The unexpected political reunion of former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid this spring was the opening twist in what is shaping up to be a heated fall election campaign in Israel. The election, currently expected to take place in October 2026, is unfolding against a regional backdrop transformed since October 7, 2023, and it could open a narrow window for Israel to reset its regional strategy and create momentum to expand participation in the Abraham Accords.
The war in Gaza has strained Israel’s ties with its existing partners in the accords and caused Saudi Arabia to harden conditions for normalization. The war and associated regional conflicts also have weakened Hamas and Hezbollah, inflicted military setbacks on Iran, and contributed to regime change in Syria. All of these regional developments will likely affect the election campaign—and the future of Israeli politics.
A political system under pressure
Israel enters this campaign season with an unusual mix of military achievement and political fragility. The Israeli public has shown declining trust in its government since October 7. By the end of 2025, only about a quarter of Israelis expressed confidence in the government. On the other hand, around three-quarters of the population supported the establishment of a state commission of inquiry into the failures surrounding the Hamas attack. Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu managed to avoid calling a surprise election earlier that year by getting the budget passed, his coalition is facing increasing public and political pressure.
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Recent polls suggest Netanyahu’s Likud party would secure an estimated twenty-four seats in the 120-member Knesset, where it currently has thirty-two seats. The existing coalition hovers well below the sixty-one-seat majority threshold, underscoring a growing appetite for change.
Bennett is one of the most likely alternatives to Netanyahu. He led a short unity government in 2021-22 and is running as a centrist. Bennet has also demonstrated an openness to working with regional allies. Both Bennett and Lapid have good relationships with leaders in the Gulf, having separately met with the United Arab Emirates president in Abu Dhabi (Bennett in 2022 and Lapid in 2025). Whether Bennett could achieve a governing majority is still uncertain, but the possibility of political turnover is increasingly plausible. The 2026 election is therefore shaping up as a referendum on October 7, with implications for both Israel’s domestic trajectory and its regional posture.
Why normalization stalled
The Abraham Accords have gone into a near-freeze since late 2023, as the ensuing war in the Gaza Strip has profoundly changed the Middle East. The war has fueled widespread anger among the Arab world, driving support for relations with Israel to a single-digit low. Although a ceasefire currently holds, Gaza remains politically unresolved. Hamas is in de facto control, and no other governing group can serve as a viable alternative. Security coordination between Israel and its regional partners persists, but officials from countries that signed the Abraham Accords have expressed growing dissatisfaction with Israel’s military conduct and its policies in the West Bank. As United Arab Emirates envoy Lana Zaki Nusseibeh warned, Israeli actions risk undermining “the vision and spirit” of the Abraham Accords.
Saudi Arabia’s view has shifted too. Prior to October 2023, Riyadh was cautiously advancing toward normalization, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stating that “every day we get closer.” At that stage, negotiations even included a draft framework under which Israel would make only modest Palestinian concessions. Faced with regional outrage and overwhelmingly negative public opinion, Saudi leadership repositioned the Palestinian issue at the center of its regional policy. By late 2024, bin Salman declared that the kingdom “will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel” without the creation of an independent Palestinian state. What had once been a flexible negotiating framework has hardened into a clear and public condition, significantly narrowing the diplomatic space for normalization. Indonesia, another prominent country that might join the Abraham Accords, has similarly reiterated that making progress on the Palestinian issue is a prerequisite for normalizing ties.
The Israeli public, however, remains supportive of regional integration: A May 2025 survey found 61 percent support normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia and expanding the Abraham Accords; two-thirds agree this would “strengthen Israel’s security, economy, and regional standing.” In contrast, others in the region increasingly see Israeli policy as a major obstacle to expanding the Abraham Accords. This disconnect reveals a gap between what Israelis want and the political reality of the region.
Leadership constraints also shape this gap. Netanyahu retains the legacy of launching the Abraham Accords, but his current coalition limits his ability to make policy adjustments that would advance them, particularly on the Palestinian front. At the same time, Israel’s wartime conduct has weakened Netanyahu’s regional standing and narrowed the diplomatic space for normalization. A different leadership might change these circumstances, not because it would change its basic views on security, but because it could offer more flexibility and restore Israel’s regional credibility.
Priorities for a new government
In this environment, restoring Abraham Accords momentum would require any new Israeli government to pursue four policy priorities.
