He’s back. On Monday, Donald Trump will be inaugurated as the forty-seventh president of the United States, as he vows to shake up the US government and world affairs in pursuit of American interests. But that world looks a lot different than the one he left behind when he exited the White House in 2021. So what exactly should he do? Read on to find out what Atlantic Council experts recommend Trump 2.0 do about Ukraine, the military, the dollar, and much more.
Ideas
Ratchet up pressure on Russia to bring peace to Ukraine
For months, the Trump team has trumpeted the big idea of bringing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine to an end quickly—initially suggesting it could be done in twenty-four hours, but now allowing that it might take three to six months. Trump has said that he will not abandon Ukraine, whose survival is important to the United States. Trump’s dilemma is that he has informally laid out elements of a solution requiring compromise by both Moscow and Kyiv.
While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has indicated a readiness for the kind of territorial compromise that Trump suggests must be part of an agreement, the Kremlin has demonstrated no willingness to consider either the establishment of a demilitarized zone patrolled by European troops or the arming of Ukraine by the West to deter future Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin has every reason to delay negotiations to encourage Trump to weaken his support for Ukraine—and to give Russia time to gain control over additional Ukrainian territory and kick Ukrainian troops out of the Russian territory of Kursk.
If the new administration wants to maximize its chances for a successful and quick negotiation, it needs to increase pressure on Moscow. It has spoken of using leverage; it must be ready from day one to do so. We know for sure that in one area, Trump is ready. He intends to remove the ill-considered measures taken by the Biden administration to limit US oil and gas production. This should put downward pressure on global oil and gas prices and reduce Russian hydrocarbon revenues. The Trump team can increase pressure on the Kremlin by implementing the new sanctions the Biden administration placed on Moscow last week. It should also go beyond the Biden team in persuading its Group of Seven (G7) partners to enable the transfer of all Russian state frozen assets to Ukraine.
Most important of all, the new president should follow up his decision last spring to enable the passage of the long-delayed US aid package to Ukraine by introducing his own aid package. This could be a loan, but it must include advanced weapons—certainly longer-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) and F-16 fighter jets, but perhaps more—to ensure that Putin understands that continuing his aggression will not lead to additional territorial gains. This approach could produce the sustainable peace that could earn Trump a Nobel Peace Prize.
—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.
Make an “Iron Dome for America” a reality
On the campaign trail, then candidate Trump called for an Iron Dome-style defense for the United States. What can the incoming Trump administration do to make this vision for enhanced homeland defense into a reality?
The first required change is one of strategy. Today, US homeland missile defense strategy covers (a) ballistic missile attacks from North Korea and (b) cruise missile defense against possible attacks from strategic competitors, but essentially only in the Washington, DC, region. That approach no longer makes sense. Homeland missile defense strategy should be expanded to include air and missile threats from all vectors, with special attention to staying ahead of the North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile threat; complicating limited, coercive missile strikes from Russia or China; and protecting US nuclear forces against a disarming strike. Doing so will defeat adversary strategies that depend on deterring or preventing the United States from coming to the aid of its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
This expanded strategy is achievable. It will require short-term investments in layered defense, knitting together capabilities like the Ground-Based Interceptor, Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. In the medium term, much more capable and survivable sensors, including those in space and covering additional angles of approach, will be essential, especially for discriminating attacking warheads from decoys. In the long term, investments in space-based defenses and directed energy will be required.
The second needed change is in resourcing. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) proclaimed that “the homeland is no longer a sanctuary,” and the 2022 NDS asserts that “first, we will defend the homeland.” For this stated top priority, the Department of Defense budgets a pittance. Despite the first Trump administration’s stated support for homeland missile defense, spending at the US Missile Defense Agency in fact declined toward the end of the first Trump administration. The second time around, the administration cannot miss out on the opportunity to adequately invest in homeland missile defense.
—Robert Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads the Nuclear Strategy Project. He served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy from 2017 to 2021.
—Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center.
Take the lead on 5G
The United States is still punching under its weight on 5G wireless. Domestically, the lack of mid-band (1-6 GHz) spectrum continues to be a barrier for commercial applications, even as, globally, China is pushing for harmonization of standards for the 6GHz band. The absence of a forward-looking agenda for telecommunications, beyond defensive line-holding against China, is a barrier to US competitiveness in 5G, and in turn limits the scope and ambition of its global 5G project. One part of this agenda should be a re-evaluation of the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC’s) spectrum allocation authority—the FCC’s authority to grant licenses for spectrum use to nonfederal entities with the aim of maximizing the public good—which lapsed on March 9, 2023. FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel stated at the one-year mark since the lapse that “in light of the reality the agency has faced for almost a year, we are now compelled to ask what we can do with our current unassigned spectrum in order to keep innovation moving ahead in a global market for wireless that is not slowing down.”
The incoming Trump administration should prioritize the extension of the FCC’s spectrum allocation authority, a necessary step to help spur investment in commercial 5G. The FCC’s authority is a crucial market signal, providing the assurance needed for entities to make long-term investments in commercial wireless applications. By way of low hanging fruit, there is currently a bill in Congress—the Spectrum Auction Reauthorization Act—that would reinstate this authority through 2026.
—Trisha Ray is an associate director and resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.
Future-proof the dollar
If you haven’t been paying close attention to the Atlantic Council’s Dollar Dominance Monitor (and we forgive you if you haven’t), you might have been surprised to see Trump, two weeks after his re-election, tweeting about how he will tariff countries trying to de-dollarize.
Trump has identified a real problem, but in this situation, tariffs are likely to backfire. As our research has shown, a range of countries are trying to build new cross-border payment systems to work around the dollar—especially when it comes to sanctions. While these efforts don’t threaten the dollar as a global reserve currency (only US fiscal excess or challenging central bank independence could do that) it does undercut the way the United States uses the dollar as a tool of national security. It is not a coincidence that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Group of Seven (G7) sanctions response, the number of countries pursuing cross-border digital currency projects has more than doubled.
But Trump’s response to these developments shouldn’t be to threaten countries. That just reinforces the reasons that countries like India and Brazil are looking for alternatives in the first place. Instead, the United States should invest heavily in the future of the dollar network. The first step would be building the next generation of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network—a fifty-year-old European-based institution that sits at the heart of how money moves around the world. Next, the United States should lead the way in setting standards for the use of digital assets in cross-border payments and make the issue a major focus when Washington hosts the Group of Twenty (G20) presidency next year. The dollar has enormous advantages, and when working in tandem with the euro, pound, and yen, no country in the world can afford to be outside this system. If Trump offers more carrots than sticks, he’ll find a world eager to remain part of the dollar network for the long term.
––Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former advisor at the International Monetary Fund.
Launch the US Volunteer Business Corps
The geopolitical challenges the Trump administration will face call for innovative solutions that harness the full spectrum of US resources, including tapping into human capital from seasoned professionals to the next generation of leaders. The Trump administration should create a US Volunteer Business Corps (USVBC). This organization would aim to enhance US soft power, cost-effectively expand the capacity and reach of agencies such as the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and provide global exposure to the next generation of US business executives. Given the coming efforts of the Department of Government Efficiency to cut back on bureaucracy, the USVBC would provide a cost-effective way to bring together retiring professionals and recent graduates to support the DFC’s efforts in frontier and emerging markets. Both groups represent untapped resources:
- Boomer retirees: The United States is experiencing a wave of retirements, with nearly sixty-five million Americans reaching retirement age by 2025, adding four million per year through 2027. This cohort represents a wealth of knowledge, skills, and experience that could be redirected toward work that benefits US national security and competitiveness.
- Student debt-burdened business school graduates: Instead of implementing student debt forgiveness as was done in the Biden administration, students could work off their debt through service in the USVBC. Thus, the Corps would create a win-win scenario—addressing student debt while making future US business executives more globally competitive through mentoring from retirees and international exposure.
The US maintains some of the highest rates of volunteerism in the world. Over seventy-five million Americans volunteered in 2024. The USVBC would direct some of that energy to US international goals.
Operationally, under the new Trump administration, the DFC should immediately create a program for private sector secondees, volunteers, and retirees to serve in advisory council roles on specific funds, deals, and sector teams. By recruiting volunteers with expertise in business, finance, engineering, and project management, the DFC could increase its operational capacity to identify, assess, and advance projects of strategic import while creating a cadre of individuals who support the DFC through its reauthorization in 2025. The 2025 DFC program would be a prototype of the USVBC, allowing for learning and refining before the rollout of a much larger on-the-ground program that would involve deep coordination with the Department of State.
—Aubrey Hruby is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and co-founder of Tofino Capital.
Become the president of strategic resilience
Great presidents often must govern on issues different from the ones on which they campaigned. Franklin Roosevelt famously shifted from “Doctor New Deal” to “Doctor Win the War.” Trump faces just such a challenge after the series of devastating hurricanes in Florida in September and North Carolina in October, as well as this month’s wildfires in California. Trump should become the president of strategic resilience.
The United States faces a crisis, like the COVID-19 pandemic that hit in March 2020, that will have devastating consequences if the Trump administration does not get in front of the challenge. Already, insurance rates in Florida and the Gulf states have skyrocketed, and California’s already horrible insurance situation is about to become desperate. Homeowners have to have insurance or they cannot get a federally insured mortgage to buy a house. Businesses have to have insurance to be able to stay in business, and if they can’t stay in business, unemployment skyrockets. Two category 5 hurricanes hitting Florida or a Gulf state in a single season, or another wildfire season next winter like the one California is in now, will put the economy of those states, and perhaps the country, into recession or worse. Americans living elsewhere should not be smug: they will get hit by the bills if Congress has to appropriate hundreds of billions of dollars in emergency aid. Voters could well take revenge against those in office.
