As Sudan enters its fourth year of conflict, the warring parties appear to be as set as ever on military victory.
A tentative peace process led by the Quad (made up of the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) is focusing on pressuring the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to accept a ceasefire applying to all combatants. The commendable aim is to stabilize the battlefield long enough to allow humanitarian aid to reach affected populations and minimize direct civilian harm. Perhaps it also may serve as the beginning of a more robust peace process. But to do so, this effort must begin to rebuild trust among the warring parties that their opponents will (or are required to) abide by agreements they sign.
The Quad can help rebuild this trust by independently monitoring and credibly verifying compliance with a ceasefire agreement. Arguably the most successful example of such a mechanism is Sudan’s own Joint Monitoring Mission (JMM) of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement (signed in 2002), which successfully sustained a tenuous ceasefire between the SAF and then rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) from 2002 to 2005, until a peace agreement was signed and a United Nations peacekeeping mission replaced the monitoring group.
The JMM was a relatively small mission with approximately twenty international monitors, thirty-four Sudanese government and SPLA monitors, and 160 support staff. The JMM used a “three in a Jeep” model, with unarmed teams of one international, one Sudanese military, and one rebel monitor based in the field. They performed their monitoring activities only when monitors were present, to ensure trust, impartiality, and safety. Their tasks included verifying troop numbers and arms restrictions, transparently investigating and reporting on alleged ceasefire violations, and helping resolve disputes. The mission facilitated relief efforts and ensured safe passage for tens of thousands of displaced people. Critical to its work was an attentive public information unit, flexible organizational structure, and high mobility (the mission had dedicated airplanes and helicopters). Importantly, it also had active support—and political intervention when necessary—from its international backers, particularly their ambassadors, organized as the Friends of Sudan. The mission’s strong field presence and excellent community relations led to its success.
Having worked on and in the region for several decades and supported the implementation of Sudan and South Sudan peace agreements, I have found that it is critical to have impartial observers on the ground who can monitor individual units, visit demilitarized locations, and investigate alleged violations of the ceasefire agreement. This cannot be done with sufficient confidence remotely with satellites or drones.
Under the proposed framework, parties would maintain their current positions, disengage from active fighting, and adopt a defensive posture only. It would also require them to demilitarize agreed-upon cities, including El Fasher and other conflict-affected locations, to create humanitarian corridors. The United States would chair a body that would handle oversight, with the United Nations playing an advisory role.
The warring parties have not yet accepted the proposed ceasefire, and getting the parties to comply with such an agreement, particularly requiring them to withdraw from heavily contested and militarily valuable locations, will be a challenge—especially if they do not trust the other side will also adhere to the agreement. Commanders would be understandably leery and hesitant, given the tenuous command and control both RSF and SAF leaders have over their units and allied armed groups with their own parochial agendas. They would need confirmation that their enemies are adopting defensive postures and fully withdrawing from certain locations.
A small, independent monitoring mission could become operational in a relatively short timeframe. Such a mission, operating much as humanitarian-access negotiators have for decades, would not require force protection units. That is the case seeing as local commanders and community leaders would agree on granting access, and representatives with direct links to forces embedded in the mission’s field teams would ensure safety. Additionally, pressure from the Quad and other diplomats, as well as the threat of the withdrawal of humanitarian assistance for areas where local commanders refuse to cooperate, would ensure the mission’s unhindered and continued presence. Successful monitoring is often as much—or more—about building confidence among warring parties and supporting mutually-agreed-upon arrangements as it is about reporting on ceasefire implementation.
The cost of the mission would depend on its size, mandate, and capabilities. The JMM was relatively inexpensive (about eighteen million dollars per year) and was financed directly by countries supporting the peace process. This would be ideal, since it is often quicker. Alternatively, some actors involved in the Quad-backed negotiations are reportedly pushing for preexisting UN resources or the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719, which would allow United Nations peacekeeping funds to be used to finance an African Union-led peace support mission.
Most important will be ensuring that a monitoring mission quickly becomes operational, to prevent real or perceived ceasefire violations from undermining the agreement and to hopefully create a virtuous loop of trust building that other confidence-building measures can later complement. Therefore, negotiators should insist any ceasefire or truce agreement allows for a dedicated, on-the-ground monitoring mechanism and should prepare to deploy monitoring teams as soon as possible after an agreement is accepted by the warring parties.
Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former senior advisor to the US special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan from 2019 to 2023.
The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.
Further reading
Fri, May 1, 2026
What can save Mali from collapse?
AfricaSource By
The security situation in Mali is becoming critical in the wake of a large-scale, coordinated series of attacks across multiple cities on April 25.
Tue, Nov 25, 2025
El Fasher is only the latest wake-up call to the genocide unfolding in Sudan
AfricaSource By Rama Yade
Sudan’s civil war has become one of the world’s deadliest crises—and the massacre in El Fasher exposes a genocide unfolding in plain sight. As regional powers fuel the war, millions face famine, displacement, and systematic violence.
Mon, Apr 6, 2026
Why African cybersecurity requires a continental approach
AfricaSource By Yasmine Abdillahi
Half a billion Africans are online, yet cyber defenses lag. Cross-border crackdowns like Operation Serengeti help, but lasting security needs regulations, skilled professionals, and shared responsibility.
Image: The entrance of the abandoned office of Al-Sudani newspaper, during a tour with Sudanese journalist Shamael Elnoor (not pictured), who returned to the ruins of a once-vibrant area housing newspaper publishing offices, highlighting concerns over an industry paralysed by the ongoing war, in Khartoum, Sudan, on August 23, 2025. Photo via REUTERS/El Tayeb Siddig.