Eight years into Abiy Ahmed’s tenure as prime minister, Ethiopia’s regional conflicts are intensifying and threatening national unity.
The northern Tigray region risks renewed war. Since February, Addis Ababa has redeployed federal troops there, flights from Mekelle to the capital have been sporadically severed, and residents have reported severe banking disruptions. Four years after the Tigray War, which killed an estimated 600,000 people, the Ethiopian government is now accusing Eritrea of aggression and of coordinating with a faction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF, meanwhile, has demanded the return of agricultural lands around Tselemti seized by Amhara militias during the war. It has also demanded the restoration of its legal status as a political party and moved on May 5 to restore its prewar legislative council in defiance of federal authorities. That will only increase tensions.
Instability has spread beyond Tigray. In the Amhara region, militias that once fought alongside the federal government (such as Fano) have turned against it, largely in response to federal plans to disband and absorb them into the Ethiopian National Defense Force. In Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state, federal troops and drones are deployed against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), a conflict largely underreported due to journalist access restrictions. Fano is suspected of receiving support from the TPLF and Eritrea, and both Fano and OLA have reportedly cooperated with the TPLF and Eritrea on military planning. This is consistent with the Horn of Africa’s long-standing pattern of indirect war through proxy groups.
This wave of internal conflict is a serious problem for Abiy, a leader who once raised hopes of a new regional beginning after making peace with Eritrea early in his tenure, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Those hopes for regional peace were shattered by the Tigray War, and persistent instability continues to erode national unity. With general elections scheduled for June 2026 and his legacy on the line, Abiy needs a unifying national cause, and he has increasingly signaled that regaining Red Sea access could be it.
Ethiopia has borne the costs of being landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, paying roughly $1.5 billion annually to Djibouti to access ports for international trade. In January 2024, Abiy attempted to diversify sea access by striking a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Somaliland to access the port of Berbera, but the move angered authorities in Somalia, who said they would expel Ethiopian peacekeeping troops stationed in the country. Eventually, in discussions mediated by Turkey, Abiy agreed that any arrangements for sea access would take place only under Somalia’s sovereignty, effectively halting implementation of the 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland.
In a February address to parliament, Abiy declared, “The Red Sea and Ethiopia cannot remain separated forever,” as he evoked the crimes committed by Eritrean troops during the Tigrayan War. Later that month, he spoke at a military parade beside a banner reading “whether you like it or not,” Ethiopia will not remain landlocked, accompanied by imagery of a soldier breaching a symbolic door to a seaport. Such instances bring to mind the old Ethiopian aspiration of retaking Eritrea’s port of Assab, which would require war. Abiy has since denied any intention of going to war. Yet some Ethiopians back pursuing sea access by force, based on their view that the country’s landlocked status is a historical anomaly and an injustice waiting to be corrected.
A direct military confrontation would be enormously costly. Ethiopia’s military is already hampered by fuel shortages stemming from the Iran war. The International Monetary Fund would likely suspend all support if Ethiopia invaded its northern neighbor. And victory is far from guaranteed: Though Eritrea’s economy and military are much smaller, the country has maintained a war footing since independence and has had time to prepare for an assault on Assab.
Most critically, an offensive on Assab would require redeploying troops and would create a security vacuum in Amhara and Oromia. This could explain Eritrea’s strategy in coordinating with the TPLF, Fano, and OLA: Keeping the Ethiopian National Defense Force overstretched in conflicts within Ethiopia’s borders so it cannot mount an offensive northward. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s calculation could be that Eritrea will exhaust valuable resources in supporting these wars. Additionally, Addis Ababa is also stirring unrest within Eritrea, including by hosting and supporting an Afari armed group hostile to the Eritrean government, the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO). Thus, for now, conflict on Ethiopian soil involving indirect support from Eritrea remains far more likely than direct confrontation.
Any renewed hostilities, whether direct or by proxy, would carry significant regional consequences. Ethiopia’s support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s civil war suggests Khartoum would back Asmara, while the United Arab Emirates, also aligned with the RSF, would support Addis Ababa. Saudi Arabia’s position is less clear: Riyadh has grown closer to Asmara recently but tends to avoid taking sides openly and could be well-positioned to mediate.
Outright military escalation may yet be avoided. Both countries have hovered near the brink before, and the catastrophic cost of another war appears to be giving pause to both sides. But there is a real risk that the current war of words spirals out of control, and Addis Ababa may yet decide to “punish” Asmara for its coordination with the TPLF, Fano, and OLA. Averting conflict will require Gulf states, Turkey, and signatories of the Pretoria Peace Agreement to simultaneously dissuade Ethiopia from pursuing Assab and press Eritrea to halt its cooperation with the military groups.
For now, Ethiopia’s June elections are the key flashpoint to watch. If they cannot be held in Tigray due to the TPLF’s unresolved legal status, tensions could escalate beyond the point of no return.
François Christophe is an independent political risk analyst with a special interest in East Africa. He was previously posted at the Embassy of France in Asmara, Eritrea.
The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.
Further reading
Fri, May 1, 2026
What can save Mali from collapse?
AfricaSource By
The security situation in Mali is becoming critical in the wake of a large-scale, coordinated series of attacks across multiple cities on April 25.
Tue, Apr 7, 2026
How a deeper US-Burundi partnership could unlock mineral and security gains
AfricaSource By Maureen Farrell, Rose Keravuori
Fraught with fragility yet rich in critical minerals and peacekeeping expertise, Burundi offers the United States a chance to diversify supply chains and strengthen regional security.
Mon, Apr 6, 2026
Why African cybersecurity requires a continental approach
AfricaSource By Yasmine Abdillahi
Half a billion Africans are online, yet cyber defenses lag. Cross-border crackdowns like Operation Serengeti help, but lasting security needs regulations, skilled professionals, and shared responsibility.
Image: An Ethiopian military officer stands guard in the outskirts of Badme, a territorial dispute town between Eritrea and Ethiopia currently occupied by Ethiopia on June 8, 2018. REUTERS/Tiksa Negeri.