On February 13, US President Donald Trump said that Russia should be invited to rejoin the Group of Seven (G7) summits of Western leaders. “I’d love to have them back,” he said. “I think it was a mistake to throw them out.”
In response, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov downplayed the invitation, saying that the G7 “has lost much of its relevance.” But Russian President Vladimir Putin did not say no. Peskov’s statement aside, Putin may view eventually returning to the G7 as a desirable goal, more than a decade after Russia was tossed out of the group for its seizure of Ukrainian territory in 2014. Putin may see this prospect as a major victory that would reduce his isolation, enhance his global stature, and give him another venue for sowing disunity among Western nations.
But inviting Russia to rejoin the G7 before Kyiv, Washington, and the wider West achieve a favorable settlement on Ukraine and related security issues would pose serious problems for Ukraine and the West and provide significant advantages for Putin.
As a former White House and State Department official for five presidents of both parties, I can recognize the potential benefits from a US dialogue with Russia, and even a Trump-Putin summit. And if that were to succeed in meeting the requirements of Ukraine and the West, it could set the stage for reconsidering Moscow’s G7 membership. But given Putin’s statement on Thursday insisting that Russia must keep the Ukrainian territory it has seized and claims to have annexed as part of any peace agreement, reaching a successful deal will be extremely difficult. It can only happen if Putin, recognizing that his economy and domestic morale are deteriorating, is willing to make significant concessions that produce a positive, just, and durable outcome for Ukraine, Europe, and the broader West. And he hardly seems in the mood for that—yet.
During the Cold War, US-USSR dialogues and presidential summits took place from time to time. Not all were successful, but some did succeed in reducing tensions or producing constructive compromises. And generally, the best of these were quite well prepared.
But these are not ordinary times, and a satisfactory outcome now will be very difficult to achieve. I would encourage such meetings now only if the White House is assured of good preparation and sees a reasonable chance of significant progress toward a favorable outcome.
In that same vein, I would also encourage Trump to reconsider any possibility of Russia rejoining the G7 until Washington and Moscow constructively resolve a number of critical military and security issues—starting with Russia accepting significant concessions for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. If Russia doesn’t, Trump should instead use the G7 to achieve the purposes for which it was originally intended—to strengthen Western unity and cooperation.
Why Russia was kicked out of the G7
Before considering any further action on Russia’s G7 membership, it is important to recall why Russia was ousted in the first place and why it should have to comply with tough conditions if it wants to be reinstated. I was a White House planner and presidential advisor (colloquially referred to as a sherpa) for the very first G7 Summit, in 1975 in Rambouillet, France, and for roughly a dozen more afterwards. During much of this period I also served as a senior advisor to the National Security Council.
The G7 was originally established as a summit to bring together leaders of the largest Western democracies to discuss common economic challenges. It evolved over time to become a forum for discussing political issues, as well. Attending these summit meetings as a US sherpa, I was impressed with how well they functioned and the numerous common economic and political strategies that emerged.
The group became the G8 in 1997, after G7 leaders agreed to invite Russia to join. At the time, this was controversial. But there were faint signs that Russia under its democratically elected president, Boris Yeltsin, whose governing team included some reformers, was moving to implement market-oriented economic and even democratic policies. Moreover, there were signals that Yeltsin was willing to strengthen cooperation with Western nations. So the decision was made to go ahead and invite Russia.
Then US President Bill Clinton and his colleagues felt that bringing Moscow into the group might further encourage cooperation with the West and give additional support to democratic practices in Russia—for which Yeltsin’s election was seen by some as an early positive sign.
For a while, other Western sherpas and I worked relatively well with Russian sherpas as we coordinated these summits. Russia sent some of its very best and most effective diplomats to represent the country. And at G8 summits, US and Western leaders worked constructively on several issues with Russian leaders. There were numerous and often productive dialogues. Many, of course, were quite candid. They were normally useful in clarifying and narrowing differences. We were hopeful that, over time, Russia and the original G7 would find more common interests and objectives, and enhance their cooperation.
