Full transcript of the second keynote address by Frank Rose, deputy assistant secretary of state for space and defense policy, at the 2010 Atlantic Council Transatlantic Missile Defense Conference.





Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
FREDERICK KEMPE:  Thank you, Gen. O’Reilly.  That was absolutely magnificent and a great update.  And it’s been terrific having this three-year relationship with you. 

    Undersecretary of State Tauscher woke up this morning not feeling well.  And so she is unable to join us.  She greatly regrets that.  We all know how much she would have liked to have been with us today.  And we all wish one of America’s finest public servants the best possible health. 

    She has sent – while she regrets that she couldn’t be here for today’s conference, she has sent her enormously capable deputy Frank Rose, deputy assistant secretary of state for space and defense policy, to provide her remarks and then also take your questions, and I’ll moderate that. 

    Frank has got an incredibly rich background.  In his current position, he’s looking after key issues related to arms control, defense policy, including missile defense, military space policy, defense acquisitions and conventional arms control.  His responsibilities also include liaison with the U.S. intelligence community on issues related to the verification of arms control treaties and agreements. 

    Before he joined the State Department in 2009 – just to get a taste of this background – he had various national security staff positions at the U.S. House of Representatives, including service as a professional staff member on both the House Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where he focused even then on missile defense, defense policy and intelligence issues. 

    Before that, he had various positions at the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, including as special assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction as policy adviser in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.  And previous to that, he worked as a national security analyst with Science Applications International Corporation and on the staff of U.S. Sen. John Kerry.  So Frank Rose knows his stuff.  I turn the podium to you.  (Applause.) 

    (Audio break.) 

    MR. ROSE:  – for the very kind introduction.  Let me start by saying, Undersecretary Tauscher sends her regrets and she very much hopes to be with you next time.  I believe she has spoken at the last two conferences that the Atlantic Council has held, and again, she looks very much forward to coming again to your next meeting. 

    I guess I am the second choice.  And it reminds me of an old quote by a former U.S. senator when he was appointed.  He was not the, quote, “first choice.”  And he was asked by the press, what were your – what’s it like not being the first choice?  And he said, quote, I’m sure I was not my wife’s first choice, but we have handled it pretty well. 

    So hopefully I won’t disappoint you today.  Well, let me just start by saying, a lot has changed since Undersecretary Tauscher’s speech last year at the Atlantic Council.  At the time, President Obama had just announced our European missile defense plans but had yet to take any concrete steps that he had set forth in his Prague speech last year. 

    The president’s goal of a world without nuclear weapons might seem starry-eyed to some, but I can assure you that our feet are planted firmly on the ground.  If you recall, the president said that we might not reach that goal in his lifetime.  But he called on us to work patiently and persistently toward that goal. 

    We are taking a step-by-step approach.  And each step contributes to our pragmatic and comprehensive approach to reducing global nuclear dangers and missile threats.  Today, we are on the verge of getting the new START treaty approved in the Senate, and I want to thank Sen. Hagel and Gen. Scowcroft for their support. 

    The treaty will re-establish effective monitoring and inspections of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces while also imposing lower limits on those forces.  And I might, as well, add that now, as a pre-rebuttal, the new START treaty does not constrain our ability to field the most effective missile defenses possible. 

    Beyond the new START treaty, we released a new nuclear posture review that reduces the role of our nuclear weapons while reaffirming our commitment to maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.  And as – our budget increases for the nuclear complex and weapons systems demonstrate our seriousness with respect to modernization. 

    The president hosted a successful Nuclear Security Summit, boosting efforts globally to secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear material.  For the first time in 10 years, we reached consensus this past May at the review conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  That was a vital and timely outcome to shore up the centerpiece of the global nonproliferation regime. 

    And in February 2010, we released our Ballistic Missile Defense Review.  This review put our previously announced European phased adaptive approach in a broader framework, and helped rebut incorrect and inaccurate accusations that we were shelving missile defense plans for Europe and abandoning Central Europe. 

    Of course, nothing could be further from the truth.  President Obama’s missile defense decisions have significantly improved our ability to protect the United States, our European NATO allies, and our forward-deployed troops from ballistic missile threats. 

    So as I speak to you today, we have had a year to implement this new approach.  I know Gen. O’Reilly gave a briefing on the technical details of the European phased approach earlier today.  Let me spend a few minutes focusing on the reactions of our NATO allies, and explaining the progress we have made over the past year. 

    First, our NATO allies have overwhelmingly embraced this approach because the new architecture can provide coverage for all of our European allies.  It also focuses on addressing the existing threats in a prioritized manner, something that both NATO and the United States Congress have repeatedly urged. 

    First and foremost, we will protect our most vulnerable allies from the existing short and medium-range ballistic missile threat from Iran.  We will expand the coverage to counter the threat as it evolves. 

    This brings me to my second point.  We have sought to put this new approach squarely in a NATO context.  We want there to be political buy-in by our NATO allies on this issue.  We will do this by seeking allied agreement at the Lisbon Summit, to pursue a missile defense capability for our European NATO allies’ territory, population and forces.  The European phased adaptive approach will become the U.S. contribution to a NATO effort. 

