Enhancing land military mobility in Europe: Advocating a pragmatic approach

Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy Security & Defense Western Europe

Report December 19, 2025 • 1:25 pm ET

Enhancing land military mobility in Europe: Advocating a pragmatic approach

By Clément Gaubert, Freddy Geay, François Catala, and Léonie Allard

Foreword
The imperative: Defining the role of military mobility in Europe
Existing infrastructure of military mobility
Prioritizing and streamlining infrastructure requirements
Leveraging civilian resources
The holy grail of a military Schengen area
Conclusion and recommendations

Foreword

It is a great honor to write the foreword to this Atlantic Council report, Enhancing land military mobility in Europe: Advocating a pragmatic approach. This new report comes at a highly opportune moment. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the 2025 NATO summit at The Hague endorsed the Alliance goal of spending “up to 1.5% of GDP annually to inter alia protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation, and strengthen our defense industrial base.” This seminal paper on military mobility opens a broader transatlantic dialogue on the efficacy of current European military mobility plans and actions, and highlights where additional fiscal resources can be wisely spent.

This is a subject of great interest to the Atlantic Council. Under the leadership of Curtis M. Scaparrotti, a retired US Army general and former NATO supreme allied commander, and Colleen Bell, former US ambassador to Hungary, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security established a task force on the subject six years ago to “assess the adequacy of efforts to improve military mobility in Europe.” I had the privilege to direct that study for the Scowcroft Center.

That task force’s collective efforts resulted in the 2020 report, Moving Out: A Comprehensive Assessment of European Military Mobility. The report generated important politico-military discussions on the issue across the capitals of Europe, helping to shape a broader debate over the need for Alliance improvements not only in capability and capacity, but also in logistics and sustainment, especially for northern and central Europe. The report also successfully encouraged the European Union (EU) to provide critical financial resources for mobility in its 2021–2027 multiannual financial framework. However, written as it was some five years ago, it came two years before Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. Consequently, a new study on the subject is timely and beneficial.

European interest has reignited on issues of military mobility, logistics, and sustainment, especially for NATO’s own southern flank. In light of NATO’s new force model and 360-degree strategy of multidomain collective defense, the 2024 NATO summit communiqué placed a heightened emphasis on the “threats, challenges and opportunities in the South,” to include “strengthening our ability to move, reinforce, supply and sustain our forces to respond to threats across the Alliance, including through effective and resilient logistics and the development of mobility corridors.” As the Atlantic Council’s task force on a security strategy for the Black Sea visited the region two years ago to help prepare its report, A Security Strategy for the Black Sea, Romanians expressed keen interest in additional study and analyses on military mobility within the broader context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, especially for its impact on NATO’s southern flank. This report places heightened emphasis on the land mobility challenges affecting that flank.

With publication of Enhancing land military mobility in Europe: Advocating a pragmatic approach, the Atlantic Council once again is playing a leadership role in advocating for military mobility modernization, this time within the context of NATO’s broader defense perimeter and rear areas. This report should be of great assistance to all NATO countries and EU member states, providing them with a foundation from which to reinvigorate their own national military mobility programs on what is increasingly acknowledged to be a vital Alliance-wide deterrence and defense planning issue. The report correctly places special attention upon Germany as a “nexus of military mobility,” and Berlin receives high priority as a critical enabler within a broader Alliance defense-planning context.

The report has much to convey to the Alliance on the technical, operational, and burden-sharing issues pertinent to strengthening collective defense across the continent. In advocating a pragmatic approach to enhancing European military mobility, the report focuses on the enhancement of existing capabilities including existing dual-use infrastructure, the mobilization of civilian assets, cyberdefense, infrastructure resilience, and looking at military mobility from the lens of a “whole-of-government, whole-of-society task.” This emphasis comports with the Atlantic Council’s 2020 report and is the right place to start. It correctly observes that land mobility capabilities have suffered from thirty years of underinvestment, making them poor cousins of European armies’ capabilities, and therefore emphasizes improving and standardizing the road and railway network in Europe including the nine trans-European transport network (TEN-T) corridors. The report also recommends making major upgrades to European rail infrastructure, electrification, and interoperable signaling systems.

The report goes further than the Council’s 2020 effort in several respects. This 2025 report focuses on European-wide improvements to both the organization of and the planning for military mobility. The report recommends that military mobility be institutionalized across the Alliance, to fully involve NATO stakeholders, from subject matter experts like the Joint Support Enabling Command for mobility on up to the International Military Staff as strategic military adviser, in the definition of priority areas of interest “to reinforce the overall coherence of the network.” The report also recommends the institutionalization of “a seminar on infrastructure linked to military mobility, jointly organized by the EUMS [EU Military Staff] and NATO, to inform participants of existing funding mechanisms and the need for nations to be involved.” These recommendations leverage and improve upon the general recommendations of the 2020 report that NATO and the EU create an institutionalized political dialogue to improve alliance information sharing.

Finally, this report’s seventeen specific technical recommendations all deserve serious consideration by national decision-makers. The report’s excellent discussion of continent-wide gaps in military mobility, and air defense mobility in particular, should be of keen interest to the Alliance given lessons learned in these areas from the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Iran wars. Also of great interest should be the report’s comparison of routes taken by major units during World War II with the TEN-T road network of today and its analyses of the deeper penetration of West-East corridors in the North than in the South. As the geography of southern Europe is much more mountainous and complex, there is an ongoing need to address these factors and rebalance military mobility southward to seek better connectivity toward the Mediterranean.

Significantly, the report’s analysis on European-wide logistics issues of concern should be of great interest to national planners and decision-makers. The report cogently addresses the commercial ownership imbalance at several key European ports involving non-European powers—including China COSCO shipping—and the need to address this imbalance. It does so by encouraging a deeper integration of logistics requirements across northern and southern Europe to enable a more balanced combat logistics flow coming out of Europe’s twenty-nine ports, with an emphasis on the TEN-T core ports, including those on the Atlantic coast. In addition, the report encourages regular training events and educational seminars on military mobility, increased Action Plan on Military Mobility funding for large-scale projects, the development of more flexible European investment rules, transportation reserves, and national implementation of whole-of-government approaches to mitigating military mobility shortfalls. If acted upon, the report’s recommendations would offer greater burden-sharing opportunities for NATO military forces and help expedite Alliance force projection during times of crisis.

There continue to be several areas where longer-term European military mobility improvements could be made that should be the focus of future NATO and EU research efforts. These include better defining transatlantic airlift and sealift requirements within the NATO force model, expanding in-theater airlift capacity, improving planning for refugee operations, leveraging cold and dispersed basing, and evaluating the efficacy of enhanced public-private partnerships. These stand as additional opportunities for more vigorous Alliance-wide study and analyses at an even deeper level of integration.

Enhancing land military mobility in Europe: Advocating a pragmatic approach demonstrates how important it is that the Alliance stay vigilant and current on the dynamic issue of military mobility. The future is far brighter on the topic of NATO military mobility than it was five years ago. The issue has been elevated out of the defense-planning realm up to the national decision-making level. The transatlantic community should be heartened that the foreign and defense ministries of the countries within the Alliance and their militaries have the resident defense thought leadership to make major progress on the mobility issue in the years ahead.

The United States Department of Defense, NATO, and the European Union should welcome the Atlantic Council’s continuing interest, expertise, and enthusiasm shown on this highly important transatlantic security topic, as evidenced by this outstanding research report. We strongly encourage US and NATO military and political leaders to not only seriously consider these Atlantic Council military mobility recommendations, but to take positive, expeditious action upon as many of them as is practicable in the months and years ahead.

Wayne A. Schroeder, Ph.D.
Nonresident senior fellow
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

The imperative: Defining the role of military mobility in Europe

Since the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the following full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the credibility of NATO’s deterrence and defense is at stake on Europe’s eastern flank. In response, facilitating the movement of military troops and assets across Europe will be essential to improve the implementation of NATO’s focus on territorial defense. Bringing troops from western Europe or across the Atlantic to the front lines is the first step of combat. Therefore, NATO’s ability to deter aggression and “defend every inch” of its territory relies heavily on military mobility.

