NATO needs a 'hellscape' defense at 'Replicator' speed

Europe & Eurasia NATO Security & Defense

Report November 4, 2024

NATO needs a ‘hellscape’ defense at ‘Replicator’ speed

By Franklin D. Kramer and Kristen Taylor

I. The NATO challenge
A. Russia
B. Unready NATO forces

I. United Kingdom
II. France
III. Germany
IV. NATO’s rear area

II. Recommendations
A. Maintain low costs and defense budget compatibility
B. Use unmanned autonomous vehicles by the thousands
C. Identify core capabilities
D. Plan for prepositioning and mobility
E. Accelerate acquisition of capabilities
F. Rapidly expand the industrial base
G. Engage government and high-end cybersecurity providers to boost cyber resilience

III. Conclusion

A NATO defense built on the “hellscape” approach of low-cost, highly effective massed armaments like the US plan for the Indo-Pacific region would provide significantly enhanced deterrence and, if necessary, highly effective defense for the European theater. Following the US Department of Defense’s Replicator acquisition process could speed its establishment to two or three years.

This report describes how such an approach and process would meet the three critical criteria of lethality, timeliness, and affordability necessary for NATO to prevail against a Russian military demonstrably capable of undertaking an extended multidomain campaign—at substantially lower costs than conventional military capabilities. A hellscape defense built at this swift speed and incorporating American and European capabilities would not resolve every issue that NATO faces—conventional capabilities are still required and particularly for an extended conflict—but it would substantially alter the military balance in the European theater strongly in NATO’s favor.

Hellscape is an informal term that has been used by US Indo-Pacific combatant commanders to describe extensive use of unmanned systems to provide combat mass in a very short time frame.¹ US Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks described the goal of the Replicator acquisition process as “fielding attritable autonomous systems at scale of multiple thousands, in multiple domains, within . . . 18-to-24 months.²

The key elements of a hellscape/Replicator approach for the European theater would be to accelerate acquisition and implementation of critical capabilities focused particularly on the forward lines of contact in the northeast of NATO and on the seas—Baltic, Black, Mediterranean, North—that are critical for NATO to control. Those forward and maritime capabilities would be supported and/or complemented by actions in rear areas to accelerate armaments production and to enhance resilience. The necessary capabilities include:

Substantial numbers of low-cost autonomous unmanned vehicles for both the air-land and maritime arenas, providing capabilities ranging from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to targeting to strike.
Prepositioning of Replicator-type capabilities for the air-land and maritime battles to support the capacity for prompt engagement including organizing NATO’s enhanced forward presence forces to operate Replicator capabilities, and supporting such actions by enhanced obstacles including land and naval mines at the potential forward lines of contact, would provide immediate counters to an initial attack.
Accelerated establishment of industrial capabilities, both European and American, such as has been demonstrated to be feasible by the recent building in the United States of a new ammunition plant in ten months; the ongoing building in France of a munitions explosives plant planned to take a year; and including engagement of nontraditional commercial suppliers, as exemplified by the planned “arsenal plant” to be built in the United States and intended to produce thousands of unmanned vehicles.
Government support/engagement including funding and tax incentives for capital costs, but enhancing efficiencies through contractor designs and operations including potentially government-owned, contractor-designed and -operated plants (GOCODEO).
Engagement of high-end, private-sector cybersecurity providers to support resilience to commercial providers of production capabilities and to critical infrastructures such as the electric grid, gas pipelines, and water necessary for effective industrial production.

It should be apparent that the capabilities of the planned unmanned systems for hellscape capacity (via the Replicator process) in the Indo-Pacific region, and those recommended in this brief for the European theater, overlap with unmanned system capabilities currently in use in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Accordingly, lessons learned from that conflict are incorporated in the discussion below including a separate section discussing unmanned vehicles in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. However, inasmuch as the use of unmanned systems by each side in that war has been somewhat ad hoc (even though effective), the paper focuses on the establishment of operational and industrial strategies for NATO as is being undertaken more systematically in the Indo-Pacific region through this hellscape approach and Replicator process.³

The discussion below describes the challenges NATO faces and then describes how a hellscape/Replicator defense would undertake to meet those challenges.

I. The NATO challenge

NATO faces a dual challenge as it seeks to enhance its deterrent and defense capabilities. On the one hand, Russia not only has demonstrated its ability to fight an extended conventional campaign, but is undertaking significant efforts to increase its military capabilities. On the other hand, while NATO has approved regional plans designed to counter the Russian threat, NATO countries—as illustrated by the status of the major European militaries of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—are far from having the capabilities necessary to implement those plans.

A. Russia

The Russian threat derives from both intentions and capabilities. As to intentions, Christopher Cavoli, NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, testified that he believes “Russia would be emboldened [beyond Ukraine]. . . . at some point, they would commit further aggression.⁴ Similarly, Celeste Wallander, US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, stated her full agreement with Gen. Cavoli: “Putin is not going to stop at Ukraine.”⁵ NATO as a whole is in full agreement as to the danger of future Russian aggression, with the July 2024 NATO summit declaration stating, “Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security,” and one which “will persist into the long term.”⁶