    This approach also creates more opportunities for cooperation and burden sharing among our NATO allies.  We will seek to expand NATO’s ALTBMD command-and-control system, to provide it with the capability to support territorial missile defense.  This will allow the United States and our NATO allies to plug in their missile defense assets into the overall NATO missile defense capability, should our allies choose to do so.  And we are certainly encouraging that. 

    We have received high-level support for our efforts from throughout the alliance, including from Sec. Gen. Rasmussen and from Madeleine Albright’s group of experts.  Support is evident in the ministerial communiqués as well.  And we hope to get more support at the joint ministerial meeting this week. 

    Beyond the benefits for our NATO allies, this approach also strengthens our ability to defend the United States.  Deploying the AN/TPY-2 radar in the first phase of the approach will augment the ability of our existing ground-based midcourse defense system to intercept any future long-range missiles launched from the Middle East.  By 2020, we will supplement that capability when we deploy the SM-3 Block II missile in Europe. 

    Finally, this approach benefits our security through the deployment of proven missile defense assets.  MDA’s thorough test plan will ensure that the systems we deploy in Europe are operationally effective before we deploy them, another fact that has been well-received by our European partners. 

    Now let me turn to the progress we have made over the past year.  For phase one, we seek to deploy a forward-based radar close to the threat.  We have briefed allies on our plan and held bilateral discussions about hosting the radar.  Following the NATO joint ministerial and summit meetings, we hope to be able to move forward on discussing basing agreements for the radar with appropriate allies. 

    Meanwhile, Romania agreed to host phase two – the phase two land-based SM-3 interceptor.  And we have held three rounds of negotiations on the basing agreement.  I am actually the lead negotiator for those agreements, and I’d be happy to talk a little bit more in detail in the question-and-answer period.  We are making good progress on the agreement, building on the excellent history of cooperation we have with Romania and the existing supplemental SOFA, as well as the Defense Cooperation Agreement. 

    Finally, last October, Poland agreed to host the phase three interceptor site.  Since then we have ratified a supplemental status of forces agreement and signed a protocol amending the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement to allow for the deployment of the SM-3 site in Poland.  The next step is to bring this agreement into force through Polish ratification. 

    These activities have put us on track to have all the necessary agreements in place, to support the deployment of our assets under the European phased adaptive approach for the first three phases. 

    Finally, let me touch briefly on Russia.  We did not, and I repeat, did not design our plan in response to Russian concerns about our missile defenses.  There were no secret deals as part of the negotiations on the new START treaty.  I’ve said it earlier and I’ll say it again.  This plan is simply better for the defense of our European allies and the United States.  The new START treaty will not prevent us from implementing the European phased adaptive approach.

    The new START Treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible.  And it does not add any additional cost or inconvenience to our missile defense plans. 

    We are also committed to being transparent about our missile defense plans with Russia and offer the reassurance that our missile defense deployments are not a threat to Russia’s strategic forces.  We have begun cooperating on missile defense activities with Russia.  And we hope to expand the cooperation both bilaterally and through the NATO-Russia Council. 

    As we look to Lisbon and beyond, I think it is clear that we have made excellent progress in the implementation of a system that provides for better security for our European allies and better confidence in our intentions.  In the coming months and years, we look forward to continuing to work with all of our friends and partners, including the Atlantic Council, and discussing how we can work best together to counter the ballistic missile threat through both missile defense and our arms control and nonproliferation efforts. 

    Thank you.  And I would be very happy to answer any questions that you may have.  (Applause.) 

MR. KEMPE:  Thank you, Frank, for those concise and very timely comments that followed up on Gen. O’Reilly’s comments very well.  And thanks for stepping in at the last moment.  Please send Secretary Tauscher all our best wishes. 

    The fact that you stepped in at the last minute, however, doesn’t mean the questions will be any easier.  And so I’m going to – I’m going to lead with two questions.  And then I’ll turn to the audience right away.  And we’ll see where we go. 

    The title of this conference suggests, Lisbon Summit coming up.  We’ve been hearing that some allies are pushing for a more ambitious arms-control agenda at NATO particularly aimed at tactical weapons, and that some have framed it sort of an exchange for their support of NATO adopting missile defense as a core mission. 

    There are also other issues.  You talked about how you’re seeking agreement at Lisbon.  How close are you?  How much of a role is this playing?  What still needs to get done? 

    MR. ROSE:  Okay, let me start with how close we think we are.  I think we’re very close.  One of the advantages of the phased adaptive approach is that it’s very consistent with where NATO is on missile defense.  For example, at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit last year, NATO said, we shall address missile threats in a prioritized basis, based on the imminence of the threat. 

    The phased adaptive approach seeks to deal with threats based on the most imminent and evolved.  So we’re very, very consistent.  The big challenge at NATO right now, as everybody knows, is money. 

