Missile Defense Security & Defense United States and Canada

Issue Brief May 21, 2026 • 1:35 pm ET

Golden Dome is the missile defense the US needs

By Henry "Trey" Obering

Bottom lines up front

The United States needs a comprehensive missile defense system to protect the homeland from advanced threats posed by China, Russia, and North Korea.
The current defenses were designed decades ago for different threats.
Improvements in technology make the idea of a comprehensive shield more achievable than when it was initially floated in the 1980s under the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Imagine how the war in the Middle East would have been different without missile defenses. Hundreds, if not thousands, of additional lives in Israel, the Gulf countries, and aboard US ships would have been lost. Now think of the United States: the only missile defense system for the United States homeland is designed to protect against a North Korean or Iranian attack—which is necessary but not sufficient given evolving technology and threats. Early in his second term in office, President Donald Trump correctly prioritized building a comprehensive missile defense system—nicknamed “Golden Dome”—to correct this shortfall.

As stated in Trump’s January 27, 2025, executive order, Golden Dome is the president’s initiative to “deter—and defend its citizens and critical infrastructure against—any foreign aerial attack on the Homeland; and guarantee its secure second-strike capability.” The initiative includes “defense of the United States against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries.”¹

This initiative comes at a critical time for US national defense and will not only enable the United States to protect its homeland but also and its allies and partners. Current missile defense capabilities were first deployed more than twenty years ago, using technology developed in the 1990s and early 2000s, and were not designed to address the advancing North Korean threat or the Chinese and Russian threats.

According to a recent Defense Intelligence Agency report, North Korea has successfully tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with sufficient range to reach the entire US homeland and is projected to possess fifty ICBMs by 2035.² Meanwhile, China has dramatically expanded its ICBM sites and missiles, and currently possesses 460 ICBMs and three hundred siloes, according to the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative. China also has developed, tested, and deployed hypersonic missiles, and launched a fractional orbital bombardment vehicle. Beijing is escalating aggression in the South China Sea. All of this is clearly designed to limit the ability of the US to project power, threaten Taiwan, intimidate the Philippines into turning over offshore resources, and isolate Japan.

Russia has deployed 330 ICBMs and 192 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) according to one 2025 nongovernmental estimate.³ The same estimate states that “most notable among these ICBMs are the SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) and the SS-27 Mod 2 (Yars), both capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads (MIRVs).”⁴ Russia is also developing the Sarmat (SS-X-30) missile, which is advertised as larger and more capable than previous designs, and also is developing the Avangard, a hypersonic glide vehicle that will add to its variety of subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic air-breathing cruise missiles—creating an inventory of threats that must be countered.⁵

In June 2015, then Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and Admiral James A. Winnefeld, then the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “Russian military doctrine includes what some have called an ‘escalate to deescalate’ strategy—a strategy that purportedly seeks to deescalate a conventional conflict through coercive threats, including limited nuclear use.”⁶ This disconcerting strategy only increases the need to prioritize the deployment of a US missile defense system (MDS).

The Golden Dome initiative—a massive design, build, and deployment undertaking—is a response to this panoply of new and growing missile and policy threats. It is a necessary initiative: Current US homeland missile defenses, while effective against the threats for which they were designed, are simply incapable of countering the missile capabilities fielded by today’s peer and near-peer adversaries. However, dramatic reductions in space launch costs and advances in manufacturing, sensor technology, communications networks, computing, and artificial intelligence have made a comprehensive missile defense architecture far more feasible than it was previously. A layered defense that integrates space-based sensors and interceptors with modernized ground- and sea-based systems is achievable today. The following outlines the strategy behind Golden Dome, the architecture it would require, and why the United States should move urgently to field it.