While there can be no certainty as to timing of any future Russian aggression, multiple NATO leaders and defense experts have highlighted the prospect of such a conflict occurring in the relative near term. Norway’s Gen. Eirik Kristoffersen, for instance, said, “The current window of opportunity will remain open for a year or two, perhaps three, which is when we will have to invest even more in our defence.”⁷ Similarly, Jack Watling of the United Kingdom’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has noted the importance of “ensuring that the UK’s Armed Forces are contributing to a credible deterrence posture alongside European NATO allies by the end of 2027.”⁸Estonia’s then-prime minister, Kaja Kallas—since nominated to be the EU’s top diplomat—described the Kremlin’s military threat to NATO: “Our intelligence estimates it to be three to five years, and that very much depends on how we manage our unity and keep our posture regarding Ukraine.”⁹ Likewise, Denmark’s defense minister, Troels Lund Poulsen, stated, “It cannot be ruled out that within a three- to five-year period, Russia will test Article 5 and NATO’s solidarity.”¹⁰ Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, puts the readiness deadline later—2029: “We must not believe that Putin will stop at the borders of Ukraine if he gets that far.”¹¹

On the capabilities side, Russia, even while conducting the war against Ukraine, has adapted its operational and tactical approaches;¹² increased its defense budget and its military industrial production; added to the size of its forces and is planning even more;¹³ received substantial support from China, North Korea, and Iran; and, despite significant ground force and Black Sea naval losses, maintained its air, space, cyber, and most of its other naval capabilities. “Its strategic forces, long range aviation, cyber capabilities, space capabilities, and capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum have lost no capacity at all,” Gen. Cavoli has testified. “The air force has lost some aircraft, but only about 10 percent of their fleet. The navy has suffered significantly in the Black Sea—but nowhere else—and Russian naval activity worldwide is at a significant peak.”¹⁴
For example, Russia:

Plans to spend 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on the military.¹⁵
Is delivering approximately 1,500 tanks to its forces per year along with approximately 3,000 armored fighting vehicles of various types, while increasing its missile production at a similar pace.¹⁶
Aims to surpass the size of the US military.¹⁷

A recent Atlantic Council report concluded, “The West is in a race against time, with the delta between Russian force reconstitution and NATO’s investment in real, exercised military capabilities.”¹⁸ Moreover, as noted, Russia is not on its own. In its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has received critical assistance from China, Iran, and North Korea. China has provided “dual-use components and material to Russia’s defense industry.”¹⁹ More recently, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said that China is providing Russia with “‘very substantial’ military support in exchange for key technological capabilities,” Euractiv reported.²⁰ Iran has transferred at least one thousand unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and, recently, short-range ballistic missiles;²¹ while North Korea provided “nearly five million artillery shells.”²² Russia would undoubtedly seek similar assistance in a conflict with NATO.

B. Unready NATO forces

The NATO Force Model provides the broad parameters of the NATO defense strategy. The model provides for 100,000 ready forces to be available in up to ten days, 200,000 in ten to thirty days, and 300,000 in thirty to 180 days.“²³ Under current conditions, however, NATO cannot meet those requirements given multiple deficiencies in the militaries of member countries. A study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies stated that:

European land forces . . . have recognised weaknesses in their respective forces, which exist in all of them to varying degrees, including operational overstretch, lack of stocks and resupply limitations, limited unit and formation level collective training, low personnel numbers, ageing equipment, unsuitable equipment, maintenance problems, and tight budgets. Many of these combine to produce lower levels of combat readiness than NATO defence plans and the New Force Model (NFM) will demand.²⁴

Moreover, as a Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis of a potential Russian attack against the Baltic countries described, “Even if the [NATO summit] commitments were fulfilled completely, NATO’s forward presence would likely still fall short of the denial standard required to make a Russian fait accompli untenable.”²⁵

These deficiencies can be usefully understood by reviewing the status of the militaries of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—three large European nations crucial to NATO effectiveness—as well as reviewing more broadly the substantial deficiencies existing throughout NATO’s rear areas.

I. United Kingdom

A recent report by the UK House of Commons Defence Committee plainly stated, “There are multiple capability shortfalls within the UK Armed Forces.”²⁶ Mobility—getting to the fight—is an issue as “deploying a full armored brigade would take two or three months,”²⁷ and, of course, to meet the NATO force goals, more than one brigade from the UK would undoubtedly be required. Even when deployed, the UK’s combat capability would still be lacking. A RUSI analysis underscored the problem of “a thinning” of the British Army’s “close combat capabilities,” noting that to be in warfighting form would require an increase in “the level of firepower—and thus lethality—available to the company,” and a substantially increased “concentration of firepower in the divisional artillery group.”²⁸ Moreover, given the potential for a lengthy war with Russia, as is ongoing in Ukraine, that also requires the UK to have the “industrial resilience” to continuously acquire raw materials for the supply chain to be able to meet its military needs.²⁹

II. France

France, too, would be unable to meet the NATO force goal requirements of timely provision of sufficient forces to the forward line of contact as in a “real war against a near-peer adversary,” according to a Military Review analysis: “The French could [only] reliably field up to two combined arms battalions . . . within a week, followed by a full heavy brigade within a month.”³⁰ To be sure, France is now focused on the requirements of high-intensity warfare, having undertaken a very substantial increase in its defense budget under its Military Planning Law for the period 2024-2029, but as recently as two years ago its chief of defense stated that the French military did “not have today the means for a high-intensity war.”³¹ Thus, the point of the Military Planning Law, whose implementation only began this year (2024) is “about reversing decades of defence cuts: ‘un effort de réparation de nos forces, abîmées par plusieurs décennies de coupes budgétaires (an effort to repair our forces, hollowed out by many decades of defense cuts).’”³² In short, while France has begun on the right track, it is decidedly only at the front end of its efforts to “make France’s armed forces capable of fighting and sustaining a high intensity conventional war.”³³

