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Speaker
Daleep Singh
Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics, The White House
Moderator
Julia Friedlander
CEO, Atlantik-Brücke
Event transcript
Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Without further ado, it is my honor to welcome the Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics at the White House Daleep Singh.
DALEEP SINGH: Thank you, Julia.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Very much. And just I’ll note at the outset that this is the third time that Daleep has joined us at the GeoEconomics Forum in Frankfurt, and Berlin, and now in New York. So you’re—you know, you’re a tri-alumnus. And we’re truly grateful that you’re here during a very busy week, and when I don’t think you have a very easy day job.
DALEEP SINGH: No.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Come to think.
DALEEP SINGH: But I have to—I have to—I have to say, Julia, you, and Josh, and Fred—I mean, you have been at the intellectual vanguard of economic statecraft going back eight years. And I think we all owe you a debt of gratitude. So thanks for having me.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Thank you very much.
Maybe we could set the stage by talking a little bit about industrial policy. We’ve been—you know, I run a German organization now called the Atlantik-Brücke. And a lot of the discussions we have within our group is, you know, what is the line between national security and economic security? You know, is it—does a tariff count of economic statecraft now? So maybe just to start us off, what is—what does industrial policy play into your everyday job? How much does it take?
DALEEP SINGH: Yeah. So let me just step back. I mean, for us the premise of industrial policy is that the private sector, left entirely to itself, it’s not going to—it’s not going to solve the most pressing challenges that we face to economic and national security. And many of those challenges, they were laid bare during the pandemic, but they were festering, they were building for decades prior to the pandemic, during the era of hyper globalization. And we know what those are.
The loss of our supply chain resilience because of a singular pursuit of maximum efficiency and minimal cost. We’ve seen the fading of our technological preeminence because of the drying up of public R&D. We’ve seen the hollowing out of our industrial base and our manufacturing capacity over the course of decades. We have a compounding climate crisis. We have high and rising inequality. We have too many people who feel left behind. And I would say, I mean, if you just look at the populism that’s sweeping across Western democracies, in many ways it is symptomatic of the exhaustion of a post-Cold War model of political economy that assumed markets have all the answers and that it’s the end of history for geopolitical competition.
So industrial policy is about recognizing that market failures do exist, we can identify them, and there are targeted government interventions, if they’re carefully crafted, that can help correct them. And they come in a lot of different forms. It’s not about picking winners and losers, at least not for us. But it does involve tax incentives, regulatory shifts, investment subsidies, government procurement, immigration reform, education policy, trade measures—you mentioned tariffs—and competition policy. The common thread is these are all interventions that are designed to change the composition of economic activity in a way that better aligns with our national interest.
And look, I mean, it’s not a radical idea. It’s not a new idea. It goes all the way back to Hamilton, Lincoln, Roosevelt, the post-Sputnik era. We were responsible—the US government was responsible for 70 percent of global R&D in the 1960s. That was more than every other country and company combined at that moment. And I would say the results over the past three years are pretty darn good. I don’t have any other way to explain how we’ve had sustained above-trend growth and rapid disinflation without pointing to something really positive happening on the supply side of the economy. And, you know, I really believe that R&D, entrepreneurship, innovation, and productivity are back as defining features of what this economy is doing. And we’re in the best position we’ve been in, I would say, since the mid-1990s.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: I mean, I think, you know, what’s interesting—a question I ask myself sometimes, and I—and I’m—you know, I agree with you. But I ask myself sometimes what took us so long? We came out of the financial crisis, where we used bodies such as the G20, and we thought this was, like, a financial sector problem, but it’s not like the deindustrialization in this country wasn’t fully apace. And it seemed, you know, talking to European counterparts, they often say, what happened to the America we knew? As if, you know, we woke up one day and were reneging on what you say, the sort of end of history concept.
But, again, with all of the achievements of the Biden administration in three and a half years, you know why—you know, why did it take us—or, maybe, arguably, part way through the Trump administration—to say, we need to sort of reconfigure how we structure the sources, or maybe the triggers of American growth?