    And you know, we are going to have some challenges.  But you know, generally as Sec. Gen. Rasmussen has said, NATO is already committed to spending $800 million – 800 million euros on the development of its Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Capability, which is a command-and-control system in which allies plug in their missile defense assets. 

    Now, right now that system is designed to deal with defensive forces, not territory and population centers.  For a relatively minor investment, we can upgrade that to do the territorial missile defense mission.  So NATO has some issues associated with cost.  But we believe we’re very, very close there. 

    On the issue of kind of missile defense and its relations to deterrence, our view is very, very simple.  Missile defense is a complement to deterrence.  It is not a replacement for.  We’re very confident that by the time of the Lisbon summit, we will work out those issues. 

    Yes, there are some issues.  But again, the U.S. position is, missile defense is not necessarily a replacement for the nuclear deterrence.  It is not.  But it is a complement.  And it can help with that overarching theme. 

    But the bottom line, Fred, is I think we’re in pretty good shape.  I think politically I think the allies believe that this is the right thing to do.  It’s consistent with where the alliance is on missile defense, what NATO heads of states and government have said in the past. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Just one follow-up on that? 

    MR. ROSE:  Yeah. 

    MR. KEMPE:  And that’s the question of Iran.  The perception of threat in Europe, as you’ve gone through, is it as high as our perception of threat?  And if the Iranians suddenly get cooperative, why spend all this money? 

    MR. ROSE:  Well, a couple of points.  Number one, threat perceptions in Europe depend on where you live.  It seems that the NATO allies closer to Iran and other nations like Syria have a heightened sense of the threat, because again they are threatened right now.  So again it really depends. 

    Now, the point – the first part of your question is, why spend all this money?  Again, the alliance is already developing this capability.  And they’ve already essentially committed to 800 million euros.  Our view is, we don’t know when and how threats could change.  So right now we could be in a situation down the road where the Iran situation changes.  But I think that’s unlikely.  But the key point behind our missile defense program and the phased adaptive approach is that threats can change. 

    So we need to have a system that is adaptable so that we can use those capabilities in other parts of the world.  And again, the missile defenses that we are developing, as part of the phased adaptive approach, are adaptable.  So we are moving – we can move them as the threat evolves.  So the bottom line is, while we hope very much that the Iranian threat will change, I don’t see that.  But again the whole issue with the phased adaptive approach is mobile, re-locatable.  So if the U.S. or NATO needs to make changes or events change, we can adapt that. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Thank you very much.  Last question from me before I turn to the audience is Russia. 

    Russia hasn’t responded to Assistant Secretary Vershbow’s proposal for NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense.  We’re supposed to be in the midst of a reset.  Are you disappointed by Russian response?  Did you expect more by now?  What are the prospects, from what you can read so far, of Russian participation? 

    MR. ROSE:  Well, this has a long history.  I mean, we have been talking about cooperation with Russia since the George Herbert Walker Bush – I mean, there are a lot of challenges here. 

    But you know, I think our approach is this.  With Russia, we need to take this in bites.  And one of the things that we need to do is we need to get a number of concrete projects to move forward with both bilaterally and at NATO. 

    One of the things we very much would like to do bilaterally is to get the U.S.-Russia theater missile defense exercise moving again.  A lot of people may not be aware.  But from the mid-1990s until around 2006-2007, we had a very active theater missile defense exercise with Russia. 

    Now, unfortunately that got on – was put on hold in around 2006-2007 given Russian concerns about the previous administration’s third site.  But there is a strong foundation.  Additionally, as you may be aware, back in – at this year’s summit, we agreed that we would continue to talk about ways we could share early warning information with Russia.  And we’re continuing discussions. 

    Now, at NATO very recently we agreed on a terms of reference to restart the NATO-Russia theater missile defense work.  I think that’s a very, very good step.  I would also note that the ad hoc working group on theater missile defense, which was a key element of the NATO-Russia work, was probably one of the most successful elements of the NATO-Russia program of work. 

    So I’m relatively positive about the NATO-Russia – again we have some more work to do.  But I think in principle, we’ve agreed to – agreed on a terms of reference. 

    MR. KEMPE:  But compared to George H.W. Bush, what do you think is the most important thing the Russians have done to move this forward? 

    MR. ROSE:  Well, you know, again Fred, I think there’s a lot of issues here with regards to missile defense.  And I mean, when George W. Bush took – excuse me, George Herbert Walker Bush –

    MR. KEMPE:  Yeah, sorry.  I actually meant George W.  During this period of time, there was a lot of effort to engage. 

    MR. ROSE:  You know, I will –

    MR. KEMPE:  So let’s go to George W. Bush. 

    MR. ROSE:  Yeah. 

    MR. KEMPE:  That’s what I really meant to ask. 

    MR. ROSE:  Yeah, I mean, I will give the previous administration a lot of credit.  They very much tried to engage the Russians on missile defense.  But again, there is a lot of political baggage here.  And it’s going to take time.  It’s not going to happen overnight. 

    I think the Russians – I think to a certain extent, they are still very much caught up in this whole issue of mutually assured destruction and kind of the interrelationship between offenses and strategic defenses. 

