Europe needs a coalition of the resolute
The December 7 trilateral meeting between French President Emmanuel Macron, US President-elect Donald Trump, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the reopening of Notre-Dame Cathedral signaled a possible convergence of views regarding a way forward in Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. The meeting might have helped dissipate the widespread fear among Europeans that the president-elect would settle for a deal throwing Ukraine to the wolves. It also alleviated some US perceptions that Ukrainians were too demanding in their approach to a deal and that Europeans were unwilling to commit.
Several European nations have been clear that their end goal is a strategic victory for a Ukraine integrated in the Western security order. Beyond its general support for this goal, France has repeatedly engaged with other European leaders on future legal, political, military, and operational guarantees for Ukraine. France should step up and lead this European effort, along with the United Kingdom and Poland, especially as the latter will chair the rotating presidency of the European Council in the first half of 2025. Only about a month out from the inauguration of Donald Trump, the most urgent move for Europe is to develop a framework for an open-ended “coalition of the resolute,” a kernel of a dozen countries—distinct from NATO—to provide security guarantees to Ukraine. This coalition should serve as the baseline for a European presence in any negotiation round driven by the United States with Russia. Along with Ukraine itself, this coalition should serve European states’ efforts to take more responsibility for their own security.
France can lead the way in supporting Ukraine
France, among other European nations, has much to offer to both respond to the US demand that Europe assume more responsibility and make sure Ukraine and Europe’s security interests are well understood by the new US administration. At first glance, France might not appear ideally positioned to lead a European effort, given its track record concerning Ukraine and Russia. Its response to date has been marred by moments of hesitation, perceived naivety, and occasional double dealing. Some critics believe France lags other European nations—such as the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Nordic and Baltic states—in their support of Ukraine.
Since February 2022, however, Macron has clarified France’s stance and significantly increased its support for Ukraine. France now backs Ukraine’s NATO membership application, as formalized during the 2023 Vilnius Summit. France has shown its willingness to avoid setting red lines, including by lifting restrictions on providing Ukraine deep-strike capabilities before the United States and the United Kingdom did so. Macron now ranks among the five foreign leaders most trusted by Ukrainians (58 percent of Ukrainians trust him, an increase of three points in a year). He is also one of the only European leaders still in office who has a long-standing relationship with Trump, which makes him well positioned to take a leadership role on Ukraine while keeping the US administration engaged.
Although France has long faced criticism for lagging other nations in providing financial and military assistance to Ukraine, it has made notable progress. While it is still behind its 2024 goal of providing military aid worth “up to” 3 billion euros this year, it now ranks fourth—behind the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom—in total aid to Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute. Since 2022, its total contributions (bilaterally and through the EU) have exceeded 13 billion euros. France supports Ukraine in key areas with advanced capabilities. In the beginning of the conflict, it responded to Ukraine’s most urgent needs by focusing on equipment for individual soldiers. As the war progressed, France shifted to providing crucial capabilities such as artillery and surface-to-air weapons. In January 2024, France and the United Kingdom initiated the first delivery of the air-launched long-range cruise missile SCALP/Storm Shadow, and lifted restrictions on strikes on Russian territory as early as May. The start of 2025 will see France delivering the first air-superiority Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets, while the full training and equipment for a Ukrainian “Anna of Kyiv” brigade (named in honor of a Kyiv princess who became queen of France in 1051) was completed in late 2024. This brigade will include over two thousand soldiers in combined arms combat—that is, covering all fields including infantry combat, anti-air defense, anti-tank warfare, drone operations, and artillery. As of September 15, 2024, France had trained nearly fifteen thousand Ukrainians in France and Poland as part of the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) in support of Ukraine.
At the political level, Macron’s international standing is weakened by setbacks at home in June, July, and December, which certainly diverted much of his political focus toward domestic issues. This precarious situation makes foreign policy and military initiatives more appealing to Macron, as they represent areas in which he retains more freedom of action. Under France’s constitution, the president has substantial operational autonomy in military affairs, acting as Commander in Chief with direct control over the armed forces. Deploying troops only requires informing Parliament within three days of the start of an operation and securing approval only after three months. Unlike in any other European state, sending troops to Ukraine might prove easier for the French president than increasing financial aid or passing a budget bill for social security.
What will security guarantees for Ukraine look like?
Despite these possibilities, the exact nature of European security guarantees remains unclear. Options vary in size and scope, must be understood as part of a wider scheme to impact Russia’s calculus in potential negotiations, and act in combination with both cross-domain pressures on Moscow and increased multidimensional support to Ukraine.
As far as security guarantee models go, NATO remains the preferred conduit for Zelenskyy as well as for Macron, who has clearly reassessed his 2019 comment about the Alliance experiencing “brain death.” However, envisaging Ukrainian accession to NATO seems to be a nonstarter for a new Trump administration at present, leaving only the option of an ad hoc guarantor force. The option of a European Union (EU) framework has been floated, but is unlikely given the proverbial hassles of its internal process. Conversely, an ad hoc guarantor force should not be seen as an alternative to NATO or an invitation, but as a first step setting the stage for both future EU and possible NATO accession.
