Watch the full event
Speaker
Lisa Monaco
Deputy Attorney General, US Department of Justice
Moderator
Stephanie Flanders
Senior Executive Editor for Economics, Bloomberg; Head, Bloomberg Economics
Event transcript
Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: Well, thank you very much. Thank you very much for joining us, Deputy Attorney General. I know you wanted to be here in person, but the president needed you more than even we did. But I’m looking forward to this conversation. We’ve had—I was just—we were just chatting earlier. And I was saying, you know, this is—the reason I had, you know, wanted to spend as much time as possible at this conference today is the transatlantic council is very good at getting into the weeds and having very substantive conversations for the nerds among us. We wear that as a badge of pride.
And when it comes to this interconnectedness of economic security and national security that we’ve seen play out and we see demonstrated in session after session at this conference, I think—I mean, you, in the Department of Justice, you’ve been living that dream the last few years. And there’s no greater symbol of that new interconnectedness than the Disruptive Technology Strike Force. So maybe that’s where we could start with asking you why that was created, and why it was—why it was a priority for the department. You know, and possibly—you know, in a pretty new area.
LISA MONACO: Well, great. Happy to do that. First, let me say thank you to Kim for that introduction, to the Atlantic Council and, importantly, to the Geoeconomic Center for really being such an excellent bridge between finance, economics, national security. I think it’s particularly important in today’s world that that bridge has been built. And thank you, Stephanie, for having this conversation. I really do wish I was there in person, not the least of which because it’s always good to get out of Washington. But, alas, events intervened.
So let me step back for a second as I answer your question, Stephanie, and kind of situate folks a little bit as to how we in the Justice Department see the current moment and the current landscape, and why this conversation, I think, is so, so important, and the conference that you’re convening is so important. You know, I’ve held a number of both national security and law enforcement roles over the last twenty years. And what I have seen is a real evolution in the threat landscape. And today, the most pressing challenges, I think, that we are seeing really combine and intertwine national security, economic security, and increasingly technology.
And what I am particularly concerned about these days, and it’s reflected in the intelligence that I and the other folks that you have heard from this morning, from government, and that I’m sure Daleep will talk about, is what we are seeing in the way that adversaries are seeking to exploit technology to gain national security, and economic security, military, and intelligence advantage; how they are seeking to fuel their rise and their competitive edge by projecting power both at home and abroad, challenging norms, as we’ve seen so brutally with Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion into Ukraine, and a whole host of other areas.
This threat landscape that we are seeing today, I think, is playing out certainly in physical battlefields and economic zones and in information spaces. And the real issue that we are focusing on here is how those adversaries, increasingly nation-states and their proxies, are exploiting critical technologies, emerging technologies, whether it’s through cybertheft, through traditional espionage, and through foreign investment, and I might add, which I’m hoping we can get into a little bit later.
So what we are trying to do is respond to that moment in a host of different ways and the role that we play, which is really a unique one. The Justice Department is unique in the federal government and amongst the executive branch as having both a national-security and a law-enforcement mission. The Justice Department is the lead law-enforcement and counterintelligence investigator and enforcer in the United States.
So we really are well-positioned and uniquely positioned to respond to this current moment and the current threat landscape, all of which is to say that’s why we have really focused our efforts on responding to this moment, to this threat landscape, to the actions we’re seeing, particularly from increasingly adversary nation-states and what they are trying to do as it pertains to critical technologies and emerging technologies.
That’s why I launched now last year something called the Disruptive Technology Strike Force. And it’s designed to be a joint effort, led by the Justice Department and the Commerce Department, not usually the folks that you think join forces on enforcement actions all the time. But the moment we are in and the current threat landscape really does call for it. So, together with the Commerce Department, Department of Homeland Security, our colleagues across the federal government, and, importantly, international partners, we are going after adversaries who are trying to siphon off our most critical technologies to use it against us and to fuel their own economic and national-security and military rise.
We have made—and I’ve directed our prosecutors to make AI a top enforcement priority when it comes to this strike force. And we are focusing very much on enforcing our export-control laws and the CHIPS Act and the additional authorities there, sanctions evasion, illicit money laundering and other networks that are trying to, again, siphon off this critical technology to potentially use against us, but really to fuel the rise of adversary nations.
