TO: Technology policy strategists
FROM: Samantha Wong, Ginger Matchett, Peter Engelke
DATE: April 17, 2026
SUBJECT: A US tech agenda focused on Latin America to outcompete the People’s Republic of China
In November 2025, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Global China Hub convened a private, in-person workshop in Bogotá to examine how Colombian—and more broadly Latin American—stakeholders perceive US and Chinese approaches to emerging technologies within the region’s ecosystem. The discussion brought together experts from the tech sector, think tanks, and academia, as well as high-level government officials to assess Colombia’s key priorities in the emerging technology landscape in relation to the wider competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Participants explored how the Colombian government and private sector are engaging with the United States and PRC, what the PRC is offering in this space that the United States is not, and how the United States can better compete to meet local needs and interests. This memo analyzes key insights from the workshop and offers a set of recommendations for moving forward.
Strategic context
Colombia’s tech ecosystem has experienced rapid growth over the past few years. It now ranks third in Latin America for start-up activity, attracting $513 million in growth capital in 2024, a rise from $445 million in 2023. Also in 2024, the number of start-ups in Colombia rose 24 percent, and the country continues to climb in the Startup Blink Global Startup Ecosytem Index.
Both the United States and China recognize Colombia as a regional power, with the fourth-largest economy in Latin America and emerging status as a tech-innovation hub. Although the United States remains Colombia’s largest trading partner and foreign investor, China is quickly closing the gap as the country’s second-largest trading partner, with investment priorities including infrastructure and technology. Chinese companies hold over $3.1 billion in infrastructure contracts in Colombia, including high-profile projects such as Bogotá’s Metro Line 1 and major highways that link key cities like Medellín to the Caribbean coast. They have also made major inroads into the consumer tech sector, with Chinese brands accounting for roughly 60 percent of Latin America’s smartphone market. Xiaomi has been Colombia’s top smartphone vendor for four consecutive years, for example, capturing around 30 percent of the domestic market. This points to a broader trend beyond smartphones, where Chinese brands have gained widespread consumer trust. This growing confidence extends to other consumer tech such as TVs as well, with companies like Hisense seeing increased revenue in the Colombian market.
Most recently in 2025, Colombia initiated a memorandum of understanding for the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative and joined the BRICS-linked New Development Bank, signifying deeper engagement with PRC infrastructure investment and development finance. Early in 2026, while in China, Colombian officials signed new agreements with Beijing to enhance information and communications technology (ICT) cooperation. The agreements focus on expanding 5G telecom network deployment, building fiber optics systems, artificial intelligence (AI) integration in telecom operations, and satellite connectivity to support rural internet and digital infrastructure. Aimed at expanding educational connections between the two countries, the Colombian Ministry of Industry and Information Technology facilitated meetings with Chinese firms such as ZTE to organize technical internships and programs designed to equip Colombian engineers and instructors to better share their knowledge.
This trend, wherein Colombian firms and both national and subnational governments increase their cooperation with Beijing, may accelerate as the United States prioritizes its domestic investment and reduces foreign aid, while ratcheting up geopolitical pressure in the region including in Colombia. (The country’s outgoing president, Gustavo Petro, has been a frequent critic of the current US administration’s regional policies.) Workshop participants also shared anecdotes about seeking financial investment from Washington and US companies, being turned down, and therefore pursuing the support of Chinese companies. The United States may be creating a commercial vacuum (wittingly or unwittingly) in the region, leaving room for the PRC to leverage its presence.
Colombia’s priorities, China’s advantage
Economic competitiveness
Despite intensifying US-PRC competition for influence in the Global South, following the common pattern among nonaligned Global South countries, participants in the workshop emphasized that Colombia is not interested in being drawn into the great-power rivalry. Instead, they insisted that Colombian entrepreneurs and business leaders remain focused on Colombia’s national priorities, particularly as they regard economic development. They emphasized that Colombia’s tech sector is largely focused on which partner—whether from the United States, China, Europe, or elsewhere—can deliver cost-effective, quality products that are tailored to local needs.