At the end of 1999, Yeltsin resigned, and later on Vladimir Putin became president of the Russian Federation. He worked well and constructively with his Western G8 colleagues for several years, including hosting a G8 meeting in St. Petersburg in 2006. Hopes were growing that the decision to add Russia was beginning to bear fruit. Even during the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, a period of heavy bilateral tensions, conversations in the G8 proved to be tense but in most areas continued on a relatively even keel. And in 2009, after Barack Obama became president, the United States attempted a “reset,” and there was little if any pressure to oust Russia from the G8.
All this came to an end in 2014. Russia invaded and annexed Crimea. Obama and his Western G8 colleagues concluded that Putin’s action was deeply contrary to the spirit of cooperation that underlay the original G7 and that continued Russian membership would be a sign that the West was indifferent to Moscow’s belligerent actions.
Membership dues
Reinviting Moscow under current conditions, without firm and enforceable commitments to resolve outstanding issues to the satisfaction of Ukraine, Europe, and the West, would be seen as condoning Russia’s actions against Ukraine. But if Trump does choose to go forward, he should set terms that would benefit Ukraine and the West in ways that are consistent with the principles and spirit of the original G7. It is also worth noting that there are six other members of the G7, including four in Western Europe, and they would have to agree to Russia’s reinstatement, too.
Preconditions, as part of a larger peace agreement, that Russia end the war in Ukraine on terms satisfactory to Kyiv and agree to strong Western security arrangements for Ukraine and the rest of Europe should be part of any deal on G7 membership. This arrangement is logical given the reason for Moscow’s ouster from the group. Russia was originally expelled from the G7 in 2014 precisely because of its belligerent actions in Ukraine, so its readmission to the group should be linked with terms preserving Ukraine’s unity and security. If Trump wants Russia back in the G7, he has the opportunity to use his frequently cited negotiating skills and close relations with Putin to obtain such terms from Russia and to sell the rest of the G7 members on the idea.
If, however, no such deal is doable, Trump also has a golden opportunity to use the present G7, as originally intended, to engage in a positive dialogue with US allies on economic and political cooperation. It should aim for sustained unity on support for Ukraine, as well as common objectives on countering threats and internal interference from Russia and other countries adversarial toward the West.
Divisions in the West are growing. Adding to the G7 a country that has taken actions strongly hostile to Western interests and aims to divide it further is hardly the answer to this problem. Trying to reach a favorable deal for Ukraine, the United States, and the West as a precondition for Russian membership is a better course and is a crucially important test of broader Russian intentions—which so far seem to be moving in the wrong direction. I wish Trump success in negotiating such a deal. While the Obama administration could not accomplish its desired reset, Trump has the opportunity to produce one. But he can do so only if the Kremlin is willing to meet the several necessary and credible conditions and commitments noted above. And if Russia fails this test—which, given Putin’s recent statements, it appears that it will—it is even more important for Trump to forge common ground in the G7 on these and other issues.
Effective economic and political cooperation were fundamental tenets of the G7 from the beginning—and even in some periods in the G8 when Russia was a member. They were very much to the United States’ advantage and helped support global stability, as well. If Trump uses the G7 in the right way, he can strengthen his hand in further negotiations with Putin and strengthen US leadership overall in enhancing the security and prosperity of the West in both Europe and the Pacific. But readmitting Russia to the G7 prematurely without extremely strong conditions agreed to and implemented by Moscow would do neither.
A summit or another kind of dialogue with Moscow, which now seems to be in the planning process, might be useful, as such communications sometimes were during the Cold War. But I would strongly suggest holding off on any suggestion of an invitation to Putin to join the G7 until the results of these dialogues or summits are made clear, and only if Western leaders decide that the commitments Putin makes are satisfactory to Kyiv, the rest of Europe, and all members of the G7—along with firm arrangements to make sure Russia honors such commitments.
Robert D. Hormats is a former undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment at the US Department of State, a former senior staff member on the US National Security Council, a visiting lecturer at Yale University, and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.
Further reading
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Image: The national flags of the G8 countries and the flag of the European Union fly near a logo of the G8 summit in St Petersburg July 13, 2006. Alexander Demianchuk via Reuters Connect.