    One of the things that we have been trying to do – now, Undersecretary Tauscher as you know has a working group with her Russian counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov.  And one of the things we’ve been trying to do is begin a discussion with the Russians about, how do we think through this issue in the future? 

    It’s not going to happen overnight.  Again, we’ve been having this discussion for about 20 years.  But we hope to make progress.  And the way we hope to make progress is not this kind of – necessarily this overarching framework.  But let’s develop a couple of very, very clear projects where we can demonstrate some progress and build some trust.  There is a challenge there. 

    Now, the new START treaty has done quite a bit to kind of restore that trust.  But it’s going to take some time.  So again, our approach in the near term both bilaterally and at NATO is to work on a couple of again clear, defined projects to build a foundation.  And we will move forward from them.  But it’s not going to be easy. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Thank you very much.  I see a first question here in the front row. 

    Q:  Thank you.  Sally McNamara.  Hello, Frank.  It’s really to the question that Fred was asking.  Whether you like the third site or not, and I suspect you don’t, the pushback that the Russians gave was wholly illegitimate.  They knew it wasn’t a threat to them, but they have this sphere of influence policy which we explicitly don’t recognize. 

    Now, do you see any pushback from the Russians over phased adaptive?  Because they’ve already said, look, we don’t think Poland is the place to have this anyway.  Now, obviously we’re looking at 2018 for phase three.  But I feel like the Russians are going to push back. 

    Do you think they’re going to do something?  I mean, if they do all these small exercises and say we’re canceling them, we could probably live with that.  What I don’t think this administration could live with is if they walk away from START.  Do you see that level of pushback coming? 

    MR. ROSE:  I don’t think so.  I mean, I – let me kind of break it down.  Again, let me kind of reiterate, the reason we did what we did last year was not to kind of respond to Russian concerns about the third site but to respond to the existing threat.  
    Now, as you may recall, in the – when the Democrats were – the Democrats during the Bush administration had had some serious concerns in Congress about the approach of the third site primarily – not necessarily the issue of the third site in defending against a potential threat.  But are we dealing with the real threat first and evolving that? 

    So one of the things that we did in this new approach is, let’s deal with the real threat first and evolve it as the threat evolves.  With regards to, kind of, Russian response, I mean, Russia has some concerns.  But I think a lot of that has to do with the fact that you have some U.S. capabilities in Eastern Europe.  And I think that’s a big concern for the Russians. 

    We are going to implement the phased adaptive approach as the threat evolves.  As I talked about in the implementation portion of my speech, we are moving forward.  With regards to Poland, we signed a protocol earlier this year to allow for the deployment of the SM-3 in 2018.  And that’s going to be ratified.  We are moving forward with Romania. 

    Now, we are going to engage the Russians and talk to the Russians and see if we can get the Russians onboard.  But the European phased adaptive approach is not going to be what was a sideline because of Russian concerns.  Again, we want to be as transparent as possible about Russia, about our missile defenses with Russia.  We have been very transparent.  My boss, Undersecretary Tauscher, has a very constant dialogue, keeping the Russians informed about what we’re doing. 

    But again, Russia does not have a veto.  Again, we will continue to try to engage with Russia on these issues.  But fundamentally, the European phased adaptive approach is about protecting our friends, allies, the United States and our deployed forces against the real threats that we face today.  Do you have a follow-up, Sally?  Or –

    Q:  No.  I suppose if you – if everything – (inaudible) – and the Russians walk away from START, what –

    MR. ROSE:  Well, I don’t –

    MR. KEMPE:  So the question was, if everyone does fall away, and they walk away from START, what do you do? 

    MR. ROSE:  I don’t think that they are going to walk away from START.  Now, what they have said, I think, publicly is that given the current levels of U.S. missile defenses, they – you know, they believe that the START treaty is sufficient.  Now, they – again, I go back to that point that I raised.  I mean, they do have, you know, concerns about the, quote, “interrelationship” between offenses and defenses.  And they’ve raised this concern. 

    Now, we’re going to engage with them on these issues.  And you know, they, again, very much focus on this issue of offenses-defenses.  But one of the hopes of our kind of strategic dialogue we hope to engage with them, in the coming months, is kind of moving them away.  But again, it’s not going to happen overnight. 

    But again, the bottom line is the phased adaptive approach.  We’re going to – as long as the threat stays as it is and continues to evolve, we’re going to move forward with that.  Again, we will engage with Russia and talk with Russia.  But fundamentally, this is about defending our European allies, our deployed forces and the American people. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Thank you.  Out here. 

    Q:  So it’s Edgar Buckley.  Frank, thank you very much.  And I want to preface my remarks by saying I’m a great supporter of missile defense.  And I’m a great believer in NATO missile defense.  And I really hope we get this decision at Lisbon, to make missile defense a NATO mission, because if we don’t, I think we are going to continue to be in a position whereby U.S. policies in effect in Europe are rather something of a challenge to NATO. 

