Over-the-horizon counterterrorism does not work. It’s time for a new approach.
In many ways, talk of terrorism is harder to find in the United States since the US-led withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. While it remains front and center for specialists who track al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and other groups, concern about transnational terrorism is less conspicuous among the wider US public today. Many Americans have redirected their attention toward nation-state adversaries, such as China and Russia. And while there is no debating that China and Russia pose real strategic threats, the threat from transnational terrorism has not evaporated. Instead, it has intensified in the past three years. Terrorist groups are now emboldened both outside and inside of Afghanistan, as revealed in Hamas’s attack against Israeli civilians a year ago, in the Houthis’ disruptions of maritime traffic in the Red Sea, in Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s latest provocations in Pakistan, a resurgence of activity in Syria, and in al-Qaeda and Islamic State-Khorasan’s (IS-K’s) open operations in Afghanistan.
In the immediate aftermath of the US-led departure from Afghanistan, US officials reassured the public that over-the-horizon intelligence would be sufficient to track and take needed action against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and IS-K. There was an expectation that this approach would be sufficient to prevent a reemergence of terrorist groups that pose a threat outside of Afghanistan. The opposite has occurred. Afghanistan is once again a hub of extremist leadership, training, and plotting of attacks against Western interests.
Now a new challenge is emerging. Despite early optimism, the new leadership in Syria poses serious concerns to US and third-country officials who are moving more cautiously than in Afghanistan. The toppling of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in recent days is a major win for the people of Syria, but Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS’s) origin as a consortium of al-Qaeda-aligned groups, including the Nusra Front, strongly suggests that the group’s domestic and foreign policies are unlikely to be moderate by regional standards. An already fragile situation in the Levant with on-going Israeli operations, a fragile Jordanian economy with concerns about domestic stability, and the imminent mass return of Syrian refugees could result in global leaders taking HTS leader and new Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir at his word when a skeptical and measured approach is needed.
All these regional developments speak to a need for the United States to stay vigilant—and present—in the fight against terrorism.
They are back
In the chaos of the coalition departure from Afghanistan, prisons were emptied of extremists and known al-Qaeda fighters, the Taliban was unable to establish governance across the country, and an already established IS-K in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar saw an opportunity to expand its recruitment from mostly Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns to third-country nationals. At the same time, terrorist organizations around the world took note that the United States and its allies moved on from terrorism. The US resources required to keep groups in check were no longer available.
In short, over-the-horizon intelligence was not interfering with the day-to-day operations or leadership of Afghanistan-based groups, and it was only marginally impacting operations in Syria, the Sahel, Yemen, and Somalia.
IS-K quickly expanded its operational activity and recruitment in Afghanistan. As a result, it has built a hub of strongholds or camps in thirteen provinces with an estimated four to six thousand fighters as of July 2023, according to the United Nations (UN). More and more Islamic State fighters from different parts of the world now travel to Afghanistan because they find this territory safer in the absence of a capable force to effectively counter them. Though US officials dispute the UN’s figures, few dispute that IS-K is present in the country and can direct and coordinate attacks around the world. Such attacks include the March 2024 mass shooing at a concert hall in Moscow that killed 139 people, as well as several thwarted efforts to disrupt the 2024 Paris Olympics.
In the United States, an Afghan on a special immigrant visa was arrested in early October after his plans to conduct an Islamic State-inspired attack on Election Day surfaced. Contrary to the Taliban’s claims that it has reduced the capacity of IS-K, all the major leaders of the group are alive and active in Afghanistan; these individuals have direct external operations as well as internal operations experience.
It’s a small world after all
Today, despite Taliban rule and the numerous sanctions and restrictions put on the government, as well as on many al-Qaeda- and IS-K-affiliated leaders, Afghanistan is more connected to the outside world than at any previous time. It has access to the internet and a budding 4G mobile phone network. It has regular direct flights to international hubs such as Dubai, Doha, and Istanbul available several times per week, and some daily. And its largely open borders with neighboring countries enable Afghanistan-based terrorist groups to act as a command-and-control center for operational planning both inside Afghanistan and abroad. The problem becomes compounded by the fact that more than six thousand Afghan passports were distributed to some known foreign terrorist operatives, including al-Qaeda, under fake names, per reports from sources allied with the former Afghan Directorate of National Security (NDS) to its former leadership.
