
Who said geopolitics is dead?  Ninety-four years on from the October 1917 revolution if anyone had any  lingering illusions that Russia is a democracy they were surely  dispelled by the 24 September announcement that President Medvedev and  Prime Minister Putin would simply swap jobs in 2012. Moscow likes to  call Russia a ‘managed democracy’. In fact Russia is a micro-democracy  of two…and even that is suspect. 
President ‘elect’ again Putin  will thus be in power until 2024…at least. Moscow also announced  recently an increase in defence spending of some $66 billion over three  years, which amounts to some 3% of the Russia’s gross domestic product.  With the economy slowing, entrepreneurial activity being squeezed by an  increasingly rapacious Kremlin and civil society all but moribund the  Putin regime is beginning to look very much like the Brezhnev regime of  Soviet old. Then, a self-serving regime sought to offset its lack of  legitimacy at home by causing trouble in Russia’s self-designated ‘near  abroad’.
 
The obvious flashpoint will be  the Baltic States, the security of which must remain an absolute  priority for NATO and the EU. Ukraine is also a worry. However, it is  the mineral rich High North of Europe where an increasingly assertive  Russia could perhaps play its most aggressive card.
 
Prime Minister Putin has  repeatedly said that Russia intends to defend her strategic Arctic  resources with military might. On 28 June the Russians conducted the  third test-firing of the new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile  in the Barents Sea. In July Foreign Minister Ivanov indicated that  Moscow intended to extend her territorial borders in the Arctic by some 2  million square kilometres and that Russia intended to keep two brigades  of troops at high readiness in the far north, rather than one. In  August Russian Defence Minister Bulgarkov announced the decision to  acquire 120 more of the highly-capable Iskander M nuclear missiles and  that the first battalion had been deployed to the Northern Military  District near St Petersburg. With a range in excess of up to 500  kilometres this deployment potentially threatens much of eastern and  northern Europe.
 
Furthermore, the Norwegians are  reporting a marked increase in sorties by Russian strategic bombers  along the Norwegian coast with simulated attacks now a regular  occurrence. On 7 July as the Russian and Norwegian foreign ministers  exchanged ratification documents for the delimitation treaty on oil  exploration and exploitation in the Barents Sea a Russian strategic  bomber formation flew down the Norwegian coast. Nor are the Norwegians  alone. Britain has noted a marked increase in Russian air and naval  operations against British air and sea space.
 
Why does Russia do this? Much of  this is traditional Russian bluster that anyone working on Russian  strategy has come to know well. Some of it is Moscow’s frustration with a  lack of progress on co-operation with the Alliance over missile defence  and concerns about NATO’s intervention in Libya – Europe’s ‘near  abroad’.  Russia sees the West as two-faced. However, strategic  opportunism is also a factor.  Moscow’s strategy must thus be seen  as a truism most Europeans seems to have forgotten; when one lacks power  to make the rules strategic influence is not solely a function of being  ‘nice’.
 
Fortunately for the West Russia  is a clumsy exponent of the geopolitical art and too often permits  frustration and the power parochial to trump strategy. In effect, it is  déjà vu all over again. Declining oil and gas revenues, a hole in  Russian Government finances and increasing defence budgets simply did  not add up to a sustainable grand strategy – then or now. However,  the impulse to play Strong Russia is ever-present.
 
A stable relationship between  Russia and the West is clearly in Moscow’s geo-political interest. One  only has to look at a map to see the challenges Russia faces to its  south and east. However, two things prevent that. First, whilst the 2010  NATO Strategic Concept hinted at better relations with Russia  uncertainty, irresolution and retreat has made the West an uncertain  partners/adversary. Second, the small Kremlin cabal that holds power  have very parochial political and strategic agendas that by and large  contradict financial and economic reality. Taken together the drivers of  Russia’s strategy in the High North become clear.
 
Sooner or later there will be a  domestic crisis in Russia. The Baltics and the Ukraine are too sensitive  for overt adventurism but not the High North. Indeed, in spite of  extant treaties boundaries and borders are sufficiently fuzzy for Moscow  to exploit if it feels the need to send a message to the West without  necessarily provoking a direct confrontation.  It is as ever a high-risk  strategy.
 
In the iconic film High Noon  local sheriff Will Kane (Gary Cooper) finds himself alone against a  ruthless gang of outlaws. The little man standing firm against the bully  eventually wins the day when the local citizenry finally realise that  his fight is their fight. Think Finland, Norway, Sweden…and Russia.
 
High Noon in the High North? It could be coming soon to a screen near you.
Julian Lindley-French is Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy, Fellow of Respublica in London, Associate Fellow of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies and a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council. He is also a member of the Academic Advisory Board of the NATO Defence College in Rome. This essay first appeared on his personal blog, Lindley-French’s Blog Blast.
        
        
        
        
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