And so this kind of unique partnership and forming of this strike force has already had really significant successes. We’ve arrested more than twenty individuals for everything from export-control violations, smuggling of sensitive technologies, dual-use items to Russia, to Iran, to China, and again, focusing on the most critical technologies that we’re most concerned about.
Just last week, we took a series of enforcement actions in five separate cases, holding individuals accountable here and abroad, who were funneling everything from lasers to UAV technologies to microelectronics with military applications to Russia, to China, to Iran, all in violation of our sanctions regimes, our export-control laws. So this is just one example in last week’s cases of the work we are trying to do to strike back against adversaries trying to use our most critical and emerging technologies against us.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: And, along with the Disruptive Technologies Strike Force, you also—you have the KleptoCapture Task Force. I would compliment—
LISA MONACO: Yeah, we’re—
STEPHANIE FLANDERS:—compliment the people who come up with these names. They watch a lot of Marvel movies, I think.
LISA MONACO: If only. If only.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: But how much of a learning curve is it if you’re trying to go after the enablers that help hide the assets and money to shell companies, to cryptocurrency exchanges? I think we saw action today announced by the president on cryptocurrency exchange. You know, are you finding you just—you need more talent to come—you know, more people who understand this stuff or you need more tools? How has that been going?
LISA MONACO: So a number of things there, Stephanie, to unpack.
One, so you did reference an announcement that we’ve just made this afternoon, a case out of our US Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of Virginia, together with our national security division here in Maine Justice. This was the disruption of an illicit cryptocurrency exchange called Cryptex and the indictment of a Russian national.
Again, this is part of our—really, our effort and our focus on disruption. We will bring and always continue to bring prosecutions wherever and however we can but that’s not the only tool we’re going to use.
We are going to take disruptive action wherever we can, going after the criminal ecosystem, in this case an illicit cryptocurrency exchange, and the money laundering on the darknet that it was fueling, again, to support ransomware actors, to support drug trafficking, again, going after the whole ecosystem that is really contributing to destabilizing activities around the world and fueling, again, a criminal ecosystem that malicious cyber actors are taking advantage of.
And when we talk about our efforts like Task Force KleptoCapture, which we launched, by the way, Stephanie, just days—mere days after Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine and we did that because we wanted to be poised together with our partners to go after those who are fueling Putin’s war machine, to go after the ill-gotten gains of the oligarchs and, I should say, their enablers—the money launderers, the fixers, the shell companies that are kind of propping up these networks and, in turn, propping up the war machine.
So we have seized everything from yachts in Fiji to grounding planes in Switzerland and the UAE. We’ve forfeited luxury apartments around the world and seized art. So we’re really trying to go after those who are fueling Putin’s war machine and thereby, together with our partners, really isolate what is kind of norm busting behavior by Putin, by the Russian invasion, enforcing our global sanctions regimes that, after all, don’t work unless we are moving in concert with our partners.
So these actions that I’ve mentioned, both the work I just mentioned today with the disruption of the Cryptex cryptocurrency exchange, that was done with our Dutch partners today as well as some others. All the work that we’re doing with Task Force KleptoCapture relies heavily on and is made stronger by our work with our international law enforcement and intelligence partners, whether it’s Germany or the UK.
You name it, we are much stronger when we are working together to really close off these avenues, these dark spaces that allow the work of the oligarchs and the illicit networks to really—to prosper. So we’re determined to shut those down, deprive Putin and his war machine of those ill-gotten gains. That was the whole idea behind Task Force KleptoCapture.
But what we need to do this work is absolutely our international partnerships but also we need cooperation from the private sector, right. We need the work and that’s true also, I should add, with the disruptive technology strike force.
Some of the best cases we’ve been able to make rely on tips and cooperation that we’ve received from the private sector who I have to imagine don’t want their networks and, you know, their backbone of being exploited by malicious actors.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: I mean, there’s—you talk about the fueling—the financial fueling of the war machine. Obviously, there’s also just the keeping it well stocked—the avoidance of sanctions—and I know Daleep Singh will be talking about this later this afternoon.