DALEEP SINGH: No, I think the problems that I—the challenges I was describing, it took a while for us to connect all of the dots and to arrive at the conclusion that there actually was a useful role for government to play. The muscles within government, though, had been atrophying as it relates to industrial policy for at least forty years. And it has taken a while to build the analytical muscle, also to learn from our mistakes. We’ve made many, and we’ll continue to make mistakes, and to course correct, and try to figure out a better equilibrium. And I hope we don’t draw the conclusion that we’re in this dark, dreary, dystopian economic environment, and we need to just reverse everything that’s been done over the past three and a half years and go back to a—go back to a laissez faire, hyper-globalization mindset. I think that would be disastrous. But that’s what the next few months are all about.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Mmm hmm. And I actually led a delegation of young leaders to Detroit in August. And we visited the Ford factory. Where’s Chris? Is he still here? And discussed a lot of the sort of the industrial structures in the history of a country, and how many of the major breakthroughs were through the close cooperation between state and enterprise.
But, you know, you mentioned through the course of the—course of the pandemic that we learned about this—you know, through supply chain shortages, and how something that, you know, as benign as the ship didn’t leave the port on time to a country is actually putting in—putting in full export stops for geopolitical purposes. You know, what are sort of the—I mean, what are sort of the global—the global implications of some of the measures that we’re putting in place? Because, you know, we can’t—you know, the US is certainly not an island. And, you know, we pull the pin out of one—you know, of one thing, and across the world the balloon deflates in many other ways.
DALEEP SINGH: Yeah. I mean, I really think the analytical framework for us to develop is one that’s based on multiplayer, multistage game theory. We have choices to make. Our strategic rivals have choices to make. So do aligned countries and non-aligned countries. And every decision, every intervention we undertake, we’ve got to think about what’s the equilibrium effect five, ten steps down the line, making assumptions about what other players are going to do. And I think what makes this really complicated right now, when we think about how to actually create a collaborative spirit with likeminded partners, is how do we deal with China?
Because, I mean, the problem facing the world, not just the US, is it’s flooding the market well beyond what global demand can plausibly absorb. In other words, without regard for market forces. And we’ve seen this. I mean, this is not new. It’s been going on for several decades. Steel, solar, wind, medical devices, machine tools. Now it’s—now the trend is broadening and intensifying to more strategic sectors—EVs, batteries, semiconductors—where we and allies are investing hundreds of billions of dollars.
So, look, I mean, it would be—it would be one thing if China’s dominance of these sectors was the byproduct of indigenous innovation and market forces. We would—we should applaud if that was the case, because of the positive spillovers that would accrue to the rest of the world. But it really is the result of massive state support. Many think tanks have tried to quantify the differential in PRC support relative to other industrialized economies. And the best numbers I’ve seen is that the multiple is somewhere between three and ten times.
And you see it. I mean, we actually do need to show the metric, show our work, so we can have a baseline of facts with our counterparts in China. You see it in volume-based metrics, you know, capacity utilization falling. You see the supply-demand imbalance resulting in sustained deflation in China. You see it in financial results, persistent financial losses among exporting sectors. And you see it in the concentration of market structure. So, I mean, that’s the competitive backdrop that we’re facing. And the only way for us to respond is to collaborate.
And what we’re trying to do is articulate, I would say, a balanced vision that’s not just about tariffs. It’s, number one, we should all invest in our own productive capacity, strengthen and scale that up. R&D, technology, manufacturing, the size and skills of our labor market. But number two, let’s give access to our productive capacity and our purchasing power to countries that are playing by the same rules. Not only to enhance areas of advantage, but also to blunt sectors where we have disadvantage—like shipbuilding, or cranes, or critical minerals.
And then the third part is the regrettable bit, which is we will need to use restrictive measures like tariffs to level the playing field and to prevent all of our investments from being undercut. Because if we just stood aside and allowed unfair competition to persist, the harm to our—to our economic growth potential, to our national security, arguably to our democracy, those are unacceptable costs. But this is—I mean, I think we have to make it very clear to everybody, this is an affirmative vision to change the terms of competition. We’re not in a race to the bottom on subsidies.