Today, Europe’s military mobility capabilities are inadequate. Assessing the performance of major land, sea, and air logistical vectors is paramount to the projected fighting power of the Alliance as a whole. If the logistics chain currently in place to support Ukraine were considered a blueprint, it would not be capable of sustaining a long-lasting and massive deployment of troops to the eastern flank. If anything, transatlantic support to Ukraine over the past three years has highlighted a harsh reality: Military mobility capabilities in Europe are stretched thin. It is therefore imperative to consider the short-term operational requirements for enabling land mobility from all directions toward and along NATO’s eastern border. This report takes a holistic view of facilitating the seamless movement of troops to the East. ¹

Improving military mobility will require a whole-of-society and multilateral approach. The military cannot act alone. Most of the challenges behind land mobility such as infrastructure development and legal and diplomatic procedures fall under civilian control. Further, military mobility must consider economic and political realities as well as military ones to marry civilian priorities with NATO’s operational requirements.

NATO is the most efficient operational actor regarding military mobility, but the European Union (EU) plays a critical role in improving the continent’s military mobility. The EU could become the main operator of dual-use infrastructure, being responsible for managing and running their day-to-day operation, to allow the Alliance to operate as seamlessly as possible. The EU’s interest in military mobility is not new, but it could acquire a more strategic role in steering continent-wide priorities.

Meeting NATO’s new force generation requirements

NATO’s military efficiency relies on three key principles: a robust peacetime-activated force structure; high levels of interoperability of forces across members; and the capability, as a result, to place a significant number of forces under NATO command. The latter requires both robust integration mechanisms and adequate military mobility infrastructure. However, Western forces have struggled to adapt to the needs of current military mobility requirements.

First, Europe has much ground to recover since the end of the Cold War, when military mobility was considered a strategic issue. The post-Cold War “peace dividend” led to reductions in European armies’ forces and structures. Ground military mobility relies on five core capabilities: road transportation, road traffic management, bridge operations, railroad operations, and air defense. Those essential capabilities were gradually scaled back. Due to thirty years of underinvestment, the overall performance levels of the largest European armies in logistics have become insufficient, especially in terms of ratio of available vehicle-launched bridges for wet gap crossings,² military transport,³rail-repair capabilities for logistics, and air-defense assets per brigade.⁴

Second, for decades, Western armies have been tailored for counterinsurgency warfare beyond NATO territory, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, Iraq, or Afghanistan. The previous decades’ focus on the war on terror meant armies logically prioritized airlift for their respective expeditionary engagement instead of sea, rail, and land. This emphasis was further reinforced by the uncontested air supremacy Western forces enjoyed, which made airlift the fastest option. The result has been a structural bias toward short-term air mobility, at the expense of long-term, railway-intensive planning required for the large-scale movement of heavy forces in Central Europe. Today, this supposedly acquired air superiority is being upended—even in the rear area—by the range of land-air and air-air systems.

The requirements for military mobility have also evolved in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with a NATO force posture readiness model adopted at the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid. The Alliance’s defensive strategy seeks to immediately inflict losses on an aggressor and defend every inch of NATO’s territory, instead of the previous trip-wire strategy. The NATO force model expanded the readiness of forces and the requirement for how fast and where troops could be deployed. At any time, more than half a million personnel are to be made available to the supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) within thirty to 180 days to implement the new NATO plans.

This strategy means military planning must account for a much quicker flow of personnel and materiel to the front—meaning NATO’s new frontline, which stretches from the High North to the Baltic states and Poland, and down to the Black Sea region. In the event of a threat to NATO’s territory, rapid and massive reinforcements will be necessary from elsewhere on the continent, making mobility essential. The recent enlargement of the Alliance with the accession of Finland and Sweden has significantly extended the distance to cover for troops coming from across the ocean and multiplied the number of border crossings, adding to the existing challenge.

Allies have been slowly building up a presence along the eastern flank. Until recently, NATO did not have significant forward-deployed units along its eastern border, except for a reassurance force in the form of four NATO battlegroups: They became operational in 2017 in the three Baltic states and Poland. At the 2023 Vilnius summit, these enhanced forward presences were bolstered to improve the imbalance of conventional forces in states on the eastern flank, and particularly in the Baltic area. Now, following the decision in 2022 to quickly create four more battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, NATO manages eight battlegroups on the eastern flank. In 2024, Sweden announced its intention to assume the framework nation role in the enhanced forward presence in Finland, which is geared toward defending the Northern ports—with a brigade-sized unit.⁵

In Romania, France deploys 1,500 permanent personnel, which will be regularly reinforced to approximately 4,000 in order to train the ability of France to deploy a brigade—typically 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers—within ten days.⁶

Even prior to this new push, military mobility was understood to be an essential task for the Alliance. The establishment of the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) in 2018 shows that military mobility, particularly in terms of coordination, was again a strategic priority for SACEUR.

The nexus between geographical constants and technological constraints

The history of military movements across Europe provides a valuable blueprint for understanding how forces would move across the continent. The maneuvers of the major units that took part in the final victory in the European theater during World War II demonstrate the continued relevance of certain corridors. Furthermore, comparing historical and current maps underlines the role of the Carpathian Mountains as one of the most formidable physiographic divides of the European theater. The map also shows how much Germany lies at the core of the northern corridor of mobility.

While dual-use infrastructures can reduce the inequality of access between the North and South, they cannot provide complete balance. Mobility will remain more complex in the southern area than in the northern area, given its mountain chains including the Alps and Carpathians, but also rivers, notably the Danube. As a result, efforts will have to be made outside of this double corridor in the North to geographically balance activity and ensure redundant connections to the Mediterranean. In the High North, achieving secondary routes is made difficult by the fact that countries only have a few roads and even fewer rail lines. Finland’s railway gauge is different from the rest of Europe. Existing lines of transport are susceptible to winter damage. The Alliance must balance these geographical constraints with military requirements.

Figure 1: Second World War mobility corridors across Europe

Figure 2: Contemporary corridors of land mobility

*Sources: Data taken from European TENtec Map and NATO online portal*

Modern realities paint a more complex picture for military mobility. In a break from the past, the relative safety of the rear area of the theater of operations is fading. The increased hybrid nature of modern warfare and the proliferation of long-range weapon systems mean that the Alliance must plan for enemy actions both along the front and in the rear, meaning western Europe will also need security in the context of military mobility. Furthermore, Russia’s alliance with Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, in which short-range, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles are situated, put military mobility most at risk in the northern corridor.

For example, the Baltic Sea’s most important harbor, Klaipėda, in Lithuania, lies six kilometers from Kaliningrad. This proximity highlights the need for additional supply-line options primarily over Norway through Scandinavia in the event of a strike on the port. Securing sea routes in the High North is also a priority as a diversification strategy, facilitated by the accession of Sweden and Finland to the Alliance. The NATO countries located on its eastern flank are vulnerable to short-range cruise missiles and drone campaigns such as the those launched by Russia in Ukraine.

In the hybrid domain, Russia has shown its willingness and ability to disrupt cyber and energy networks in Europe. It also has shown its capabilities to act covertly, including with the deployment of a military ship under disguise in the English Channel.⁷ Russian activity remains persistent along NATO’s maritime borders, while incursions have increased across continental Europe⁸

—particularly on the eastern flank—testing civilian preparedness. These actions challenge not only military mobility but also aim to generate broader cognitive effects. One such effect is habituation—often described through the “boiling frog” metaphor—where organizations gradually become desensitized to hostile activity. Ultimately, the resilience of societies is closely tied to the resilience of their critical infrastructure.