But, you know, you have a lot of this avoidance and evasion hiding in plain sight. I mean, even in the trade statistics where you find enormous explosion of exports potentially containing sanctioned goods embedded in them from countries in Central Asia but also countries like India.
I’m just trying to understand. I mean, DOJ has been playing a bigger role in sanctions enforcement. Does the DOJ have a role in, you know, whether Indian companies—once you put Indian companies on the entities list, are there then actions against them? I’m just trying to think of how you see your role extending.
LISA MONACO: Sure. It’s a great question and an opportunity for me to explain why the role that the Justice Department plays is so unique and so critical. I mentioned before that the Department of Justice is unique in our system because we are both a law enforcer and—a law enforcement organization and a national security agency. What does that mean? It means we have both criminal tools and law enforcement authorities, and we have national security and intelligence tools and authorities. And we can bring both to bear to get after whatever the threat is, and use the best tool that we have, together with our partners, to disrupt that threat.
So what do I mean by that? It means that the cases I’ve referenced, the investigations that we do, that can feed in—that can produce information, intelligence, evidence, that we can share with our partners to help them develop their sanctions package, to help them develop the information that is necessary to put them on the entities list—sometimes to share with our international partners to help them undertake their work within their system and their rule of law system. So it really is a virtuous cycle to be able to use both our law enforcement and criminal tools as well as our national security and intelligence authorities.
And the name of the game here, Stephanie, is all tools we have developed. And this dates back many years to how we’ve gone after other national security threats—whether it’s terrorism, whether it’s nation-states, cyber actors, to today going after autocratic regimes who are undermining the rule of law. undermining confidence in the financial system because of the actions they are taking. We are really playing an increasingly large part in getting after that national security threat, using the same kind of approach that we have in other spaces. And that is all tools, whatever tool that we can use as a government, whether it’s our criminal indictment, whether it’s our contributing to a sanctions regime, whether it’s us helping the Commerce Department, or whether it’s us feeding information into one of our international partners’ work, that is what we are going to do. And we’re not kind of prejudicing whose tool is better. We’re coming at it to decide what’s the best way to disrupt the threat.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: And you mentioned we had a very thoughtful conversation about AI before lunch. And you talked about seeking tougher penalties for criminal actions that involve misusing AI. So I’m interested in what kind of examples you’re thinking of, of that kind of misuse, in the investigations that you’re undertaking.
LISA MONACO: Sure. So this is something I’ve been talking a lot about. You know, we want our companies to be leading in this space. We want the United States to be a leader and an innovator. Companies and, indeed, government agencies should be using new and emerging technologies, like AI, to make their work better, more efficient, more precise. But we have to do so attentive to the risk posed, particularly to deliberate risk posed from deliberate misuse. So the message that I have tried to convey when it comes to corporate criminal enforcement and the use and misuse of AI, or other emerging technologies, it’s really the following.
One, first and foremost, this is a brave new world, but the law applies. We have frameworks and laws that I believe, and we believe, apply to current conduct. So, for instance, we have been sending the message that price fixing with AI is still price fixing, fraud or market manipulation with AI is still fraud and market manipulation. And we are going to treat it as such. Accordingly, we’ve also sent the message that if AI is being deliberately misused and abused within a company to perpetrate a particular crime, to make it more impactful/more serious, we will seek enhanced sentences. And that’s a direction that we’ve given to our prosecutors.
Again, we want companies to be the leaders in the development and use of these technologies, but we have to be doing it in a way that is consistent with responsible corporate behavior. So we have also directed earlier this year that the Criminal Division, which is responsible for evaluating a company’s—for instance, a company’s compliance program in the context of a potential investigation or resolution, we’ve directed that they include an evaluation of how that company’s compliance program is mitigating or addressing the potential for abuse of technologies in the course of that compliance evaluation.
