders praised the ceasefire MOU and agreed to help open the Gulf. Nonetheless European leaders remain in shock.

Trump’s summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in May 2026 was not the success Trump had hoped for. Xi gave Trump a stern warning on Taiwan to which Trump did not respond. There were few solid deliverables, though China promised to purchase more US agricultural products and aircraft. And military to military talks were resumed. The best that can be said about the summit is that the two leaders were cordial and that bilateral tensions were somewhat eased.

The net result of seventeen months of Trump 2.0 foreign policy has been to make the world a more unpredictable and dangerous place. Trump’s initial successes in the Western Hemisphere and Middle East have thus far been dramatically overshadowed by the impact of the Iran war and relations with NATO. Alliances across the globe have been weakened. Major power adversaries were strengthened and emboldened. American munitions were dramatically expended in Iran and diverted from Ukraine. Deterrence was reduced in both Europe and Asia. The risk of miscalculation increased. Trade relations and economies were threatened. Norms and institutions, both domestic and international, that have kept the peace were eroded. The outcome remains to be seen.

Is this the new American normal?

Allies are right to ask whether this new US national security policy is transient or permanent. The president is not the United States. But for the first two years of his second term Trump’s party has controlled both houses of Congress. Six of the nine Supreme Court justices are conservatives, and Republicans control legislatures in twenty-eight of the fifty states. And yet several checks and balances still restrain Trump’s worst impulses.

Trump is not the first US president to take actions that seemed outside the powers of the presidency. Tension over power between the three branches has been a feature of the US democratic system since the Constitution was ratified. The Supreme Court seized the power to declare laws unconstitutional. Franklin Roosevelt tried but failed to pack the Supreme Court. Nixon was forced from office by the press and Congress. And after Watergate, Congress passed multiple bills designed to curb presidential power.¹⁷ Additionally, over time norms and customs about governance, in addition to the Constitution, have been accepted that have put informal guardrails on the role of how each branch operates within the system.¹⁸

Trump’s effort to accumulate power is unusual in its breadth and scope, including circumventing norms and customs and even challenging the Constitution itself. One of his principal tools is using emergency powers to issue executive orders that in normal times can be seen as outside his authority. Many of these efforts were challenged in court and some were found illegal, such as Trump’s 2025 tariff regime and his federalization of the Illinois National Guard. A few congressional Republicans are beginning to question Trump’s foreign policies. In June, both Houses of Congress voted narrowly to limit Trump’s war powers in Iran, though that action would be subject to a veto. And importantly, congressional support for NATO remains very strong, including among Republicans.

The most important check on Trump’s power will be the midterm elections which occur in the second year of a presidency, when all House and a third of Senate seats become vacant. This check on the president comes at the hands of the voter, who if unhappy with the current president can vote in legislators who can act to check him. The outcome will be known in November 2026. On the one hand, the Iran war, the cost of living at home, and brutal mismanagement of immigration enforcement will certainly have a major impact on voters. On the other hand, Republicans seem to be winning the battle to gerrymander congressional House districts in their favor.

The press and civil society (through “No Kings” demonstrations and social media) also play a critical role when other checks and balances have been weakened. They keep voters informed not just of administration actions, but the implications of those actions, so that they can hold the administration accountable. The Trump administration has made a powerful effort to mute the press, but with limited success.

Finally, while the international community does not have direct influence in terms of checks and balances, it can have impact. A good example is European unity in the face of Trump’s claims to Greenland, which effectively silenced him for a while.

Restoring the guardrails on the executive branch will depend to a large degree on the results of the midterm elections. A legislative branch that will do its duty to the Constitution will be the critical tool to restoring a properly functioning US democracy as envisioned by its founders.

The European response

European leaders were not as ill-equipped to deal with a second Trump presidency as they were in 2017. For European leaders, Trump’s blunt remarks critical of NATO and the Allies in 2017 during a 9/11 ceremony at NATO HQ showed that Trump harbored grievances and anger toward the Alliance, especially over burden sharing. During the four years that followed, allied leadership, including NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, had to learn how to get along with Trump and keep him from leaving NATO.¹⁹

However, with his re-election in 2024, allies would have to write a new playbook to deal with a new Trump. European leaders were presented with an emboldened and vengeful Trump, hardened by his previous four years as president and surrounded by loyalists in both the executive and legislative branches. The first sign of what a new Trump administration could look like came a month after Trump’s inauguration, when Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance signaled a withdrawal of US support for Ukraine and attacked Europe for suppressing right wing speech. A major transatlantic crisis grew as Trump embarrassed Zelenskyy in the Oval Office, laid claim to Greenland, castigated Europe for not supporting his war with Iran, and again threatened to withdraw from NATO.