What we want to do is create a competition in which we’re competing on our ability to attract ideas, and talent, and investment, the depth and breadth of our alliances, and our capacity to innovate through knowledge creation, risk taking, and entrepreneurship. If those are the terms, I really like our chances.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: It’s an interesting paradigm. On the other—on the other side, you know, we—on the sort of—you talk about the promote, and then there’s the protect. We heard it from Lisa Monaco just a few minutes ago. Is that some of the tools that we talk about at economic statecraft, export controls, sanctions, investment screening? Now we’re talking about outbound investment screening. You know, how do you—I mean, again, you in multiple—I mean, before your return to government, you called for, you know, the creation of a new economic statecraft doctrine.
I think we in the in the initiative have all said thank you, because we had tried to put the—you know, figure out how to do it ourselves, and didn’t know where—you know, where to where to set the limits. Where do you—you know, where do you—you know, what do you think now, right? We’re at a point where we’ve—no, I mean, again. Like, in 2022 with Russia was like a big explosion, right, where we put—we sort of said, we’re just going to throw a spaghetti to the wall and do what we can to—
DALEEP SINGH: It wasn’t quite spaghetti, but yeah.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: I’m not—yes, well.
DALEEP SINGH: I’m just saying. Fair enough. Point taken.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: To harness the full powers of G7 regulatory mechanisms.
DALEEP SINGH: Yes.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: But I mean, so where—you know, how—I mean, how far do you think you can—we can push the use of these measures, both sort of in terms of international markets—and this is something that my board member, Anahita Thoms, would remind us, because she is as a leading partner and working on export controls in Germany—is, you know, how—you know, at what point do we hit up against the sort of technical restrictions of how we implement this, both in terms of the—you know, the governments that—you know, as many—as many sanctions lawyers as OFAC can hire, and as many—and as many compliance officials—compliance officers a company can hire, right? Like, at some point, like, our geopolitical aspirations and at physical capacity.
DALEEP SINGH: Yeah. And that’s true, I think, of both restrictive and affirmative measures. Just to step back. I mean, my observation from being in and out of government the last three-plus years is we are—we are what everybody knows. We’re in the most intense period of geopolitical competition since the Cold War. We know that. We know Russia and China both have expressed and revealed a desire to disrupt the US-led order. They both have the capacity to do so in different ways. And, you know, barring catastrophic miscalculations, since great powers are nuclear powers, let’s pray that conflict and confrontation don’t take place on the battlefield. But if that’s true, the path of least resistance is that the competition will happen in the theater of economics and technology and energy.
So if that’s the reality we’re in, if that’s the geopolitical—the geoeconomic reality we’re in, we have to also confront another reality which is an unfortunate narrative that’s taken hold. That we’re spending our marginal unit of time trying to invent and sharpen and reimagine tools that break linkages in the global economy through trade, technology, and capital. And you mentioned a few of them—sanctions, export controls, tariffs, investment restrictions, price caps. You know, and those tools don’t win hearts and minds. So what I’ve been—what I’ve been advocating for is balance in the use of economic statecraft.
There’s another end of the spectrum, positive tools that can both advance our strategic objectives in supply chain resilience, in sustaining technological preeminence, in rebuilding our industrial capacity, and in safeguarding energy security. Those are just illustrative examples. But also offering the prospect of mutual economic gain to geopolitical swing states in the Global South. Well, how do we do that? I mean, my concern is that we lack the financial firepower to underwrite that affirmative vision.
The private sector, I don’t think, has sufficient incentive to invest, especially abroad, in projects with very long time horizons that require very high-risk appetite, that involve a lot of complexity and uncertainty, that involve a lot of asymmetry between the information we have in government and what’s actually happening on the ground. And so we get insufficient private sector mobilization. You know, we don’t turn billions into trillions. And then the existing public authorities we have are often inadequate in terms of their scale or their scope or their flexibility.
And that leaves a lot of opportunity on the table. You know, could we, for example, have a strategic resilience reserve that could stockpile physical critical minerals, or synthetic reserves, or even critical technology inputs? Could—
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Like the strategic oil reserve, in a way?
