Dispatch from Manila: On the frontlines of the ‘gray zone’ conflict with China
Click on the banner above to explore the Tiger Project.
MANILA—Chinese vessels have repeatedly threatened and rammed Philippine vessels within the internationally recognized Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines to assert China’s excessive maritime claims, most recently on August 31. As a result, for the leaders of the Philippines, China’s aggression is not in some shadowy, ill-defined “gray zone”—it is a real and constant series of attacks on their people and sovereignty. As General Romeo Brawner, Jr., chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, told us on August 27 in Manila: China’s activities are “ICAD”—illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive. Brawner urged the United States and like-minded countries in the region to see these attacks as not just the Philippines’ fight, but their fight as well.
Brawner was speaking to participants of the US Indo-Pacific Command’s international Military Operations and Law (MILOPS) conference at the historic Manila Hotel, just days before the August 31 ramming. Brawner’s remarks followed those of Philippine Secretary of Defense Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., as part of a panel including US Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson and Admiral Samuel Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command. The conference also included top military lawyers, operational officers, and nongovernment national security experts from nearly thirty countries across the Indo-Pacific.
I’m sympathetic to Brawner’s arguments.
“Gray zone” implies shadowy, behind the scenes actions, while much of what China is doing is flagrant and out in the open, even if it is short of the unambiguous lethal attacks that would be recognized as warfare in legal terms. Perhaps the recent case of former Mayor Alice Guo—arrested and charged for activities with Chinese organized crime and suspected of being an agent of Beijing—fits more in the “gray zone” category.
But I’m not convinced that these terms are mutually exclusive. There is a broader “gray zone” conflict short of war that China is waging against the Philippines, of which these ICAD activities at sea against the Philippines are perhaps the most visible—that is, the least “gray”—element. At the same time, China is using an array of different tactics within the “gray zone” against targets throughout the region. This includes what Taiwan’s leaders call strangulation, in the form of Beijing placing military, diplomatic, economic, and informational pressure on the international lifelines of support to Taiwan without physically blockading it. As we discussed in the panel I led at the MILOPS conference, the “gray zone” categorization can be so broad and vague as to paralyze rather than galvanize an international response. One panelist, Grant Newsham, a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat, argued that the very term itself leads US officials to hesitation and indecision.
To be sure, appropriate terms and definitions can help leaders and policymakers frame and understand threats so as to develop better strategy, policy, plans, operations, and tactics to meet them. And it is certainly important to get the terminology right. But whatever you call these acts of aggression, coercion, deception, and subversion short of traditional definitions of war—and let’s stick with “gray zone” for now—the real question is how do the United States and like-minded countries in the region defeat China’s actions short of war? Or, ideally, deter them in the first place?
Since the “gray zone” conflict with China is most of all a war of narratives, the best place to start is to consider how to fight an information war in the gray zone—offensively and defensively. One approach is radical transparency: fully describing the activities of the threat and providing details about what is being done to combat it. From what I heard in Manila, this approach is a double-edged sword for the Philippines. On one hand, transparency has proven helpful to mobilize domestic and international support in solidarity with the Philippines’ willingness to confront China’s bullying. However, attempting to “name and shame” seems not to have changed Beijing’s behavior. Moreover, as the Atlantic Council’s Brian Kerg has pointed out, there is a danger in fueling China’s narrative by highlighting its activities in a way that could make it seem more intimidating.
The contrast between Manila’s clear messaging and that of many other capitals in the Indo-Pacific region is stark, and it’s central to its strategy for countering China. The Philippines, despite being vastly outmanned and outgunned, and with an economy less than a thirtieth of China’s, is now far more willing to speak out and directly criticize China’s aggression than almost all of its regional neighbors, and far more willing to emphasize its alliance with Washington as fundamental to its security. Teodoro’s and Brawner’s comments to the group were striking after years of prevaricating and indirect references to China from officials of so many countries. For example, otherwise confident and proud South Koreans—unapologetic allies of the United States—still often can’t even bring themselves to name China publicly when expressing their concerns about Beijing’s aggression, and want to avoid publicly “taking sides” against China, instead referring obliquely in official strategy documents to unnamed threats to “peace and stability in the Taiwan strait” and the erosion of the international order.