Golden Dome strategy

The United States needs an architecture with the capability and capacity to defeat the full range of threats that North Korea or Iran might employ, given that these states might not be deterrable in the classic sense. But the nation also needs to defend against China and Russia, with the capability to defeat ballistic, hypersonic, or cruise missile attacks, along with sufficient capacity to underwrite US strategic deterrence—including a guaranteed second-strike capability that instills doubt in adversary planning. Robert Peters, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, explains this as follows:

The most effective deterrence strategies involve threats to both reduce the effectiveness of an adversary’s potential attack and respond to the attack by inflicting unacceptable costs on the adversary. If the adversary fails to achieve his objectives in an attack and provokes an unacceptably costly US response, then he will have the worst of both worlds: too few gains and too many losses.⁷

This strategic logic drives the architecture. The types and quantities of sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control infrastructure must be calibrated to deny adversaries the confidence that any attack would succeed.

Golden Dome architecture

As outlined in Trump’s executive order, components of the Golden Dome architecture should include:

a “left-of-launch” element capable of preempting or preventing an attack on the United States from being launched, including cyber or electronic warfare capabilities;
space-based intercept elements capable of tracking and destroying ballistic missiles during their boost or ascent phase in the atmosphere or in space—before they’re able to deploy warheads, countermeasures, and decoys—and intercepting them during their mid-course phase in space;
space-based interceptors capable of destroying hypersonic missiles in their boost phase and during their atmospheric trajectory;
a terrestrially based underlayer including silo-based, fixed-site, and mobile land-based and sea-based interceptors that are capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in their mid-course phase in space and in the atmosphere during the terminal phase, and which could also be used against hypersonic and advanced cruise missiles;
space-based target acquisition and tracking constellations, which can provide launch detection and precise tracking of adversary missiles from their birth to death, and can also provide a kill assessment; and
robust, high-bandwidth, low-latency, space-based communications constellations to allow global connectivity of the sensors, interceptors, and command components.

Adversary drones are not specifically mentioned in the president’s executive order but should be addressed. As demonstrated by the drone attacks in the Iran war and the Ukrainian attacks inside Russia, unmanned advanced drone strikes are already an aspect of modern warfare and will become even more important in the future. Therefore, a Golden Dome architecture able to deal with such attacks would likely involve the use of anti-drone drones, as well as directed-energy and electronic warfare, such as high-energy lasers and high-power microwave and electronic jamming defensive weapons.

Space-based tracking and communications

Current US space-based sensors provide missile launch warning and impact prediction, but these sensors lack the accuracy needed for intercept-quality tracking, a function currently handled by terrestrial radars. The ability to provide birth-to-death tracking of enemy missiles with the required precision and timeliness, particularly against Russian and Chinese threats, can only be accomplished cost-effectively from space. Notably, US adversaries continue to develop threat capabilities designed to degrade US trajectory data critical to building fire control solutions.

In 2009, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) launched two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demonstration satellites to determine the feasibility of providing intercept-quality tracking from space. The demonstration flight results were outstanding and indicated that this capability is achievable. In fact, during several flight tests in 2013, SM-3 interceptors successfully used STSS tracking to intercept target missiles.⁸ MDA and the Space Development Agency (SDA) launched the first Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) satellites in 2024. These satellites, built using STSS lessons learned, are designed to provide intercept-quality performance and will be a key element of the Golden Dome architecture.

Additionally, SDA is developing a Space Tracking Layer as part of its Proliferated Space Warfighting Architecture (PWSA), which will generate precision tracking sufficient for interceptor fire control. SDA announced plans to award three contracts for eighteen tracking satellites; each will be the start of building a larger constellation involving hundreds of satellites.⁹

A space-based precise tracking capability would contribute to the defense of the US homeland, and could also be shared with theater defense assets to significantly expand their operating and defended areas. A space-based sensor layer, when integrated with terrestrial sensors, could also significantly enhance the tracking of more advanced threats such as hypersonic missiles.

The backbone of a space-based missile defense capability would certainly include communications satellite constellations. These constellations allow connectivity between missile warning satellites, interceptor satellites, fire control elements, and command, control, battle management, and communications (C2BMC). The constellations’ bandwidth must support communication among hundreds of elements with very low latency.

A Golden Dome defense would require the ability to intercept adversary missiles in their boost or ascent phase, typically less than ten minutes into the missile’s flight trajectory. To achieve such an intercept, the communications constellation must have coverage over adversary territory and contain sufficient numbers of satellites to ensure continuous connectivity.

