How the US and the Philippines should counter Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea

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On September 27, two Chinese missile vessels chased Philippine civilian boats near the First Thomas Shoal, also known as Bulig Shoal, in an area of the South China Sea known as the West Philippine Sea. It is considered the first time that such ships chased civilian vessels during maritime patrols. The Philippine vessels, the BRP Datu Romapenet and BRP Datu Matanam Taradapit, which are under the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, were en route to Hasa-Hasa Shoal (also known as Half Moon Shoal) to provide food and other aide to Filipino fisherman in the area. The following day, September 28, a Chinese helicopter chased and flew close to the BRP Datu Romapenet during its resupply mission near Bombay Shoal, which is close to Palawan Province in the Philippines.

In the wake of China’s escalating coercive tactics against Philippine vessels, the United States must work with the Philippines and its other Indo-Pacific partners to publicize, counter, and deter China’s maritime aggression in the South China Sea.

A pattern of aggression

The September incidents fit a larger pattern of China’s aggressive tactics against Philippine vessels. In late August, some forty Chinese vessels from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Coast Guard (CCG), and China Maritime Militia (CMM) blocked passage in the South China Sea of a ship belonging to the Philippines’ Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Services. A CCG vessel then rammed and fired a water cannon at the ship, which was on a humanitarian mission to deliver supplies to Filipino fishermen.

The incident occurred near Sabina Shoal, also known as Escoda, which is less than ninety miles from the Philippines’ Palawan Province and well within the country’s exclusive economic zone. In the attack, the Philippine ship was damaged and failed to deliver its humanitarian cargo. It was the first recorded time that the PLAN has participated in the use of force against Philippine government vessels, a dangerous escalation on the part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

Only two days later, CCG and PLAN warships maneuvered to block a Philippine supply mission to the BRP Teresa Magbanua, a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) patrol vessel anchored for months at Sabina Shoal. The PCG anchored the vessel there in April after Philippine officials discovered piles of crushed corals, leading Manila to suspect that Beijing plans to build it up into an outpost, like it has in other parts of the contested Spratly Islands.

On August 29, a CCG ship rammed the Teresa Magbanua three times in an attempt to dislodge it. The incident was the fifth in August alone and involved some forty Chinese ships, including PLAN, CCG, and CMM vessels. The Philippines was compelled to remove the Teresa Magbanua on September 16 because of bad weather, structural damage due to ramming incidents, and a lack of daily supplies. The crew needed to be medically evacuated and arrived at port in Palawan malnourished and dehydrated, some of them on stretchers with IVs attached. The Philippines’ National Maritime Council plans to replace the Teresa Magbanua with another ship at some point in the future.

Elements of PRC forces

According to Ray Powell of Sealight and the Gordian Knot Center for National Security, China employs four different kinds of forces in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea. Each of these forces plays a part in China’s goal of gradually seizing possession of the maritime territory in what it views as its “10-dash line”—the perimeter of the entire South China Sea.

The first force is known as the “Spratly Backbone Fleet.” Think of it as the backbone of the PRC’s efforts. It includes hundreds of large fishing vessels manned by “patriotic” fishermen out of ports in Southern China. These fishermen act as enforcers, and the pay for their services often supplements their income from fishing. The crews of these vessels are at the cutting edge of the PRC’s “gray zone” tactics. For example, they sometimes lash several of their boats together at anchor to form semipermanent formations—a practice known as “rafting”—in and around the shoals within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

The second force is the CMM. Although some members of the CMM also work as fishermen, their primary role is to carry out missions under the authority of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The CCM currently consists of around 4,500 vessels, and the PLA uses the CMM to enforce its coercive policies of occupation and area denial in the waters of the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea.

Next is the CCG. An estimated 250 vessels currently make up the CCG, which has been referred to as “China’s second navy.” In recent months, most of the actions that China has carried out against Philippine vessels operating in the waters off the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone have involved the CCG. This includes the attack on small boats of the Philippine Navy during a resupply mission in Ayungin Reef (Second Thomas Shoal) in June, in which Chinese personnel used axes, long knives, tear gas, and batons to attack Philippine sailors and damage and disable Philippine naval vessels.

Last is the PLAN, China’s navy. PLAN ships have intimidated and deterred both Philippine fishing boats and naval vessels, as was the case in the incident in Sabina Shoal on August 25. The PLAN is by some measures the largest navy in the world, with some 680 ships, three aircraft carriers, 58 destroyers, and 54 frigates. At present, the PLAN is transitioning from being a so-called “green water” (or coastal) fleet to being a “blue water” fleet that can operate beyond the first island chain. 

What the PRC wants in the South China Sea

What is the PRC’s goal with these “gray zone” actions? First and foremost, China seeks to attain dominance over the entirety of its self-declared “10-dash line.” Achieving dominance requires China’s military and paramilitary organizations to gain complete operational control over the waters.

With complete control, China would be able to exploit the fisheries in the waters as well as resources in the seabed—and demand that commercial vessels seek China’s permission to traverse them. In the long term, the PRC likely wants to attain both actual control and international recognition of its control over parts of what is currently the Philippines and other littoral states.

All signs indicate that China’s authorities are absolutists in their territorial claims. The PRC regards “every square inch” of territory that it lays claim to as a nonnegotiable part of China. Although China may offer negotiations, it is unlikely ever to make actual concessions. This is illustrated by the dispute between Washington and Beijing over the militarization of China’s man-made islands in and around the Spratly Island chain. In September 2015, Chinese leader Xi Jinping assured then US President Barack Obama that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” of the Spratly Islands. Xi added that China’s outposts would not “target or impact any country.” Subsequently, however, China has violated this promise by pursuing the militarization of those disputed man-made outposts.

How the US and its allies should respond

China’s aspirations are unacceptable to Washington and Manila, not only from a strategic standpoint but also because they violate the existing rules-based international order. The United States and the Philippines, along with US defense allies Japan and Australia, must adopt the following five measures to blunt China’s ambitions and deter further aggression.

First, the US Coast Guard and the US Navy, in concert with Philippine vessels, should begin regular joint patrols of the maritime region of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. While both the United States and the Philippines have been skeptical of this proposal in the past, it is time to send a clear message to Beijing that its recent acts of aggression will not stand.

Second, US and allied assets should be deployed to assist with future resupply voyages to the specific locations that have previously been targets of Chinese aggression.  

Third, PRC authorities should be notified of maritime actions by the United States and its allies, primarily as a means of de-escalation but also as part of a wider deterrence policy.

Fourth, the Philippines should continue its current policy of “assertive transparency,” the use of visual evidence to expose China’s illegal actions to the public. Philippine and sometimes foreign journalists have been aboard Philippine vessels when they have encountered illegal and aggressive actions by China. The United States, Japan, and Australia should support these efforts by encouraging greater participation of foreign journalists to report on the PRC’s actions.

Fifth, the United States and its allies should act, and be seen to act, collectively and in consultation with each other. Many eyes are on Russia’s war against Ukraine now, but Washington also needs to train more eyes on the Pacific. Consultations with Manila, Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra will demonstrate that these democracies are committed to protecting Philippine sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea. They will also send a message to China that its efforts to bully the Philippines will not be tolerated.


Elizabeth Freund Larus is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

James Rice taught in the law faculty at the National University of Malaysia (1989-1992) and in the department of philosophy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong (1992-2018). He currently lives in Vigan, Philippines.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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Related Experts: Elizabeth Freund Larus

Image: Chinese Coast Guard vessels fire water cannons towards a Philippine resupply vessel Unaizah on its way to a resupply mission at Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. REUTERS/Adrian Portugal.