This clear political will is important to working together to confront Beijing in the “gray zone,” but the strong enthusiasm in Manila for the alliance, admittedly, is relatively new. As one US official reminded me, the Philippines-US alliance is Washington’s oldest continuous formal bilateral treaty alliance, but one could be forgiven for forgetting that. It is underpinned by a mutual defense treaty, but lacks the structure and institutionalization of other US alliances. Compared to, for example, the alphabet soup of abbreviations for meetings that drive the annual South Korea-US alliance meeting calendar—such as the KIDD, the MCM, the SCM, and the new NCG—the Philippines-US alliance has only one recurring annual meeting: the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board (MDB-SEB).
There may be a lack of institutionalization in the alliance, but certainly not a lack of activity. I learned that the US and Philippine militaries engage in hundreds of activities together each year. The Philippines, as one US official noted with justifiable pride, is the one place in the world that the US military is operating in a joint (across military services) and combined (international) manner with an ally directly confronting China. This demonstrates both Manila’s political will and the practical learning taking place, and this is clearly part of how the allies should counter China in the “gray zone.”
Yet justifiable doubts remain as to operational readiness for effective military responses as an alliance, given the lack of institutionalization. Unlike in North America, where the Canada-US North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) defends the skies, or on the Korean peninsula, where the South Korea-US Combined Forces Command would control the allied forces repelling a North Korean attack, there’s no combined Philippines-US headquarters. Indeed, despite constant activity, there’s not much of a permanent force presence or even a major US military headquarters in the Philippines. I met some impressively expert US military officers and diplomats in Manila, but their quality was not matched in quantity. Comparing the relatively fewer number of US officials in the Philippines to the much larger number in places such as South Korea, I came away wondering how these hardworking Americans in Manila got any rest.
The lack of resources was a recurring theme of discussions in Manila. The Philippines has the lowest per capita gross domestic product of any US ally. In a time when both sides of the aisle in Washington are—rightly—expecting countries that have grown wealthy under US protection to spend more on their own defenses and collective defense of common interests, the Philippines is different. Even if Manila spent a much larger proportion of its gross domestic product on defense, such expenditure would amount to “budget dust” in the defense establishments of most US allies. Washington has recognized this, offering $500 million in financing for US military equipment purchases to make up the shortfall.
It is clear, at least under its current leaders, that the Philippines has the will to fight back. But it does not yet have the weapons to do so effectively—and this $500 million worth of equipment will help. It also does not have the sort of robust organizational structures and well-funded supporting research institutions that many other US allies have. These elements are often critical to developing defense strategy, policy, plans, and doctrine to enable that fight. They will need help developing that as well—and it will take more than money.
On this “gray zone” battleground, “hardware” does matter—and the United States should send the hardware the Philippines’ military forces need and help them prepare to use it. But the “software” of the alliance also needs investment. It’s long past time to devote more US intellectual capital to working with the Philippines on developing new approaches to fighting China in the “gray zone,” and to building up the institutions of the Philippine-US alliance at the strategic and operational level.
Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leading the Council’s Tiger Project on War and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. He is a former senior US government official with two decades of service as an intelligence officer and strategist, including twelve years stationed overseas in the region. He posts as @Mister_G_2 on X.
Note: The author’s travel to Manila for the MILOPS conference was sponsored by US Indo-Pacific Command.
The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.
Further reading
Fri, Jun 14, 2024
Think China can already take Taiwan easily? Think again.
New Atlanticist By Brian Kerg
Beijing’s influence campaign in pursuit of a “cognitive fait accompli” against Taiwan is conducted across multiple lines of operation.
Tue, Aug 13, 2024
From the Pentagon to the Philippines, integrating deterrence in the Indo-Pacific
New Atlanticist By Kevin M. Wheeler
The United States and its Indo-Pacific allies must work together across all levels and domains for their regional deterrence to be effective.
Wed, May 29, 2024
The Philippines’ domestic politics are the wildcard in its trilateral partnership with the US and Japan
New Atlanticist By
Fractured domestic politics and China’s influence operations in the Philippines make that country’s participation in a trilateral partnership with the United States and Japan questionable.
Image: Members of the Philippine Coast Guard, assigned to Philippine Coast Guard Vessel Melchora Aquino (MRRV-9702), pilot a small boat during a bilateral US-Philippine search and rescue exercise in the South China Sea, July 16, 2024. (US Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Elijah Murphy)