European political momentum and the EU’s role as an operator

NATO allies pledged at the 2025 Hague summit to spend 1.5 percent of gross domestic product annually toward infrastructure including military mobility.⁹

Harnessing the current political momentum, this report suggests ways for Europe to address and advance its short-term gaps in air, sea, and land mobility. For example, successfully moving a massive number of troops across the entire European continent depends on reliable, resilient infrastructure with sufficient trucks and trains to execute the mission. However, it also relies on efficient coordination, smooth border crossings, and solid planning. A patchwork of players is involved in the practice of planning military mobility including:

Sending nation: The nation whose troops are moving.
Host nation: Transit takes place through this nation.
NATO command structure.
EU authorities: Those who are responsible for the administrative and legal issues of troop movements.

Much of the effort sits with member states. Many European allies have already taken initiatives to foster greater mobility. A notable example is the tripartite agreement between Poland, Germany, and the Netherlands to create more fluidity in terms of cross-border procedures in military movements along the corridor that connects all three countries. NATO also is a driving force, both in terms of procedures¹⁰ and resources, notably through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). This program has seen its funds annually increase,¹¹ given growing security pressures on the continent. However, the management of this funding remains complex, and recent statements lead us to believe that military mobility is no longer one of the most important spending priorities.“In terms of the total approved program (EUR 5,651 million from 2025 to 2030), the majority of the forecasted expenditure relates to Command and Control – Communications and Information Systems, followed by Basing/Facilities and Petrol, Oil and Lubricants. ¹²

NATO adds another layer to the planning. In peacetime, JSEC prepares the theater for potential reinforcements; during crises, it coordinates the reinforcement and sustainment of forces by managing a multidomain network of contacts across NATO and the EU, facilitating logistics and cross-border coordination to ensure the rapid deployment of forces. This coordination remains complex. It relies on the voluntary efforts of individual nations, and will also be limited, as some EU states are not members of NATO (i.e., Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta¹³).

Finally, the European Union is and will be an increasingly major player in improving military mobility. First and foremost, it relies on the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) program, which is an EU program dedicated to civilian and military use, to plan and develop a coherent, efficient, multimodal, and high-quality transport infrastructure across the EU. TEN-T “comprise[s] railways, inland waterways, short sea shipping routes and roads linking urban nodes, maritime and inland ports, airports and terminal,”¹⁴and more; specifically, TEN-T core ports are ideally connected to the surface network. The program has elevated military mobility as a strategic priority. It specifically delegates this issue to several of its offices: the European Defense Agency (EDA), the European Investment Bank, the European External Action Service, and several other commissions and agencies. Numerous initiatives have been taken under EU auspices, such as working meetings, reports, and audits, but a more centralized response stands out as an effort to fully target the problem: the Action Plan on Military Mobility (APMM).

The APMM seeks to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles and fund necessary infrastructure improvements. Despite complex coordination challenges—especially with neutral EU states like Austria, Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta—the collective momentum makes one thing clear: Military mobility is no longer a convenience but a cornerstone of Europe’s defense posture. The EU’s White Paper for European Defense Readiness 2030—its first—identified military mobility as one of the seven capability gaps Europe needs to collectively address urgently.¹⁵ At the same time, the newly created Defense Commission has since set up a task force to update the existing APMM. The negotiation of the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2028–2034 also opens a window of opportunity to prioritize cross-border, dual-use military infrastructure. Military mobility was already a priority for the EU in its 2017 Strategic Compass,¹⁶ leading to the first EU APMM adopted in 2018, following by a second one in 2022. Given that the action plan draws out priorities until 2026,¹⁷ the Commission is in a process to develop a new set of priorities for the next multiannual plan.¹⁸

This Atlantic Council report looks at four areas that require more European and, most importantly, EU effort to strengthen military mobility:

Infrastructure development: Updating existing or, if necessary, constructing new transport infrastructure such as port facilities, railroad, road, and supporting infrastructure.
Coordination between the EU and NATO: Better coordinating, sustaining, and employing large-scale forces of the Alliance’s command structure, with the EU acting as an operator.
Establishment of requirements for civil-military infrastructure development.
Development of norms on legal and diplomatic procedures to ensure seamless movement: Facilitating border crossings for military forces by improving communication and coordination between civil-military actors.

EU-NATO cooperation: Efficiently streamlining activities

JSEC’s first mission in a crisis is to coordinate with the host nations to secure lines of communication, then facilitate the transit of military forces across a network of ports, railroads, airports, and roads called the reinforcement and supply network (RSN) of NATO. Since its creation, JSEC has been the main military mobility stakeholder in NATO, achieving a level of planning detail unseen since the 1990s and taking over as the head of the Allied Movement Coordination Center (AMCC), the operational level of military mobility coordination for NATO.

On the host nation side, things have been much slower, but there has been a clear trend toward taking the issue more seriously at the political level since 2022, in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. First, in western Europe, armies started to create standing Homeland Defense Commands: e.g., France and Germany regained those capabilities in 2023. Some countries, like Finland, had preserved them. Among other duties, these staff structures are tasked with planning the transit of sending-nation troops on their territory. This is important because host nations’ responsibilities include organizing troop-staging areas and making arrangements to protect, refuel, and feed the different convoys.

The protection aspect is essential because defending critical infrastructure and assets is vital against hybrid threats of sabotage and long-range fires. All these tasks require space, time, and supplies (e.g., food, fuel) that will quickly overwhelm any peacetime logistical system. Nations have also made significant improvements regarding their own movement coordination staff or, when in place and fully functional, through their own National Movement Coordination Center (NMCC). These bodies are specifically tasked with coordinating the air, sea, road, and rail movement of allied troops as a host nation or their own troops abroad as a sending nation. Several countries had not set up NMCCs up until recently, and some have not fully integrated the different movement capabilities. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Poland has recently announced its plan to create dedicated national units for the reception, staging, and onward movement (RSOM) of Alliance units on its soil.

The EU has not created an additional structure for coordinating allied movements in a major joint operation that does not involve NATO. Still, the existence of the Multinational Joint Headquarters (MNJHQ) in Ulm could fill this role, if called upon to do so, as its commanding general is also the JSEC commander. Of note is the existence of Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE), an ad hoc structure that deals with multimodal strategic movement. While relevant during expeditionary warfare and peacetime, it is unlikely to be fit for high-intensity warfare in its current form. While the multiplying of actors from NATO, the EU, and other ad hoc structures is a clear indication that the subject is being taken seriously, it also carries the risk of overlapping responsibilities. On the planning side, the coordination between NATO and the EU has been fruitful, for example between Europe’s TEN-T and NATO’s RSN. However, there are initiatives that should be merged, like NATO’s Multinational Ammunition Warehouse Initiative (MAWI) and a network of logistics hubs dubbed NetLogHubs,¹⁹ through a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) project. The missions and roles of different entities need clarification, and some will need to disappear, while others will have to be streamlined.

Planning and training

Realistically, there is no way to make sure that when the time comes, the marshaling of Alliance troops on the eastern flank will proceed smoothly. General Eisenhower famously said, “Plans are worthless; but planning is everything.”²⁰

In this case, everything depends on the quality of the planning conducted both by the Alliance’s staff and member nations.

Since 2022, the Alliance has overhauled its various war plans, and the military organizations of its member states have significantly improved their respective levels of preparation. For military mobility in times of crisis, the Alliance will activate the reinforcement and supply network, which includes ports, railways, and roads, but also convoy supply centers and hospitals. Until then, it all comes down to testing these plans. NATO training plans now require that movement training is systematically included in every training exercise in Europe. JSEC has also built its own training schedule, which notably includes Exercise Steadfast Dart, focusing on the deployment of the Alliance’s high readiness Allied Reaction Force. Using simulations or war-games, these events involving member nations’ NMCCs are of great added value. For the purposes of planning and training, NATO uses the LOGFAS (Logistics Functional Area Services) suite, whose software tools include resources, ammunition, force structure, and support infrastructure characteristics to enable accurate operational planning. To achieve the best planning results, the accuracy of the data provided by member states (a sensitive subject among certain members of the Alliance) is of the utmost importance. As managing the logistics of a coalition is challenging, the introduction of AI in a LOGFAS successor has the potential to improve its capabilities.

