Turkish-US relations have long been overshadowed and stymied by crisis: S-400 sanctions, the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and YPG influence in Syria, F-35 defense procurement, competitive alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the normative divisions created by regional conflicts. Despite these complex problems, after President Donald Trump returned to the White House, 2025 became a transitional year in which these problems were not solved but did not paralyze bilateral relations; moreover, the relationship was carried forward by increasing areas of compromise. Therefore, as we move further into 2026, the fundamental question is not whether there will be a major break or rapprochement but whether the two countries transform the pragmatic groundwork laid in 2025 into a more permanent working arrangement and make areas of compromise the main axis driving the relationship.
In this context, compromise should be viewed not as romanticism but as a geopolitical necessity and a cost-reduction mechanism. The interests of Turkey and the United States do not coincide one to one but, when they clash, the costs paid by both sides increase. Therefore, the emerging picture can be summarized as the two countries moving toward greater coordination in areas where they cannot replace each other and managing their disputes by compartmentalizing them. The return of leadership diplomacy, coordination aimed at producing results on the ground in Gaza, the window of opportunity for cooperation in post-Bashar al-Assad Syria and the Middle East, signals of controlled normalization in the defense sector, the institutional leverage created by the July 2026 NATO Summit, and Trump’s visit to Ankara beforehand all lead to the same conclusion: the relationship can progress not only through crisis-producing issues but also through crisis-preventing areas of agreement.
Leadership diplomacy
The first practical result of leadership diplomacy was the reactivation of that crucial channel with President Recep Erdoğan’s visit to Washington in 2025. The critical implication of this is that most of the problems in Turkish-US relations are political, not technical; even those that appear technical carry the burden of domestic politics, bureaucratic resistance, and intra-Alliance bargaining. Leader-level diplomacy does not eliminate this burden, but it does two things. First, it removes a deadlock from being a permanent obstacle; second, it produces the political authorization that makes technical negotiations possible. What is needed to expand areas of compromise in 2026 is to anchor this momentum in institutional channels: regular strategic dialogue, coordination between defense and foreign affairs channels, and rapid contact mechanisms that can be activated in times of crisis. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s functional contribution on Syria and Gaza in 2025 serves as proof for the White House of improved Turkish-US relations.
Gaza: Despite differences in rhetoric, results-oriented cooperation on the ground
The Gaza issue in Turkish-US relations can be positioned as an important example of compromise in 2025. Although Turkey and the United States have different discourses and priorities regarding the region, it was possible to produce results on the ground in areas such as establishing a ceasefire, access to humanitarian aid, practical implementation mechanisms, and diplomatic coordination. This stands out as a model in which compromise means producing the same result rather than establishing the same discourse.
In 2026, the strategic value of the Gaza file is twofold. First, it demonstrates that a joint crisis management capacity can be developed despite the long-standing normative divergence in Turkish-US relations. Second, this capacity is not just a momentary agreement. If it evolves into a process that can be sustained through multilateral formats, it creates a common output area that reduces regional costs for both countries. But the lesson of 2025 is clear: harmony is not absolute; it is sustainable when it is functional and goal oriented. Despite Israel’s objections, the White House’s support for Turkey’s participation in the International Stabilization Force and Ankara’s willingness to participate are among the most promising recent developments on the Ankara-Washington front. More importantly, the Turkish foreign minister’s presence as a signatory—standing alongside Trump at the inaugural meeting of his Board of Peace in Davos—underscores the weight Washington assigns to Turkey in addressing the Gaza crisis and highlights the potentially constructive role Ankara could play on the ground.
Syria and the Middle East after Assad
The Syria issue has long been a source of tension in Turkish-US relations. However, the past year has shown that the post-Assad era offers an opportunity to reframe this issue. The survival of the new order, the country’s territorial integrity, the establishment of central authority, the easing of sanctions, and the start of reconstruction processes create broad common ground between Ankara and Washington.
The key point that makes compromise possible here is this: for Turkey, stability in Syria means not only increasing border security but also preventing the risk of fragmentation and ensuring that terrorist threats are not reproduced. For the United States, a stable Syria is an outcome that limits the risk of regional wars spreading and reduces the need for costly military engagement. Therefore, in 2026, Syria might cease to be an area where the two countries pursue the same goal with different means and instead evolve into a partial convergence of means.