In that context, an open-ended coalition of the resolute could be proposed, in coordination with Ukraine, ahead of negotiations. This would ensure that European security interests are factored into potential talks, while securing a European seat in a negotiation round with Russia. Such a coalition could also ensure Europeans contribute more directly to measures to prevent renewed Russian aggression.
France and other potential contributors must clarify what they would be willing to commit and how they could sustain such a force over several years. Since November 2024, Macron has proposed putting European forces on the ground in Ukraine to several European leaders, without revealing the exact timing or contour of such forces. Zelenskyy referenced Macron’s idea in his recent meeting with German opposition leader Friedrich Merz and in discussions with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp also publicly referenced the idea while cautioning against quick action. Macron’s proposal now needs to be made explicit. Questions regarding such a guarantor force’s strategic and military credibility should be discussed, and the answer lies mostly in the composition of the force.
Such a coalition could take several forms and involve various nations, starting with those European states that have signed the most binding and complete bilateral agreements with Ukraine. In that respect, the United Kingdom and France stand out. They have the most seasoned militaries and are probably the only nations with command-and-control capabilities to lead such an operation. Their status as independent nuclear powers adds a unique dimension to their strategic posture. While it would be unrealistic to claim escalation dominance over Russia, their leadership would send a strong signal that would force Moscow to reconsider any reckless action.
Poland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic states—all of which have gained considerable political leverage in shaping European security—might play along, especially as their collective contribution can provide significant mass to the coalition. Combined, the four Nordic states’ air forces taken together are at least as large as the UK Royal Air Force. Given its fast-expanding military, especially in the land domain, Poland would be a key addition and possibly a third lead nation along with the United Kingdom and France. But Warsaw remains cautious and might prioritize territorial defense over forward deterrence in Ukraine. Still, it is hard to think of a more credible contributor.
While Germany is Ukraine’s main financial supporter, it is hard to see its government making any bold moves before the snap elections in February 2025. Nevertheless, it is essential that Berlin at least politically agrees to such a project, provides security guarantees to Ukraine, and avoids another public Olaf Scholz-Macron fight over the proposal, which would only benefit Russia. Along with its European members, the coalition should include partners such as Canada, which is leading the NATO land forces in Latvia and ranks fifth in total military aid to Ukraine according to the Kiel Institute.
All of this remains uncertain pending the United States’ position during its presidential transition. Not much is possible against Washington’s will, but a lot can be achieved without the United States bearing the bulk of the effort. France understands that boots on the ground might be a nonstarter for the United States, favoring bilateral guarantees that would keep US troops out of Ukraine physically. If the United States supports the European proposal in one form or another, other nations might be encouraged to take part. Beyond a possible endorsement of guarantees, the coalition will need US critical enablers in Europe. These critical enablers include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), airborne early warning (AEW), long-range strikes, and missile defense entail neither a NATO security guarantee nor US boots on the ground but would make a significant difference.
What leverage exists for a robust strategic framework?
The notion of security guarantees to Ukraine is related to—but should not be confused with— either the longer-term strategy on Russian containment, or the increased efforts to bring the war to a stalemate by enhancing NATO’s role. This includes ideas to expand the Security Assistance and Training (NSATU) mission and the proposal to supply military trainers and maintenance support activities to increase Ukrainian capacity, possibly linked with some air-defense zone over a portion of Ukrainian airspace. The EU accession process might have a bigger role to play in making sure aid is anchored in the long term. In the economic domain, beyond the latest plan to make the fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine that uses the interest from the frozen Russian assets, there needs to be increased pressure on Russian revenues by lowering oil prices and a mix of secondary sanctions.
The territorial scope for application of security guarantees could be defined by the post-negotiation establishment of a line of contact between Ukraine and Russia. While a guarantor force has been presented in various media comments as comprising “peacekeepers,” it could not be a Blue Helmet-style force close to the line of contact or—even worse—a renewed Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers’ force that would have no deterring strategic effect on Russia should it decide to resume its large-scale offensive.
What is needed is an actual guarantor force that would demonstrate European strategic solidarity with Ukraine’s security and deter any significant Russian advance. As previously discussed in a Foreign Affairs article, the guarantor force could comprise an air-control component (both land-based and airborne), as well as a ground component made up of several brigade combat teams deployed in the eastern part of Ukraine. While not posted on the line of contact, these forces should be ready to intervene in the case of Russian breakthrough.
There are varying options in terms of footprints, depending on the number of countries involved. A lighter option would include a smaller “tripwire” force inside Ukraine modeled after NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, with additional forces standing by. But this approach risks inviting more Russian testing and provocation. Another lighter approach might bet on an air component only, reviving the old idea of a no-fly zone over Ukraine enforced by combat air patrol on alert and deployment of ground-based air defenses.