III. Germany

An analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies has described the substantial difficulties facing the German military. Just weeks into his appointment at the Ministry of Defense, Pistorius observed that Germany’s armed forces are not “combat ready—combat ready in the sense of being able to confront an offensive, brutal war of aggression.”³⁴ Germany has since undertaken a substantial effort to increase military capabilities including the establishment of a special fund of €100 billion ($108.9 billion),³⁵ but it still is lacking multiple needed capabilities. Shortages of personnel and equipment persist, according to a Deutsche Welle report on an analysis by the German Bundestag’s commissioner for the armed forces.“³⁶ The commissioner’s report itself included multiple deficiencies identified by the Ministry of Defense:

There are gaps in materiel, spare parts and ammunition that can only be closed in the medium term. A number of units have major personnel shortfalls. There is a shortage of materiel, from major equipment to spare parts. The shortage has become even greater as a result of the deliveries to Ukraine. The infrastructure is disastrous in many places. . . . Unfortunately, I have to record that, even in the second year following the Federal Chancellor’s Zeitenwende (“turning point”) speech, substantial improvements in personnel, materiel and infrastructure have yet to materialise.³⁷

IV. NATO’s rear area

In a conflict with Russia, NATO’s rear areas would almost certainly come under attack. As the war against Ukraine demonstrates, Russia will attack both critical infrastructures and populations. That is fully in accord with Russian military doctrine, which provides for “special operations for the destruction of critically important targets.”³⁸ In essence, that means, as James Black of the RAND Corporation put it, “attacking the underlying infrastructure and industrial base that enables NATO governments and militaries to function, and seeking to demoralise their populations.”³⁹

NATO nations will accordingly need to defend against both kinetic and nonkinetic Russian attacks including cyber and electronic warfare. On the kinetic level, Russia would utilize air and missile attacks—as it has been doing extensively against Ukraine. NATO’s struggles to provide Ukraine air and missile defense capabilities underscore the limited number of systems the Alliance has for defense of its own territory. Undersea attacks against cables and pipelines would be another area of significant concern: “Russia can also use divers, submarines, uncrewed vehicles, or other methods to attack undersea infrastructure on which Baltic nations depend,” another RAND analysis underscored.⁴⁰ Comparable undersea attacks could be undertaken in the North, Mediterranean, and Black seas and in the Atlantic Ocean.

In the nonkinetic arena, Russia has capacity to target critical infrastructure, according to the 2024 US Annual Threat Assessment, including “industrial control systems, in the United States as well as in allied and partner countries.”⁴¹ The vulnerability of critical infrastructures to cyberattacks has been demonstrated numerous times, including the attack on the Colonial Pipeline gas pipeline,⁴² numerous attacks on water utilities,⁴³ and the Volt Typhoon intrusions into multiple critical infrastructures.⁴⁴ Similarly, Russia’s electronic jamming of GPS-guided missiles in the context of the Ukraine conflict and its jamming in NATO countries of GPS signals for aircraft and other civilian uses demonstrate the vulnerability of multiple military and civilian systems reliant on GPS in the context of a conflict.⁴⁵

The next section of this brief describes the role of a hellscape/Replicator initiative in helping NATO to overcome the significant issues described above.

II. Recommendations

A NATO hellscape defense undertaken at Replicator speed could overcome many of the current deficiencies that the Alliance’s deterrent and defense posture is facing. Hicks has underscored the importance of low-cost autonomous attritable systems and the use of commercial technologies for an effective NATO defense (as well, of course, for the Indo-Pacific region).⁴⁶ A recent solicitation by the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) stresses that the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to “employ low-cost precision effects at extended ranges,” given the observable impact of “asymmetric low-cost, one-way unmanned aerial systems (UAS)” in recent conflicts. DOD is looking for “reliable, affordable, and adaptable long-range UAS platforms” that will, at scale, provide “operational flexibility.”⁴⁷

To be sure, a focus on a speedy hellscape approach will be most valuable when combined with effective traditional capabilities including deep strike through long-range bombers and artillery fires, agile communications and information systems including the use of space-based capabilities like low-earth orbit satellites, sufficient ammunition stocks, and resilient logistics necessary for prevailing in an extended conflict. Notably, undertaking such an initiative as a key element of NATO deterrence and defense would not only complement such traditional capabilities and align with NATO’s deterrence and defense strategy,“⁴⁸ but would substantially alter the military balance in Europe. A seven-step approach would be required.

A. Maintain low costs and defense budget compatibility

As a new initiative, a hellscape defense for the European theater using the Replicator process would have to fit generally within the current and planned defense budgets of NATO nations. That process has a very low cost for a defense program, at approximately $1 billion for two years. “With Congress’s support,” Hicks has said, “we secured needed funding for fiscal year 2024, about $500 million, and budgeted a similar amount for fiscal year 2025.”⁴⁹ That level of funding is entirely compatible with and easily accommodated by NATO nations’ planned defense budgets, which now use 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) as a budgetary floor.⁵⁰ Regarding the three large European NATO members discussed above, the UK is planning to increase its defense budget to 2.5% of GDP;⁵¹ the French Military Law provides substantial additional funds; and Germany’s €100 billion fund can obviously accommodate Replicator-level expenditures.

B. Use unmanned autonomous vehicles by the thousands

The heart of the Replicator effort is the use of substantial numbers of low-cost autonomous unmanned vehicles that would provide capabilities ranging from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to targeting to strike. In the Indo-Pacific region, WIRED reported, the Pentagon’s hellscape plan includes:

Producing and deploying what amounts to a massive screen of autonomous drone swarms designed to confound enemy aircraft, provide guidance and targeting to allied missiles, knock out surface warships and landing craft, and generally create enough chaos to blunt (if not fully halt) a Chinese push across the Taiwan Strait. Networked drones will not just strike adversaries but also provide critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions to fill the gaps between satellite imaging and crewed overflights, ostensibly allowing the US and its allies to develop a more complete picture of the battlefield as it evolves.⁵²

As noted above, Hicks has called for “multiple thousands, in multiple domains.” An interview with Adm. Samuel Paparo, the current Indo-Pacific combatant commander, led to the conclusion that, in response to a Chinese attack, “the U.S. military would deploy thousands of unmanned submarines, unmanned surface ships and aerial drones to flood the area and give Taiwanese, U.S. and partner forces time to mount a full response.”⁵³ Adm. John Aquilino, the prior Indo-Pacific commander, had previously stated that the “metric for me: 1,000 targets for 24 hours.”⁵⁴

For NATO forces in Europe, the level of effort and anticipated scope—including air-land and maritime battles—would be of commensurate size. At the moment, no such broad-based effort exists for the European theater, though there are activities in several countries which could be expanded on or incorporated into an effective hellscape/Replicator defense.

NATO should build on these efforts and establish NATO-wide defense planning requirements for hellscape/Replicator capabilities of the types described in the next section of the report. NATO nations should move forward themselves—even absent direction from the NATO defense planning process.

C. Identify core capabilities

While significant portions of the Replicator process remain classified, public reports indicate that important elements of the effort include contracts for autonomous unmanned aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles. NATO countries would, of course, need to make their own decisions, but the US program is reported to include the following:

UAVs: “The accelerated fielding of more than 1,000 of defense contractor AeroVironment’s Switchblade 600 loitering munitions—a man-portable missile that circles over targets before dive-bombing them at the right moment—in the next year.”⁶⁹
USVs: The procurement of uncrewed “interceptor” surface vessels under the DOD’s production-ready, inexpensive, maritime expeditionary (PRIME) effort. According to a DOD solicitation,⁷⁰ as reported in the media, the PRIME drone boats will “autonomously transi[t] hundreds of miles through contested waterspace, loitering in an assigned operating area while monitoring for maritime surface threats, and then sprinting to interdict a noncooperative, maneuvering vessel.”⁷¹
UUVs: Anduril Industries’ Dive-LD autonomous underwater vehicles were, according to a news report, “ultimately selected alongside several other technologies for the second tranche [of Replicator].”⁷²

It is worth noting that while hellscape/Replicator is intended to consist of thousands of unmanned vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles have had success with significantly lower numbers in the context of Ukraine attacks against the Russian Black Sea fleet. Public numbers indicate only about one hundred Ukraine USVs have been acquired,⁷³ but their impact has been devastating. As Gen. Cavoli observed, “It’s quite a thing to watch a country that has virtually no navy defeat one of the biggest navies in the world. . . . The Ukrainians have successfully pushed the Black Sea [Fleet] out of operating west of the southern tip of Crimea. That’s a remarkable thing. And they’ve done it [predominantly] with completely unmanned systems.”⁷⁴

In addition to UAVs, USVs, and UUVs, other reports on content secured via the Replicator process include acquisition of counter-drone systems,⁷⁵ “designing and fielding an unmanned aerial vehicle capable of mass-production at low cost and high volume,”⁷⁶ and establishing an artificial intelligence hub.⁷⁷

Artificial intelligence will be utilized by Replicator-acquired capabilities in a variety of ways. An AI data hub will allow multiple systems developed by different companies and operated by different services (and potentially even different countries) to have access to the information necessary to coordinate tactical and operational capabilities.⁷⁸

Artificial intelligence is expected to play a key role at the tactical and operational levels, according to reports, to ensure that swarms of autonomous vehicles are effectively utilized. Specifically, it will be important to establish “mesh networks” (which connect devices or nodes) and can organize the thousands of planned unmanned vehicles to work in tandem for ISR, targeting, and striking. As RAND analysts Thomas Hamilton and David Ochmanek describe:

The core function of each UAV in the mesh is to observe potential targets in its area of regard and communicate the results of those observations to other, nearby UAVs in the mesh. Through this intramesh communication, each UAV will, in principle, “know” everything. The mesh will use the information from the observations to determine optimum targets for each weapon as it becomes available. This will require significant onboard processing on each UAV, yet the overall computing capability required will be modest by modern standards—certainly less than that of a contemporary smartphone. The system is only keeping track of the position and rough description of a few hundred objects. Weapons could become available as they enter the area of mesh observation from launch locations far away. Alternatively, weapons could be employed from larger UAVs or other platforms operating near or inside the area occupied by the mesh.⁷⁹

It is important to understand, in light of the extensive use of electronic warfare (EW) by Russia, that appropriately engineered mesh networks generally would not be affected by such jamming. Equipping each UAV with a data link in the proper frequency band and a wide-area directional antenna can ensure drone-to-drone communications over ranges of 10 to 20 kilometers (km) even in the presence of heavy standoff jamming.⁸⁰ A mesh with a density of greater than one UAV every 10 km can also provide in-flight target location updates to incoming weapons, helping to ensure that they find the right targets.⁸¹ Finally, as a further defense against Russian electronic warfare, the United States and allies possess anti-radiation missiles that can be targeted against jammers.