At first, allied leadership returned to a policy of appeasement, including NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte jokingly referring to Trump as “Daddy.” That and a revived NATO focus on the Arctic defused the Greenland issue but it was inadequate to suppress Trump’s worst instincts. With appeasement and flattery less effective than it was during the first term, what was the European way ahead?

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney set the tone for a new era in transatlantic relations in his speech at Davos during the Greenland crisis, describing the transatlantic relationship being “in the midst of a rupture, not a transition”.²⁰ He called for nations to recognize and adapt to this new reality. For many European nations it became a call to protect European sovereignty and to pursue what French President Emmanuel Macron called greater strategic autonomy for Europe. Europe embraced the need to break free of the dependency on the United States that has held it bound to Washington since 1949. In EU meetings and in smaller bilateral settings, European capitals began to explore what a Europe without the US might look like. While these discussions were going on, European leaders still needed to deal with Trump.

Avoiding a complete break

The transatlantic relationship has never, in its post-war history, been more exposed to deep rupture than it is today. In light of these developments, how might Europe respond in the years ahead?

To avoid a complete break with the US and to buy time for Europe to become strong enough to stand on its own feet, a new playbook is needed that should include both short-term and long-term elements. Several elements of the playbook are already emerging.

The immediate need is in the Persian Gulf and in Ukraine. In both cases, Europe will need to fill in where the United States would normally take the lead. European nations will need to vigorously implement plans to keep the Strait of Hormuz open after the US war with Iran ends. This effort should become a NATO mission.

In Ukraine, the new €90 billion European aid pledge may be just a down payment. In additions to becoming Ukraine’s principal supplier of weapons and financial assistance, Europe may need to lead both in peace negotiations and in creating ironclad commitments to Ukrainian post-war security, including deploying troops.

The old transatlantic relationship may nevertheless not return to the way it was. To prepare for the long run, therefore, Europe may need to implement deep-rooted and enduring structural changes now to transition to a more independent and equal partnership with the US.

These changes need to be made quickly but not in a panic. The transition will take many years and should as much as possible be coordinated within NATO. European and American defense planners should work within NATO to design a NATO Transition Strategy to rebalance the Alliance. This strategy should set priorities for rapid European defense procurement, with the US continuing to fill in for the common defense where necessary during an agreed transition period. The normal NATO Defense Planning Process is inadequate for this task, and a new high-level transition planning group should be formed for this purpose.

To meet these longer-term transition requirements, Europe must:

accelerate its commitment to spend 5 percent of GDP on direct and indirect defense,
assign more national naval and air forces to NATO,
improve the readiness and mobility of its existing forces,
forward deploy at least a full brigade of European forces to each frontline state,
accelerate efforts to take on greater command responsibilities within NATO,
integrate the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine into the NATO force,
consolidate, stimulate, and set priorities for its diffused defense industry,
increase NATO defense efforts in the Arctic,
find ways to contribute to America’s deterrence and defense mission in Asia,
and importantly strengthen Europe’s nuclear deterrent posture as it finds ways to sustain America’s nuclear umbrella over Europe.

This transition strategy to implement the new playbook will require close and ongoing consultation and coordination between Brussels and Washington. Hopefully the very process will give the United States confidence that Europe is fulfilling its pledge to shed the current uneasy co-dependence that exists in the Alliance. During this transition period Europe will need to support American policies where possible but unite to oppose them when issues like Greenland impinge on national sovereignty. Both diplomacy and defense policy will need to be carefully managed.

About the Authors

Fellow

Hans Binnendijk

Distinguished Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

James J. Townsend Jr.

Senior Advisor

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

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Image: NATO defense ministers meet for two days of meetings at the alliance's headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, June 27, 2019. (DoD photo by Lisa Ferdinando)

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