    I think we need to remember that.  Up until now, collective defense in Europe has been implemented through NATO as a collective activity.  Where we are at the moment with the U.S. phased adaptive approach is that it is a U.S. initiative conducted with some European allies bilaterally. 

    That’s not a very comfortable place for NATO to be.  It’s not what the United States wants.  It’s not what NATO wants.  But we need to remember that.  So when we come to bring it into NATO and to come to the European allies for a collective investment in this, we need to remember also that the European allies are approximately broke, they don’t have much money.  And it’s going to take them some time to put their investments, with all their other priorities, into this program. 

    They will do it, but it’s going to take some time.  One of the things they want is a NATO-based – which is a SACEUR-based, SACEUR-controlled – command-and-control system, okay.  They do not want actually the prospect of a missile defense system in Europe being triggered by a U.S. decision without consultation with NATO. 

    Let’s put our cards on the table here.  So that’s what everybody says they want.  And Gen. O’Reilly sort of acknowledged that.  But there was quite a lot of talk about the U.S. system and the NATO system and one integrating with the other.  Actually, he spoke mainly of the NATO system integrating with the U.S. system.  On the European side, what we need to see is a collective defense capability with a European – with a NATO command and control under SACEUR. 

    Of course, there has to be a U.S. command and control as well.  We know that.  But these things need to be brought together.  This is a big challenge.  And the U.S., I think, is going to need a lot of patience, even after we get a Lisbon decision, which I hope we do. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Frank, let me just identify Edgar a little bit further. 

    MR. ROSE:  I know Edgar. 

    MR. KEMPE:  I know.  (Laughter.)  I’m sure you do.  But maybe not everyone in the audience knows him, a former assistant secretary-general of NATO.  He’s a member of our Strategic Advisors Group.  But the Atlantic Council likes to bring people in the room who are practitioners.  He’s done the job.  He knows the issues.  This is a serious question.  Is the SACEUR going to have the key here at some point?  Or is this – or is this going to be a U.S. key? 

    MR. ROSE:  Edgar, thanks very much for your comments and thanks for all the work that you did on NATO.  I think a lot of the work that Edgar and Peter Flory did has really over the past couple of years moved the debate forward at NATO. 

    Your point about NATO, I mean, that was a big concern that I had when I was a staff member on Capitol Hill as well as when I worked in the Pentagon in the Bush administration – I’ve worked for Democrats and Republicans – is that – ensuring that this is put in a strong NATO context.  The point you made on collective defense is absolutely on mark.  And you know, again, one of the reasons why we made the change last year is to kind of reaffirm NATO’s role. 

    On C2, I mean, I think that’s a key issue.  But one of the things that I would argue is that this is not a complicated issue.  NATO has a long history of working complicated command-and-control issues – say, the air-defense model, the nuclear model – I don’t think this is all that difficult.  Now, there are political issues, yeah, yeah, yeah.  I hear that.  But it requires patience.  Nothing in NATO happens overnight.  But I agree with you.  C2 is a challenging issue. 

    But again, we have a number of models that NATO has used effectively for over 50 years with regards to command and control.  And I think this is eminently workable.  Our initial thinking right now is that again, this would be a U.S. contribution to a, quote, “NATO system.” 

    Now, the details will have to be worked.  Now, what I do understand is that SACEUR is beginning to think about these issues.  Have decisions been made?  The answer is no.  But the alliance hasn’t made a decision.  But again, I think these issues are eminently workable.  And I think all the points you’ve raised are right on target. 

    MR. KEMPE:  And SACEUR of course, supreme allied commander Europe.  Do you want to follow on that? 

    Q:  No.  (Inaudible, off mike.) 

    MR. KEMPE:  Or okay.  Please – oh, no.  Sorry. 

    Q:  Thank you.  Mike Elleman from the IISS.  The PAA, or phased adaptive approach, by its very name says it will adapt according to the evolving threats.  We’ve talked a lot about Iran as the primary threat to the European security in terms of missiles or ballistic missiles.  While I agree that Iran is not likely to backtrack on its current posture with regard to missiles and nuclear capability, the fact remains that Iran currently has an ability to target the very southeastern corridor of Europe.  But there are no signs presently that they intend to develop longer-range missiles.  And if they do develop longer-range missiles, it will take time.  You know, they can’t create the capability overnight. 

    Is there any thought within the U.S. policy community and the European policy community to actually implement PAA as its – as the name suggests, that if Iran starts to create a capability, then we’ll move to phases three and four?  If they don’t create that capability, would we consider not deploying phases three and four and working with the Russians, to find alternative defensive measures?  Thank you. 

    MR. ROSE:  Well, Mike, thanks very much for the question.  I mean, as you said, phased adaptive approach is designed to evolve with the threat.  But what I would say with regards to Iran is, they are continuing to develop their medium and intermediate-range capabilities. 

    You know, if the Iranian threat were to go away, I think we would need to take a hard look at our capabilities and what we’re doing.  But right now, based on where we are and based on the developments of the Iranian threat, our view is that we need to move forward with the PAA as laid out. 