The file on the YPG and the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is not completely closed; however, with the SDF withdrawing from areas it had long controlled in the face of advancing Syrian forces, Ankara-Washington ties appear to be entering a new phase in terms of Syria. In particular, US Ambassador Tom Barrack’s remark that the conditions on the ground—and thus the perceived need for the SDF in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—have changed could be read as a historic turning point in Turkish-US relations. The critical element that will increase reconciliation in 2026 is verifiable progress on the ground in the post-SDF era: an integration timetable, security arrangements, the alignment of local administrations with the central state, and the limitation of moves by external actors that undermine stability. When this happens, the Syria file could transform from an unsolvable crisis to a manageable transition in the relationship. Furthermore, Washington’s goal is both to align with Ankara on the SDF/YPG issue and to play a role in bringing Israel to an understanding with Syria. Washington and Ankara are on the same page regarding Turkey’s political and military role in Syria providing security for Israel. When considered alongside the constructive and reasonable progress on the Gaza file, this could put the United States, Arab states, and Gulf countries on the same page—and, in turn, create an opportunity for Washington to renew its image as a Middle East peacemaker. This is a new historical threshold and allows for a restructuring of the Middle East regional security architecture that produces security for everyone. With its diplomatic capacity and crisis resolution capabilities, Turkey stands out as a key country in such a process. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s evolving defense pact—and the ongoing talks on Turkey’s potential participation—constitute a noteworthy development, signaling that regional security is shifting from ad hoc responses toward a more institutionalized architecture.
The issue of Iran—one of the critical topics in Turkish-US relations in the Middle East—stands out as an area to be managed (rather than to seek full agreement). Before the conflict broke out, Turkey pursued a cautious approach based on regional balance, economic interaction channels, and border security and cautioned against the military option.
Ankara and Washington share many interest vis-à-vis Iran, including preventing instability by Iranian proxy networks, securing maritime trade routes, limiting Iran’s nuclear program, and ensuring the resilience to shocks of regional energy and connectivity projects. However, Turkey’s security concerns related to potential outcomes of regime collapse and a power vacuum take precedence in policymakers decision-making.
Nevertheless, the United States and Turkey need to stay closely coordinated to prevent fallout from the conflict creating shocks to bilateral relations. Turkey is also poised to play a role in an eventual deescalation and resolution, in tandem with other regional countries.
Defense cooperation
Defense cooperation in Turkish-US relations is both the most fragile and the highest strategic lever. Throughout 2025, signals of normalization and controlled progress at the rhetorical level in the defense sector are coming to the fore: the F-35 issue becoming renegotiable, the emergence of more flexible language on US sanctions on weapons and military systems subject to the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, the F-16 procurement and modernization process advancing to a certain stage, and Turkey continuing its air force modernization with different options. Ankara’s Eurofighter initiative is a striking example of this.
It would be wrong to interpret this table as an immediate solution, but to say that there is no solution at all would miss the mark for 2026. In the defense sector, compromise is achieved not through a single major decision but through a series of complementary, small steps: technical working groups, oversight and transparency mechanisms that address compliance and security concerns, supply chain and subsystem cooperation, joint production, and modernization packages. In particular, the emergence of Turkey’s need for critical components such as domestic fighter jets and engines presents an opportunity to shift the relationship from the crisis files of the past to the capacity partnership of the future. Real compromise could grow in 2026 as the parties shift from the language of maximum demand to the language of feasible packages.
NATO and European security
One of the most important topics to emphasize in bilateral relations is Turkey’s hosting of the 2026 NATO Summit. This is not a protocol detail in terms of bilateral relations; it is a strategic framework opportunity. NATO is the historical backbone of Turkish-US relations. When the backbone is strengthened, the management of side issues also becomes easier.