Timing is also a key variable. While it is generally assumed that the guarantor force would be a post-deal instrument, a bolder approach might be to think of it as a pre-deal tool—as a fait accompli imposed on Russia to influence talks, sending a message that European forces are going to be deployed either way. While this option supposes an even lower aversion to risk than a post-deal force, it might prove more relevant strategically.
France’s military is seasoned and versatile. However, it is not yet equipped for the type of protracted territorial warfare Ukraine has faced. The current French force structure needs to speed up its adaptations to high-intensity operations to deliver credible conventional deterrence. Changes are under way, thanks to lessons learned from training with Ukrainian armed forces and other deployments on the eastern flank. Moreover, France has a proven track record of sustaining long-term overseas operations. France was able to maintain a force of five thousand troops in the Sahel for nearly a decade while simultaneously deploying a dozen fighter aircraft, making it the second-largest contributor to the US-led air campaign in Operation Inherent Resolve over Iraq and Syria. While these campaigns have recently ended or wound down, freeing up some room for maneuver, French armed forces have rapidly expanded their presence on NATO’s eastern flank, from just a few hundred personnel in 2022 to around three thousand today—some of whom could be used as part of a European coalition in Ukraine.
Any deployment of a guarantor force needs to be coupled with a long-term European vision for dealing with the inevitable Russian attempts to intimidate such a coalition and to test its consistency and risk aversion. France has tried to take a leading role in forging new response options for escalation management, in both the short and long terms. On air defense, deep strikes, or long-range missile production for the battlefield, select capability coalitions have emerged with some creative answers. The European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA)—which includes France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Poland—aims to build new long-range strike weapons with a range exceeding five hundred kilometers, as a way to fill gaps in European defenses highlighted by the conflict in Ukraine. Also, the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), while incomplete, is a starting point to develop a comprehensive European defensive shield.
Another implication to consider of deploying a guarantor force in Ukraine is how it will affect NATO’s New Force Model and operational planning. Indeed, deploying a multi-brigade joint force from some of NATO’s most capable European contributors would impact the ability of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to go on with its current regional and strategic plans. But this would not necessarily be a bad thing. As often noted, there is no other major military contingency for NATO planning other than one involving Russian aggression. Establishing a guarantor force in Ukraine also means pinning Russian power to this southeast corner while safeguarding a mighty six hundred thousand-strong Ukrainian military. This is certainly more advantageous strategically than losing Ukraine and saving European forces for a battle west of the Article 5 border.
Finally, Europe needs a global outlook to strengthen its leverage in future negotiations and preempt possible formats beyond the transatlantic family. Here again, France can offer value. A possible format reuniting the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Ukraine would have direct implications on transatlantic policy regarding China. Given its support for Russia’s war, including China in a discussion critical to the future of the European security order could be unprecedented and warrants careful consideration. Macron’s political leadership regarding Ukraine is credible only if he also takes a strong stance against China’s support for Russia, while continuing to invest in existing communication channels with Beijing. A future negotiation might also implicate North Korea-Russia ties, given that North Korean soldiers are deployed in Ukraine. France’s steadfast position on the North Korean nuclear issue can contribute to making sure European and US interests align in curbing North Korean involvement in Ukraine, as a possible second summit between Trump and Kim Jong-Un could have direct implications for the situation there.
As January 20 looms, Europe must act swiftly
Timing will be crucial in the coming weeks. The foremost priorities are increasing Western support for Ukraine and intensifying pressure on Russia. All the discussions about security guarantees between Europeans and Americans will amount to no more than wishful thinking if the Ukrainian armed forces collapse in the coming months or if Russia feels confident enough to reject negotiations. The envisioned guarantor force must be part of a wider strategy to prevent a Ukrainian collapse and compel Russia to negotiate.
As Trump’s January 20 inauguration approaches, Europeans must act swiftly to consolidate a unified position on future security guarantees for Ukraine. The coalition option should be proposed ahead of negotiations, ensuring Europeans are at the table from the outset in shaping the future European security order. A European coalition or guarantor force would have significant deterrent value, reinforcing strategic solidarity between Europe and Ukraine, strengthening their shared security even further.
As policymakers in Washington see Europeans taking greater responsibility for their own security, they should support the nations already committed, incentivize others to join the endeavor, and bring their ambitions to a practical conclusion. A revitalized transatlantic relationship hinges on Europe shouldering a larger share of the burden, as well as further integrating Ukraine into the European security framework.
About the authors
Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.
Elie Tenenbaum is a research fellow at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) and director of its Security Studies Center.
Related content
The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.
Image: French President Emmanuel Macron accompanies US President-elect Donald Trump and Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy as they leave after a trilateral meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris as part of ceremonies to mark the reopening of the Notre-Dame de Paris Cathedral, five-and-a-half years after a fire ravaged the Gothic masterpiece, in Paris, France, December 7, 2024. REUTERS/Sarah Meyssonnier