So we’re telling you that you need to be asking questions like: How is the company managing the risk posed by a particular technology? How is it mitigating the potential for deliberate misuse of that technology? It’s all part of what we are trying to do, which is to incentivize a culture of compliance, incentivize responsible corporate behavior, because I think that redounds to the benefit across the board, both for our national security, our economic security, and confidence in the rule of law within the United States.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: I guess one of the examples that kind of crystalizes how much the world has changed, but just also just the complexity of what constitutes a national security threat, has been the debate around TikTok. So I just—I just wanted to ask you, I mean, there’s—obviously, ByteDance is facing—there’s a January deadline for divesting TikTok. There’s a big legislative or political battle around that. But just sort of stepping back, why is it that it’s a national security threat? What would be the case for banning TikTok?
LISA MONACO: So I—you said that we’re going to nerd out, so let me nerd out for one minute. And this is in the lane of—
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: Everyone’s sitting up in their chair now. They’re excited.
LISA MONACO: Yeah, I’m sure.
Since this is very much a matter of ongoing litigation, I have to be very careful and limited in what I can say. And, obviously, the fact that it’s ongoing is very clear by the fact that we just had an oral argument in the DC Circuit in connection with the legislation that the Justice Department is defending.
And so a few things I can say. One is that the law that the Justice Department is defending that Congress passed earlier this year is not seeking to prohibit protected speech. It is seeking to restrict foreign ownership of a company that—and a foreign ownership itself that threatens national security. So our briefs that we have filed with the court and that were the subject of this oral argument make, I think, quite clear that the central purpose of the law is to break the ties that bind TikTok to Beijing, to break the ties that bind TikTok to the PRC government. And the law that we are defending addresses—and that Congress passed—addresses, I think, the risks that we’ve been discussing, and that is the risks posed by foreign adversaries that are seeking to influence particular sectors with significant national security vulnerabilities.
So this is not a ban of TikTok or any other application that this law is reaching, and it doesn’t censor American speech. What it is responding to is a real and documented national security threat posed by nation-state adversaries who can weaponize applications or software that are running on every phone in every pocket across the United States, and that has the potential to covertly manipulate content. And I will also say, Stephanie, as part of the filing that we have made in the course of this case, there has been declassified intelligence that’s been included in that—those legal briefs that demonstrates that TikTok and ByteDance have acted in response to PRC demands to censor content outside of China. So I think I’ll leave it at that.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: I mean, I guess this is an example of something—and it’s coming up a lot here—you know, you’re having to innovate. And you said yourself, it’s about using whatever the best tool is, and then you’re—or sometimes devising new tools to respond to new threats within a framework that you can legally justify. But I guess the more you innovate—sorry, carry on.
LISA MONACO: No, I was just saying, that is exactly what you see is at play with this legislation, that Congress was responding to the moment that I’ve described earlier, the kind of—the state that we are in with regard to the challenges posed by the intersection of national security threats and the misuse and abuse of certain technologies. And I think that law that it passed is very much a response to that challenge.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: I guess the broader question I was thinking of is, you know, that the more you innovate, and you come up with new tools, you obviously want to feel like it can be justified within existing legal frameworks. But it’s inevitably going to be more open to challenge whether, as you know, by political opponents or by other legal opinion. I just wondered—I mean, and, obviously, you’ve got the court of public opinion when it comes to something like TikTok, but also when it comes to the way that we’re pursuing Russian sanctions. Are we penalizing the oligarchs more than we’re penalizing ordinary Russian people? All of those debates.
You know, as a lawyer, do you—you know, how do you kind of reach comfort with this kind of innovation? What are your sort of lodestars when you’re thinking about the effect on public opinion of doing something which, you know, doesn’t have a lot of precedent and is perhaps more contentious?
LISA MONACO: So I’ll take it in kind of two buckets. With regard to the legislation that I just referenced, obviously our role in the Justice Department is to defend the legislation that we believe is legally sound, that is—and we’ve worked with Congress to provide technical assistance on the legislation, and that it is defensible within our legal framework. And our briefs and the oral argument make that clear—the arguments we put forward in that regard.
