The race for Iran’s presidency

For the US and Iran, an Ebrahim Raisi presidency could portend not much beyond a return to a 2015 nuclear agreement that traded limited sanctions relief for time-bound curbs on Iran’s nuclear activities.

One wonders if the former Central Bank of Iran governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, a moderate, stands a chance. His performance in the debates and his wife’s appearance in an interview have certainly garnered attention.

Saeed Jalili can be seen as a back-up candidate, who is gradually depicting himself to be a serious challenge.

Although Ebrahim Raisi’s positions are indeed more hardline than President Hassan Rouhani’s, he does not, in principle, oppose a return to the JCPOA.

Conventional wisdom is that the election will facilitate Ebrahim Raisi’s ascent to the real decision-making post in Iran—that of Supreme Leader. But nothing is ever certain in Iran’s contentious politics.

The Supreme Leader for years has been agitating to find what he describes as a new generation of young and pious “revolutionaries” to take the helm of the country’s institutions. That aim may be taking priority.

A perpetual candidate, a man who never leaves the scene, an election-addict, and a resilient politician: these are among the kinder ways in which Iranians describe Mohsen Rezaei.

For Ebrahim Raisi, an election win also puts him one step closer to the real top job in Iran.

It would require a miracle to revive the fortune of the reformists or moderates based on the current attitude of many Iranians.

While the final list of candidates will not be announced by the Guardian Council before May 26, it can be said with certainty that whoever emerges victorious will not have a material impact on Iran’s domestic or foreign policy.

Khamenei’s interventions might have helped the hardliners camp eliminate its strongest competition but he definitely has not been able to resolve the big differences and gaps inside his own camp to bring its top figures into agreement on a single candidate.

Given the economic uncertainty, unrest in the upcoming election season is possible. An excessive vaccination fee, rumors of nepotism as the vaccination programs roll out, black market distribution of vaccines, or distribution of fake vaccines could ignite a wildfire—especially under current circumstances.

For hardliners in Iran, the June 18 presidential election is less about choosing a new executive branch chief than about consolidating power centers before the time comes to choose Iran’s real ruler: the next Supreme Leader.

In calculating his next acts, Raisi’s decision will undoubtedly reveal his appetite for risk and further reward in Iran’s notoriously factionalized system.

The internet has always been one of the most challenging issues for the Iranian government, especially during elections. Over the past three years alone, Iran has tried to meet this challenge on numerous occasions by shutting down the internet during nationwide protests or blocking popular apps and websites.

Zarif might seem highly qualified to be president of Iran. However, it remains uncertain whether he has the temperament, the talent, and the stomach for the bear pit of electoral politics.

Ali Larijani is a veteran official in the Islamic Republic whose long service in a variety of key posts would make him a plausible—if not especially charismatic—candidate in Iran’s upcoming June 18 presidential elections.

There are no definite candidates yet in the reformist-moderate camp for obvious reasons—they are likely to lose. Unless there is a drastic change in the political or economic atmosphere that can guarantee a bigger turnout, the candidates of this camp do not have any chance of winning.

Even if Saeed Mohammad does not run in the June elections, he will still remain an influential figure and a rising star within the IRGC cadre, who is likely to play a larger role within the Islamic Republic’s political establishment.

Hardliners had hoped that Donald Trump’s re-election would help them to oust the reformist and moderate candidates in June’s presidential election. Now hardliners are concerned that the new US administration will destroy their plans.

Despite his constant denials, it is reasonable to believe Parviz Fattah is planning a presidential run.

In recent months, there have been talks that the two-term ex-president is planning to run in the 2021 Iranian presidential elections.

There is a growing number of voices among the reformist faction indicating confusion and distress less than a year before the June 2021 presidential election.

With Iran’s June 2021 presidential elections approaching, a perennial public debate over whether women have the right to run for president has resurfaced.

Given the extraordinary circumstances that Iran is currently facing, it appears that the establishment is pondering elevating a former high-level military officer to head the executive branch.