Targeted human rights sanctions are, in short, a tool governments use to freeze the assets of and deny visas to those responsible for or complicit in human rights violations. While they are generally intended to prompt offenders to change their behavior, they have additional effects. For example, preventing perpetrators from obtaining the tools needed to continue abuses and showing support for victims. However, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) has heard from multiple sources that many people in affected communities—including the Iranian community—do not have sufficient information, especially in their native language, about these measures and what they mean. 

Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed. 

This page will be subsequently updated with a Persian translation of the post.  

Targeted human rights sanctions are a foreign policy tool that seek to impose consequences on those who commit certain harmful acts. The official stated purposes vary by government, but broadly include accountability, behavioral change, and protecting “the stability of international political and economic systems.” In the end, however, those who stand to benefit when sanctions fulfill their purpose are the victims of the human rights abuses for which perpetrators are designated. For Iran, these include all those subject to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (IRI) ongoing abuses—including, inter alia, protesters, dissidents, hostages, women and girls, LGBTQI individuals, ethnic and religious minorities, journalists, detained individuals, and others—both inside and outside Iran.  

As the ultimate beneficiaries, and often those most knowledgeable about specific individuals or entities responsible for abuses, civil society’s role is essential in the sanctions process. Civil society can include those in Iran as well as those in the diaspora, encompassing everyone invested in the issue—victims and survivors, activists, researchers, and all who want to support human rights. However, governments vary in how much information they’re willing to share publicly, how clear their processes are, and how proactive they are in engaging with civil society. While some of the opacity is warranted due to security and confidentiality concerns, it can also isolate the communities those governments are trying to protect and distance them from the process.

Many governments have already made great strides, but they should continue to improve their sanctions programs by making a more concerted effort to engage with civil society, such as through dedicated partnerships and working groups. In the meantime, civil society can still use its expertise and the information it has available to advocate for specific government actions.

Why civil society participation is needed

Civil society has a unique and necessary knowledge of the overall context of a situation, the networks of actors, and perpetrators’ “asset footprint[s].” Civil society’s evidence, testimony, and expertise is therefore crucial for all accountability processes. Swedish officials were able to arrest Hamid Noury, who was ultimately convicted of war crimes for his participation as an assistant to the deputy prosecutor during the 1988 prison massacres in Iran, based on evidence submitted by civil society actors. Testimony from expert witnesses, victims, and victims’ families was likewise critical in establishing Noury’s guilt. In the Syria context, documentation from different organizations and victim participation helped German prosecutors secure the historic conviction of Bashar al-Assad regime officials.  

When it comes to sanctions, governments don’t require a civil society recommendation to designate a person or entity, and government officials in charge of sanctions designations can both investigate potential perpetrators themselves and consult with their partners in other jurisdictions. However, given competing national security priorities, officials do not have the capacity to investigate every potential perpetrator and every potential violation on their own. Government agencies are also further under-resourced when it comes to enforcing those sanctions they do issue.

For those jurisdictions that can accept closed-source evidence, civil society can provide testimony and other confidential materials for their consideration. Even without the resource and evidence considerations, expert organizations have found that consultation and transparency helps “ensure that designations remain legitimate in the eyes of the people of Iran,” enhances responsiveness to victim needs, and ensures that designations support other accountability efforts.

What civil society can do

First, civil society can help identify potential perpetrators and submit information available for sanctioning authorities to then further investigate and analyze according to the relevant evidentiary threshold and policy considerations. A 2023 report from Human Rights First (HRF), REDRESS, Open Society Foundations (OSF), Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (RWCHR), and the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) looked at Iran as a case study and found that civil society’s recommendations help governments better “target those most susceptible to the financial and reputational pressures exerted by sanctions,” so long as governments engaged with civil society “holistically, and not selectively choos[ing] topics of interest based on political priorities.”