Mesh networks can be effective on their own. But Hamilton and Ochmanek point out that they can be usefully complemented by other sensing and communications capabilities, in effect establishing a multidomain effort:

New technologies for sensors, autonomy, and automatic target recognition make it possible for small air, space, land, and maritime platforms to collect and share data and to process those data onboard, generating the information that joint and combined forces need to target moving enemy forces. Key attributes of these sensing grids should be affordability and mass. . . . Promising candidates for this include maritime drones; unattended ground sensors; small unmanned aerial vehicles; and small satellites, including civil-sector constellations. Examples of all of these exist today, albeit at varying levels of maturity.”⁸²

D. Plan for prepositioning and mobility

The success of the Replicator process will depend on its immediacy to the fight. To do so in the Indo-Pacific theater will require prepositioning on Taiwan or nearby.⁸³ Likewise, in the European theater, these capabilities will need to be prepositioned at or near the forward lines of contact, both for the air-land and maritime battles.

The Baltic countries, Poland, and Finland are the most obvious places for air-land hellscape/Replicator capabilities. Each of these countries should significantly increase their inventories of these systems. Additionally, NATO’s enhanced forward presence forces should be organized, trained, and equipped to fight with these capabilities.

For the EFP forces in the northeast, emphasis should be on autonomous air-land capabilities and should include swarming UAVs guided by the use of mesh networks. Such capabilities are now available and can be established at low cost:

Ongoing developments in robotics and autonomous sensing can enable a force to establish a ubiquitous sensing and targeting grid in contested areas using large numbers of unmanned platforms. . . . Each drone would be equipped with one or more sensors, allowing them to collect data via electro-optical, radar, and acoustic means. Using edge processing, these data could be processed onboard each sensor platform and shared with other platforms in the grid in real time via data links. Using automatic target recognition algorithms, the grid itself would determine what types of [targets] it has observed. As defending forces launched . . . missiles toward the battlespace, the grid would assign a target to each one, communicating the target’s latest location to the incoming weapon using the same data links that were used to share information with other platforms within the grid. Th[is] . . . approach could be employed to support a defense against Russia’s invasion, [including both UAVs and] unattended ground sensors.”⁸⁴

For the EFP countries on the Black Sea (which should also engage with Turkey), the emphasis should be on maritime capabilities both for maritime domain awareness as the United States is doing in the Gulf (Task Force 59⁸⁵) and Latin America (Windward Stack⁸⁶), and also for strike. The latter can be undertaken both by utilizing USVs in the manner that has been so effective for Ukraine and by mesh networks guiding UAVs against maritime targets. Additionally, the multiple countries bordering NATO’s other maritime seas (i.e, Baltic, North, Mediterranean) should likewise host hellscape/Replicator maritime capabilities, ideally organized among groups of countries with significant interests in each of those bodies of water. While there are existing maritime cooperation efforts,⁸⁷ none focus on a Replicator-type effort, but the following nations are positioned to lead in their respective areas: the UK and Norway might provide the lead for the North Sea; Germany and Sweden for the Baltic Sea, and France and Italy for the Mediterranean Sea. The UK, France, Spain, and Portugal could undertake an effort along the Atlantic coast.

It is worth underscoring that a hellscape/Replicator defense focused on autonomous unmanned vehicles can receive significant support from the use of obstacles such as land and naval mines. Baltic nations and Poland are in the process of establishing obstacle-oriented defenses;⁸⁸ as part of creating a hellscape/Replicator defense, the use of land and naval mines at the potential forward lines of contact should be evaluated. Lessons can be drawn from the Ukraine conflict, where mines have been utilized by both sides, as well as from the Korean context, where the defense of South Korea is supported by mines. Decisions can be made as to whether to utilize anti-vehicle and/or anti-personnel mines, the former allowed and the latter barred by the Ottawa Treaty on mines (to which neither the United States nor the Republic of Korea are parties).⁸⁹ Naval mines would have a useful role and are currently being purchased by “Germany and eight other [NATO] countries on the Baltic Sea,” as described by German Defense Minister Pistorius.“⁹⁰ NATO nations should also evaluate developing the “capability to deploy AI/ML enabled maritime mines that can reposition themselves and swarm targets . . . [and which] could be used to destroy high-value targets or to channel . . . naval forces towards kill boxes sown with dumb mines,” as a RAND report suggests.⁹¹

E. Accelerate acquisition of capabilities

As should be clear from the two-year time frame of Replicator, the initiative requires industry to be able to produce capabilities very quickly. From the limited amount of public data, “thousands” of weapons will be provided in a two-year period. Such accelerated capabilities for the European theater could similarly be achieved if appropriate actions are taken.

First, the use of commercial technology is key. The DOD’s Defense Innovation Unit has the specific mandate of “focus[ing] exclusively on fielding and scaling commercial technology across the U.S. military at commercial speeds.”⁹² The breadth of the outreach to commercial companies as part of the Replicator initiative is exemplified by the fact that “DOD has awarded contracts for 30 different hardware and software efforts with more than 50 major subcontracts to a range of different companies.”⁹³ Establishing a Replicator initiative for Europe will require comparable focus on utilizing commercial capabilities.