Member nations also have made significant improvements to the thoroughness of their military planning. However, except for countries bordering Russia, it seemed like only defense ministries were concerned about this issue. The next step is achieving a genuine whole-of-society approach to the military mobility equation. Though the current situation is encouraging, the training that has been conducted to date only involves military structures. As previously noted, military mobility in a time of crisis must be a whole-of-government, whole-of-society affair. The next step will have to include the involvement of civilian actors in transport and security, whether they are from other government departments, private-sector entities, or infrastructure stakeholders. It is encouraging to note that in March 2025, France’s Homeland Defense Command hosted HESTIA 25,“²¹

a tabletop exercise involving the armed forces, civil servants from a range of departments, and private-sector actors. The focus of the event was the role of France as a host nation within NATO and aimed at fostering mutual comprehension among the different stakeholders, while improving planning and learning valuable lessons.

Existing infrastructure of military mobility

Analyzing the efficiency and capacity of major logistical sea and rail routes is paramount to assessing the projected fighting power of the Alliance as well as its capability to take troops to the front lines. In addition, the durability of these routes must be sustained through a developed network of warehousing and stocking facilities throughout Europe.

Figure 3: Core European ports and freight rail network

*Sources: Data taken from European TENtec Map*

The European ports: Gateways to military power

Most of the Alliance’s fighting power is provided by the United States and transported by sea, making European port facilities key to the success of European military mobility.

The series of connected ports in the Atlantic Ocean and North Sea are the most unlikely to be threatened by an opposing force, due to the projected Alliance’s naval supremacy. These “core ports” are geographically even: fourteen are located on the Atlantic (in France, Spain, and Portugal) and fifteen on the North Sea (in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium). However, the overall port activity is far less balanced. The ports of the North Sea conducted 75 percent of maritime commercial activity in 2023 (Netherlands, Belgium, France). In 2023, 58.3 percent of commercial activity was concentrated in Dutch and Belgian ports, with 28.4 percent in Rotterdam’s core port and 17.1 percent in Antwerp’s core port. This imbalance creates a vulnerability in terms of the division of logistical efforts because it makes dispersion much more difficult. In addition to physical vulnerability, this overconcentration is making NATO’s logistics planning highly predictable.

This vulnerability is accentuated by China’s investments in European ports. According to the European Parliamentary Research Service,²² China holds 24.9 percent of the Port of Hamburg’s shares and, even more significantly, COSCO Shipping²³ owns more than 85 percent of the Zeebrugge container terminal in Belgium and 67 percent of Piraeus Port in Greece, as underlined by a study from the Dutch think tank Clingendael 24. Beyond this financial vulnerability, China is currently providing a vast majority of the cranes used in Dutch ports, notably in Rotterdam. An investigation led by the US Congress demonstrated high threats to confidentiality due to illegally installed Chinese modems in said cranes.²⁵As these cranes unload the goods and scan them, it is likely that the cargo manifests of ships will quickly find their way into servers in China. Consequently, on February 29, 2024, the US House Committee on Homeland Security sent a letter to the chairman of Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company, asking for clarification.

Railways: The artery of military mobility

Trains are the only ground-transportation mode capable of sustaining long-lasting and high-intensity conflict. In most European countries, the state and its armed forces maintain close ties with the major railroad companies. For instance, the three biggest European railroad operators²⁶. are still 100 percent owned by their respective countries and the armed forces remain important clients. This relative autonomy is reinforced by the recent European TEN-T policy aimed at developing cooperation and the intermodality of national rail networks. This policy focuses on nine key corridors crucial for military mobility.

Table 1: Rail corridors crucial for military mobility

	Corridor name
1	Atlantic
2	Baltic Sea-Adriatic Sea
3	Mediterranean
4	North Sea-Baltic
5	Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea
6	Western Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean
7	North Sea-Rhine-Mediterranean
8	Rhine Danube
9	Scandinavian-Mediterranean

Despite a strong will to establish coordinated governance over these corridors, there are still some challenges hampering the flow of military mobility. The first set of improvements are needed at the national level (and could be streamlined by standardization):

Dealing with who or what is traveling: Some countries, like Germany and Austria, do not allow the circulation of mixed trains, meaning trains that transport both troops and equipment.
Engine interoperability: Due to differences in railway safety systems and signaling, one country’s engine can only tow a train on its own national network, thus requiring an engine shift at each border crossing.
Notice necessary for a foreign train to cross a border: Before February 2022, Poland required one month of notice during peacetime and five days during wartime.²⁷ Despite the dissemination of dedicated Response Measures,²⁸ this question of notice has been a thorn in NATO’s side, including when deploying its Very High-Readiness Joint Task Force between 2003 and 2024.

The second set of improvements is strictly systemic. Germany lies at the core of European military mobility. Accordingly, its railway network is the most developed on the continent. But, when it comes to freight, its network is already overloaded with brown coal convoys, which mainly move at night and are essential to fuel coal power plants. In this area, military mobility is linked to Germany’s domestic policies.

The third and last set of improvements needed are in the technical realm. Most modern military fighting vehicles have gotten heavier and bigger due to enhanced protection and firepower needs. This change makes rail transport more difficult, as most flatbed wagons were designed for smaller Cold War vehicles. Similarly, some key rail infrastructures, such as tunnels and bridges, might not be adapted to these new vehicles’ dimensions. For instance, before the launch of a modernization program named Scorpion in the 2010s, only four French military vehicles were considered oversize load. Now, most are.

On the other hand, modern civilian trains and engines are also not adapted to military needs because dual-use requirements had disappeared when they were engineered. Some cannot be efficiently adapted to war use,²⁹ while older, dual-use models are too expensive to modernize: The average cost of modernizing one railcar is around €400,000 ($466,480). Fortunately, some countries are investing again in this area: For example, the Polish Army, which has been highly dependent on railways to ensure its strategic mobility, invested in heavy platforms and ramps in 2018 and 2019.³⁰ Moreover, certain parts of the European rail network also lack sufficient electricity, with only 56 percent of this network electrified in 2021.³¹

Additionally, signaling is only slowly being standardized, preventing trains from crossing borders without having to switch the engine. The European Rail Traffic Management System initiative, launched in the 1980s, is a common effort toward a unified railroad network, but the project is making very little progress. Only 17.3 percent of the nine TEN-T key corridors are equipped with interoperable signaling systems and only 13.6 percent of the sensitive North Sea-Baltic, North Sea-Rhine-Mediterranean, and Atlantic corridors are equipped.

Given the range of improvements needed, Europe could further support the standardization of dual-use European rail cars for the transport of personnel, wounded people, and equipment. (See recommendation 1.)

Strategic air mobility: Enabling NATO’s first response

Strategic air mobility is a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence and rapid response, offering unmatched speed and flexibility—but it also is vulnerable. In a crisis, air transport enables quick deployment of light forces and equipment, but once air superiority is contested, its role shifts to moving personnel, with heavy gear transported by sea or rail. The majority of NATO’s strategic airlift capacity comes from the US Air Force. While European allies operate Airbus A400M transporters and take part in multinational efforts like the Strategic Airlift Capability initiative, they remain reliant on US assets, especially for oversized cargo. This imbalance is worsened by limited aerial refueling and reliance on a few critical hubs such as the Ramstein and Brize Norton air bases in Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively. Many European runways cannot handle large aircraft, and civilian airports pose security risks. Strategic airlift also depends on ground infrastructure and legal access rights.