Economic competitiveness therefore is the central factor driving Colombia’s tech and infrastructure partnerships. While the country’s economy is growing rapidly, making Colombia one of the most dynamic economies in all of Latin America and the Caribbean, some 65 percent of the population is still vulnerable to poverty, which means that the affordability of technologies (in particular, consumer-facing technologies) is a critical concern. Colombian consumers are often drawn to Chinese technologies, particularly smartphones, as they are typically less expensive, innovative, and have comparable quality to Western alternatives. Many Chinese tech companies have strategically integrated AI, longer-lasting batteries, and user-friendly applications to make them attractive to Global South consumers. This attention to the Colombian marketplace has proved successful for both countries, generating further Chinese investment.
Beijing’s state support
Beijing’s ability to undercut US and European firms on price is driven by substantial state subsidies and financial support, vertically integrated supply chains, and government and state-owned enterprise procurement policies, which together make it difficult for Western firms to compete at the same price point. China is further advantaged by the fact that the Colombian government’s procurement policy requires contracting agencies to conduct public, competitive bidding processes with cost as a core metric. These processes lead to Chinese contractors successfully outcompeting Western firms, given the emphasis on price.
Further, the PRC’s long-term, state-driven strategy of investing in critical Colombian infrastructure has enabled it to gain a foothold in the country’s wider tech ecosystem, giving Beijing an upper hand. Workshop participants confirmed that Chinese-built infrastructure helps to lock in future investment decisions, as tech systems are often designed for compatibility with Chinese platforms. For example, in 2020, Chinese automative giant BYD, the world’s largest electric vehicle manufacturer, secured agreements to supply major Colombian cities with electric bus fleets, resulting in the company now capturing 92 percent of the market share in the Colombian electric bus market. These deals further solidified agreements to develop complementary electric-grid systems to power over 1,500 buses. With BYD-built systems now firmly established, it is difficult for Western firms to compete for subsequent electric bus contracts. Such trends in this sector are reflected across Latin America, where Chinese electric bus manufacturers account for approximately 85 percent of the region’s electric bus fleet. Latin American manufacturers follow at around 9 percent, while European manufacturers represent just 1.9 percent of the total fleet.
Lack of US investment
In contrast, workshop participants highlighted a significant gap in US public investment in Colombia’s tech ecosystem. Colombian officials have sought greater US investment. For example, during Petro’s recent visit to Washington, he sought to secure energy-sector investments and promoted city-led infrastructure initiatives to US companies. The problem, expressed by workshop participants, is that many American companies view the Colombian market as insufficient in scale to generate sizable returns on investment, particularly due to recent instances of, as the US State Department summarized, “regulatory uncertainty, economic slowdown, and fiscal issues.” Hence, unlike Chinese companies, many US infrastructure and tech companies have begun to avoid significant investments in Colombia. While the United States currently remains Colombia’s top source of foreign direct investment, the investment is mostly in established industries such as manufacturing and mining instead of tech sectors. Furthermore, investment levels have declined in the last two years, dropping 15 percent in the first half of 2025, reflecting a downward trajectory in US investment in Colombia.
In response, Colombian policymakers are seeking alternatives, including PRC financing and support. Here, Beijing is proving valuable. The PRC can direct state-owned enterprises and financial institutions to strategically invest in Colombia and the region without the same shareholder pressures faced by US companies. China has buttressed concrete investments with substantial efforts to be seen as a good business partner, hosting Colombian presidential candidates and senior policymakers on all-expense-paid visits to China and donating hundreds of computers to the Colombian Foreign Ministry, among other forms of outreach. Although there are risks involved, including potential cybersecurity risks via the donated computers, workshop participants noted that policymakers in Bogotá still regard the PRC as the preferable partner compared to the United States, given Beijing’s ongoing investment.
Long-term reliability
Colombian policymakers’ perceptions of Beijing contrast with those of Washington, which has gained a reputation as a less reliable economic partner. The United States has not developed a consistent, cohesive economic strategy for competing with China in Latin America (some policies, such as tariffs imposed by the US government on Colombian goods in 2025 and 2026, are regarded in Colombia as counterproductive). Workshop participants reinforced these perceptions, arguing that Beijing is viewed as more intentional and consistent, and possesses a long-term orientation because national policies do not shift depending on the administration in power. Even if the United States was willing to invest more in Colombia’s tech ecosystem, participants underscored that Washington is often unreliable and lacks the sustained diplomatic engagement necessary to build credible, long-term tech partnerships.
Balancing PRC security risks
On the other hand, Colombian stakeholders noted that they are aware of the risks associated with closer PRC engagement. Like concerns expressed by the US government, workshop participants cited concerns about intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, and the absence of robust regulatory frameworks to guard against Chinese malpractice, noting a need for more local regulations and transparency to safeguard national security.
Yet the average Colombian consumer views the benefits of using Chinese technology as outweighing these risks given price differentials, a view reinforced by the fact that concerns about data privacy also extend to US tech companies. Workshop participants reinforced such views, emphasizing that Beijing’s persistent investment in the region overshadows its security risks, as many in the region prioritize economic development and foreign investment. A key point of workshop discussion concerned the inadequate level of national support at the policy level and private-sector priority for developing the local Colombian tech sector, including growing small tech companies and young workforces.
Conclusion
Colombia is looking to adopt a pragmatic yet business-oriented approach to the US-China tech rivalry, signing onto partnerships and agreements that attract investment, expand economic growth, and secure access to technologies at competitive prices. This approach is a common thread across the Global South, including in Africa.
Colombia, likewise, continues to scale its digital economy and deepen ties with the countries providing the most compelling partnerships rooted in reliable market success, infrastructure development, technological innovation, and low cost. Yet workshop participants stressed that the Colombian government needs to articulate a coherent tech strategy that addresses how to turn these priorities into long-term success. Tech policies in Colombia, they argued, are often formulated as an afterthought to other dynamics such as geopolitical trade disputes, leaving insufficient government attention to how to improve their domestic innovation ecosystems. Bogotá should place a greater emphasis on strengthening domestic tech research and development and educational (technical) training programs. The aim should be long-term technological development, utilizing foreign investment as opportunity arises, while balancing national security concerns.
Meanwhile, the United States is at high risk of losing Colombia’s burgeoning tech market to the PRC due to uncompetitive pricing, insufficient investment in broader infrastructure that underpins the tech stack, limited public-sector investment, and an ineffective diplomatic approach. These shortcomings weaken US competitiveness in Colombia and across the region, whether in consumer markets, business-to-business engagement, or broader diplomatic influence. This is particularly critical as Beijing’s tech inroads in the region are not just limited to one part of the stack, thereby enabling broader PRC control of the wider tech stack. As a result, US companies risk being excluded from commercial opportunities if Colombia’s market becomes fully integrated with Chinese systems—from the ICT layer to the application layer.
With the upcoming Colombian presidential election scheduled to be held in May, Bogotá’s relationships with both Washington and Beijing could shift. If Iván Cepeda is the winner, (a senator and civil rights activist), he is likely to continue Petro’s agenda, which has accommodated PRC investment. He will need to strengthen the strained relationship with Washington if either side is to increase tech development. However, his opponent, Abelardo De La Espriella (a lawyer and entrepreneur with US citizenship), among other things is likely to prioritize national security and combating drug traffickers, which may bring Washington closer to Bogotá and leave the door open to expanding cooperation. The country’s growing tech ecosystem and tech-smart consumer base presents an ideal opportunity for the United States to leverage both its business and national security interests to counter the PRC’s presence in Latin America. To remain competitive, the United States should expand collaboration opportunities in partnership with the government, particularly with local Colombian tech start-ups, while also scaling up investment in the region to counter aggressive PRC offers and presenting profitable alternatives to PRC-backed investments.
About the authors
Samantha Wong is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, where she helps research and devise allied strategic solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, with a particular emphasis on defense and technology.
Ginger Matchett is an assistant director with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where she focuses on the strategic foresight portfolio assessing trends, opportunities, and security threats shaping the future around the world. She works on global environmental, food, and water security, the impacts of climate change on security and defense, human rights, and US-China competition.
Peter Engelke is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a nonresident senior fellow with its Global Energy Center. His diverse work portfolio spans strategic foresight, innovation and technological disruption, geopolitics and hard security, climate change and Earth systems, and urbanization, among other topics.
Acknowledgements
The Atlantic Council would like to thank the Tides Foundation for supporting the Council’s work on this publication.
The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.
The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.
Image: Juan Diego Cano/Pool / Latin America News Agency via Reuters Connect