In establishing those capabilities, European nations should first conduct broad outreach, contacting companies already working with their militaries on autonomous unmanned vehicles and also companies that are supporting the ongoing US Indo-Pacific activity, in addition to others working with DIU, such as those included in its Blue UAS portfolio of approved makers of unmanned aerial systems,“⁹⁴ or those undertaking development efforts such as the four commercial companies engaged in the US Air Force’s Enterprise Test Vehicle activity.⁹⁵ Additionally, NATO nations have previously undertaken a number of demonstration projects regarding unmanned vehicles including through Allied Command Transformation,“⁹⁶ and these could provide a basis for national acquisition initiatives for the European theater. National acquisitions would be more practicable than NATO acquisitions as they would be both accomplished in a more timely fashion and more effectively incorporated into force structures and operations.

Second, as a corollary to the importance of nontraditional commercial suppliers, there will be high value in an internal bureaucratic mechanism designed to seek out such capabilities, such as the DOD DIU. Other government elements can also facilitate the efforts of a specialized unit: By way of example, the US Commerce Department recently held a conference on Taiwan, attracting some twenty US companies with UV capabilities for discussions.⁹⁷ Comparable actions could be undertaken for Europe.

There are already steps in this direction in the UK, France, and Germany. In the UK, Strategic Command operates the jHub, which is focused on innovative capabilities,“⁹⁸ has established a memorandum of understanding and personnel exchange with DIU,“⁹⁹ and is expanding its innovative activities (as announced by the prior government) through the establishment of the Defence Innovation Agency, which is planned to be operational in 2025.¹⁰⁰ France has a Defense Innovation Agency and has published an extensive reference document on guiding defense innovation that includes multiple approaches to the commercial sector and to academia.“¹⁰¹ Germany has undertaken development efforts both through its Cyber Innovation Unit“¹⁰² and through the KITU 2 project for UAVs, which has achieved a recent significant developmental success using AI to guide drone swarms while demonstrating effective resistance to EW jamming.¹⁰³ Each of the UK, French, and German activities are in their relatively early days and need to be expanded to reach their full potential. Other NATO nations need to undertake comparable efforts, which could include working with the larger countries’ activities.

Third, in addition to a specialized unit, NATO nations need to orient their military services to recognize the importance of acquiring low-cost unmanned capabilities. That will occur most effectively when the highest-ranking defense officials are fully engaged in the effort. In the United States, the DIU now reports directly to the secretary of defense,¹⁰⁴ and the deputy defense secretary “recently established the Deputy’s Innovation Steering Group to bring together leaders from across the department to break down systemic barriers that impede innovation.”¹⁰⁵ The results are significant. As the WIRED report describes, the Army is budgeting for semiautonomous loitering munitions, the Marine Corps is undertaking development efforts for kamikaze drone swarms, air-launched loitering munitions, and uncrewed surface vessels, Special Operations Command wants air-launched systems, and the Navy is seeking “missile-hauling drone boats as potential escorts for transport ships.”¹⁰⁶

It also is notable that US combatant commanders have themselves initiated the use of unmanned vehicles as with Task Forces 59 (USVs) and 99 (UAVs) by Central Command,¹⁰⁷ and the Windward Stack activity utilizing USVs by Southern Command.¹⁰⁸

Fourth, prompt transitioning of research and development efforts to production is another key element. Already, Sydney Freedberg reported, “The Pentagon’s Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve [RDER] has successfully transitioned at least seven technology projects to the services so far, from high-altitude balloons to underwater communications, including five that were not previously linked to the high-speed acquisition effort.”¹⁰⁹ As with Replicator, the RDER activity has provided much speedier results for programs including accelerating: “production and fielding of initial units by at least two years” for global autonomous reconnaissance crafts (GARCs); family of integrated targeting cells by five years;¹¹⁰ and MQ-9 drone “enhancements” by about two years.¹¹¹

Finally, traditional defense firms can also be sources of production for key capabilities. In the United States, for example, RTX has developed the Coyote counter-drone system with the Army, contracting for 600 at a cost of $75 million.“¹¹² Moreover, traditional firms can effectively integrate subcontractors as, for example, Honeywell’s Stationary and Mobile UAS Reveal and Intercept system (SAMURAI), is “designed to counter swarm drones and protect critical assets,” and incorporates components from seven companies.¹¹³

F. Rapidly expand the industrial base

The Replicator initiative has generated a need for a rapid expansion of the industrial base to provide autonomous unmanned vehicle production. Establishing such a capability for the European theater in a relatively short time seems entirely possible given that Ukraine, in the context of war, has stated that it now has the capacity to build four million unmanned vehicles annually.¹¹⁴ Beyond Ukraine, there are a number of ongoing efforts in both the United States and in Europe that demonstrate that industrial capacity can be rapidly increased.

In the United States, a new ammunition plant was recently built in ten months, highlighting the ability to quickly add physical production capabilities.¹¹⁵ In France, a plant for explosive propellants is expected to be completed in a year.¹¹⁶ While neither are producing unmanned vehicles, they reflect an ability to move more quickly than has generally been associated with establishing new defense production.