US officials and the State and Treasury Departments have stated that “civil society recommendations are seriously considered and remain an invaluable source of information.” A 2022 report estimated that at least 34 percent of US sanctions designations made under its thematic human rights and corruption-based or Global Magnitsky-style sanctions regime were based on civil society recommendations. That same report put that number at only 4 percent of UK sanctions actions and 13 percent of EU sanctions actions under their equivalent Magnitsky-style sanctions regimes.

Second, civil society can advocate for governments’—and the United Nations’—attention on situations that warrant targeted sanctions, such as by highlighting new concerning trends. For example, in the UK, the government amended its sanctions legislation related to Iran to allow designations for transnational repression—the IRI’s targeting of dissenters, activists, and others located outside Iran. This amendment directly responded to increased threats from the IRI reported by Iranians living in the UK. In the US, an advocacy campaign by the James Foley Foundation and the families of hostages led to the Levinson Act and Executive Order 14078, enabling designations for those engaged in or complicit in hostage-taking.

Finally, civil society can submit evidence relevant to enforcement if they have information on sanctions evasion—on specific instances, on networks of actors, on identified techniques and activities, or other relevant information. As more countries expand transparency on beneficial ownership, civil society can use this to strengthen their own information and knowledge, which can then be submitted “as a resource to overextended governments.”

Resources for civil society

While governments have noted their appreciation for civil society’s information, the process to submit that information to the correct authorities is not always clear. One of the most comprehensive resources available is HRF’s coalition of organizations that are submitting packages recommending designations. At quarterly meetings, members can discuss updates, hear from and pose questions to government officials working in sanctions units, and otherwise support one another. Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) also put together a similar coalition for groups submitting packages recommending designations under the (Saudi journalist Jamal) Khashoggi Ban, which relates to transnational repression.

Besides the coalition, HRF and its partners have put together resources for those interested in submitting information to governments advocating for certain designations:

• HRF’s resources are mostly focused on submitting information to the United States. These include a template for submission, a Frequently Asked Questions document, explainers on different sanctions programs (including Iran-related sanctions), an explainer on Magnitsky sanctions through a Middle East and North Africa lens, and trackers.
• REDRESS’ resources are mostly focused on submitting information to the United Kingdom. These include a template for submission, a guidance note on evidence collation, and a fact sheet on the UK’s use of coordinated Magnitsky sanctions.
• RWCHR’s resources are focused on submitting information to Canada. They have a template and submission guide, and an intake form for those wishing to discuss potential submissions. The Peter A. Allard School of Law has also put together resources for those looking to submit information to Canada.

For sanctions enforcement information, most information is available through the relevant governments:

• Information can be sent to the US Office of Foreign Asset Control through its compliance hotline.
• Sanctions evasions in the UK can be reported to the Financial Conduct Authority.
• Suspicious transactions in Canada can be reported to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre.
• The European Union Commission has a sanctions whistleblower tool.
  

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.
Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

Thu, Oct 24, 2024

Iran targeted human rights sanctions series: Can children of Iranian officials be designated?

IranSource By Holly Dagres, Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo

Children of Iranian officials might be impacted by targeted human rights designations, but only through strict sanctions enforcement and investigation and only where there is political will.

Economic Sanctions Human Rights

Fri, Aug 2, 2024

Iran targeted human rights sanctions series: What is ‘beneficial ownership’ and how does it relate to targeted sanctions?

IranSource By Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo

Increased transparency over beneficial ownership, as well as leaked documents, have yielded examples that highlight why beneficial ownership information is critical for sanctions enforcement.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

Tue, Jul 9, 2024

An Iranian war criminal’s freedom has a detonating impact on the universal jurisdiction project

IranSource By Shadi Sadr

There is a significant risk that the transfer of convicted war criminal Hamid Noury could lead to similar cases, unless the international community addresses its detonating effects.

Human Rights Iran

Image: Thousands of Iranian-Canadians and their supporters protest Iranian Islamic regime at Nathan Phillips Square in Toronto, Canada on October 22, 2022. - Protests against Islamic regime have been growing all around the world since the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish who was arrested and killed by Iran’s morality police for allegedly violating its strictly-enforced dress code. (Photo by Arif Balkan/NurPhoto)