- Restore credibility with Gulf partners. The first priority is to demonstrate to its Gulf allies that Israel is a credible partner, not an obstacle. This primarily includes shelving discussions of West Bank annexation and taking stronger measures to curb settler violence, while also avoiding actions that could further destabilize the situation. These actions do not require a final status agreement, but they are essential in order to restore the minimum political conditions under which Gulf leaders can justify engagement.
Israel has already shown this trade-off is possible. In 2020, Israel agreed to put its annexation plans on hold in exchange for normalization with the UAE. Today, the stakes are higher, and regional politics are more constrained, but the logic remains the same. Leaders from the Gulf will be willing to act pragmatically, but only if Israel demonstrates comparable discipline. Without that signal, integration will remain politically unfeasible regardless of shared interests. - Deepen coordination with Washington. Israel’s next cabinet should work with Washington to institutionalize the Abraham Accords as a long-term regional framework. Establishing an Abraham Accords directorate, jointly coordinated with the United States, would sustain momentum beyond political cycles. Its core objectives should include convening regular regional forums and working groups, encouraging the accession of additional countries, coordinating regional initiatives such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and promoting greater awareness of the accords’ strategic and economic value.
Although the Abraham Accords currently enjoy support in Washington, that support cannot be taken for granted. While both the Trump and Biden administrations have backed normalization, the accords’ long-term sustainability will depend on whether they are seen as advancing core US interests: strengthening regional stability, countering adversarial influence, expanding free trade, and fostering both economic connectivity and pro-American partnerships. A dedicated institutional framework could help preserve bipartisan support even if political leadership changes. - Re-engage the Palestinian track. The trauma of October 7 makes this policy priority politically difficult, but it remains unavoidable. Any attempt to create a regional framework, especially one that involves Saudi Arabia, will ultimately require addressing the Palestinian issue. Right now, the idea of full statehood remains unlikely, given the strong opposition from the Israeli public and the fact that the current Palestinian Authority (PA) is incompetent as a governing partner. However, it is essential to keep some political momentum going as a pragmatic step toward achieving long-term separation and regional integration, rather than as an ideological concession.
The next government should pursue a narrow, incremental approach that signals goodwill. This includes moving toward implementation of the second stage of the ceasefire, expanding the role of non-Hamas Palestinian technocrats in reconstruction, strengthening PA revenue streams to prevent financial collapse, and supporting post-conflict stabilization measures. The goal is not renewed negotiations but separation from ongoing conflict—sufficient to meet regional expectations while remaining politically feasible at home. - Keep integration moving. Even prior to Saudi normalization, the next government should treat regional integration as a long-term strategy and advance it through economic, technological, and minilateral channels. The Abraham Accords can continue delivering tangible gains if they are operationalized, not just preserved. This means deepening existing ties by expanding the UAE free trade agreement, and advancing partnerships in specific sectors with Bahrain and Morocco in areas such as energy, infrastructure, and technology.
At the same time, Israel should invest in durable regional architecture. The I2U2 Group, which brings together Israel, the United States, India, and the UAE, offers a viable platform for translating normalization into joint investment and minilateral cooperation. Alongside this, Israel should accelerate its role in the IMEC, which has become even more important amid Iranian and Houthi disruptions to traditional trade routes. The goal should be to turn normalization into a durable economic and institutional interdependence, which would generate mutual gains and make regional cooperation more resilient to future political shocks.
Ultimately, the next government in Israel will not be judged on whether it can recreate the diplomatic momentum of 2020 but on how well it can adjust to a far more constrained regional reality. There are many obstacles, but the Abraham Accords remain the future of the Middle East. This election will not determine the future of regional integration, but whether Israel remains part of it.
Amit Yarom is a graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is a foreign policy researcher, specializing in the Gulf.
Itai Melchior is a nonresident senior fellow with the Project for Middle East Integration at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He previously served in the Office of the Israeli Prime Minister as deputy director of the Ministry of External Affairs and Special Liaisons Directorate within Israel’s National Security Council.
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Image: Former Israeli Prime minister Naftali Bennett and Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid gesture as they announce their political union ahead of this year's general election, the new party will be called Together, in Herzliya, Israel April 26, 2026. REUTERS/ Gideon Markowicz