    Again, if there are changes in the threat, if it evolves differently, I think we will need to re-evaluate.  But right now our view is that the Iranian threat, you know, specifically with – you know, for example, the Ashura missile.  Iran – this is a solid-fueled missile that Iran developed.  They are continuing.  They had a space launch a year or two – last year.  And they are continuing with that space launch capability. 

    One of the concerns we have about their space launch capability is, that can easily be turned into an offensive ballistic missile defense program.  So we need to continue to move forward right now.  Again, the bottom line of your point, this is phased and adaptive.  If the threat changes, we will re-evaluate as appropriate. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Thank you.  I saw a question toward the back here.  Yes, please. 

    Q:  Hi.  Tom Collina, Arms Control Association.  Frank, good to see you again.  My question is, can you walk us through how the decision will be made on the forward-deployed radar and where that might go, to the extent that you can?  And also, on the status of the joint-threat assessment with Russia, which the Russians have been talking about in the media?  Thanks. 

    MR. ROSE:  Tom, I’m not going to go into the real details on the AN/TPY-2 radar.  But what I will say is, we are discussing that with allies.  As I noted in my speech that hopefully after the Lisbon Summit, we will be in a position to start talking about the concrete basing agreements.  With regards to the joint-threat assessment, that is coming along quite nicely. 

    Now, we don’t necessarily agree with everything, the Russians’ view.  I mean, our views aren’t necessarily the same.  But what I would say is that we’ve come a long way.  I remember being in situations five or six years ago in which Russia was saying that you could not take Scud technology and develop a medium-range missile. 

    We’ve had a lot of divergence – convergence on issues like that.  Do we agree on everything?  I think the answer is no.  But are we coming to better understand each respective position?  I think the answer is yes.  You know, I think our hope is to complete the joint-threat assessment either later this year or early next year.  Again, it will show some convergence on our thinking with – our mutual thinking on ballistic missile threats. 

    But do I think it will say, you know, a full agreement?  I think the answer is no.  But again, you’ve got to engage the Russians.  You’ve got to start talking.  And again, that is kind of our whole approach with Undersecretary Tauscher’s dialogue on missile defenses, as in – as well as with the joint threat assessment to – again, let’s talk, let’s see if we can have some convergence on our issues.  Again, it’s going to take some time.  It’s not going to happen overnight. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Let me grab a question to the side of missile defense.  But because you’re talking so much about the Russians, whenever my conversations come up with my European friends, about the Russians, they keep talking about the tactical nuclear situation.  What are we doing there?  And what are we doing to assure our European friends that we actually care about that issue and are willing to move that one forward? 

    MR. ROSE:  Well, I’m not necessarily the tactical nuclear guy. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Yeah. 

    MR. ROSE:  But I will – I will address that issue.  You know, our first objective right now is to get START ratified.  And as I mentioned, once we have START ratified in force, I think the tactical nuclear issue with Russia is something that we need to have a discussion about.  So I think that is our plan.  Number one, let’s address START first, get that ratified.  But then we need to begin a discussion about future nuclear reductions.  And our view –

    MR. KEMPE:  Where the Russians have enormous superiority. 

    MR. ROSE:  Oh, absolutely.  They have large numbers.  And our view is, as we move forward with the next level of discussions, tactical nuclear weapons are issues that we’re going to need to address in those discussions. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Okay.  Please, Ian. 

    Q:  Frank? 

    MR. KEMPE:  Just wait for a microphone. 

    Q:  Thanks.  Thanks, Frank.  I just want to follow on a question and dialogue we had with Gen. O’Reilly.  The problem I have with his briefing and the outline of the phased adaptive approach, it’s almost too good.  I mean, if I were a European, if I were Edgar, I’d be looking at that – in French shoes or German shoes – I’d say, missile defense, box checked.  We’ve got comprehensive coverage here.  I don’t have to do much. 

    So what is the incentive for Europeans, when they’re being offered such a comprehensive system, to actually really contribute financially and even operationally?  When in your timeline does the phased adaptive approach really become a NATO missile defense system, vice a U.S. umbrella? 

    MR. ROSE:  That’s a good question, Ian, as always.  But let me – you know, fundamentally let me say – make a couple of points. 

    One, with regards to the incentive I would say is that we are upgrading the ALTBMD system, in order to allow allies to plug their capabilities in.  For example, there are a number of existing capabilities in Europe that exist today that can be leveraged.  For example, Spain.  Spain has the F100 destroyer.  That is probably one of the most capable Aegis ships outside of the United States. 

    So one, we have existing capabilities that we can leverage, and this will allow them to leverage it.  Second, we have other nations like Germany and the Netherlands, which also have Patriot that can be – so I think one of the incentives is, by upgrading this ALTBMD system, it will give the impetus for NATO nations to make the minor upgrades they need, to integrate into the United States. 

    Secondly, with regards to command and control, Edgar raised that issue, you know, you need to – you need to – have to have some capabilities to and influence – for command and control.  So you have to bring some capabilities to bear. 