Europe’s continued reliance on chartered Antonov AN-124 aircraft through the Strategic Airlift International Solution framework exposed vulnerabilities in its strategic airlift policy. Following the withdrawal of Russian operators between 2018 and 2022, what remains of the Ukrainian fleet is facing mounting maintenance challenges after losing access to Russian-produced spare parts. Though the European Air Transport Command has improved tactical coordination, it lacks the mandate and resources to manage strategic movements. Despite being less visible than ground logistics, strategic air mobility remains important to NATO’s initial response in Europe.

Stocks and warehouses: The fuel of military mobility

During wartime, a network of fully stocked warehouses is crucial in maintaining the vitality of logistical activity, with fuel, ammunition, spare parts and even vehicles directly available. Being able to position reserve equipment in strategic locations is essential to quickly react to any contingency. While the notion of prepositioning military stocks itself triggers some sovereignty issues, this strategy is critical to absorb the first blow of the enemy. The relatively small size of the European continent does not alter the pertinence of this principle, which is why, at Belgium’s urging, NATO launched Multiannual Warehousing Initiative (MAWI) in 2021. This high-visibility warehousing project aims to organize the stocking of ammunition close to the anticipated front lines. As of June 2023, twenty-three allies had joined. However, support for this project has been mitigated by its clause regarding ammunition consumption in wartime, wherein the host nation can use nonnational ammunition stocks and refund them retroactively, a highly sensitive matter when it comes to precious and not-easily procurable ammunitions like 155 millimeter shells.

Although pertinent, this project only concerns ammunition, not battlespace management. For instance, a divisional support group requires a 400 km2 area to set up. Given the growing transparency of the battlefield of modern combat, military logistics will have to rely on a deconcentrated civilian warehousing network. In the absence of an ambitious strategic project regarding EU military stock prepositioning, identifying this network and preparing the legal aspects of requisitions could be a step toward a strategic approach to military commitment on European soil.

Without forestalling sovereignty delegation, the EU could help identify civilian warehouses that could be requisitioned in wartime. (See recommendation 2.)

Future of US force projection in Europe

The United States maintains an organization under the 21st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) to provide theater sustainment in Europe, a practice begun in the beginning of the Cold War. It is the lead organization for the sustainment activities of the US Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF). Currently the US Army’s largest forward-deployed formation, its very presence functions as a deterrent against potential adversaries.

First, the 21st TSC guarantees the smooth reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of incoming US units, leveraging its maintenance and mobility support units to accelerate force deployment. If called upon to do so, it can dramatically increase the throughput of ports, rail networks, and airports anywhere in Europe, ensuring that troops and equipment reach their respective operational area without delay.

Second, it provides sustainment for initial US forces through a vast network of depots and prepositioned stockpiles, demonstrating the ability to surge forces anywhere in Europe without relying on ad hoc logistics. Finally, the 21st TSC’s overarching mission is to sustain the USAREUR-AF at the theater level, guaranteeing that deployed forces remain effective throughout the campaign.

US deterrence and the credibility of the transatlantic security guarantee are fundamentally reliant on the 21st TSC’s ability to project, sustain, and surge American forces rapidly. In essence, US deployment is inseparable from “Team 21” and its unique logistical capabilities, which may be put under stress by the new US defense posture. As the US posture evolves, NATO must ensure the credibility of its power projection structure remains credible.

Prioritizing and streamlining infrastructure requirements

The infrastructure requirements issue stands at the crossroads of two contradictory dynamics. On one hand, NATO has the best assessment on military logistic needs and the fastest planning process. On the other hand, upgrading mobility infrastructures—used for civilian purposes in peacetime—is a long-term national and civilian prerogative. In this context, the EU’s normative power has a key role to play in organizing the meeting between the operational military requirements and harmonized, communitarian infrastructure development. In that framework, the EU APMM appears to be the best vector to enhance cooperation between NATO and the EU.

An EU strategy to achieve continent-wide effects

The EU APMM, first signed in 2018, has provided a strong incentive for member states to upgrade their infrastructure. The previous action plans have led to significant improvements, but their limited budget prevented them from achieving any broad strategic objectives. The two successive action plans, in 2018 and 2022,³² were shaped by the war in Ukraine, prompting an acceleration, which was also emphasized in the Strategic Compass published the same year.³³Approximately €1.7 billion was allocated under the 2021–2027 MFF,³⁴ but a significantly larger, more strategically directed budget could be earmarked in the coming year.

The military scope of selected APMM projects still requires refining. Decision-making is a major issue in the process. It is difficult to understand why some projects receive more money and others do not. Ultimately, 70 percent of selected projects concern land mobility by rail or road, with 81 percent of budget allocated. A major issue is that the selected projects directly support movements within the borders of the applicant countries, with only two of the ninety-five projects selected involving cross-border infrastructure.³⁵ Moreover, the locations of the selected projects show wider distribution in the eastern part of Europe, with Germany, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, respectively, in the top four places among the countries that received funding from the action plan. As a result, it remains challenging to assess the overall contribution of these projects to military mobility on a continental scale.

From a geographical perspective, the distribution of APMM-funded projects has favored northern and northeastern Europe. Strikingly, Romania is the only southeastern European country to have benefited from the mechanism, and even then, it ranks only eleventh overall. This imbalance is a systemic weakness in terms of military mobility. It naturally leads to a concentration of flows toward the North, which will rapidly lead to the saturation of lines of communication and greater chances of sabotage due to the geographical concentration of flows. This trend is further underscored by the fact that none of the projects put forward by Greece have been selected.

Instead of merely validating national proposals, the EU should define a genuine strategic framework for military mobility, prioritizing cross-border projects and ensuring that neglected but critical regions are not left aside. (See recommendation 3.) It also entails working more closely with NATO when setting priorities and awarding funds, to reinforce the overall coherence of the network. (See recommendation 4.)

Better cooperation between the EU and NATO would improve the project selection process and give a more strategic dimension to the actions implemented. This assessment must play a greater role in the project validation process to ensure coherent and redundant mobility, to more easily compensate for any regional shortcomings.

Process and budgetary improvements

A study of the current complex EU application process is conducive to imbalances since candidates will invest in this process with varying levels of intensity. In the wake of reviews from the 2021, 2022, and 2023 calls for applications, questions should be raised about the relevance of the process, as it exists today. The selection process involves two phases, one conducted by the European Climate, Infrastructure, and Environment Agency and the other by the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport. The first phase consists of an independent evaluation report by three experts, followed by a consensus evaluation report from the same experts. In the second phase, the military evaluation is carried out by the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), followed by several internal assessments, and then a final meeting to arrive at a shortlist of projects.

Efforts should be made to clarify and streamline the current mechanism, as highlighted in the European Court of Auditors’ report on EU military mobility.³⁶ Currently, the strategic assessment of infrastructure renovation needs is largely reduced to a single microstep, carried out by the EUMS, in the middle of an administrative mille-feuille. The EU should renovate its application process to include a one-stop, lead decision-maker, which could help implement a better overall strategy. The applicant information should also be supplemented by details of other financing methods. Whether we are talking about direct financing from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) or financing purely military infrastructures through the NSIP, efforts must be made to educate all nations participating in the EU and/or NATO, to achieve continental-scale military mobility effects. (See recommendation 5.)

More generally, the EU’s budget for military mobility is insufficient. After an assessment phase from 2021, member states could submit project applications for funding to upgrade dual-use infrastructure. Precipitated by a downward revision, EU funding quickly dried up, as the last call in 2023 exhausted the allocated funds. A total of ninety-five projects were supported by this mechanism, which will ultimately refund 50 percent of the expenditure incurred by states. With an average value of €18 million, each project is expected to be delivered before the end of the EU multinational financial framework,³⁷ which should enable assessment of the mechanism’s effectiveness by 2027.

The amount of funding should not be such a rapidly limiting factor in terms of overall strategy. If we return to Greece, each of its two submitted projects obtained scores that enabled retention in the final ballot, but funds dedicated to the APMM were exhausted before these projects could be financed. This is regrettable, given that the lines of communication linking Greece to Bulgaria and Romania are already being used intensively, and it is a safe bet that in the event of mass deployment, this network would be insufficient.