In addition, there might not be sufficient time for command and control of such an intercept from a central command center. This means that the communications constellations must be capable of peer-to-peer networking, enabling the satellite and interceptors to accomplish their mission by communicating with each other to obtain the latest tracking and threat information.

Fortunately, tremendous progress has been made in this area. As of August 2025, there are more than eight thousand Starlink communications satellites in low Earth orbit.¹⁰ SpaceX is also launching Starshield, another communications satellite constellation designed for national security purposes.¹¹ The Starlink or Starshield constellations could provide the global coverage, high bandwidth, and low latency needed to support what must be a large constellation of space-based interceptors.

Modernizing “brilliant pebbles”

Looking ahead to the Golden Dome architecture, some analysts are drawing on historical concepts for space-based missile defense. One such effort draws on the “brilliant pebbles” concept, which was originally funded by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) in 1987 and which envisioned a constellation of small, autonomous satellites designed to intercept ballistic missiles during their boost phase through high-speed collision.¹² Although the program was canceled after the Cold War, the underlying concept remains relevant to contemporary discussions of space-based missile defense.

Advances in computing, communications, and manufacturing have significantly expanded what such an architecture might look like. A modernized approach could involve a large constellation of small interceptor satellites operating in low Earth orbit that are capable of detecting, tracking, and engaging ballistic missiles during their boost, ascent, and mid-course phases. Through peer-to-peer networking and onboard processing, individual interceptors could share tracking data and coordinate engagements without relying exclusively on centralized command and control.

Such an architecture could also leverage existing communications constellations—including SpaceX’s StarLink or Starshield, the future Amazon Leo, or others—to enable resilient connectivity and low-latency data sharing. Incorporating artificial intelligence and machine learning could allow interceptors to autonomously allocate targets, coordinate engagements, and reposition themselves to optimize coverage and resilience across the constellation.

Importantly, many of the enabling technologies for this type of distributed system are already being demonstrated in other military applications. For example, Ukraine has employed a comparable approach—known as Geographic Information System Art for Artillery (GIS-Arta)—in its war with Russia, using similar distributed targeting software to enable Ukrainian artillery and anti-tank missiles to engage Russian armor within thirty-five to forty seconds.¹³

A distributed space-based interceptor layer could also maintain continuous tracking of missile threats throughout their flight, providing what missile defense planners call birth-to-death custody. This persistent tracking would be critical for distinguishing warheads from countermeasures and enabling engagements later in the mid-course phase, when decoys and other penetration aids complicate interception. Such a constellation could also contribute to resilience by incorporating measures for self-defense against potential anti-satellite threats. The space-based interceptor (SBI) layer could also be effective against a type of long-range hypersonic missile called a boost-glide weapon. It launches like a ballistic missile and then reenters the atmosphere to maneuver toward its target, making it vulnerable during its boost phase. 

Within an integrated, layered missile defense, an SBI layer could play an important role in engaging missiles early in flight, particular during boost or ascent phases when they are most vulnerable. These systems can also help thin large missile salvos and provide tracking data to the terrestrially based missile defense systems that form the underlayer of a broader Golden Dome architecture.

A potential Golden Dome underlayer

If adversary missiles make it through the left-of-launch cyber and electronic warfare defense and an SBI layer, they will face an underlayer consisting of sea-based, land-based, and mobile interceptor systems capable of mid-course, exoatmospheric, and endoatmospheric phase intercepts.

The first engagement would likely involve the ground-based missile defense (GMD) silo-based system located in Alaska and California. This system consists of forty-four interceptors supported by a network of radars and sensors, as well as a C2BMC architecture.

This system is being upgraded with the next generation interceptor (NGI), which will replace the aging ground-based midcourse defense system, including the anti-ballistic missile ground-based interceptor (GBIs). Current plans call for fielding twenty NGIs starting in 2028, then backfilling the GBIs for a total of sixty-four interceptors.¹⁴ The NGI program predates the announcement of the Golden Dome initiative and could be expanded to include NGI deployment at a third site on the US East Coast. Congress authorized funds for a review of a third site in the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act to improve defensive coverage against potential attacks. In 2019, the Department of Defense released a study that showed Fort Drum, New York, as the preferred location but declared there was no operational requirement to develop it.¹⁵ This review could be leveraged to fast-track the development and deployment of NGIs to a new site.

