On February 11, 2025, Atlantic Council Vice President and Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Senior Director Matthew Kroenig testified before the US House Committee on Homeland Security on China’s strategic port investments in the Western Hemisphere, drawing on recommendations from the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper titled A Strategy to Counter Malign Chinese and Russian Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the important topic of Chinese strategic port investments in the Western Hemisphere and the implications for US homeland security.
I want to assist your work by sharing insights gleaned from my more than two decades of experience working on US national security policy at the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and now as a scholar at Georgetown University, and a vice president at the Atlantic Council.
My message today is simple: China’s port investments in the Western Hemisphere pose a serious national security threat to the United States and its allies and partners in the region. Washington and regional states should work together to decouple from Chinese investments in ports and other areas critical to national security.
China poses the greatest contemporary threat to US national security. It is a comprehensive challenge with economic, technological, diplomatic, ideological, and military dimensions. Ultimately, the rivalry concerns the leadership of global order.
China employs overseas infrastructure investments, including in the Western Hemisphere, as part of its grand strategy. Countries in the Western Hemisphere are often attracted to China’s infrastructure investments, but they come at a cost. Through its investments, China cements access to resources, captures elites, gains leverage over governments, shifts national policies in its favor, and undermines democratic norms, transparency, and environmental standards.
China’s investments in ports, including in Peru and Panama, pose a number of threats to US homeland security. Chinese-operated ports are used to facilitate the shipment of fentanyl precursors to the United States. China exploits the presence of technology and access to data for an intelligence advantage. China could restrict or block access to ports, threatening American trade and economic wellbeing. In the event of a crisis or war, China could hinder the passage of American naval vessels, undermining American war plans. China could also use deep water ports to host People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels, enabling the projection of military power into the Western Hemisphere.
As Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated, this status quo is unacceptable. There are a number of steps the United States should take to counter Chinese port investments in the Western Hemisphere and protect US and allied security, freedom, and prosperity.
The United States should encourage countries in the Western Hemisphere to adopt a de-risking approach to China. Regional governments do not need to choose between the United States and China. They can continue lucrative trade with China in non-sensitive domains, such as agriculture. But US allies and partners should pursue a hard decoupling with China in areas of sensitive national security concern, such as: telecommunications, advanced technology, ground satellite stations, surveillance systems, military and intelligence cooperation, critical minerals, and critical infrastructure, including ports.
President Donald J. Trump said, “China is operating the Panama Canal and we didn’t give it to China, we gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back.”
I applaud the Panamanian government’s subsequent decision to forgo renewal of their participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Panama should use its current audit of operators in the Panama Canal area as an opportunity to sever the contracts with Chinese companies and to re-bid the contract to US or allied companies that will better ensure American and Panamanian interests.
Pressuring regional countries to de-risk from China will often be doing these countries a favor. Many Latin American countries entered into agreements with China years ago under previous governments, in a different geopolitical environment. Today, these same countries now understand that undue Chinese influence in sensitive sectors is not in their interest, but they do not have the ability to stand up to China on their own. Pointing to American pressure, as the “bad cop,” can help these countries take necessary steps that would be difficult to take on their own.
Washington cannot, however, expect regional countries to trade something for nothing.
The United States must provide credible and affordable alternatives to Chinese infrastructure investments. The US government cannot compete with Chinese-subsidized infrastructure investments on price or scale, but it has a number of other advantages.
First, it should incentivize its vibrant private sector to invest in the region. Institutions like the International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank should continue their transformation into instruments to advance American interests in this new era of great power confrontation.
Second, the United States should leverage its global network of allies and partners for great power competition in the Global South. The European Union and US allies in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, have world class technology companies, extensive trade relationships in the Western Hemisphere, and significant foreign aid programs. To be most effective, however, the various activities should be brought together in a coordinated fashion, guided by Washington.
Third, the United States and its allies can compete on quality. While Chinese investments are often economically attractive, they come with strings attached. The United States and its free world allies can outcompete China on free and fair-trade practices, transparency, anti-corruption, rule of law, technical know-how, and high labor and environmental standards.
Finally, as the Trump administration looks to increase defense spending and debates regional priorities, it should boost the budget of US Southern Command and increase SOUTHCOM training and exercises with regional partners. In the worst-case scenarios, SOUTHCOM must be prepared to step in and secure access to ports and open sea lines of communication.
Appended to this statement is a copy of A Strategy to Counter Malign Chinese and Russian Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, an Atlantic Council report I co-authored last year that explores these issues in greater detail and provides actionable recommendations.
I am honored that the Committee on Homeland Security has invited me to share my views on these challenges, and I look forward to taking your questions.
Further reading
Mon, Feb 12, 2024
A strategy to counter malign Chinese and Russian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean
Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series By Matthew Kroenig, Jason Marczak, Jeffrey Cimmino
As strategic competition with China and Russia continues to intensify, the United States and its allies need a strategy for countering the malign influence of authoritarian rivals in the Western Hemisphere. This Atlantic Council Strategy Paper proposes a path forward for the United States and its allies to do that.
Mon, Feb 26, 2024
Redefining US strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a new era
Report By Jason Marczak, María Fernanda Bozmoski, Matthew Kroenig
The strategic interest of the United States and the countries of Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) lies in strengthening their western hemisphere partnership. However, the perception of waning US interest and the rise of external influences necessitate the rejuvenation of and renewed focus on this partnership.
Mon, Feb 12, 2024
China pairs actions with messaging in Latin America. The United States should do the same.
Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series By David O. Shullman
China has coordinated trade, financing, and investment with diplomatic engagement, public diplomacy, and information operations to deepen its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington should, in turn, pair diplomatic engagement and messaging with greater attention to regional countries’ needs.
Image: Our Nation's Capital March 8, 2018. Photo by Louis Velazquez/Unsplash.