More generally, the budget allocated to the APMM appears to be poorly directed and too small to provide a comprehensive response to the issue of military mobility on a continental scale. First, part of the budget should be dedicated to large-scale projects that go beyond the national framework and aim to achieve an objective strategic rebalancing on a European scale. Second, the overall budget needs to be increased to consider inflation in construction costs and to avoid holding back microprojects whose overall impact is difficult to measure. The EU should dedicate part of the APMM budget to large-scale projects, targeted by the EUMS to bridge identified capability gaps. (See recommendation 6.) At the same time, it needs to increase the budget dedicated to the APMM to guarantee funding for large-scale projects and prevent the premature drying up of funds, leading to strategic imbalances. (See recommendation 7.)

Feedback should also contribute to better targeting problematic infrastructures. Whether we are talking about flows resulting from support for Ukraine or those deliberately provoked as part of multinational exercises, lessons must be learned to pinpoint military mobility problems linked to dual-use infrastructure. Some lessons seem to have been learned already from Russian aggression, such as the financing by the CEF of standard gauge railroads in Ukraine between Chop and Uzhhorod, but more needs to be done. If Atlantic Resolve³⁸ operations were to make greater use of rail, the difference in rail gauges between Spain and the rest of Europe should encourage the EU to take up the issue of Spain’s network conversion to standard gauge. It is therefore crucial to update the APMM’s guidelines and prioritize the actions to be taken in the light of completed missions. The EU should include a list of operational shortcomings related to dual infrastructures in the joint EUMS/NATO assessment, to encompass the full spectrum of multinational missions in Europe. (See recommendation 8.)

On these two fronts, the EU could take the lead by organizing a dedicated seminar on infrastructure related to military mobility. This event should be jointly hosted by the European Union Military Staff, with active support from NATO stakeholders, to raise awareness of existing funding mechanisms and emphasize the importance of national involvement. The target audience should include representatives from transport ministries and armed forces, fostering greater synergy between civilian and military actors and encouraging more coordinated strategic planning across member states. (See recommendation 9.)

Leveraging civilian resources

The current role of the private sector in military mobility

Being able to access the massive pool of civilian transportation vehicles is a tempting way to improve military mobility in Europe. Since a quick surge in the number of military transport fleets is unlikely, it could be the quickest option available. There are two different approaches to using the private sector: through contracts or requisitioning. The latter calls to mind various legal tools enabling states to legally appropriate resources, assets, and services if no other solutions are immediately available. Although this policy exists in Europe, there are significant process variations across countries. Notably, requisitioning has fallen out of fashion since the Cold War. With the return of war on the continent, however, nations are updating their legislative arsenals to become more efficient in times of crisis. That said, tapping the private sector is not a panacea.

The private sector has had an enduring role in warfare. No matter the period, it has played a significant role in military logistics.³⁹ The success of those endeavors relied heavily on comprehensive planning: Plans were thoroughly tested and routinely revised to stay relevant. The most recent reference in Europe is the Cold War, where both sides planned to rely on requisitions to expedite mobilization, quickly transport hardware and supplies, and boost transport capabilities. Civilian and military offices were engaged in a constant inventory of not only civilian truck fleets but also buses and civil-engineering vehicles—with the tallies, locations, and statuses constantly tracked and updated. Civilian airlines and maritime transport companies made arrangements to enable use of their respective assets on short notice to directly support their country’s armed forces. Given the sheer scale of logistics in peer-to-peer warfare, there will never be enough military vehicles to support this kind of massive effort.

Since the end of the Cold War, the civilian sector dramatically shifted to occupy a contracting role, without any notion of requisition. Western armies themselves encouraged this evolution, deliberately reducing their own heavy logistical assets and increasingly outsourcing functions to civilian providers. The subsequent rise of expeditionary warfare also meant that logistics were essentially static as ammunition consumption remained low, as did human and material losses. Western armies became accustomed to this logistical comfort.

Three years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, several important realizations have slowly surfaced. First, in the case of major conflict, military mobility alone is insufficient to enable the transport of forces across Europe in a timely manner. Armies lack the number of trucks needed to transport equipment and resources, but the same goes for heavy equipment transport (i.e., trucks able to move main battle tanks) or flatbed railcars, which are mostly owned and operated by civilian companies. This leads us to the second point: The contribution of the private sector will be essential if we want to reach the scale that is required to move and supply a significant military force in Central Europe. The final realization is that mobilization has become an increasingly rare practice, and contemporary governments are often unfamiliar with the full range of capabilities and tools it affords.

Countries are revising old laws. In France, the law mandates that construction, bus, and truck companies must establish and update inventories of their vehicles via a web portal. However, most companies are simply unaware of these legal requirements. A partial conclusion is that mobilization is not an exclusively military issue. Private companies need to be made aware of their obligations and must be involved in current discussions regarding planning and policies. Political impetus is crucial for these processes to be completed successfully, as is testing to ensure the effective functioning of requisition processes. Set up national-level, regular vehicle-mobilization training events involving private companies,⁴⁰ to check inventories and ensure the validity of the process. (See recommendation 10.)

An unequal modernization

European countries have unequal histories and development and various contexts of mobilizing civilian assets. While European countries have been highly active since 2022 to update their laws,⁴¹they are not all at the same level of progress. Most have achieved significant legislative progress, but there is a lot left to do. Also of note, apart from Sweden and Finland, military mobility is considered a purely military issue. However, the need to involve civilian stakeholders from both the public and private sectors is obvious. Most national plans state that transferring massive forces to the front lines will be a “whole-of-government, whole-of-society task.” What remains is translating this buzzword into solid facts, actual plans, and realistic training. Nationally, European countries should foster a whole-of-government approach to military mobility to develop robust relationships between ministries. The EU could fund studies of various European national approaches to civil-military relations to establish a set of lessons learned. (See recommendation 11.)

Take France, Germany, and Sweden, for example, which pursue diverse approaches to civil-military relations—adapted to the specific national context. Since 2023, the French Military Programming Law for the 2024–2030 period has allowed the prime minister to proceed with requisitions and even to delegate that power to both civilian and military authorities. More importantly, this new law expands the cases qualifying for requisitions to include the first stages of a crisis and not merely during war scenarios. It significantly enlarges the scope to become something much more adapted to hybrid warfare.⁴²The result is a significant improvement in the speed at which the French government can respond to unforeseen circumstances, improving deterrence.

As the biggest country in Central Europe, Germany is a nexus of military mobility. Its legal arsenal dates to 1968 with the passage of its Economic Security Assurance Act. Dubbed WiSiG,⁴³ the act laid out its economic mobilization processes in times of both tension and war. These laws have not been altered since then and do not cover the requisition of transport means for the direct benefit of the military, instead focusing on the security of the economy. Although not as advanced as other countries, Germany started to actively plan for its role in a major conflict in 2022. In 2024, Germany started communicating about OPLAN Deutschland, its classified plan to organize the deployment and transit of up to 800,000 NATO soldiers with their 200,000 vehicles and associated logistics across the entire country. As host nation, it is Germany’s role to provide troops with places to stop, rest, and access spare parts, equipment, and fuel. Inevitably, these plans must involve the private sector. To this day, however, there is no sign that Germany plans to resort to requisitioning to achieve its desired results, opting instead for extensive planning of a massive contribution from the private sector.

