President-elect Donald Trump’s election victory has led the Kremlin to double down on a risky gamble: that Trump’s desire for a quick resolution to the war in Ukraine will lead to a settlement that freezes the conflict along its current lines, legitimizing Moscow’s territorial gains. Since the US election, Russian forces have ramped up their military offensive, which will predictably continue until the inauguration as Russian President Vladimir Putin aims to strengthen his negotiating position.
Despite Europe’s wish for stability on its eastern border, it must not accept any resolution that entrenches Russian territorial gains in Ukraine. Indeed, several indicators suggest that the war may be entering its final stretch. The course set by Moscow might be leading it toward an iceberg over the next twelve to eighteen months, as Russia confronts three primary challenges that could alter the conflict’s trajectory to the Kremlin’s disadvantage.
First, the Russian economy is under severe strain from the war’s financial demands. Military wages have skyrocketed, with new recruits offered substantial sums, distorting the labor market and creating a stark wage gap between military personnel and civilians. The average civilian salary is currently at just above a million rubles per year, while many new military recruits receive a sign-up offer of up to two million rubles. This unsustainable policy, designed to increase recruitment and maintain morale, is destabilizing the economy by distorting the labor market. It is also a testament to Putin’s miscalculated gamble on a swift military campaign. To sustain the war effort into its third year, Putin is now dragging the Russian economy toward a crisis due to escalating military expenditures.
Second, Russian manpower shortages are becoming critical, with an estimated thirty-six thousand soldiers killed or wounded each month. Recruitment quotas are stretched thin, with regions throughout Russia struggling to feed the country’s war machine with men. To ease the pressure, Russia has begun recruiting from territories it occupies in Ukraine and has even resorted to turning to North Korea for additional troops to avoid tapping into the populations of Moscow and St. Petersburg. The deployment of troops from Pyongyang is unlikely to be a one-time occurrence. Instead, the Kremlin appears to be trying to establish a pipeline of ten thousand to fifteen thousand North Korean troops per month to fill its manpower deficit and try to stave off an eventual crisis of manpower shortages.
Third, Russian forces are facing a looming crisis in heavy armored vehicles as stocks dwindle. The scarcity of such equipment will eventually force a shift toward more infantry-intensive tactics, likely causing further increases in Russian casualties.
Putin’s intensified military efforts in anticipation of the US election were a calculated risk, betting on a quick settlement. However, if Western resolve holds over the next twelve to eighteen months—when Russia might hit its breaking point—the conflict’s outcome could defy Putin’s expectations.
The importance of Europe sticking together
Europe will likely become a lower priority for the United States in a second Trump administration, as Washington’s focus and resources shift toward China and the Indo-Pacific. This pivot will put more pressure on European states to strengthen their defense spending, increase their contributions to NATO, and move toward greater strategic autonomy. As this shift gives the United States greater flexibility in Asia, it will also require Europe to take greater responsibility for addressing regional security challenges, such as the threat posed by Russia.
It is possible that US disengagement from Europe, combined with Russian advances in Ukraine, might convince European Union (EU) countries to agree to a robust common European Defense. But a Russian victory would likely end up undermining Europe’s ambitions to become a more cohesive political bloc. Although Ukraine is not an EU member, a Ukrainian defeat could spill over and end up revealing that the bloc is not prepared to fulfill the most basic mandate for any political entity: guaranteeing strategic security and stability to its citizens. One plausible reaction to a Ukrainian defeat would be for major European countries to retrench into their own state-level security, which could then threaten to weaken the European project along its economic and other lines as well.
Moscow is deeply aware of this and plans to realize this prospect through hybrid campaigns, including weaponized immigration, arson, sabotage, cyberattacks, and disinformation. Arguably, the primary effort of Russia’s war is not the kinetic one on the battlefield, but rather the cognitive one directed at European countries to undermine their political will to act, making a Russian victory inevitable, so the Kremlin hopes.
Peace isn’t peace if it leads to another Russian push
If the United States reduces its support for Kyiv, then Europe must resist the temptation to seek a premature, unjust settlement. What may appear to be the restoration of peace would cause catastrophic damage to the West’s deterrence. It would also be a welcome respite for Putin, allowing him to reorganize and prepare for a new push toward the Kremlin’s repeatedly stated objective of erasing Ukraine as an independent country.
Many indicators suggest that the war is entering a decisive stretch, presenting a crossroads for Europe’s future. With the United States potentially reducing its commitment to Ukraine and the new European Commission taking charge in Brussels, the EU’s actions vis-a-vis Ukraine will be carefully watched by allies and adversaries as the first signs of its new strategic identity. They will shape its perception in Washington as well as in Moscow and Beijing—whether it be one of division or unity, strength or weakness, awareness or denial.
As Russia sails toward the iceberg, it is crucial for Europe to remain steadfast in its stance. Allowing Russia to claim victory now would not only have grave consequences for Ukraine but could also lead to the collapse of the European project.
Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served within the Italian government for seventeen years in various capacities related to foreign affairs and security policy, including as a special adviser to Italy’s minister of foreign affairs.
Gabriele Carrer is a journalist at Formiche in Rome. He has been a visiting fellow at the Rome office at the European Council on Foreign Relations, where he researched foreign disinformation and interference threats in Italy.
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