DALEEP SINGH: But to broaden it beyond petroleum, but similar. Could we have a lending authority that could provide non-recourse bridge financing for a lithium producer in Australia or a nickel producer in Indonesia that is illiquid but solvent because it’s getting flooded by PRC overcapacity? Could we invest—could we have the ability to invest in the shipyards of Canada and Finland in specialized areas, like polar icebreakers, learn from their expertise, rebuild our industrial capacity, while forging a stronger alliance with our NATO allies? Could we invest in technology moonshots like nuclear fusion, enhanced geothermal?
You know, could we buy out Chinese debt that’s plaguing distressed countries and offer concessional financing at a more sustainable—in a more sustainable way, with higher standards? These are all the kind of use cases that I think, you know, illustrate what I think is an era of economic realpolitik. We have got to be unsentimental about it. And if we don’t, we’re going to fall behind strategic rivals, and we’re going to miss an opportunity to usher in a new era of American economic leadership. I think that’s what’s at stake.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Does the money—I mean, again, assuming we could get a big more, you know, appropriation through the next Congress or through private capital markets, I mean, where does the money come from?
DALEEP SINGH: I mean, part of it will require—look, we have fiscal constraints. So I don’t want to sugarcoat the likelihood of getting a huge dose of fiscal ammunition. But we also have the ability to get more bang out of our existing fiscal resources. We have the ability to work through the MDB system, where balance sheet capacity is more abundant. And we have the ability to partner with allies who may be willing to multiply the impact that we have so the sum is greater than the individual parts. This is where we have to get creative. I’m not saying it’s going to be easy. It’s very easy to implement sanctions. We just issue an executive order. Positive economic statecraft is way more difficult. It requires democratic legitimacy, and it should.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Yeah. No, and I certainly appreciate the breadth that the G7 statements have taken in this direction. But, again, it’s going to mean—what you’re talking—all the creative ideas that you’re mentioning, they’re sort of like, OK, we’ll do this with Finland, and we’ll do this with Australia. Does the US remain the sort of maypole of creating this—as sort of the source of resilience of democratic countries? Can we do that or, you know, who—I mean—
DALEEP SINGH: We’ve been the arsenal of democracy before, in a military sense. Why can’t we do so in economics, and technology, and energy? I think we have to try.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Yeah. No. I mean, I totally agree. Speaking of which, I know you wanted to discuss—to discuss sanctions and the question of what to do with Russia’s reserves.
DALEEP SINGH: Yeah.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: And I’m sure everybody’s familiar with this case at this point, everyone in this room, that that the US and its allies has been looking for creative ways to mobilize the reserves that we have frozen the wake of Russia’s invasion and to create financial mechanisms to give it back to Ukraine. So if you want—do you want to give us sort of the latest state of play? Because I know there’s been some technical, technical issues.
DALEEP SINGH: There are technical issues, but ultimately this is about political will. You know, and I—what I can say is we’re going to get to the finish line. I don’t have doubt that we’re going to deliver on the commitment that our G7 leaders made in Apulia to harness $50 billion from the frozen Russian assets for the benefit of Ukraine, and to begin dispersing by the end of the year. And I fully expect that every G7 country is going to contribute to that disbursement. And that’s no small thing.
I mean, never before in history has a multilateral coalition frozen the assets of an aggressor country two days after its invasion began, and then found a way to harness the value of those frozen assets to fund the aggrieved party while it fights for its existence. Never happened before. And we’re going to do so while respecting the rule of law and maintaining our solidarity. I think it’s going to bring to life why multilateralism is a force multiplier, and why time is not on Putin’s side. I can give you 300 billion reasons why time is not on his side. And it’s within our control to give Ukraine the resources it needs to prevail. The choice is ours, not his.
Now, how we get there? Part of me would like to spare you the gory detail of the international sausage making.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: We’ve been nerding out all day, so go ahead.
