The US presidential campaign has been a source of high anxiety for Americans, most of whom (regardless of party) believed that a loss by their preferred candidate and victory by “the other” would bring calamity at home and abroad. Republicans assessed the Biden-Harris foreign policy record as one of weakness and failure, worrying that more conflict and chaos would follow a potential Harris victory. Democrats viewed Trump as unpredictable and impulsive on international affairs, and considered him a risk to the trust that underpins American alliances and partnerships abroad.
Mutual accusations are not unique to this election—in fact, clashing foreign policy visions and predictions of doom have been very much a staple of past US presidential elections. For NATO members, worries over Trump’s second term should be tempered, though, by both comments of those close to Trump, who believe he seeks to strengthen rather than abandon the Atlantic Alliance, and the general pursuit during his first term of a pragmatic foreign policy. Though now a counterfactual thought exercise, European concerns over Harris’s thin foreign policy record might have been balanced by her tendency to stick within the mainstream of Democratic Party thinking.
In other words, now that President Trump has secured a second term and a friendly House and Senate, European allies of the United States might do well to rein in their worst fears about what comes next. Despite the apocalyptic scenarios painted over the past year, Washington’s policy shifts from 2025 onward may well remain within the norms of previous eras of turbulence and contention—which is to say, most of the past century. The United States will inaugurate a new president in January, and the new administration will face limits and structural checks that incline foreign policy toward the center. Congress will continue to play a major role in setting foreign policy directions and bounds—and a narrow majority in both the House and the Senate—will set the stage for bipartisan compromises on national security and foreign policy.
Role of Congress
The US Constitution intentionally divided authority over foreign policy between the president and Congress. While Congress has been relatively less assertive in the post-Cold War period, it retains important checks on executive authority. These include budget and appropriations approval (what’s called the power of the purse,) oversight powers, the ability to approve or curtail military operations, and to provide “advice and consent” for international agreements. The House of Representatives and the Senate share many of these responsibilities, but approving treaties, and perhaps most importantly in the early stages of an administration, confirming presidential nominees, is reserved for the Senate.
US presidential transitions have long operated on the principle that “personnel is policy,” meaning that effecting change in foreign affairs, national security, domestic programs, or anything else depends upon getting the right people with the right skills into the right presidential appointments. The Senate is a key player in that process, as it can either expedite or slow confirmations as part of a policy bargaining process, and both Republicans and Democrats have played hardball with nominations in the past.
Slow-rolling nominees may again be a feature of the upcoming presidential transition. Yet the bigger picture of a closely divided Congress gives grounds for guarded optimism as to the overall foreign policy direction and priorities once the winner has been declared. Even in times of acrimonious division on domestic politics and partisan polarization, representatives and senators have worked across party lines more often than not on matters of national security and foreign policy. Sudden lurches in foreign policy, including a potential softening of commitment to NATO and European security, would run headlong into the prerogatives of Congress, especially the Senate, in the sensitive early stages of a new administration.
119th Congress
How will Congress look when it convenes on January 3, 2025? The results of the November 5th election yielded flipped the Senate from Democrat to Republican control with the Republicans holding a 53-47 advantage. The House of Representatives appears headed for a closely balanced 2025 composition, with a slight Republican edge. While it is possible that both the presidential and congressional outcomes could seem more decisive after counting (and lawsuits) conclude, the likely outcome on the legislative side will be two chambers with slim majorities, possibly controlled by different parties, and consequently a higher need for compromise and bipartisanship on foreign policy issues.
Committee leadership changes in each chamber, depending upon the majority party in that chamber. For the 118th Congress this has meant Democratic leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and Republican leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). The SFRC serves as the primary counterweight to executive authority on foreign policy, balancing, reinforcing, or sometimes opposing the administration’s approach. SFRC Chairman Ben Cardin will depart, as he retires. With the Republican majority, James Risch of Idaho will likely be the new chairman. Risch is known as an ardent supporter of NATO and a passionate advocate for strong Alliance relations. A current SFRC member, Marco Rubio, has been tapped as Trump’s secretary of state nominee. Rubio has good working relations with Trump, but can be expected to put his own stamp on foreign policy. There also are two Republican senators who will remain on the SFRC, Todd Young and Rand Paul, who have major differences over policy or personality with Trump and can be expected to take a very critical look at any sharp turns in foreign policy or Alliance matters.
On the Democratic side of the aisle, Jean Shaheen will make history as the first female senator to serve as ranking member of the SFRC. A dedicated Atlanticist, she has a strong working relationship with Risch and a similar strategic outlook. Other Democratic members of the SFRC likely to return have been sharply critical of Trump, but might play a prominent role in a potential Harris administration due to the latter’s relatively enigmatic foreign policy views and thinner base of overseas experience compared to President Biden. These senators include Tim Kaine (Virginia), Chris Van Hollen (Maryland), and Chris Murphy (Connecticut), who would likely work to keep a new Democratic administration’s major foreign policy themes consistent with the Biden administration’s approach.
November till January
A flurry of activity is commencing as the incoming administration focuses on roles, policy priorities, personnel, and myriad administrative details. New members of the House of Representatives are attending New Member Orientation as the House organizes for the new term (all members of the House stand for election each two years). The Senate, which elects only one-third of its membership each two years, is taking up committee and leadership assignments during this period. In a sense, this gives the Senate and the SFRC a head start in organizing for the policy debates that will begin after the presidential inauguration of January 20.
Given the constitutional structures, political dynamics, and leading personalities in play this election cycle, US allies and partners have better grounds to expect continued US leadership— and alliance commitment—than is commonly appreciated. Whether the United States will lead, and whether the winning candidate fulfills worst fears and expectations posited during the year-plus presidential campaign, may be the wrong question. The right question is how quickly the administration can get its team in place, and how quickly it can forge consensus with key congressional stakeholders on foreign policy. And while the answer remains to be seen, the prospects for a balanced/closely divided Congress with a number of experienced foreign policy hands augurs for an outcome that may exceed expectations.
Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.
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Image: Lithuanian Military Academy students hold NATO membership states flags during the celebration of the 15th anniversary of Lithuania's membership in NATO in Vilnius, Lithuania March 30, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins