A year before the next general election, voters in three eastern German states went to the polls to elect their state parliaments. In campaigns characterized by broad discontent and national debates, the results were a resounding defeat for Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s center-left coalition. Not even the surprise victory for his Social Democrats (SPD) in Brandenburg can hide this fact.
In a last-ditch effort all too familiar to observers of European politics, a coalition of left-wing-to-conservative voters upheld the cordon sanitaire to keep the far-right out of power by rallying around the SPD. It was a Pyrrhic victory for democracy that saw the co-governing Greens and the Left Party booted out of the state parliament, the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) place a distant fourth, and the third member of the national coalition, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), take less than one percent of the vote. As if the mood around Scholz’s cabinet table wasn’t poor enough, these election results set the stage for more grumbling than governing in the run-up to next year’s general election. And if the outcomes are any indication, Germany could move decisively to the right and shift its position on a number of important issues, such as aid to Ukraine, immigration, and climate change.
A red light for Scholz’s traffic light coalition
Optimists may be rejoicing that the “center is holding.” Notably, the minister-president of Brandenburg, Dietmar Woidke, went so far as to proclaim that “as so often in history, it was the Social Democrats who stopped extremists on their path to power.” But the opposite is the case. The main takeaway from these elections is that the democratic firewall is crumbling. As in Saxony and Thuringia, any stable government in Brandenburg will be at the mercy of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which averaged 30 percent of the vote, or the left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), which rose to 15 percent from a standing start, for lack of better alternatives.
Ironically, strategic voting and the self-sacrifice of the democratic center only enabled populists to become kingmakers in all three eastern German states. While all candidates for minister-president ruled out coalitions with the far-right, none of them has done so with the BSW. In one way or another, the left-wing nationalist personality cult formed around one of Germany’s most illustrious—and controversial—politicians will dictate the terms in at least three provincial capitals. And although Germany’s foreign policy is still being decided in Berlin, the BSW has made it abundantly clear that it wants a seat at the table. The BSW has said that any coalition agreement in the three eastern German states must include a mandate “for peace, for diplomacy” regarding Ukraine and against the stationing of US missiles on German soil. Accordingly, Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius dubbed AfD and BSW “Moscow´s fifth column.” In just one month, three of Germany’s federal states have come under heavy populist influence.
The beleaguered Social Democrats are ignoring this fact; after all, they defied the predictions and emerged victorious on September 22. When prompted to comment at the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Scholz rejoiced at “a great result, amazing for the SPD, also for all of us.” He will feel vindicated in a renewed candidacy after scoring an approval rating of just 19 percent—the lowest approval rating for any chancellor since the surveys began in 1997. But the voices calling on him to step aside for a more electable Kanzlerkandidat, such as Pistorius, will only be muffled temporarily. After the SPD barely met the five percent threshold for parliament in Saxony and Thuringia, the electoral victory in Brandenburg was won despite Scholz. Tellingly, the chancellor avoided campaigning in the state, which houses his own constituency, reportedly at the urging of Woidke, who distanced himself from his unpopular party leader.
All three of Scholz’s coalition partners suffered humiliating defeats in European, state, and local elections. They have lost their “dare for more progress,” as the coalition agreement is pointedly titled. To make matters worse, the elections show that antidemocratic populism is becoming part of the mainstream. A large proportion of the electorate appears to have chosen the antiestablishment AfD and BSW out of conviction, not out of protest. Remarkably, the AfD won the under-thirty-years-old vote by a margin of up to 20 percent. This generation, socialized in and by the crisis decade, longs for more stability, security, and a positive outlook—a phenomenon that can be observed all across Europe. it is particularly receptive to supposedly simple solutions propagated on social media.
An uncertain future for German democracy
Will Scholz’s coalition last for another year? None of the parties have anything to gain from new elections, but the mood in Berlin is becoming more defiant. And as the FDP is thrown out of one state parliament after another, its members might be inclined to gamble on whether voters will reward them for putting an end to the unpopular three-way coalition. In any event, expect more infighting at the expense of stable governance. All three coalition parties are now scrambling to deliver for their clientele, sharpen their profile, and position themselves ahead of the next general election in September 2025. The momentum for major policy initiatives has passed. Election season has come early.
By this time next year, Germans will have elected a new parliament, and the early signs are pointing to a victory for the CDU. The SPD is at risk of being swept from power, leaving CDU Chairman Friedrich Merz in the position to form a government. But who would govern with him? In an effort to win back disgruntled conservatives who strayed to the AfD, he moved the CDU to the right rhetorically and programmatically, alienating the center-left. The FDP, who would be Merz’s desired coalition partner, is closer to being thrown out of the Bundestag than to carrying the votes required for a majority. The minister-presidents of North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein are openly courting a nationwide edition of their successful CDU-led coalition with the Greens. However, Merz and Bavaria’s influential minister-president, Markus Söder, have stifled that thought experiment in its tracks by repeatedly framing the Green Party as the “main antagonist.” Even if the Green Party were to look past these slights, it is unlikely to support the conservative-populist platform the CDU is running on.
This leaves only the Social Democrats who, if defeated, would rather rebuild in the opposition than hand their longtime rivals the keys to the chancellery. But to swallow their pride and enter (yet another) grand coalition may well be the country’s only chance to hold the line against AfD and BSW next year. And yet such a constellation would likely further strengthen the populist parties that have emerged from and feed off public discontent with the performance of previous national governments. For many voters, a grand coalition is synonymous with stagnation and “politics as usual.” The prospect of yet another grand coalition (such as took power from 2005 to 2009 and from 2013 to 2021) could well see the far-right AfD and left-wing nationalist BSW secure enough votes to become kingmakers of their own in future federal elections.
The election is a year out, but already there are early signs that Merz might have backed himself into a corner. If the CDU comes out ahead next year, and if the SPD bows out of a grand coalition, Merz may have to lead Germany’s first-ever minority government. His only alternative would require some sort of improbable arrangement with the AfD or the BSW. Meanwhile, if the negotiations in any of the three eastern German states were to lead to a coalition between the CDU and BSW, formalized or tacit, it may well become a blueprint for the national stage. Such a democratic cul-de-sac could see Germany move away from its leadership role on climate change, immigration, and the European Union. It could also endanger the scope and size of Germany’s aid to Ukraine. By this time next year, Merz’s ability to govern may depend on the (tacit) support of populist parties that would attempt to hold him hostage with their more radical positions. This would mark a turning point in German history and lead to another wall falling in Berlin, only this time ushering in a more nationalist and Russia-friendly turn.
Jurek Wille is a student of international relations at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Before joining SAIS, he worked for the German government.
Friedrich Conradi is a journalist and student of international relations at Johns Hopkins SAIS and last worked for German public broadcasters’ political talk show Anne Will.
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Image: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) speaks on stage during an election campaign rally for the Saxony state elections in Chemnitz, Germany, August 30, 2024. REUTERS/Lisi Niesner