United Nations arms embargo on Iran

While, in many countries, defense companies are private, they are state-owned in Iran. Because of the Islamic Republic’s long pariah status, interaction with the outside world has been limited.

On the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, the European approach has been, to a large extent, inspired by legal concerns and a commitment to a rules-based international order.

An Israeli perspective.

Despite the spectrum of positions on Iran exhibited by Gulf governments, one thing they agree on is the need for the US and Europe to arrive at one voice on the embargo, and on Iran’s proxy activities across the board.

By becoming a major arms supplier to Iran, Beijing would unnecessarily antagonize the United States and alienate several Iranian rivals across the Middle East, many of which are also strategic partners for China.

A particular issue of concern to Turkey is whether Moscow might choose to supply advanced weapons systems to Iran, which Tehran has long sought.

Moscow made clear months ago that, once the United Nations arms embargo on Tehran expires in October, Russia intends to resume selling weapons to Iran.

Iran’s purchases will likely be limited, by both economic and geopolitical constraints, including the impact of US sanctions and the coronavirus pandemic and caution on the part of potential suppliers.

The United States, for its part, will need to be careful not to undermine one of its most powerful diplomatic tools developed since World War II: the ability to use the unique authority of the UN Security Council to get Russia and China—sometimes—to agree on what needs to be done.