    So bottom line, I think we have a lot of existing capabilities right now, whether it be radars, lower-tier systems for the allies to participate through this phased adaptive approach.  But I think Ian raises an excellent point – is there’s a challenge in Europe right now with regards to money. 

    And whether – you know, how many other systems, especially upper-tier systems, they will be prepared to purchase.  And I think that’s a question yet to be answered.  But you know, I think, again it’s a legitimate question. 

    But again, there have been a number of nations who in the past have expressed some interest in buying upper-tier capabilities.  But again, money is going to be a challenge.  But again, there are a number of NATO allies who have existing capabilities, like the Dutch, like the Spanish who – if we make the upgrades to ALTBMD, they could make a real, substantive contribution. 

    MR. KEMPE:  No, the money question is such a key question.  We’ve been talking about at the Atlantic Council a new austerity movement in Europe as potentially a defense depression in Europe.  And in the order of what you said is your priority, why should Europeans put this very expensive system at the top or near the top? 

    MR. ROSE:  Well, what I would say is that number one, again, the alliance has already made this decision to defend its forces from threats up to 3,000 kilometers.  That’s a key point that I want to emphasize, is that the alliance is already pregnant with regards to missile defense. 

    So they are making those investments.  You have another number of allies making Patriot investments, Aegis investments, et cetera, et cetera.  I think the bottom line is that the – is, you know, money is an issue.  But the question will be, is – well, let me – let me rephrase that.  The bottom line is, it depends on where you live in Europe.  But I think for the most part, allies are comfortable with where we are on missile defense.  I think that the phased adaptive approach is fully consistent with the alliance.  And again we are seeing a lot of political support. 

    So you know, there are a lot of challenges there with regards to money.  But again, the alliance has already made a decision.  And it’s just a relatively minor upgrade, to ensure that we can do the territorial missile defense system as well. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Thank you, Frank.  Questions?  Let me turn to one of my own, while I look for others.  And I’ll turn to you next, Simon.  Were you scratching your ear? 

    Q:  (Off mike.) 

    MR. KEMPE:  Okay, I – the reason I mention tactical nuclear weapons, I know that that’s not specifically your field.  But this is all –

    MR. ROSE:  Yeah, absolutely. 

    MR. KEMPE:  This is either politically integrated or in terms of security integrated.  So let me talk to you about something else that this affects, and that’s the U.S. force posture in Europe.  Administration – you know, I guess I’m wondering whether the administration plan to reduce U.S. forces in Europe, and there will be more pressure on this as there’s economic pressure on the Pentagon – proposed drawdown of two brigade combat teams. 

    And some wonder, well, if that engagement is replaced with a trans-Atlantic missile defense architecture, what are actually the strategic implications of that?  What are the political implications of this qualitatively different sort of engagement? 

    MR. ROSE:  Fred, with regards to the overall U.S. force posture in Europe, I’m not really up to speed on that.  But what I would say with regards to missile defense is, we in the Obama administration fundamentally believe in the trans-Atlantic link. 

    And our view is that missile defenses, number one, help deal with solidifying the trans-Atlantic link in the 21st century.  The challenge that NATO faces in the future is not from large armies coming through the Fulda Gap.  The challenge it faces is new threats such as ballistic missiles, cyber threats.  And we need to adapt. 

    And we believe that the phased adaptive approach is consistent with where the alliance is going and where the threats are.  Again, we – you know, go back to my first point is, we do not believe missile defenses are a replacement for nuclear deterrence.  We believe it is a complement, part of a comprehensive view.  We do not view missile defense as kind of separate from the overarching strategic posture but, again, part of our overarching response to the new threats the alliance faces. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Thank you very much.  Simon? 

    Q:  Simon Lunn from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly formerly.  I spend a lot of my time at NATO now talking to the various allies on their views on the nuclear policy issue, their sub-strategic systems, et cetera, et cetera.  And for the longest while, missile defense really wasn’t very prominent in anybody’s considerations.  Actually, it’s become more prominent recently because of obviously the things we’re talking about today and the run-up to Lisbon. 

    I’ve two – really two questions.  One is, back to Russia, because the more we look at the European security scene, it is quite obvious whichever – almost whichever problem you’re looking at, it leads back to Russia.  It doesn’t matter what you look at.  In some way, shape or form, all roads in a way lead to Moscow.  And in people’s attitudes towards what we’re discussing this morning, the whole question of the opportunity cost in that relationship comes up. 

    And you know well there are certain allies who are worried that this is going to be a problem in the Russia relationship.  So I think – I’m not sure I can push you any further, to say more on what we hope to do. 

    But I mean, I was told not long ago that whether President Medvedev does or does not attend Lisbon could be a function of their relationship towards the ballistic missile defense and our willingness or unwillingness to be more explicit.  But I wanted to take you back to your previous career on the Hill, because if – this question of what else are we – I understood – I think I’ve understood sort of the linkage that we’re now on in terms of costs and what the Europeans will be asked to do. 