Moreover, production capabilities for unmanned vehicles are being rapidly put in place by commercial industry. In Ukraine, the Turkish company Baykar is constructing a plant whose factory building will be completed in about twelve months, with additional time to put in place internal machinery.¹¹⁷ Another set of examples involving substantial private financing comes from Anduril, which obtained $1.5 billion from private investors for expanding its production capacity.¹¹⁸ Anduril is undertaking to build an “arsenal plant” designed to manufacture “tens of thousands” of autonomous systems by “leveraging simplified, modular and software-defined design and production techniques.”¹¹⁹ The company is building a new factory in Rhode Island to produce Dive-LD UUVs, with the opening expected in 2025.¹²⁰ At the same time, Anduril is proceeding with its Barracuda initiative, which is a “family of air-breathing, software-defined expendable autonomous air vehicles (AAVs) that are optimized for affordable, hyper-scale production.”¹²¹

One possible approach for undertaking expanded Replicator initiatives for the European theater is the potential of utilizing government support including direct funding and/or tax incentives for covering capital costs. One method that deserves consideration would be utilizing government funding to cover capital costs but relying on contractor design and operations to achieve the agility that commercial industry brings. Nations would have to adapt any such government-owned, contractor-developed and -operated plants to their own circumstances, but it may be a useful bridging mechanism for some countries by providing an intermediate mechanism between pure commercial activity and complete government control. Another approach would be to provide subsidies via tax incentives for defense production akin to what is being done by many countries in the information technology arena with microchip plants. While not precisely the same, the European Union has provided approximately €11 billion in defense financing to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility.¹²² Comparable approaches could be utilized to support the building of industrial plants focused on the requirements of a Replicator initiative.¹²³

G. Engage government and high-end cybersecurity providers to boost cyber resilience

One key aspect of the Replicator initiative is providing cybersecurity support to the commercial providers of production capabilities so that those capabilities would be resilient against Russian cyberattacks. “We created a process to review and strengthen the cybersecurity of companies that support Replicator, before we publicize specific systems or vendor names,” Hicks stated. “It’s part of our commitment to ensuring private industry has access to the information, tools, and tradecraft needed to defend their networks—and the capabilities they build—from intrusion and attack.”¹²⁴ The importance of cybersecurity is underscored by the DIU solicitation for UAVs, which includes the requirement that systems must “be able to meet a cyber-security evaluation conducted in accordance with DOD Instruction 8510.01 Risk Management Framework for DOD Systems.”¹²⁵

If the UK, France, and/or Germany undertake Replicator-type efforts, they each have substantial governmental cybersecurity capabilities to help secure their industries. They could also support other nations, as could the United States, which already has undertaken multiple cyber defense efforts with other countries through what Cyber Command calls hunt forward activities.¹²⁶ Moreover, NATO itself has recently expanded its cybersecurity capabilities through the establishment of the NATO Integrated Cyber Defence Centre, which includes a focus on civilian infrastructures in its mandate.“¹²⁷ This new NATO capability also could be used to enhance the resilience of Replicator-type activities in multiple countries. Such national and NATO cybersecurity capabilities can also be used to support critical infrastructures like the electric grid, gas pipelines, and water utilities that are required for industrial production. Finally, high-end private-sector cybersecurity providers have been substantially engaged in providing Ukraine cyber defense capabilities in the face of Russian attacks. Their engagement as a “sixth domain” to provide cybersecurity in wartime has previously been proposed.¹²⁸ Engaging such private-sector providers systematically to support Replicator initiatives undertaken by commercial entities would significantly expand the scope of effective cyber resilience efforts.

Unmanned vehicles in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has laid bare the importance of unmanned vehicles (UVs) in modern warfare, as thousands of UVs are deployed each day on the battlefield. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the UVs discussed in the overall issue brief (and in the Replicator initiative) and those in use in Ukraine: in the issue brief, the discussion concerns autonomous UVs, whereas the UVs in Ukraine are (to date) generally not autonomous though Ukraine has developed some autonomous drone capability which it is using effectively,¹²⁹ and has received from the United States the Phoenix Ghost drone which has autonomous capability.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, there are important lessons from both Ukrainian and Russian use of UVs that deserve full understanding in generating a hellscape/Replicator defense for NATO.

Missions:

Both Ukraine and Russia have used UVs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, and strike, all well-recognized missions. Additionally, Ukraine is increasingly using UAVs for battlefield logistics that allow Ukraine to evade Russian efforts to cut off supply lines that sustain the front lines.¹³¹ Ukraine has also used UVs for mine laying along the front line.¹³² As UV capabilities continue to develop, unmanned ground vehicles may have expanded missions including logistical support and tactical capabilities, and unmanned surface and/or underwater vehicles may have multiple missions including ISR, strike, and naval mine-laying capabilities.

Types:

In 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Ukraine invested heavily in drones in order to offset Russian superiority in air capabilities. Ukraine’s Armed Forces used Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones to push through Russian air defenses to strike fixed targets. More recently, as the war has evolved, Ukraine has utilized smaller UAVs for the land battle including heavy use of first-person view drones. Both the larger and smaller UAVs have proved susceptible to Russian defenses, especially electronic warfare. That vulnerability is largely a function of the UAV being required to be connected to the operator, which makes it susceptible to jamming. Using frequency hopping or tight beam transmission¹³³ can make a guided UAV less susceptible to electronic interference, but the most effective way to defeat such attacks is to make the UV autonomous.¹³⁴

Production:

Ukraine’s ability to mass produce UAVs has significantly enhanced its ability to offset Russia’s many military advantages. Recently, Ukraine authorities have said that Ukraine now has the capability of producing four million drones annually.¹³⁵ Mass counts in warfare.

