More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and despite the fact that a horizontal escalation beyond NATO’s fence remains a growing possibility, today only twenty-three of thirty-two NATO allies spend the requisite 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. Even fewer are making a serious effort to invest in real exercised military capabilities that are essential to the implementation of NATO’s new regional plans. This reality can no longer serve as fodder for perennial complaints from Washington about European allies not doing enough when it comes to “burden sharing.”
Even while several NATO allies fail to sufficiently rearm, the countries of NATO’s northeastern corridor—especially Sweden, Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland—have made tremendous strides in terms of defense spending, developing their capabilities, and showing that they are serious about contributing to the Alliance’s collective security. The glaring disparity between what the allies along the Northeastern corridor are doing versus what the countries further away from the flank are failing to do should generate a change in US policy. For NATO to work in a way that lowers costs for the United States and increases the Alliance’s effectiveness, Washington should prioritize its defense cooperation with member states that are doing the most to bolster their own defenses, especially the Northeast corridor allies.
You get what you pay for
The lack of investment in defense over the past three decades has led to a situation in NATO in which the largest and wealthiest member states, including Germany and the United Kingdom, struggle to field anything bigger than brigade-level forces, and where they have fewer tanks in their entire inventory than Russia adds to its own every few months. Most principal NATO allies lack weapons, munitions, and supplies to carry out an operation longer than a few weeks’ duration. A case in point: It is questionable whether the Dutch army is still able to defend its territory, having eliminated its remaining Leopard 2 tanks. Today, the Netherlands is trying to restore some armor capabilities by creating one tank battalion, but it remains to be seen whether it will be able to do so. The Belgian army numbers 28,000 personnel on paper, but it continues to struggle with recruitment shortfalls for even such a small military. A few years back, the Belgian ministry of defense even considered a plan to allow homesick recruits to sleep at home rather than in barracks during basic training. The vaunted French armed forces also continue to struggle, with the former chief of staff of the French Army telling the media last year that the country was not ready for high-intensity war.
Punching above their weight
But it’s not all bad news when it comes to defense spending, readiness, and commitment within NATO. The countries along the NATO’s Northeastern corridor—especially Sweden, Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland—have demonstrated that they are serious about capabilities, willing to spend money on defense, and prepared to take risks. In fact, Poland just announced that it will increase its defense spending in its 2025 budget to 4.7 percent of its GDP. Based on the numbers released by the Polish National Security Bureau, Poland currently has the third largest military in NATO, fielding 216,000 personnel, and it aims to expand its force to 300,000, including 50,000 Territorial Defense Forces. Poland’s massive investment into its capabilities includes 250 Abrams M1A2 SEPv3 tanks, K-2 South Korean tanks, thirty-two F-35 fighter aircraft, Apache attack helicopters, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and thousands of rockets, and self-propelled howitzers, both of Polish and Korean manufacture.
Sweden is ramping up its defense industry, as it also works closely with US defense and space contractors to look for synergies to expand production and lower costs. Stockholm has already reestablished a “total defense system” to offset risk to its cyber infrastructure. Even though the Swedish military shrank significantly after the Cold War, it has retained a broad set of advanced capabilities it is now rapidly expanding. As Stockholm joined NATO, it brought in about one hundred Gripen JAS 39 aircraft, plus refueling capabilities that make the Swedish air force one of the most powerful in Europe. It also operates some of the most advanced submarines in the world.
Finland, a country that has retained conscription, can quickly expand its peacetime standing army to a force of 280,000. It trains 21,000 new conscripts each year, plus 10,000 soldiers retrained each year on a rotational basis. In total, 870,000 Finns aged between seventeen and sixty can be pulled into service in a national emergency—these are impressive numbers for a nation of 5.5 million. The same goes for the equipment Finland fields. The country has the largest conventional artillery in Europe, numbering some 1,500 units. It also has one of the most robust artillery and missile systems, and to strengthen its air force, it has purchased sixty-four F-35 fighters from the United States.
The Baltic states, though limited in terms of the size of their economies and populations, are nonetheless investing heavily in defense, most recently setting up new ammunition factories. Germany’s Rheinmetall is planning major investments in ammunition production in Lithuania. Estonia is building a defense industry park to help companies set up new production plants. And Latvia has established a state-owned company to coordinate and invest in ammunition manufacturing. All three Baltic states have targeted their defense spending at 3 percent of GDP, fast-tracking military modernization and weapons acquisition. All have also invested heavily in military infrastructure on their territories, including the bases at Ādaži in Latvia, Tapa in Estonia, and Rukla in Lithuania, as well as planning new installations. Further south along the Northeastern corridor, Romania has been ramping up its rearmament, with a contract to buy thirty-two F-35, after it already purchased thirty-two F-16 fighter jets from Norway to augment the seventeen F-16s bought from Portugal since 2016.
Washington should look northeast
The United States should encourage, work more closely with, and reward those allies that spend the money and share the risk to ensure their own defense and to resource NATO’s regional plans with real exercised capabilities. At the same time, Washington must send a clear message to those allies that don’t contribute as much to collective defense that the status quo will not do. Most importantly, the United States should rethink its base structure in Europe and shift its force posture to reflect the new reality of collective deterrence and defense. This means moving to permanent US basing in Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania, while refocusing the existing US legacy installations in Germany to training, logistics, sustainment, maintenance, and support.
The transformed geostrategic map of Europe requires that the United States revise old assumptions when it comes to working with NATO allies. At a time when threats to collective security are rising and many allies have yet to match their rhetoric with action, Washington needs to deepen its cooperation with those NATO members that put a premium on doing rather than talking.
Andrew A. Michta is a senior fellow and director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council. The views expressed here are his own.
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Image: Servicemen stand by Abrams tank as they attends the 32nd International Defence Industry Exhibition - MSPO i Targi Kielce in central Poland on September 5, 2024. The Exhibition presents most modern solutions and technologies in military industry. (Photo by Dominika Zarzycka/NurPhoto)