The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are about to take a historic energy security step on February 9, when they will synchronize their former Soviet electricity systems with the Continental Europe Network (CEN). This will conclude the final chapter of Russia’s involvement in the energy sectors of these frontline European Union (EU) and NATO member states. But the Baltic states and their NATO allies must now work to secure this hard-won energy independence from Russia’s ongoing hybrid attacks on critical energy infrastructure.
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have faced a wide array of Russian coercive energy policy measures arising from their historical dependence on Russian energy supplies and Soviet-era energy infrastructure. These measures included a total economic and energy blockade of Lithuania in 1990 in response to its independence movement, a prompt shutdown of an oil pipeline after Lithuania declined to sell its crude oil refinery to a Russian company in 2006, and long-term politically motivated gas pricing for the Baltics, to name just a few well-known cases.
Having faced the destructive impacts of Russia’s weaponization of energy, the Baltic states have become leaders among European nations in severing ties with Russia’s energy supplies over the past decade. The installation of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Klaipėda, Lithuania’s seaport, in late 2014 marked a significant step in this direction. It opened the Baltic gas markets to global LNG suppliers, including those from the United States. This alternative gas supply route enabled the Baltic states to ban all Russian gas imports, both piped and LNG, just two months into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. The Baltic states became the first European countries to take such a principled stance, and they are among those advocating for the rest of the EU members to follow suit by implementing a blanket ban on Russian LNG.
Flipping the switch
The timely diversification of oil and electricity supply routes also allowed the Baltics to stop importing these energy sources from Russia. In terms of electricity, the Baltic states use the interconnectors Estlink 1 and Estlink 2 between Estonia and Finland, Nordbalt between Lithuania and Sweden, and LitPol Link between Lithuania and Poland for power exchanges with Europe. However, the Baltic states’ early market-level integration with their EU neighbors did not mean the immediate end of Russia’s involvement in the their electricity sectors on the system control level.
These are the last days that the Baltic states’ power grids remain a part of the Russian-controlled Integrated Power System/United Power System (IPS/UPS) grid. This effectively means that a dispatch in Moscow is still responsible for maintaining electric frequency stability in the Baltic states—bringing all the risks that such a dependency on Moscow entails. Ukraine and Moldova performed a test desynchronization from the IPS/UPS grid concurrently with the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, immediately asking for an emergency synchronization with the European grid, which was granted. Lithuania was aware of the potential need to perform an emergency synchronization, too, and thus had prepared its power grid to function in an isolated mode if needed. On February 8, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will decouple from the Russian-controlled grid and conduct a joint isolated operation test before joining the European grid on February 9.
The planning for the Baltic synchronization with the European grid began as early as 2007, but—due to multiple project phases involving political, regulatory, and infrastructural components in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland—it has only now been finalized. The project was co-financed by the EU, which has allocated more than €1.2 billion from its Connecting Europe Facility. For the EU, the project is as important as it is for the Baltic states: only with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia connected to the European grid can the EU achieve its goal of a fully integrated European energy market, in which all uncontrolled third-party impacts on its member states are eliminated.
Securing critical infrastructure
Although Russia will no longer exert direct influence over the energy supply and system control of the Baltic states, Moscow may now focus on targeting their critical energy, communications, and data infrastructure. Since October 2023, at least eleven cables running under the Baltic Sea have been damaged. This includes the underwater Balticconnector gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland; communications cables linking Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Lithuania; and the Estlink 2 power cable between Estonia and Finland. A data cable between Latvia and Sweden has been damaged as recently as January 26. The Lithuanian government is responding with increased military involvement in protecting critical seaborne energy infrastructure under the Baltic Sea amid an attempted sabotage of the NordBalt power cable that connects it to Sweden.
The damage was caused by vessels dragging their anchors on the Baltic Sea’s seabed. Investigations into the circumstances of the damage are still ongoing, but the rapid increase in such incidents and the vessels involved—mostly Russia’s “shadow fleet” oil tankers—raise concerns that the damage was intentional. As a response, NATO has stepped up its presence in the Baltic Sea by launching a new military patrol mission called Baltic Sentry. This mission involves deploying frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and naval drones to enhance the ability of littoral states to respond to destabilizing acts on their critical infrastructure. The Alliance has also established a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to enhance information-sharing and situational awareness and a dedicated Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure within NATO’s Maritime Command in Northwood, United Kingdom.
Crucial first steps have also been made to increase the protection level of the onshore LitPol Link interconnector between Lithuania and Poland, through which the Baltics are synchronizing with the European grid. Lithuania’s Public Security Service has taken over the protection of several LitPol Link sites from a private security company that had previously been assigned this role. The Baltic states and Poland, fully aware of Russia’s hybrid activities in the region, have also urged the EU to provide financial support for enhancing current security measures for the LitPol Link and other critical energy infrastructure in the region.
It’s a start, but more needs to be done, particularly in the case of Lithuania. With vital interconnectors—LitPol Link in energy and Rail Baltica in transport and military logistics—passing through the country, Lithuania is emerging as a crucial gateway connecting continental Europe to the Baltics, the Nordic region, and even the Arctic.
All these interconnections traverse the narrow land corridor between Lithuania and Poland, known as the Suwałki Gap. This notorious area borders Belarus to the east and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave to the west.
Russia could attempt to isolate the Baltics from the rest of Europe by obstructing the Suwałki Gap from these territories. Thus, beyond the punctual tactics of strengthening the security of the LitPol Link and, later, the planned additional onshore electricity interconnector between Lithuania and Poland that is reportedly set to run along the Rail Baltica tracks, an approach of a comprehensive protection regime for this vulnerable border area is needed. An increased NATO military presence in Lithuania and regional measures, such as installing the Baltic Defense Line along the Baltic states’ borders with mainland Russia, its Kaliningrad region, and Belarus, are important steps toward a solution.
With the Baltic power systems soon operating in harmony with those in continental Europe, the regional security agenda shifts from concerns over the security of energy supply to the protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Baltic nations and their allies should further enhance their proactive efforts to deter sabotage and secure this strategically vital region.
Justina Budginaite-Froehly, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
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