DALEEP SINGH: OK. But, I mean, all I’ll say is this, the scale of the US contribution, it does depend on the strength of EU assurances that the Russian assets will remain immobilized until there’s a just peace between Russia and a free and sovereign Ukraine, and until after, Russia has paid for the damages it has wreaked. Now there is one member state that is refusing to give those assurances, but I don’t think he has as much leverage as he may perceive. Not least because he’s doing a disservice to his own taxpayers.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: I think, for all of us who were sort of watching from the outside when the G7 partners took this measure, it was sort of, like, the most—it was the most impressive sign of unity that I think—that was palpable, at least on the outside. So, but—you know, but we had Matt Axelrod up here this morning. And he was enthusiastically talking about, you know, working with—working with partners to plug the holes. And I know that there was another G7 statement that—you know, going across agency and across governments—talking about the workarounds.
So to what extent do you think that countries such as Iran, and North Korea, and, of course, we’ve talked about China being the supplier of at least components to lethal aid to Russia. To what extent are they—are they doing this out of—out of convenience? Or doing it with a true mission to disrupt—to disrupt US and Western capabilities?
DALEEP SINGH: Yeah, that’s a good question. I mean, there’s no doubt that—I mean, Russia has sustained its military capabilities by transforming its entire economy into a war machine. But, I mean, it’s deeply concerning that other countries in this, you know, so-called axis of upheaval have decided to become witting cogs in this arsenal of autocracy. That’s a big problem. I don’t know. I mean. to me it, in part, signals that Russia has become desperate and is partnering with rogue pariah countries like North Korea and Iran to sustain a war that was supposed to end within a matter of weeks.
But China’s more puzzling. You know, it’s hard for me to understand why a country that says it wants better relations with Europe is now fueling and funding the biggest threat to European security since the Cold War. You know, it’s hard for me to understand how a country that claims it wants to be a responsible stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific is now part of an axis that’s building Pyongyang’s nuclear capability. And it’s hard for me to understand how Beijing, with all of its domestic economic problems—it’s in a deflationary slump—when it’s reliant upon external demand to pull out of that slump, why it’s antagonizing all the major sources of external demand. So, you know, if China wants to help end this war, it can pull the plug tomorrow on the factory to the war machine. And if it doesn’t, I think it’s going to cause profound reputational damage. I don’t see this as a strategic win. I ultimately think this will be a strategic wedge.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: And do you—are we going to be able to try to pull—to stop these nodes of resistance, as you said? I mean—
DALEEP SINGH: It’s happening. I mean, it’s—you know, I know sanctions sometimes are about shock and awe. And there’s a place for that. But it’s mostly about stamina. And you do see—I mean, just look at the interbank rates in Russia for renminbi. There’s clearly a pullback in China to finance the procurement of lethal—inputs that create lethal output on the battlefield. It is happening. And this is a game of Whack-a-Mole. And we have to just stay at it and be unrelenting. That’s what this is all about, really.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Yeah. Which shows that sanctions aren’t as easy as issuing a press release.
DALEEP SINGH: They’re not.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Absolutely. And I know one last topic I think, you know, we should touch on is a little bit about building partnerships internationally, but also a little bit about how the US approaches setting global policy, and how we—how we sort of portray ourselves, right? And to the question that we go in and say, you know, we’re the superpower, so follow us? Or do we approach it with a sense of humility and trying to ask others to bring policies to the table?
DALEEP SINGH: Yeah. I think humility is a really important word. You know, I mean, I’m humbled by the uncertainties of this moment. At least in my lifetime, I can’t remember a moment when the uncertainties of our domestic political climate, our geopolitical backdrop, and the global macroeconomic regime were so high and feeding upon each other at once. You know, the intensification of geopolitical tensions is feeding upon our domestic political polarization, and the disruptive effects of the post pandemic economy, and vice versa. And so, look, I mean, I think it’s a moment in which everyone—whether you’re a policymaker or you’re in, you know, the world of markets or economics—it’s a good moment to think probabilistically about scenarios, and not so much to think about a base case with a point estimate.
You know, it’s a—to me, it’s a time in which you really want to pressure and probe your base case. You want to really constantly test your assumptions and your priors. You should attack lazy narratives. And we all have blind spots. We should do our best to try to see them. And I think that actually goes to a question around culture. It doesn’t get mentioned very much in the context of a national security discussion, but I think we have to generate a cultural mindset in which people feel much more free to speak up, to take risks, to think and act differently, to seek out people with whom they disagree, and then to admit when you’re wrong, to change your mind, to course correct, and ultimately to have less top-down hierarchy and more bottom-up creativity. We’re going to need that. I mean, the biggest debacles of risk management, I was taught a long time ago, they’re failures of imagination, not memory. And so we should set ourselves not to—not to committing those kinds of mistakes.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Do you think that bureaucracies are built for that?