Sweden has one of the most comprehensive mobilization systems in Europe, rivaled only by Finland. In times of crisis or conflict, Sweden can mobilize civilian resources for both civilian and military needs. Local and regional authorities and the private sector are included in the mobilization planning process. There is an existing legal framework for requisitioning civilian transport assets: buses, trucks, ships, and planes. Both regional and interregional transport systems are merged in military logistics to be used most notably for evacuations and conscript transport. Essential dual-use infrastructures like ports, rail terminals, and airports can also be used and even modified to better suit military needs. The new Total Defence Bill for 2025–2030 (signed in 2024) has modernized and updated the different rules enforced in times of crisis or war, but the Swedish government has stated there is still a lot to do. Sweden is currently looking to revive its Krigsviktiga-företag concept, ⁴⁴ which designated specific companies whose mission was to maintain their strategic activities even in the case of war and the breakdown of their regular supply chain, thanks to additional stocks and higher readiness. Relying as it did on financial incentives, this system did not survive recent waves of privatization, globalization, and European rules on competition.

Priorities in the private sector-military relationship for strategic mobility

Militaries must factor in the involvement of the private sector given the gigantic size of the task required by mobility in times of war. However, relying exclusively on the private sector is not a panacea as there are areas where the needs of the military and civilians simply do not overlap. Road transportation is the private sector’s most obvious potential contribution. Trucks carry almost 80 percent of all freight transported over land in the European Union, with a truck fleet of around 6.4 million units.⁴⁵The biggest fleet is Poland’s (1.4 million), followed by Germany and Italy (900,000 each), and then France (600,000). Overall, 700,000 buses are in operation across the EU, almost half of which can be found in three countries alone: Poland (130,000), Italy (100,000), and France (95,000). On paper at least, the resources are there to allow for a quick surge in capacity if need be; but the reality is more nuanced.

There are significant differences between civilian and military logistics. Truck companies use pallets to load and handle goods (the share of container transport in road transport is only 6 percent⁴⁶), whereas the current military standard is the 20 foot container. The proportion varies greatly depending on the country in question, but on average, only about 20 percent of trucks can handle these containers. Transshipment between strategic and tactical transport would entail a loss of time and effort that would have to be addressed with proper staffing or contracts, further increasing the need for container-handling equipment. European countries, including through the EU, could identify key transport companies and encourage them to use container-compatible equipment. (See recommendation 12.)

Additionally, there is a concern about the dispersal of truck drivers in western Europe for a massive transport fleet. A significant portion of the drivers employed by transportation companies are not nationals and many third-country drivers come from Central Europe. Thus, there is a significant risk that these foreign drivers will answer the call of duty in their own country in a time of crisis. Companies will have to report honestly on these topics if any serious survey initiative is to be successful.

Furthermore, the European Union is facing a looming crisis in road transportation due to the current shortage of truck drivers. This shortage is evaluated at around 250,000 positions today and could triple in 2028 because a third of truck drivers are over the age of fifty.⁴⁷

Rail is the other area where the private sector’s role will significantly reinforce military mobility. It would be tempting to think that we could easily employ civilian rolling stock for mobilization, but as is the case with road transport, what stands out are the different civilian and military needs.

Even thirty years after the Cold War, most armed forces still possess rolling stock to transport their hardware, but the current number is nowhere near enough to transport entire divisions. On the civilian side, while flatbed railcars are available in large numbers, they are unfortunately not suitable for transporting military vehicles, as they are too high and narrow and few of them are suitable for transporting standardized, reusable containers. Power sources could also become a problem as electric engines become more prevalent across western Europe. However, the lower level of electrification in Central Europe, along with the greater vulnerability of electric lines to sabotage and damage, all make it dangerous to rely solely on electricity. European nations should identify a European budget for the development and acquisition of a standardized military flatcar. (See recommendation 13.)

The relationship between railway companies and the armed forces is a key factor in ensuring that military trains function smoothly. Some companies have teams dedicated to military trains, and exchanges between the highest levels of the armed forces and their CEOs are frequent. However, the liberalization of the rail sector within the EU has introduced significant weaknesses to military railway transport because the needs of the armed forces are so specific that few companies are ready to work with them. As a result, it’s usually the “historic” national operators that bid for contracts involving loading and driving trains for the military, but even this relationship is currently jeopardized by excessive regulation. For instance, Poland is currently in the process of buying new military rail stock from its historical operator, PKP Cargo, but is worried that the move could be classified as unauthorized public aid under EU competition law. European countries could take measures to make European investment rules more flexible on military mobility issues. (See recommendation 14.)

From a human resources standpoint, mobilized workers will have to be prepared. Warfare is evolving, and the relative safety of the rear area of the theater of operations is slowly fading with the proliferation of long-range assets. Proper preparation is crucial because, although civilian drivers face lower risks than combat troops, their exposure remains considerable. Being able to provide volunteer drivers with a suitable military status that will negate their right to withdraw could be a solution. Nations could assess the interest in a transportation reserve that would be used as a pool for military strategic transportation. (See recommendation 15.)

Finally, yet importantly, the world has changed since the Cold War, and global supply chains have shifted how we produce and consume resources. European citizens today rely on a delicate logistical web that makes food grown thousands of miles away available. Even after the COVID-19 pandemic, we live in a world of just-in-time deliveries and minimal stocks. Any brutal change in that web could have dire consequences for the civilian population. Proper planning must consider that a sizable portion of the civilian transportation fleet will be essential to maintain that chain.

Although the requisition process is an act of supreme authority that comes from the state, there must always be compensation provided to the owner. This means that massively resorting to it will not be cheap, especially when considering the damage and destruction to which those assets would be exposed. None of these factors are insurmountable, but it does mean that, as always, planning is essential—not only preparing minds and processes but also adapting the hardware. At the national level, armed forces will have to express their specific needs to the private sector, including initiating discussions with transport and railway companies, several years before a crisis starts to loom, to ensure that everything works as planned when the time comes.

From outsourcing to dependence: The integration of the private sector in the logistical optimization of armed forces through AI

The scarcity of resources, the complexity of equipment, and the omnipresence of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance have transformed warfare into a system where data constitutes one of the most critical fuels.⁴⁸. In the field of logistics, tasks such as inventory tracking, constrained flow coordination, and data compilation represent major challenges, consuming significant human resources. To address this, NATO relies on logistics information systems such as Logistics Functional Area Services (LOGFAS), which enable real-time tracking of inventory, transportation assets, and expressed requirements.

However, artificial intelligence now emerges as an indispensable enabler to optimize not only these activities but also the use of all necessary resources. The term “resource” should be understood here in its broadest sense. Requisitioning would prove not only administratively complex to implement but also cognitively unmanageable without large-scale data processing capabilities. In the realm of military mobility, the prospects offered by AI seem almost limitless, yet they largely remain beyond the reach of armed forces in terms of data management and computational power.

Given this capability gap, armed forces are turning to specialized companies, generating long-term dependencies. Technological giants such as Google, with its data storage and sharing capabilities, ⁴⁹or Amazon Web Services (AWS), with the optimization of asset allocation⁵⁰

and resource management, ⁵¹ illustrate some of the possibilities. Some armed forces have already entrusted the management of their operational data to such private actors.

On a broader scale, NATO announced on March 25, 2025, the adoption of the Maven Smart System NATO, developed by Palantir, to equip Allied Command Operations. This AI platform aims to accelerate battlefield decision-making by fusing multisource data. In the specific field of military logistics, Palantir collaborates with Rune Technologies to integrate TyrOS, software designed to transform current logistics processes into intelligent supply networks. This system enables the prediction of future needs, the optimization of available resources, and the facilitation of decentralized operations, even from a laptop in a hostile environment.

Other solutions are under exploration, such as the European Defence Operational Collaborative Cloud at the Alliance level, or Artemis.IA, developed in France. However, this diversity of initiatives presents a challenge: Despite the undeniable contribution of AI in supporting military mobility, competition among private actors and the dispersion of efforts are slowing progress. As customers, the armed forces have little leverage to influence this dynamic. Furthermore, AI raises additional issues, ranging from data compatibility and information sovereignty to resilience against cyber threats.

While the potential of AI for military logistics and mobility has been widely discussed, few significant breakthroughs should be expected in the near term. Such a revolution cannot occur without prior harmonization of standards and methodologies, as well as convergence of perspectives on the security issues inherently linked to the use of artificial intelligence.