More broadly, no single terrorist group operates in a silo. Communication between groups, be it voice or digital, through social media or chat apps, is common. Several investigations by the NDS supported the conclusion that, despite various names and goals, terrorist groups extensively shared expertise and new tactics with each other, as noted in lectures and presentations given by former NDS senior leaders. The movement of fighters from one group to another is also a common practice. A successful attack or operation is often viewed as a shared win across groups and a means to recruit, fundraise, or validate a group’s credibility. Moreover, the ongoing fighting between Israel and the consortium of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and various Sunni groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad inspires and mobilizes previously dormant or undermanned groups globally, providing a rallying call against Western interests.
What the West can do
The Taliban seems to have neither the intention nor the ability to counter the growth of terrorist groups in Afghanistan. While the Taliban rolls out new rules to restrict the behaviors and movement of women, IS-K and al-Qaeda are actively recruiting new fighters, indoctrinating future fighters and supporters around the world, and planning attacks abroad. As a result, Afghanistan has once again become a hub of transnational terrorist activity under a Taliban regime. At the same time, the resilience of Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State, and African-based al-Qaeda affiliates highlights that the terrorism problem is far from under control.
The West must be willing once again to view the terrorism fight as worthy of time and resources, starting with an admission that countering terrorism cannot be done well from a great distance. There are three ways to put that change of mindset into practice.
- Reestablishing relationships and programs with third-country political leaders and intelligence services can provide the frontline information, insights, and trip wires needed to better forecast terrorist operations and attacks. For Afghanistan, many former NDS and Afghan military leaders remain in close contact with former colleagues, sources, and family and friends on the ground who are able to provide information and insights that cannot be gathered through technical means. In other nations, funding and on-the-ground partnerships with operational units in intelligence services, security and policing services, and some military units which were common in the 2000s and early 2010s can once again build vital source networks and capabilities for nations to reduce or eliminate terrorist groups on their soil.
- Devoting resources to grassroots and opposition organizations can help to prevent new recruitment and reduce community support for existing resident terrorist groups. Applying direct political pressure on the Taliban and other governments that provide a safe haven for terror is necessary to hold these governments accountable for the terrorist activity happening on their turf.
- Outside of the normal sanctions or withholding of aid, pressuring countries to cease allowing the Taliban’s or other terrorist groups’ leadership to visit, send their children or family members for education or medical care, and invest in businesses outside of Afghanistan or their home country could be easy wins that negatively impact Taliban members’ daily lives. For nations that support or permit terrorist activities, naming and shaming, reducing or eliminating financial aid and support, and actively supporting opposition political actors would all garner attention and encourage substantive changes.
- Maintaining a robust US and coalition military presence in Syria may not be politically popular, but it would be a constant reminder to HTS that a highly capable global power is watching. On-going support to Israel to take this opportunity to further degrade the Islamic State in partnership with the United States will help to reduce the threat the group poses in the region, and would send clear signals to Bashir, the new prime minister, that threats with ties back to Syria will be dealt with quickly and severely.
Despite the robust attention currently being paid to conflicts like Ukraine, the upcoming change in US presidential administrations, and the global economy, the threat of terrorism continues to once again gain steam, often quietly, in the background of our daily lives. As was learned previously, turning a blind eye to or wishing the problem away is not a viable policy or political position, and prevention is far more impactful than relying on responses after the fact.
Ahmad Zia Saraj is on the faculty of the King’s Centre for the Study of Intelligence at King’s College London and was the director general of the Afghan National Directorate of Security from 2019 to 2021.
Jennifer Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Further reading
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Image: Taliban fighters hold an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan flag on the first anniversary of the fall of Kabul on a street in Kabul, Afghanistan, August 15, 2022. REUTERS/Ali Khara