DALEEP SINGH: Yes. Yes, absolutely.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: I mean, they’re top down, aren’t they?
DALEEP SINGH: Yes.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: But also horizontal?
DALEEP SINGH: Not enough.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Not enough. Yeah, no, it’s—no, it’s—
DALEEP SINGH: I mean, it’s physically the case. My office is physically segregated from my team. So I am—I am removed from the information flow. And I hate it. And it makes for worse decision making. So, sorry.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: No, it’s OK. It’s a question for—it’s a question of organizational design, right? Because we have—we have these large, large governments and large bureaucracies. And I think what we’ve—you know, at least, my experience was that, you know, I was working in the Treasury Department. I didn’t really know how export controls worked, because the people at the Commerce Department were, you know, too far away. And so, you know, maybe just, you know, in the last—in the last minute or so, you know, how do we—again, like, you’re talking about creative solution making. How do we reform our bureaucratic structures? And how do we work most effectively with expertise on the outside to get there?
DALEEP SINGH: Hmm. Yeah, we’ve got to pierce the bubble. I mean, it does require building connective tissue with foreign counterparts, with regulators, with the private sector, with civil society, with people that are going to tell you, you know, you’re full of BS, and who are willing to speak truth to power. Like, we actually need—we need many more channels for that type of communication to happen. It’ll make us better. We shouldn’t shy away from it. But I also think, for any of us who are in the world of government, we’ve—you know, if you’re in—my world is at the intersection of economics and national security.
All the economic models are broken, of course, because we don’t have great models that that do a good job when the demand side of the economy and the supply side are both in flux, and you got monetary policy, fiscal policy, foreign policy, all shifting. And that’s why it’s been so difficult for forecasters to know where the economy is going. But for policymakers, all we can do is look to history. And we can do that by engaging with the outside world. But, I mean, I’m reading as much as I can of Alfred Hirschman. What was Germany thinking during the era of the Kaiser and the Weimar Republic and the Nazi era? And what was the UK doing?
You know, they actually spent sixteen years over nine governments writing a handbook of economic warfare, as Germany became a rising power. And then they actually abandoned it in 1960 because they thought economic statecraft was moot in the nuclear era. But it’s fascinating. And it’s rhyming, it’s not repeating, but we’ve had—I mean, the 1870 to 1913 period in the US, first wave of globalization, right? Capital flows, trade flows, technology flows were mostly unfettered. They were unprecedented. Technological change was transformational. The railroad, telegraph, electrification.
You know, we had a concentration of corporate power—Rockefeller, Vanderbilt, Carnegie. Inequality was rising. So was populism. William Jennings Bryan gave that famous speech, you shall not crucify mankind on a cross of gold. And my reading of that period—it ended, of course, in two world wars.
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: And in a big financial crisis before that.
DALEEP SINGH: And there were financial crises once every ten years. So what happened? I mean, deep structural change is what ultimately broke the fever. We created the Fed, created the income tax, passed labor laws for the first time, gave women the right to vote, broke up big businesses. I think we need that. We need to think about that type of change now. The IRA, CHIPS Act, infrastructure bill are good first steps. But we’ve got to continue thinking about how do we repair the social contract at home, how do we rebalance the equilibrium abroad, so that we can sustain our leadership?
JULIA FRIEDLANDER: Thank you so much. Thank you so much, Daleep. We’re very grateful for your leadership and also for your candor. And it’s not easy in a position like yours to speak openly with an audience such as this one. And for taking the time. Of course, I would argue that speaking to actors on the outside is just as important as on the inside, but we know it takes time. So thanks again.
DALEEP SINGH: My pleasure. Thanks for having me.
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Image: US Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Daleep Singh greets Atlantik-Brücke CEO Julia Friedlander at the Transatlantic Forum on GeoEconomics on September 26, 2024.