Why post-Assad Syria complicates the Iran-Turkey rivalry
Turkey and Iran’s complex relationship can be best described as a “cooperative rivalry.” The two countries maintain important trade ties and their interests overlap on several matters, from opposing Israel’s war on Gaza and bombing of Syria to supporting Qatar during the 2017-2021 blockade. Turkey has also played a key role in helping Iran dull the impact of Western sanctions. But with Ankara and Tehran aspiring to play increasingly influential roles in the Middle East, they have at times also seen high levels of competition and tension in bilateral affairs.
With Syria’s Iran-allied regime falling late last year and being replaced by a Turkey-oriented political order in Damascus, Syria’s fluid dynamics have, at least for now, shifted the Levant’s balance of power in Ankara’s favor while weakening Tehran’s clout. Developments in Syria could complicate Iran-Turkey relations, especially given that Tehran believes Ankara’s Syria policies pose a threat to Iranian interests. Turkish policymakers are likely worried about Iranian meddling in Syria that could affect the country’s fragile transition in manners that harm Turkey’s interests.
Nonetheless, Turkey and Iran can manage and compartmentalize their tensions vis-à-vis Syria in a way that prevents outright hostilities between them. Additionally, if Turkey and Israel’s tensions in relation to Syria continue heating up, there could even be reason to expect a degree of Iran-Turkey alignment in Syria.
Iran’s loss and Turkey’s win
With Turkey emerging as a “big winner” in Syria after Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Iranian policymakers are nervous about some of the wider implications for Tehran’s strategic interests. With the rise of a Sunni Islamist government in Damascus—one that views Iran-backed nonstate actors as a serious regional threat and vows to stop Iranian arms from flowing through Syria—Tehran has concerns about the future of Hezbollah, a group that has long played a critical role in the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. With Assad out of the picture (after Iran invested tens of billions of dollars in propping up his regime) and a Turkey-oriented administration leading in Damascus, Iran has suffered a humiliating loss in Syria.
Iranian media outlets close to the state frequently depict Turkey as having worked with the United States and Israel to topple Assad as part of a grander plot aimed at empowering the West and Israel while weakening Iran. Since Assad fell late last year, a number of Iranian voices have blasted Turkey for its role in facilitating Azerbaijan’s oil exports to Israel amid the war in Gaza—arguing that Ankara bears some responsibility for Palestinian suffering.
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The Syrian tilt in Turkey’s favor comes after Ankara gained clout in the South Caucuses with the unfolding of the 2020 Karabakh war, a conflict that underscored the power of the Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance while fueling major geopolitical and security concerns for Tehran.
Turkey is determined to help the Islamist rebels-turned-rulers in Damascus cement their control over all of Syria. Ankara sees the potential for a strong unitary state in Syria with a pro-Turkish government in power that is aligned with Turkey’s long-term interests. Turkey has fears about Iran potentially lending support to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party-linked People’s Protection Unit (YPG)—the armed group in Syria that Ankara is most concerned about from a security standpoint. Turkish policymakers are also monitoring the situation in Latakia, Tartus, and other parts of western Syria where, in the event of further fragmentation of the country, a breakaway Alawite-led statelet supported by Iran could form, cutting off the new government in Damascus from much of the country’s Mediterranean coast.
The precedent for managing tensions
As much as Turkey has gained clout in Syria at Iran’s and Russia’s expense, Ankara recognizes that Tehran has cards to play in post-Assad Syria, which could challenge Turkey and weaken Syria’s new government amid the war-torn country’s fragile transition. Within this context, Turkey and Iran will likely be keen to prevent their Syria-related tensions from fomenting hostilities in bilateral relations—they may even look for ways to advance common interests through cooperation.
There is a precedent for that. For example, in 2017, Turkey, Iran, and Russia met in Kazakhstan for the Astana Process (a forum on peace in Syria). To be sure, the new reality in Syria is different from the country’s situation in 2017. But the Astana Process highlighted how Ankara and Tehran, despite their conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis, can come together as two regional heavyweights and engage in dialogue geared toward resolving the conflict. Although the Astana Process failed to resolve the civil war, the format did, to its credit, lead to reduced violence in Syria.
The potential for alignment
Israel’s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-Assad Syria could play a part in bringing Turkey’s and Iran’s interests into greater alignment. At this stage, it is unclear whether Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric will evolve into more concrete actions or how such actions would play out. Nonetheless, Turkey and Syria’s new government are exploring a defense pact that could include Turkish airbases in central Syria. That may fuel tensions between Turkey and Israel, which could play out in a variety of ways. Even if a Turkish-Israeli military confrontation on Syrian soil seems unlikely at this point, intensifying friction between these two US allies would probably serve Iran’s interests.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recently accused Ankara of facilitating Iranian cash flows to Lebanon’s Hezbollah. If true, this would mean that Turkey is helping Iran maintain influence in the eastern Mediterranean. The United States has also sanctioned Turkey-based Mira Ihracat Ithalat Petrol and its chief executive officer for “providing critical financial support” to a financial network that runs between Iran and Hezbollah. Some experts have noted that, since Assad’s fall, Iran could be eyeing Turkish airspace in its search for alternative routes for flying arms to Hezbollah. However, it is unclear whether Ankara would ever agree to playing this role for Iran and Hezbollah.
Looking ahead, the fragile transition in Syria is set to bolster Ankara’s regional influence in ways that complicate Turkey’s sensitive relationship with Iran. While the Trump administration surely would like to see Turkish influence in Syria serve as a bulwark against Iran, it is unlikely that Ankara will approach the Islamic Republic in a manner that fully aligns with any US-led “maximum pressure 2.0” agenda. With vested stakes in preventing hostilities with Iran, policymakers in Ankara are likely to seize on the new balance of power in Syria while also maintaining a fruitful dialogue with Iran and keeping Iranian security concerns about Syria-related issues in consideration.
Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
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Image: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan holds a joint press conference with Syria interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Ankara on Febuary 4, 2025. Ahmed al-Sharaa and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are expected to discuss a joint defense pact in Ankara on Tuesday, including the establishment of Turkish airbases in central Syria and training for Syrias new army, four sources familiar with the matter told Reuters. This marks the first public indication of a potential long-term military cooperation between Türkiye and Syrias new government following the ousting of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. (Turkish presidential press service via EYEPRESS)