    But it does appear at the moment that for the most part, this is too good to be true for Europeans, who are being asked really to link in, to spend money that we hope has already been programmed but not much more. 

    And if you’re a Hill staff member in a couple of years’ time, how is this going to play in terms of the allies, again, not quite doing their bit in burden-sharing terms?  It could have – I mean, we talk about this system in one sense as an opportunity for alliance cohesion and solidarity. 

    But in fact, it could turn out rather the opposite if – I mean, this austerity business.  I think everybody here realizes the question of cost is absolutely crucial.  What people are being – what are people going to give up, in order to do the thing that you want them to do? 

    MR. ROSE:  Simon, two very excellent questions.  Back to Russia, I mean, this is not easy.  I mean, we will continue to engage with Russia. 

    MR. KEMPE:  But specifically Russia and Lisbon? 

    MR. ROSE:  Yeah. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Are you seeing the Russia element and – a Lisbon decision somewhat dependent on how Russia plays this out, Medvedev plays this out? 

    MR. ROSE:  You know, we’ll just have to see how this develops.  I mean, again, President Obama has been very, very clear with the Russians that we want to engage with them both bilaterally and at NATO.  You know, some allies have concerns about Russia.  But again, one of the reasons why we have been engaging with Russia is to say very clearly, this is not a threat to you, number one. 

    And number two, we want to work with Russia.  I mean, Russia, number one, in the long term faces threats from ballistic missiles.  And number two, they have, I’m sure, as Gen. O’Reilly talked about – they have some capabilities that we find very, very interesting, specifically the Armavir and Qabala radars. 

    But as I said a little bit earlier, our view is that while we want to work with Russia, we want to engage with Russia, fundamentally, the phased adaptive approach is about defending the United States, our friends and allies and our deployed forces against the existing threats. 

    You know, one of the things that we’re also very interested in working with Russia is to – working with countries like Iran, to get them to move away from their ballistic missile threats.  But again, Russia is always a challenge.  We’re committed to engaging them. 

    Again, back on the cost, I think you’re absolutely right.  Cost is an issue.  And I don’t think anybody is trying to downplay that.  But one of the reasons why we chose the approach with ALTBMD is, one, it’s a relatively inexpensive fix.  And two, kind of my response to Ian’s question is, there are already a number of allies who can make a real contribution with ALTBMD. 

    Again, I refer to the Spanish, I refer to the Germans, I refer to the Dutch.  So it’s not a question of, you know, purchasing millions and millions of dollars in interceptors.  There’s a lot of organic capability.  And I think a lot of people don’t realize that right now. 

    I mean, I’ve been doing this for over 10 years.  And everybody says, oh, the Europeans don’t like missile defense, this and that.  But they’re actually developing capabilities.  And the whole idea of this is, hey, the United States is going to develop the capabilities for the PAA regardless, because we’re going to use those capabilities around the world. 

    The PAA, the same systems that you use for that – SM-3 – are the same systems that would be used in the ALTBMD program, the upper tier.  So again, there is a lot of concrete stuff already being done.  And that’s why we decided to do what we decided to do.  Again, and, you know, what I would say to my congressional colleagues is, hey, the allies are doing a lot already. 

    Now, the question will be is, are you going to be able to get allies to buy some upper-tier capabilities in the future?  I think that’s a challenge.  But again, there are a number of allies who have expressed interest in purchasing those capabilities in the future.  And again, it will depend how the threat evolves. 

    MR. KEMPE:  Thank you very much.  Unless I see one more question – we have time for one more brief question and answer. 

    Q:  Thank you.  Embassy of Georgia, Vladimir (sp) – (inaudible.) 

    We spoke about the allied countries and NATO – (inaudible) – Europe.  What about the partner countries like Georgia?  Simply to say, we might be punished because of the friendship with the United States or Europe.  So how we can ensure the Georgia – partner countries like Georgia to be covered or secured from these kinds of threats? 

    MR. ROSE:  What I would say is, you know, NATO is committed to the security of not just our allies.  But we also want to continue to work with our partners like Georgia to deal with the threats that we face.  I know NATO has a long, substantive dialogue with our partner nations.  And we also consider their security as important to our security.  We see these issues as indivisible. 

MR. KEMPE:  And of course, there’s one specifically engaging Georgia on this.  With that, let me just say a couple of things before we go into break.  And we’ll reconvene at 11:45 with Peter Flory, former NATO assistant general, Jim Townsend, who we know well here at the Atlantic Council – our former vice president here, now deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy – and then Kari Bingen, who’s a staff member at the U.S. House Armed Services Committee.  So really a great group of people, and then the European – then a European – the European panel then after the lunch break. 

Let me just say, I mean, it really lines up, the Russian element, as a huge area of discussion here.  Allied element and particularly the cost factor, a huge discussion.  But we’ve really been teed up this morning with a very, very rich picture of where this is all going and certainly where the U.S. sees this all going.  So this is terrific for our further discussion, Frank.  I want to thank you very much on behalf of the audience for a wonderful discussion. 

MR. ROSE:  Great.  Thank you.  (Applause.) 

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