In the Eastern Mediterranean, tensions are largely the norm rather than the exception. Greece and Turkey, two stable states and NATO allies, enjoy largely peaceful unneighborly relations, despite occasional tension between them. Bilateral disputes, especially those regarding the delimitation of maritime zones, are longstanding and well-known.
But the two countries still seem trapped in regional and bilateral geopolitical dilemmas, some of which have little resonance today. The typology of disputes in the region is rich: from ethnonationalist, entrenched ones (such as the Cyprus problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and indeed Greek-Turkish issues), to asymmetrical ones (e.g. migration and terrorism), to potential ones (for instance energy-related), to human-security ones (such as water shortages, wildfires, rule-of-law shortcomings, and gender challenges). Every day that passes with problems unsolved adds new layers to existing idisputes, making the mix exceedingly difficult to tackle.
Turkey and Greece’s default mode until today has been one of postponement, waiting for a comprehensive solution of bilateral disputes in the hope that after such a solution, all other matters of disagreement would somehow be settled. If Turkey and Greece stick to this mode, that may never happen, and opportunities will continue to be missed—and calamities will remain difficult to avoid. Some skeptics argue that it may be impossible to solve the bilateral disputes as they have become near existential, going beyond national interest and involving the fundamental notions of justice, national pride, and identity.
Turkey and Greece should realize that many of their problems lie in the past, but any solutions lie in the future and in their synergies. Instead of resorting to inaction in the hopes of some future conflict resolution, they should actively seize opportunities and deal immediately with problems that, while the subject of disagreement, are not such long-standing disputes. Doing so would create a much-needed cooperation culture, and Turkey and Greece would solve these matters irrespective of whether a comprehensive solution for long-standing disputes is reached. This requires vision, pragmatism, and political resolve.
It is doable and it has been tried before. The two counties have initiated several connectivity mechanisms. They were even able to establish an effective rapprochement between 1999 and 2010. That period was characterized by flourishing bilateral trade and great progress on less political matters. Greece and Turkey also have a tradition of offering mutual assistance in natural disasters, such as wildfires and earthquakes. At the same time, various mechanisms for cooperation and crisis management also exist. They include the High-Level Cooperation Council, a permanent Confidence Building Measures Council, an exploratory talks committee, and a business council. Additionally, the countries have established electrical interconnectivity and have now even reached a point of modest electricity trading between them. Furthermore, the two countries have recently supported each other regarding their memberships in or leadership positions at international organizations including the UN Security Council, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and International Maritime Organization. Finally, there is an ongoing “positive agenda” initiative, headed by the two deputy foreign ministers, pursuing initiatives of common interest and rapprochement.
All these show that, notwithstanding rooted issues, there is a way forward for cooperation. Turkey and Greece can set up effective parallel efforts if they embrace realism, exercise political courage, and acknowledge the urgency of tackling current or foreseen challenges.
The two countries are united by the challenges they face regarding broader problems and by mutual advantages they share with respect to working together on the opportunities available to them. The way forward, therefore, lies in cooperation.
The field of energy, and in particular renewable energy, offers Turkey and Greece an area of cooperation that can unlock important gains for both, pave the way to cooperation in other fields, and promote even broader regional cooperation and stability. In the energy sector, Turkey and Greece can set up platforms for cooperation that lead to interconnectivity and through it to interdependence, eventually to normalcy, and ultimately peace. Such cooperation could revolve around large-scale infrastructure projects to improve access to the EU energy market, natural gas distribution, energy efficiency and conservation projects, and much more. If Turkey and Greece committed to burden sharing or gathering together their competencies, they could explore or exploit resources that can only—or at least optimally—be developed through collaboration. This is particularly true of renewable energy, such as wind power. Indeed, one of the merits of some renewable energy sources is that, unlike the underground resources that become fossil fuels, states largely do not quarrel over the rights to such commodities (e.g. wind and sunlight). It is a major value add that these renewable energy sources can be used in a collaborative fashion if, when, and for as long as the states involved wish to do so. This is particularly useful in the case of states experiencing animosity in their bilateral relations.
Such cooperation would have several advantages for both countries, their populations, and the broader region. Cooperation on energy specifically would provide the immediately concerned communities, such as the coastal and insular ones, with much-needed energy relief and security, especially when demand is high, such as during the peak tourist season in the summer. Regional energy prospects, as well as international relations, would also greatly benefit. Energy cooperation between littoral states, such as Greece and Turkey, would lead to greater energy security, improved interconnectivity, reduced geopolitical and security risk (driving down costs for energy and investment projects), and the opening of additional common funding opportunities, such as European Union (EU) support. This energy cooperation could form part of a useful and much-needed broader discussion on climate convergences, EU-Turkey relations as connected economies, and more; after all, energy is a matter of not only economics but also hard security, human security, human rights, and democracy.
Eastern Mediterranean energy may not be competitive internationally or in a position to meaningfully contribute to wider European energy security, but it is and is likely to remain important for the region. Thus, a “region for the region” approach might be the most pragmatic one for Greece and Turkey. They can help craft a sustainable vision for a broader energy mix at a regional scale built on synergies and not exclusions. Energy can be a catalyst for cooperation—and hence for well-being, peace, and prosperity, paving the way towards cooperation in more fields, between more countries.
That is certainly the case for Turkey and Greece. For their bilateral relationship, cooperation more broadly would create additional linkages between Turkey and Greece, connecting communities and creating markets. That has been shown by Greece’s new visa facilitation scheme for Turkish citizens seeking to visit some of the Aegean islands, increasing the number of visitors to those islands by dozens of thousands, boosting local economies, and contributing to social ties, reconciliation, and more peaceful relations. This also supports the legitimacy of any rapprochement and efforts to improve domestic sentiments about the “other” among the public. It also facilitates political leaders’ initiatives.
Successful partnerships in areas such as energy could challenge rooted zero-sum mentalities of enmity and suspicion and allow for understandings and partnerships in more contentious fields, like security. Ultimately, these could lead to heightened trust and the reduction of skepticism, potentially culminating in solutions for even the longest-standing bilateral disputes.
Harry Tzimitras is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Programs and the director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo’s PRIO Cyprus Centre.
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