Don’t cut corners on US nuclear deterrence

The nuclear threats to the United States and its allies are growing. To deter these threats, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (a commission on which one of the authors, Matthew Kroenig, served) recently recommended that the United States plan for its first strategic forces buildup since the end of the Cold War.

In contrast to this bipartisan consensus, House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA) argued in Newsweek in May for adjustments and cuts to the US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Smith’s argument that the United States should consider mobile basing for a portion of its ICBM force has merit, but his other arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. Rather, bipartisan support for modernizing and expanding the US nuclear arsenal will be essential for ensuring that the United States and its allies have the strategic forces they need to deter aggression in the face of hostile, nuclear-armed, autocratic rivals.

There are several problems with Smith’s arguments. First, he questions whether land-based nuclear forces are needed at all. Yet, every presidential administration since the 1950s has considered this question and concluded that ICBMs are necessary. Indeed, as we have argued at length elsewhere (see here and here), ICBMs contribute to the major goals of US nuclear strategy—they deter adversaries from launching a strategic attack, assure allies, and give the United States the ability to respond if deterrence fails.

There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Second, Smith argues that an enemy nuclear attack on vulnerable ICBMs could force a US president into a use-them-or-lose-them situation and a “rushed” decision to launch a nuclear attack. But the president is not forced to launch nuclear weapons as soon as a possible enemy missile launch is detected. The president has the option to ride out the attack and retaliate with other, more survivable forces, if necessary. Moreover, it does not make sense to argue that ICBMs are, on the one hand, so important that the president would need to launch them if under attack and, on the other hand, the United States should slash their numbers. ICBMs are either important or they are not. If ICBMs are expendable, then there is no reason for the president to launch them if under attack. If they are important, as we believe they are, then it is unwise to curtail them.

Third, Smith argues that US ICBM silos are uniquely dangerous because they invite an adversary to target its nuclear weapons in the US heartland, and that such an attack could kill millions of people. But the purpose of nuclear weapons is, of course, to deter nuclear attack in the first place. If ICBMs continue to deter effectively, as they have for the past half century and more, then an attack will not come. Moreover, if the adversary did not need to target its nuclear weapons on missile silos in the isolated high plains of Montana and North Dakota, for example, then the attacker could reallocate those weapons toward major US cities, which would only result in more US deaths in the event of a nuclear war.

Fourth, Smith continues by arguing that, even if the United States does maintain some silo-based ICBMs, the Department of Defense should purchase fewer of them. But again, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued that the current US nuclear modernization program of record—which includes the new Sentinel ICBMs,* new ballistic missile submarines, new strategic bombers, and new air-launched nuclear cruise missiles—is necessary but not sufficient to maintain strategic deterrence. There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Fifth, Smith argues that, if the United States keeps the same number of nuclear weapons, then it should shift warheads from ICBMs to the submarine leg of the nuclear triad. But there is not much room to shift large numbers of warheads to the sea-based leg without increasing the total number of submarines, and the United States is already straining to produce the planned number of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines on time. Moreover, if the United States were to build more submarines, that would be inconsistent with Smith’s stated concern about costs. Building and operating more submarines is much more expensive than modernizing ground-based missile silos.

Sixth, Smith worries that the Department of Defense does not have the resources to complete the US nuclear modernization program while making necessary investments in conventional forces. It is true that the Department of Defense must make tradeoffs in some areas, but not with nuclear deterrence, which is its highest priority. Congress should ensure that the United States has sufficient resources at its disposal to build and deploy the necessary nuclear and conventional forces.

Smith’s strongest argument is that the United States should consider putting some portion of its ICBM force on mobile launchers instead of in silos. In fact, the bipartisan congressional commission recommends this option to enhance the survivability of the ground-based leg. But this option would not result in cost savings, contrary to what Smith suggests. A mobile option would require building new missile garrisons and also result in higher operational and security costs. Given the worsening international security environment, land-mobile missiles should be a complement to, not a replacement for, the ICBM program of record.

Now is not the time to be making cuts to the US nuclear arsenal. As the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued in its consensus report, the United States must urgently complete its nuclear modernization program of record and take actions today to enhance its strategic posture. The future of international peace and security depends on it.


Matthew Kroenig is vice president of the Atlantic Council and senior director of its Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is currently a commissioner on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and was a senior policy adviser in the Pentagon in support of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center.

Note: The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducts work on nuclear and strategic forces that is sponsored by donors including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation (which has the sole contract from the US Air Force to engineer and manufacture Sentinel ICBMs), the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, and the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. This article did not involve any of these donors and reflects only the authors’ views.

Further reading

Image: The 91st Missile Wing’s Missile Maintenance Teams of Minot Air Force Base are responsible for maintenance performed at the launch facility on the top three components of the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Photo by Airman 1st Class Kristoffer Kaubisch. April 10, 2023.