The Tiger Project: Expert commentary

As part of Operation Atlantic Eagles, Tokyo has sent four F-15 fighter jets and four additional military aircraft to the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

In Washington, a narrow focus on the number of US troops in South Korea has obscured a more important discussion on the broader capabilities needed going forward.

When it comes to the US military presence in South Korea, what the US force is capable of doing matters more than exactly how many troops are stationed there. As the US Senate and House draft this year’s must-pass National Defense Authorization Act, they should focus on requirements, not setting a floor for USFK.

The future of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula—and indeed, the wider Indo-Pacific region—will hinge on Seoul’s ability to reframe US force realignments not as unilateral disengagements but as catalysts for action.

As the Philippines has focused more on Chinese threats to itself, Manila also seems increasingly inclined to see its own security as connected to that of the broader region.

Europe has NATO. The Indo-Pacific needs a similar mechanism. Enter the United Nations Command, a legacy of the Korean War ready to be refitted for the current threat landscape in the Pacific.

The US review of AUKUS should be understood as part of a larger US effort to accelerate defense industry cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

The assumptions underpinning analysis and discussion of conflict in the Indo-Pacific are due for a rethink. Though many conversations about Chinese military aggression assume South Korea would not get involved, it could play a decisive role in deterring and defeating an attack on Taiwan.

Washington and Seoul must set a new foundation for the seventy-year-old alliance that reflects the current strategic environment.

With China escalating its operational tempo in the Taiwan Strait, the United States must enhance its forward defense posture in the Indo-Pacific.

In the coming years, the US-South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) alliance is likely to be tested in at least three fundamental ways: by a concerning growth in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile weapons program; by changes to ROK defense capabilities and structures, including the establishment of ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM); and by potential strategy and policy changes under new US and ROK political administrations.

The United States remains focused on planning for a short, sharp war with China. But a potential conflict will almost certainly become a long war of attrition.

Taiwan is under unprecedented pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), facing coordinated threats on multiple fronts.

MG Bradley Gericke, US Army (ret.), argues that the US must prepare to win quickly in a conflict with China to deter war and avoid the high costs of protraction.

US defense priorities appear to be at a crossroads. Can the United States materially sustain Ukraine in its fight with Russia while preparing for a possible fight with China in defense of Taiwan?

LTG (R) Scott D. Berrier argues that transforming the Intelligence Communit’s early-warning system and attaining real-time awareness is crucial to deterring Chinese aggression.

The “toplines” from Markus Garlauskus’ report on two emerging and interrelated deterrence challenges in East Asia with grave risks to US national security.

US military and defense thinkers must overcome two major misconceptions that for too long have shaped US actions regarding nuclear weapons.

Moscow and Pyongyang are devising and developing new business practices to supply each other while evading the reach of many US sanctions.

The US and its allies took note when China launched large military exercises around Taiwan just after October 10. But it’s also important to pay attention to how Taiwanese reacted to Beijing’s saber-rattling.

The new Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience could enable faster provisioning of resources to Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea, or even the United States if a war breaks out. 

Washington, Manila, and their Indo-Pacific allies must work together to counter China’s maritime aggression in Philippine waters.

In the Philippines, China’s aggression is not in some shadowy, ill-defined “gray zone.” It’s a real and constant series of attacks on the country’s people and sovereignty.

To better prepare Taiwan to defend itself, the United States needs more transparency into Taipei’s weapons integration challenges.

The United States and its Indo-Pacific allies must work together across all levels and domains for their regional deterrence to be effective.

A repeated theme in recent discussions in Taipei was Taiwan’s ability to withstand Chinese coercion and to adapt and sustain its defenses while under attack.

Beijing’s influence campaign in pursuit of a “cognitive fait accompli” against Taiwan is conducted across multiple lines of operation.

The US and Japan must modernize their command and control structures to ensure deterrence and defeat threats in the Indo-Pacific.

US policymakers and military leaders must rigorously study and plan for a broad range of implications from a years-long war against China.

Such a coalition would help disrupt cyber threats, signal US resolve, and ideally help deter future cyberattacks from China.

With North Korea’s rapidly advancing military technology, aggressive nuclear policy changes, and deepening ties with the PRC making deterrence on the Korean Peninsula increasingly more complex, this is how the US and South Korea can shore up cooperative deterrence and boost alliance resilience.

Washington and Seoul have drawn closer together in recent years, but concerns remain about what role the alliance would play in a US-China military conflict. The US and South Korea should take these steps to address this sensitive question.

On November 14, a Chinese warship used its active sonar to harass and injure two Australian Royal Navy divers with high-powered sound waves.

This paper examines the historical record of cognitive biases, focusing on the US intelligence community’s failure to forecast PRC intervention in the Korean War, despite collecting information and evidence indicative of that outcome.

The US intelligence community has just released its National Intelligence Estimate on North Korea, a watershed analysis. But more is worth adding to the discussion.

The nuclear collaboration announced by the US and South Korean presidents this week is the type of strategic measure the allies need to focus on, rather than a reactive approach.

US President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol are navigating political tensions around nuclear weapons and microchips to find a common future.