The alternative approach is to commit to the steps required to save lives and reduce the damage when disasters occur. The federal government, through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Federal Emergency Management Agency, is responsible for both coordinating disaster response and increasing resilience at the state, local, and personal levels. Trump can use DHS’s considerable infrastructure expertise, its network of partnerships, and its authority to make disaster mitigation grants (which are separate from disaster recovery grants) to strengthen the federal response, and work with state and local governments and the private sector to have a legacy that leaves the United States a stronger and more resilient nation.
—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program and former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.
Create a competitive defense economy
During his last administration, Trump was deeply involved in the defense industry, including personally leading negotiations and spurring foreign military sales. Two major reforms—reforming the budgeting process and creating competition within the Department of Defense—could create a defense economy in the United States that is more responsive and competitive, increasing military and economic strength for the nation. Such action would be the greatest US defense reform since Goldwater-Nichols passed in 1986.
The new administration should embrace the reforms proposed by the bipartisan Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform Commission. The commission made many recommendations, but the chief issue is that the current PPBE process makes it too easy to disconnect resourcing from strategy. Installing a new system, including restructuring the budget so it is easier to understand, will improve this shortfall. The new system should enable the president, Congress, and the American people to understand what capabilities the military is trying to buy and how money is being appropriated to buy them.
Trump can make this new system more successful by fostering a competitive environment within the Department of Defense. Lack of competition within the defense industry and high barriers between service responsibilities have dangerously reduced defense productivity and increased program costs. Active encouragement of competition between programs in addition to competition between companies can reduce the negative impacts of the government’s monopsony.
The new Trump administration is in a unique position to complete major overhauls of dated defense processes. Many nominees for key positions within the Department of Defense do not have major ties to existing bureaucracies, while the same party will be in control of the White House and Congress. This sets the stage for the kind of major defense defense reform that hasn’t bee seen in decades, at a time when the United States needs to find a competitive edge.
—Edward Brady is the 2024-2025 senior Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the Air University, or any other US government agency.
Shake up shipping
In spring 2024, a bipartisan, bicameral group of Congress members released “Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy.” Two of the members, Representative Michael Waltz and Senator Marco Rubio, have since been tapped for cabinet posts in the incoming administration. The other two introduced the SHIPS Act in December 2024, a much-needed bill that will provide the necessary investment and focus to revitalize the national shipping industry over the next ten years. While it is vital that the new administration support this initiative, in addition to the Navy’s request for 3 to 5 percent budget increases above inflation to improve its shipbuilding, these are long-term solutions that do little to turn the tide to ensure effective deterrence against China by 2027—the year US officials have said China is targeting to attain the military capability to invade Taiwan.
In the short term, Trump should be bold and turn to allies and partners to bolster the US maritime industry until the SHIPS Act has a significant effect. He should push for Congress to repeal or meaningfully change the Jones Act, which mandates that only US-built, -owned, and -staffed ships travel between domestic ports. Until that is done, he should issue broad waivers for ships and crew to meet US needs. While China is the largest shipbuilder in the world, the next three, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, are vital allies in the region. The United States should provide additional funding to invest in their shipbuilding capacity and buy merchant ships, which can immediately supplement the currently dismal US maritime industry. The SHIPS Act would recruit and train new American mariners, but until then Trump can open H-2B visas (he has recently signaled his approval for legal migration for foreign workers) or even create a path to citizenship for mariners from the Philippines, Indonesia, and India, the three largest suppliers of seafarers outside of China and Russia. A short-term program to add merchant ships and their vetted crews to the US fleet could reduce the strategic sealift shortfalls to ensure readiness in the Indo-Pacific by 2027.
—Michael Hogan is the 2024-2025 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views or policy of the US Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the US government.
Further reading
Thu, Jan 16, 2025
Trump has an advantage in upcoming USMCA trade talks. Here’s how his team can use it.
New Atlanticist By Sophia Busch
The Trump administration should take stock of the economic leverage—and dependencies—the United States has with Mexico and Canada ahead of 2026.
Fri, Nov 8, 2024
What the world thinks of Trump’s return to the US presidency
New Atlanticist By
From Ukraine to Australia, Sweden to Singapore, Atlantic Council experts examine how people in different countries view the decisive win by President-elect Donald Trump.
Thu, Jan 9, 2025
Land grabs, occupation, and threats will not make the US great again
New Atlanticist By Daniel Fried
The president elect’s threats may be bluster or tactical, but they reveal a dark side of power unworthy of any US president.
Image: US President-elect Donald Trump speaks at Turning Point USA's AmericaFest in Phoenix, Arizona, U.S., December 22, 2024. REUTERS/Cheney Orr/File Photo