When it comes to the sanctions, I guess I would quibble a little bit with the premise. Which is to say, I think the sanctions regimes and the kind of underlying authority, whether it’s [International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)] or other authorities, have been longstanding and, kind of, well practiced. I suppose some might say too well practiced. There is an ongoing debate about overuse, potentially, of sanctions. I think with regard to using those tools to respond to the brutal and unprovoked and illegal invasion by Russia into Ukraine to garner—and this has been the critical ingredient, Stephanie—to garner an unprecedented, kind of, alliance of nations to join in those sanctions and enforcing those sanctions, that has been a critical element.
Because, you know, when you think about what is a common currency to—you know, I guess pun intended—of these rule of law nations and rights respecting nations, it is upholding the rule of law, it is pushing back against the norms-violating behavior that we see most brutally and vividly in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And we need to be enforcing those sanctions to the best of our ability. But it obviously has to withstand a test, as they inevitably will be and have been challenged in many instances, by very well-resourced oligarchs, I would say. But we are up to that challenge. We are up to that task.
And have repeatedly been able to defend these enforcement actions and pursue these forfeiture actions, again, to take back and ensure that those who are trying to prop up Putin’s war machine are not benefiting from those ill-gotten gains and using them to fuel Russia’s brutality in Ukraine. And going after individual oligarchs who are evading our sanctions regimes, I think is obviously quite fair game. Similarly, the enablers and the shell companies, the money launderers have to be part of that enforcement regime. And it’s something that we have done in a very deliberate way, going after the oligarchs themselves but also the enablers and the facilitators that are creating a very permissive environment for some of these sanctions evasions.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: So we’ve had lots of tough subjects. I’m going to end with an easy one, which is the election. You talked about bad actors’ use of technology. What are you—I mean, briefly, but I know this is maybe the last time we’re going to hear from you publicly before the election. So, you know, what is the DOJ seeing on that front, whether it’s interference or just malign use of technology with respect to the election and its integrity?
LISA MONACO: Sure. Well, look, I’ve been, as has the attorney general, trying to be quite vocal about this, because I think it’s very important that people understand the threats that we are seeing and, importantly, what we are doing about them.
So when it comes to the threat environment with regard to election security, we are seeing, I am seeing, a more complex and diverse environment than I frankly have ever seen before. I think it’s more diverse because we’re seeing more threat actors, more nation-states getting into the game, particularly when it comes to malign foreign influence.
We are seeing more complex operations and a—all of it operating in a more polarized environment than we’ve ever had before, thereby kind of fueling disinformation and misinformation, designed to sow discord and distrust in our democracy, and all of it fueled by and accelerated by artificial intelligence.
So when it comes to Russia, it is—and our intelligence community has been quite clear about this—is the dominant and predominant actor in this space. When it comes to Iran, they also are accelerating their efforts to influence the election, including the presidential election. And you’ve seen a number of statements issued by the intelligence community, by the FBI, in that regard, including very recently last week.
And when it comes to China, we are seeing efforts to influence not the presidential campaign, unlike or in contrast to Russia and Iran, but really trying to influence down-ballot races. But all of it, the overlay here is efforts to sow discord, sow distrust in our election system and undermine confidence in our democratic process. And what we have been trying to do is investigate, expose and disrupt wherever we can so people understand and can be discerning consumers of the information that they’re getting.
So a few weeks ago we took very significant actions to expose and disrupt two operations, directed by Russia and directed by Putin, to wage an online covert malign foreign-influence campaign, one operation involving the Russian state-sponsored or state-operated media operation, the RT, where they were funneling millions of dollars through shell companies to an American company here in Tennessee and using that to coopt unwitting American commentators to push out Russian propaganda, all, again, designed to prop up pro-Russian narratives.
We also, in that same set of actions, exposed and disrupted a Putin-directed operation from a proxy company called the Social Design Agency—a very Orwellian name, I might add. And this was used by Russian actors and directed by Putin to push out AI-generated content, targeting particular voter demographics and pushing out Russian propaganda and pro-Russian influence campaigns. And we’ve seen similar work and being accelerated by Iran; again, fake personas, webs of online personas, pushing out AI-generated content, all designed to sow discord, and, in some instances, using the conflict in Gaza almost like kerosene to whip up protests and demonstrations and to fuel discord.
