Central Asia Middle East Russia Security & Defense Terrorism
New Atlanticist November 27, 2024

IS-K terrorists already pose a global threat. Now Russia might be making the danger worse.

By Katherine Spencer

Election day could have been a violent tragedy. Just two weeks before Americans went to the polls, US officials confirmed that Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) was behind a thwarted terror plot. A twenty-seven-year-old Afghan man, who had resettled in the United States after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, had planned to carry out a mass shooting targeting large groups of people on November 4. IS-K, an affiliate of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), had been in direct communication with the would-be attacker. 

IS-K was formed in 2015 and operates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Initially, the group seemed to focus on recruitment and on conducting attacks within Afghanistan. The group experienced a slowdown between 2018 and 2021 because of US and Afghan military operations targeting the group in Afghanistan. The Taliban, too, fought against IS-K during this period. However, after the US troop withdrawal in 2021, the Taliban became the only force combating the group on the ground, which allowed the terrorist organization to regroup and build operations in Afghanistan and beyond. With this resurgence, IS-K seems to have pivoted its strategy away from attacks within Afghanistan to a more global agenda.

In the first half of 2024, IS-K carried out three successful attacks abroad that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians in Iran, Turkey, and Russia. The attack in Moscow on Crocus City Hall, which claimed the lives of more than 140 people, made headlines and stoked fears of a resurgent and coordinated global IS-K threat. The success of the attack might also provide motivation for the group to attempt similar mass casualty attacks elsewhere. 

In addition to these attacks, there have been a number of publicly disclosed foiled plots and arrests connected to IS-K across the globe. Authorities reportedly disrupted IS-K plots to attack the Olympic Games in Paris and Taylor Swift concerts in Austria this past summer. In August, a United Nations official called IS-K the “greatest” terror threat to Europe. And the threat is not only in Europe; eight Tajik nationals suspected of connections to ISIS were arrested this year after entering the United States. 

IS-K is simultaneously increasing its online propaganda output and tailoring it to a wider audience. Last summer, IS-K began releasing more multilingual content, with an uptick in Uzbek- and Tajik-language materials in particular. Shortly after the Crocus City Hall attack, a media group connected with IS-K created a new Tajik-language magazine, a change from its infrequent and low-profile usage of Tajik in previous materials. 

Moscow remains an unreliable partner with a diminishing willingness to engage in counterterrorism cooperation.

US officials have reported that the group has rolled out a “sophisticated propaganda campaign” targeting disaffected individuals in the Muslim diaspora to carry out attacks in Western countries, including in the United States. This represents an expansion from previous recruitment efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. On top of the group’s new efforts, Israel’s war in Gaza has also likely contributed to radicalizing a new generation.

There is another change that further complicates US and European counterterrorism efforts: Russia is making the IS-K threat worse. 

Two weeks before the Crocus City Hall attack, the United States alerted Russia about the possibility of an impending terrorist strike on large gatherings in Moscow. The public warnings and private communication on the matter with Russian authorities in the lead-up to the attack proved futile. Only three days before the tragic attack, Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the warning, citing it as “propaganda” meant to “intimidate and destabilize” Russian society.

Intelligence sharing has been an integral part of counterterrorism efforts since 9/11, and the United States and Russia have successfully cooperated on the issue in the past. But the deterioration of US-Russian relations amid the Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a greater blind spot in the US response to the global threat of IS-K. It remains unclear whether Russia simply didn’t trust the Western tip or failed to react effectively to it, although both constitute a faulty policy with deadly consequences.

In addition, most Central Asians recruited to IS-K have been radicalized in Russia. For decades, Russia has been a major destination for Central Asian migrants seeking work, but the harsh living conditions, economic struggles, and widespread hostility they face there make this population more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Central Asians, particularly Tajiks, have been involved in much of IS-K’s recent activities, with some experts estimating that they may make up as much as half of the group’s recruits. With Russia a fertile recruiting ground for Central Asians, who make up much of IS-K’s ranks, Moscow’s counterterrorism policy would play a key role in mitigating the threat. 

In response to the March attack, Russia has tightened restrictions on Central Asian migrants. In the summer, the State Duma passed a new batch of laws that curb the rights of migrants, while raids against migrant communities have become more frequent. These official actions, accompanied by increased instances of xenophobia on the street, contribute to a growing hostile environment for Central Asians in Russia. These hardships, which have pushed some to extremism already, will likely worsen as Putin’s crackdown continues, leaving an already vulnerable population even more exposed to IS-K’s recruitment pitch. 

Russia has shown no clear intention to effectively tackle the growing threat of IS-K. The Kremlin has blamed the Crocus City Hall attack and others on the West or Kyiv, likely as an attempt to deflect responsibility for failing to stop the attacks. Moscow remains an unreliable partner with a diminishing willingness to engage in counterterrorism cooperation while pursuing ineffective policies to mitigate this threat. Indeed, its policies likely created more fertile ground for recruitment in the country. 

US policymakers should expect a growing blind spot coming out of Russia resulting from Moscow’s ineffective counterterrorism measures and increasingly hostile policy to a population already vulnerable to extremist recruitment. Russia cannot be relied on to deal with this threat, which makes the attention of the United States and its allies on this issue all the more urgent.


Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

Image: Law enforcement and fire fighters at Crocus City Hall outside Moscow following a shooting attack on March 23, 2024. Photo by Yuri Gripas/ABACAPRESS.COM