Dispatch from Munich: Sorting signal from noise in the Trump team’s Ukraine moves

MUNICH—In the whirlwind month since US President Donald Trump reassumed office, no week has featured more intensive activity to negotiate an end to Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine than this past one. 

In recent days, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made his first visit to Europe and Trump spoke by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. US Vice President JD Vance subsequently met with Zelenskyy at the Munich Security Conference, which also featured appearances by presidential envoys Ric Grenell, Keith Kellogg, and Steve Witkoff. Then came the news of Witkoff, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz heading to Saudi Arabia this week to start negotiations with the Russians on ending the war.

Controversial statements by Trump in Washington and Hegseth in Europe have prompted many observers to conclude that Trump will move these talks in a direction more sympathetic to the Kremlin’s preferences. 

These include Trump’s remarks that: 

  • he might meet with Putin three times (in Saudi Arabia, Washington, and Moscow), along with his unclear response to a question about whether he considers Zelenskyy a full negotiating partner;
  • the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO was the principal reason for the outbreak of the war; 
  • it is possible that Ukraine might at some point become part of Russia; and 
  • it might be time for Russia to rejoin the Group of Seven (G7).

Added to this were Hegseth’s statements that it was unrealistic to talk about Ukraine joining NATO or regaining its territory from Russia as part of a peace deal, and ruling out the use of US troops in vouchsafing Ukrainian security. 

Another factor was an apparent change in job description for Kellogg, a retired US Army lieutenant general. Months ago, he was announced as the special presidential envoy for Russia and Ukraine. But this past week it became clear that his responsibilities will cover just the Ukrainian and European angles of the peace talks, while Witkoff, the special presidential envoy for the Middle East, will also handle the Russian side of the talks. It may not be a coincidence that Moscow was not enthusiastic about Kellogg’s role in the negotiations. 

Taken together, these developments appear to constitute a 180-degree turn from the approach Trump took less than a month ago, when he suggested that Putin was the principal obstacle to peace and threatened sanctions and tariffs to force him to negotiate a durable settlement to the war. 

But that is not the end of the story.

In the same press conference where Trump failed to mention Zelenskyy as a full negotiating partner, he said the United States will continue providing aid to Ukraine, because otherwise “Putin would say he won. … And, frankly, we will go as long as we have to go, because we are not gonna let the other happen.”

In addition, the day after Hegseth’s remarks, Vance stated in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that Ukraine must enjoy “sovereign independence” and broached the use of sanctions and military action, if necessary, to pressure Putin to make peace.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Trump dispatched US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to Kyiv to begin negotiating a deal that would send US arms to Ukraine in exchange for access to its large deposits of rare-earth and critical minerals. The Bessent mission did not yield an agreement, reportedly because the United States was asking for too much control over Ukraine’s resources without providing security guarantees in return, which is not surprising in the opening round of negotiations. But these talks will continue because the United States needs reliable sources of critical minerals. It is significant that the transactional Trump sees a concrete business and security prize for engaging Ukraine and ensuring its long-term survival and sovereignty.

So where will Trump policy on Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine go next? The Trump team has yet to officially put forward a peace plan, but for more than two months it has talked publicly about four elements to achieve a quick and sustainable peace. Two of those elements require compromise by Ukraine: territorial concessions (at least de facto) and at least a twenty-year moratorium on joining NATO. And two require compromise by Russia: a major arming of Ukraine and the establishment of a demilitarized zone between Russian and Ukrainian forces occupied by European forces. Both measures would help deter future Russian aggression.

Despite the Trump team’s twists and turns regarding the war in recent weeks, this four-part proposal still seems to be the best way to understand its policy. And if this policy is rigorously implemented, it could produce a durable peace. 

Encouragingly, the conference did feature a serious conversation, on stage and in the corridors, about what a European force in Ukraine might look like. This is notable because such a force is essential to achieve a durable peace within the framework Trump has adumbrated. The US need for the Europeans to play that role might also prompt the Trump team to reconsider its current position that Europe should not be represented in peace negotiations—a position that was not well-received in Munich.

It is safe to say, however, that the Trump team’s appearances at the Munich Security Conference did not persuade most participants that the administration has a clear, consistent approach to the war—or that its approach can succeed.  


John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Further reading

Image: U.S. Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov attend a bilateral meeting, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference (MSC), in Munich, Germany February 14, 2025. REUTERS/Leah Millis