The holy grail of a military Schengen area

Streamlining administrative hurdles

The Schengen area permits the seamless movement of people and goods across the borders of different countries. Citizens can travel without passports from Portugal to Poland, never stopping for border control. But for armed forces to move a significant number of troops across allied territory in peacetime, there are complex steps to follow called cross-border movement procedures (CBMP). Standardization is one of the EU’s greatest powers, yet it has failed to iron out these problems. The main issue seems to be that many countries add their own layer of national regulations and paperwork, even though the EU form alone is “officially” enough. On the one hand, NATO is obviously the main client of military mobility. On the other hand, the EU is the main regulator across the continent and already provides funding and executes programs to enhance the infrastructure and border-crossing processes. Some improvements could be made in the following areas.

The first step is that the nation that allied forces want to move into must grant a movement credit that gives authorization to use its roads during a specific timeslot. Depending on the country and situation, the delays can be very long, especially if a force intends to move across several countries. This is because typically civilian authorities grant (or deny) movement credits. Some countries like Germany and France have decentralized their respective processes to regional offices, which causes further delays and complexity. Nowadays, Poland has a much more efficient process because the Army has been given the power to grant movement credits.

Next comes the preparation of the proper customs documentation for border crossing. This requirement appears simple enough: a single form for multiple border crossings. Both NATO and the EU have their own form and while close in content, only the NATO form is digitized. Each country also can (and often does) request additional paperwork. The EU could streamline the process by expediting the digitization of EU 302 Form. (See recommendation 16). Some countries add yet another layer of difficulty by requiring diplomatic clearance to cross.

The number of military organizations that deal with the different aspects of mobility can also be quite overwhelming for the sending nation. Depending on how a force is moving, the host nation might have several entities that will grant, plan, or execute the movement. Integrating these into national military command centers is key. Enforce a standard for NMCCs that integrates all modes of transportation and centralizes the granting of movement credits. These structures could also be supported by JSEC and MCCE to improve their readiness. (See recommendation 17.)

The transport of dangerous goods (e.g., ammunition and explosives) in the military domain has also become a complicated issue, due to a core series of EU regulations augmented by national restrictions. This is particularly significant for the southern strategic corridor. The European Defense Agency has made recommendations for the transport of dangerous goods in the military domain, but they are not mandatory. Streamline restrictions on dangerous goods transport across the EU for military purposes. (See recommendation 18.)

Developing specific corridors

Both at the political and military levels, cooperation between the EU and NATO exists across several points of contact. Regarding military mobility, the main one is through NATO’s Logistics Action Plan.⁵² On the administrative side, NATO and the EU are working hard to resolve the different issues. The urgency of the situation means that both parties are regularly exchanging information and requirements. Several projects are showing promise to reach NATO’s prerequisites for enabling and deploying large-scale military formations within seventy-two hours. Among them is the Secure Digital Military Mobility System (SDMMS), which will allow the direct and secure exchange of information between EU member states and dramatically accelerate approvals of CBMPs. Eventually, this software will also cover customs.

Another aspect to improving border crossing is the ability to get a train directly from a country to its destination without changing the engine at each border crossing. Standardized security systems like the European Rail Traffic Management System will greatly help with this endeavor, but it will take decades to finish developing the needed railway equipment and rolling stock. Despite the efforts of the different actors, most notably the EDA and NATO, progress on a “military Schengen” has been very slow so far; an intermediate solution is relying on bilateral and multilateral agreements to advance on this issue. In March 2025, the European Council identified four priority corridors: Northern, Central Northern, Central Southern, and Eastern Corridors,⁵³ which European member states are striving to support and streamline.

Practically, these corridors are unfolding in minilateral groupings, the first of which was formed between Netherlands, Germany, and Poland, with a letter of intent signed January 30, 2024. The three countries are all major stakeholders in military mobility, due to the size of their ports and their geographical location.⁵⁴During the NATO Washington summit in 2024, Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, and North Macedonia signed a corridor agreement.⁵⁵

Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria signed a letter of intent in October 2024, while Romanian and Bulgarian defense ministers signed a memorandum to establish a regional special operations command center which will plan and manage the Alliance’s special operations forces in the Black Sea region. In November 2024, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland) signed a letter of intent stating their willingness to create such a corridor. ⁵⁶.Also that month, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania signed a letter of intent for a corridor that would permit direct access to southern Europe via the maritime port of Alexandroupolis.⁵⁷

These various planned corridors could provide a blueprint for the future look of European military mobility.

These military mobility areas could theoretically allow for significant improvements and facilitate the movement of military forces between the different nations involved, as well as offer helpful options to transfer forces between northern and southern Europe. The additional corridor between Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, and Romania would potentially keep the road to Romania open in case of a blockade of the Eastern Mediterranean. Unfortunately, stringent regulation regarding the transport of hazardous material in Italy, in total disregard of EU regulations, could dramatically downsize the impact of this initiative.

Notably, these “corridors” are only an administrative development and have not improved infrastructure, as is often incorrectly portrayed. Nevertheless, the Netherlands-Germany-Poland initiative has the potential to become the model for streamlining cross-border procedures, if and only if its successors adopt the exact same requirements. Otherwise, we will end up with a dozen corridors, each with its own specific procedure.

Conclusion and recommendations

Given current geopolitical circumstances—despite the time required to update legislation in Europe, revise the Military Mobility Action Plan or design the EU’s multiannual financial framework 2028–2034—the EU should focus on enacting prompt, rapid solutions, many of which are outlined in this report.

The delays in developing military mobility should encourage every actor to keep prioritizing the issue. An economic reality as well as a military one, mobility is a perfect subject to become one of the first building blocks in the development of European strategic autonomy.

Recommendations

Support the standardization of dual-use European rail cars (transport of personnel, wounded people, and equipment).
Identify civilian warehouses that could be requisitioned in wartime.
Define a genuine strategic framework for military mobility, fostering cross-border projects and ensuring that neglected but critical regions are not left aside.
Work more closely with NATO when setting priorities and awarding grants to reinforce the overall coherence of the network.
Renovate the EU application process to include a one-stop, lead decision-maker, to help implement an overall strategy; and strive to educate all nations participating in the EU and/or NATO, to achieve continental-scale military mobility effects.
Dedicate part of the APMM budget to large-scale projects, targeted by the EUMS and NATO to bridge identified capability gaps.
Increase the budget dedicated to the APMM to guarantee funding for large-scale projects and prevent the premature drying up of funds, leading to strategic imbalances.
Include a list of operational shortcomings related to dual infrastructures in the joint EUMS/NATO assessment, to encompass the full spectrum of multinational missions in Europe.
Organize a seminar on infrastructure linked to military mobility, jointly organized by the EUMS and NATO, to inform participants of existing funding mechanisms and the need for nations to be involved. To encourage synergy, the audience should include representatives of transport ministries and armed forces.
Set up regular mobilization training events involving private companies.
Nationally, foster a whole-of-government approach to military mobility in order to develop robust relationships between ministries.
Identify key transport companies and encourage them to use container-compatible equipment.
Identify a European budget for the development and acquisition of a standardized military flatcar to facilitate mobility by rail.
Make European investment rules more flexible on military issues.
Nationally, assess the interest in a transportation reserve that would be used as a pool for military strategic transportation.
Expedite the digitization of EU 302 Form.
Enforce a standard for NMCC that integrates all modes of transportation and centralizes the granting of movement credits. Those structures could also be audited by JSEC and MCCE to assess their readiness.
Streamline the restriction on dangerous goods transport across the EU for military purposes.

Acknowledgements

This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. An earlier draft of this study was submitted as part of the European Commission’s targeted consultation on the military mobility package.

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Image: Romanian and French soldiers from the combat engineering corps take part in a military exercise to cross the Mures River in Romania, November 9, 2025. REUTERS/Andreea Campeanu

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