So it’s a very aggressive space, increasingly fueled by AI, designed to influence our elections. But our focus is on exposing it—investigating it, exposing it, disrupting it. And you have seen an unprecedented level of transparency from this government, from the intelligence community, from the Justice Department and the FBI about what we are seeing and putting that out on a regular basis so individuals and voters can be discerning about what they’re seeing.
Last thing I’ll stay, Stephanie, all that said, I have a great deal of confidence in the ability of individuals to go out and vote in a fair and safe election process because we have a very diffuse and resilient system that is undertaking that responsibility, all of it done at the state and local level throughout the nation. But part of the reason I am confident in that is because we are pointing out this information and trying to be as transparent as possible in making sure people understand the what—the lengths to which some of our foreign adversaries will go to try and influence this election.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: Well, you mentioned election integrity just there, but I know also the degree of polarization. I mean, we, obviously—on the domestic front we’ve seen the department already weighing in on some of the legal battles that are being—cases that are being raised already on what you might call a precautionary basis around the country around election integrity. Do you—do you see any serious legal cases there? Which are the ones that you’re most focused on, the sort of paper trail that’s been left?
LISA MONACO: Well, you know, the Justice Department has—this goes back to our dual national security and law enforcement mission. Our responsibilities when it comes to election security are quite wide-ranging, from exposing and holding accountable foreign malign actors in the way I just described, to enforcing our civil rights laws and our voting rights laws and ensuring that there is access—that there’s ballot access, access to voting places. And we are continuing to do that. We have filed a few lawsuits in places where we want to make sure that states are living up to their responsibilities to ensure equal and clear and fair access to election and polling places.
But there is another entrant on the election security kind of landscape, Stephanie, that I think is important to address, and that’s the unprecedented rise in threats to public officials, including election workers, that we have seen in the last several years. This is something that I had not seen in my previous many, many years of service, and something we have responded to with an Election Threats Task Force that we launched a couple of years ago because we have been seeing such a disturbing rise in threats of violence and sometimes actual violence being perpetrated against election workers—everyone from elected or appointed secretaries of state to volunteers, people who simply are volunteering to help all of us exercise our most fundamental right, the right to vote.
So we have brought more than seven hundred cases—threats cases in the last several years. More than half of those involved threats to public officials, including election workers. And we are determined to do everything we can to hold accountable individuals who would perpetrate threats of violence or actual violence against public officials because no one—no one—should have to be intimidated or feel threatened simply for doing their job. It’s unacceptable, it’s wrong, and we are determined to hold those who do so accountable.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: You’ve brought me right to my last question, which is a bit more of a sober one. But we’ve been—at Bloomberg, we’ve been running a swing state poll every month since the end of last year, and over the course of this year I think a rising majority of people responding to that poll have said they expect civil unrest around the election and after the election. Is that—is that what the department is expecting?
LISA MONACO: So I’m not going to comment on polls or expectations. There is no place for political violence. I mean, we saw the danger posed by it, of course most starkly in July with the attempted assassination against the former president and now, of course, just two weeks ago with the attempted assassination in Florida. Thankfully, the former president was unharmed most recently, and we are doing everything we can to ensure accountability particularly in this most recent case where you’ve seen we’ve now brought attempted assassination charges. That case is very much ongoing and in its early stages but we are determined to spare no resource to ensure accountability. And, again, no place for political violence. Not in July in Butler County, Pennsylvania, not two weeks ago in Florida. Not ever.
I am confident that the work that we have been doing both to hold accountable in this most recent case, the work that we have done to respond to the unprecedented threat against our democracy that we saw in the attack on January 6th of 2021, that we are showing that we are holding accountable those who would undertake threats to our democracy and that should be a very clear message to anybody who would contemplate doing so in the future.
STEPHANIE FLANDERS: Well, you’ve reminded us that the defense of national security and, certainly, economic security is on multiple fronts at home and abroad right now.
But, Lisa Monaco, deputy attorney general, thank you very much for joining us.
LISA MONACO: Thanks for having me.
Watch the event
Further reading
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Image: US Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco spoke at the Atlantic Council's Transatlantic Forum on GeoEconomics on September 26, 2024.