Today’s GMD system—with each GBI carrying a single kill vehicle—can distinguish missile warheads from simple countermeasures and decoys but would struggle with advanced missile threats from Russia and China, both of which might employ sophisticated countermeasures and multiple warheads. One major advantage of the NGI is that it will carry multiple kill vehicles on each booster.¹⁶ This would increase the probability of intercept in complex threat environments and allow a single interceptor to engage multiple warheads.

Another potential element in the underlayer could be a current or matured variant of a system already deployed, such as Aegis Ashore. The current Aegis Ashore sites consist of SM-3 interceptors combined with Aegis radar systems and were originally developed under the MDA’s European Phased Adaptive Approach to defend NATO allies and US bases from emerging threats.¹⁷ The SM-3 Block II-A interceptor has also demonstrated the ability to intercept ICBM-class targets in recent flight intercept tests and could potentially contribute to homeland defense.¹⁸

The final layer for homeland terminal defense against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles is the mobile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which has demonstrated its ability to intercept targets in the atmosphere and space. There are seven operational THAAD batteries globally, with an eighth expected this year.¹⁹

THAAD and SM-3 interceptors have been successfully deployed in combat operations in the Middle East. Additionally, such systems are widely deployed by US allies and partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, creating opportunities for greater integration and expanded missile warning and tracking.

The Golden Dome underlayer would also need to address hypersonic and advanced supersonic cruise missiles. Unlike ballistic missile defenses, these systems maneuver during flight, making them harder to track and intercept.

The Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) constellation could help address this challenge, particularly when integrated with terrestrially based radars. For example, MDA conducted a simulated hypersonic missile intercept using an upgraded SM-6 interceptor with tracking data provided by HBTSS.²⁰

Because hypersonic systems generate extreme aerodynamic forces and temperature during flight, they might also present opportunities for interception. These conditions could enable the use of blast-fragmentation interceptions or directed-energy systems such as high-energy lasers, which the US military is now testing.²¹

Conclusion

More than twenty years ago, when President George W. Bush identified emerging threats from North Korea and Iran, he took decisive steps to accelerate the development and deployment of missile defense systems to protect the US homeland and US allies and partners.

The systems deployed then were only made possible by the investments the United States made starting in 1983, with President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Critics ridiculed those investments, arguing that the technology would never work and that missile defenses were destabilizing. While these capabilities matured, adversaries simultaneously continued developing more advanced missile threats.

Today, the United States faces a broader set of missile threats from China, Russia, North Korea, and other potential adversaries. Like his predecessors, Trump is taking decisive steps with the Golden Dome initiative to address this growing threat, which will continue to challenge the United States and its allies and partners as adversaries field increasingly capable ballistic, supersonic, and hypersonic missile systems.

Like any effective defense system, Golden Dome will need to be layered and integrated for maximum effectiveness. Space-based sensors and interceptors could play an important role within such a layered architecture, but dramatic reductions in space launch costs and advances in manufacturing, communications networks, computer processing, sensor technology, and AI have expanded the range of technical options for missile defense architectures and made them much more feasible than they were during the SDI era. These developments could enable new space-based capabilities while existing terrestrial interceptor systems provide a critical final layer of defense.

Strengthening homeland missile defenses could expand the options available to US leaders in responding to missile threats to protect the US homeland. As missile threats continue to evolve, sustained investment, technological innovation, and strategic leadership will be required to ensure the United States can effectively defend the homeland and its allies and partners abroad.

This issue brief is part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Great nuclear debate series, a curated anthology of perspectives on arms control, force sizing, and missile defense from leading experts.

About the author

Lieutenant General Henry A. “Trey” Obering III retired from the US Air Force after thirty-five years of service. He served as the director of the US Missile Defense Agency from 2004 to 2009.

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Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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Image: US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, participates in an announcement by United States President Donald J Trump about moving forward with the Golden Dome missile defense shield, in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, US, on Tuesday, May 20, 2025. Credit: Chris Kleponis / Pool/Sipa USA

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