Innovation:

Ukraine has developed new UV capabilities with impressive speed and has also utilized existing capabilities in new and highly effective ways.

In August 2024, Ukraine launched its first missile drone—named after a traditional Ukrainian bread, Palyanytsia, which the Russian tongue stumbles over¹³⁶—and in September 2024 launched a mass attack on a Russian weapons depot utilizing the long-range UAVs that had been developed in the course of the war.¹³⁷ The attacks are part of a larger campaign to hit high-value targets within Russia including Russian industrial infrastructure that sustains the Russian war effort (e.g., oil, major steel plants).¹³⁸ The campaign seeks to destroy industrial capacity at a rate faster than Russia can reconstitute it and to erode public support for Putin’s war within Russia.

Beyond air capabilities (and as noted earlier), Ukraine’s use of uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) have played an outsized role in the Black Sea, with Ukraine utilizing this technology to materially damage over a third of Russian warships in the Black Sea.

Industrial production:

Ukraine has demonstrated that UVs can be produced at both speed and scale at a relatively low cost including dramatically scaling up its public-private partnerships for UV production. At the beginning of the war, Ukraine had seven domestic drone manufacturers and now has more than 200 drone-manufacturing companies.¹³⁹ Additionally, Ukraine’s own drone production will be supplemented by the Ukraine Drone Coalition, led by Latvia and the United Kingdom, which seeks to deliver one million drones to Ukraine.¹⁴⁰

Russia, however, is also ramping up to ten times its current capacity, with a goal of producing nearly 1.4 million drones this year.¹⁴¹ That increased production, coupled with shipments of Iranian Shahed-131/136 drones to Russia, allows Moscow to compete with Ukraine in UV production and use.¹⁴²

Constraints:

As both sides race to scale up production, there are still significant limitations to drone technology in warfare. Most notably, electronic countermeasures and jamming technologies are effective at neutralizing the military use of many types of drones.¹⁴³ Additionally, human-controlled drone-swarming capabilities are not as lethal or effective as what is expected from those primarily controlled by artificial intelligence. However, advances in autonomous drone capabilities (as recommended in the brief, and those being undertaken in connection with Replicator), can defeat the electronic warfare challenge and significantly increase UV effectiveness. Already, Ukraine is ramping up efforts to augment its drones with artificial intelligence systems in order to offset Russian electronic warfare advantages.¹⁴⁴ However, these steps are still in their infancy and will require significantly more resources, innovation, and integration to fully succeed.

Lessons:

Drones are relatively low-cost and easy to produce at scale—making UVs an attractive tool in a military’s arsenal. In a war of attrition, drones present a risk-acceptant capability. Investment in these capabilities now can aid ISR efforts, enhance precision-strike capabilities, and provide logistical support across allied territory.
New drone technology should increasingly focus on autonomous capabilities to offset the threats posed by electronic countermeasures and jamming technologies to disrupt the primary mission of the drones. Given the prohibitively expensive cost of shooting down UAVs with air defense systems, autonomous drones would be a cost-effective way to overcome Russian air defenses.¹⁴⁶
An appropriately resourced drone fleet allows mass precision at close range, which will be an important element in future wars of attrition. NATO and its constituent members should enhance their focus on capabilities that allow for mass precision at close range to buoy allied defense efforts.
Maritime unmanned surface vessels have had demonstrable effect and should be part of NATO’s arsenal. (Unmanned underwater vehicles will be another important capability, though not yet demonstrated in the Russia-Ukraine war.)
Russian offensive campaigns have been stymied by Ukraine’s battlefield awareness, aided by its massive deployment of drones. As such, NATO and its constituent members can utilize drone technology as a complement to other ISR capabilities to monitor Russian military movement during conflict, thereby providing effective tactical and operational indications and warning.

III. Conclusion

A hellscape defense built at Replicator speed would not resolve every issue that NATO faces, but it would substantially alter the military balance in the European theater strongly in NATO’s favor. The necessary actions to create these capabilities include:

Amassing substantial numbers of low-cost autonomous unmanned vehicles for both the air-land and maritime arenas.
Prepositioning of Replicator-type capabilities for the air-land and maritime battles to support the capacity for prompt engagement, and supporting such actions by enhanced obstacles, including land and naval mines.
Accelerating the establishment of industrial capabilities, both European and American.
Utilizing government support/engagement including funding and tax incentives for capital costs but enhancing efficiencies through contractor designs and operations.
Engaging high-end, private-sector cybersecurity providers to support the resilience of commercial providers of production capabilities and to critical infrastructures such as the electric grid, gas pipelines, and water necessary to effective industrial production.

NATO and individual member nations should undertake such a hellscape/Replicator effort as an immediate and highest priority.

About the authors

Board director

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Cybersecurity Defense Policy

Staff

Kristen Taylor

Program Assistant

Transatlantic Security Initiative

Europe & Eurasia European Union

Related program

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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Image: An FPV drone with an attached portable grenade launcher is seen during a test fly conducted by Ukrainian servicemen of the 'Bulava' Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Unit of the Separate Presidential Brigade at their position near a frontline, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Zaporizhzhia region, Ukraine October 11, 2024. REUTERS/Stringer

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