Washington’s approach in 2026, which pushes Europe to take on more responsibility and pressures it to share the defense burden, increases Turkey’s value within the Alliance. For Ankara, this opportunity is not just about rehashing the rhetoric of strategic importance—it is about institutionalizing coordination through concrete agendas: southern flank security, Black Sea balance, defense industrial capacity, readiness levels, and new threat areas. If the summit process is well managed, Turkish-US relations could enter a more predictable trajectory over the next year, fueled by a common Alliance agenda rather than scattered crisis headlines.
Russia-Ukraine and the Black Sea
In the context of the Russia-Ukraine War, Turkey’s mediation and balancing policy is seen by Washington as a complementary diplomatic role. This area offers one of the most realistic forms of compromise: not complete alignment but a division of labor. There are differences between the US approach and Turkey’s concerns about Black Sea balance, but both sides acknowledge the strategic value of keeping diplomatic channels open and striving to manage the war in a controlled manner. Trump’s frequent references to Turkey’s mediation capacity on Ukraine is more than a normative position; it is an indication that Turkey’s military diplomatic capacity is understood.
What will increase consensus in 2026 is the institutionalization of this division of labor: preventing escalation in the Black Sea, managing trade and maritime security risks, and maintaining concrete mechanisms such as prisoner exchanges and humanitarian mechanisms could make Turkey a burden reducer from Washington’s perspective. Success in this area will be measured less by declaring a common position and more by operating a common crisis management capacity.
South Caucasus
The capacity for compromise in Turkish-US relations can be interpreted as a quiet coordination that manifests itself in the Middle East, the NATO axis, and the South Caucasus. Although Washington and Ankara’s perspectives on this region do not always fit within the same conceptual framework, the common ground between the two capitals is clear: strengthening lasting stability in the South Caucasus, ending cycles of conflict, and preventing the region from becoming a fierce proxy arena for external power competition. For this reason, the Caucasus could form a constructive agenda in the Turkey-US relationship, one that does not generate major headlines but makes the relationship more predictable.
The logic of this compromise takes shape on two levels. First, it supports normalization and peace processes (e.g., between Armenia and Azerbaijan). Progress toward regional peace is consistent with Turkey’s goals of security and connectivity in its immediate neighborhood, while also contributing to the erosion of Russia-centered security dependencies. Second, a security approach that enhances the capacity of regional actors but does not encourage conflict requires a more measured form of engagement aimed at deterrence and stability without completely overwhelming the field with military competition.
In these early days of 2026, there is another reason for addressing the Caucasus as a separate point of agreement in Turkish-US relations: this region is a rare area in which the two countries’ interests often produce complementarity rather than competition. Turkey’s proximity to the region, its political influence, and its capacity for connectivity—combined with the United States’ diplomatic weight and its ability to generate international legitimacy—increase the likelihood of producing a solution file rather than a crisis file. Of course, there are vulnerabilities. The slowdown of peace processes, disruptive moves by external actors, and internal political fluctuations could turn this area back into a source of tension. However, precisely because of these risks, the Caucasus will be an important testing ground in 2026 for what compromise means in Turkish-US relations: not complete alignment in rhetoric but coordination that enhances stability on the ground.
Conclusion
In 2026, Ankara and Washington can create strategic breathing room in their relations through well-designed compromises. The common character of these compromises is cost-reducing functionality rather than ideological convergence. This includes results-oriented coordination on the ground in Gaza, common ground for the sustainability of the post-Assad order in Syria and the Middle East, a shift from crisis to process management in the defense sector, a strengthened institutional backbone within the NATO 2026 framework, and a division of labor in the Black Sea. They all point to the same thing: the future of the relationship lies not in denying disagreements but in accumulating enough common ground to prevent disagreements from holding the relationship hostage.
If these areas of compromise are linked to shared timelines, verifiable steps, and regular consultation mechanisms, Turkish-US relations could make a real leap from controlled fragility to institutionalized pragmatism. And this leap would produce what both sides need most in today’s stormy international environment: predictability.
Murat Yeşiltaş serves as director of foreign policy research at the Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, a policy think tank based in Ankara and also known as SETA. In addition, he is a professor of international politics at the Social Science University of Ankara.
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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.
Image: US President Donald Trump welcomes Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., September 25, 2025. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst.