Is Iran’s Axis of Resistance turning toward Tunisia?
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Tunisia earlier this fall, where he met with Tunisian President Kais Saied and Foreign Minister Mohamed Ali Nafti, has renewed speculation regarding the North African country’s shifting posture toward Tehran and the broader expansion of Iranian influence in the region.
Notably, the two countries are poised to renew bilateral agreements through joint committee meetings and enhanced economic and trade relations, including by reopening direct flights between Tunis and Tehran. The meeting comes against the backdrop of several Iranian high-level visits in the region, highlighting undoubted interests by the regime in North Africa, and comes a year after the Tunisian president flew to Tehran for former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral.
Both countries stand to benefit significantly from revitalized economic and tourism partnerships. Iran is severely weakened after heavy losses to its leadership and those of its proxies during the most recent two-year war between Israel and Hamas, while Tunisia is isolated internationally, economically weak, and increasingly economically and politically dependent on Algeria. An expansion of relations in North Africa can only strengthen the Iranian regime and its so-called Axis of Resistance, now looking for avenues to rebuild its regional standing and power. For Tunisia, relying on the Algeria–Iran axis could prove beneficial should the United States continue to withdraw support. Washington was once Tunisia’s main international supporter, but no longer sees Tunisia as a viable partner for democracy building in the region and has diminished its support significantly in recent years. Deepening the Iran relationship would also serve Saied’s populist, anti-Western agenda, allowing him to retain legitimacy while continuing his wide-scale crackdown on Tunisia’s institutions.
Tunisia–Iran relations
Tunisia–Iran relations have never been particularly noteworthy. Before Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the two countries had a “stable” relationship, but tensions between the two countries increased later on due to Tunisia’s fears of the spread of the revolution and Islamist ideologies into its own borders. This fear was amplified because the success of the revolution empowered many Tunisians who believed in the importance of Islam in politics, and gave impetus to the Jema’ah al-Islamiyah, the predecessor of Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda party. The revolution offered the Jema’ah a “totally new dimension of Islam” and its political role, enabling leaders to “Islamize some leftist social concepts.” Then President Habib Bourguiba (Tunisia’s first president and father of the country, who attempted to protect his authority by repressing Islamists) severed ties with Iran in 1987 after student protests broke out in Tunis University. Tunisia’s second president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, later restored relations under his “zero enemy” foreign policy strategy, but both trade and economic relations remained negligible. Even at its peak in 2008, Tunisia’s automotive imports from Iran totaled only about eighteen million dinars. In the wake of the Jasmin revolution in Tunisia, Tehran viewed the rise of Rachid Ghannouchi’s Islamist Ennahda party with enthusiasm, but aside from an initial increase in bilateral meetings and talks of renewed partnerships, little was achieved between the two countries.
In recent years, however, some speculation over Tunisia’s renewed interest in Iran has emerged, particularly considering Saied’s controversial rule and foreign policy approach. Since his July 2021 power grab, Saied has consolidated authority through decrees, weakened judicial and parliamentary institutions, and adopted a sharply anti-Western narrative that blames Europe and the United States for Tunisia’s economic and political woes. Araghchi’s visit to Tunis this September signaled a notable convergence in both strategic thinking and economic agendas. Leaders from both countries expressed words of praise for each other’s condemnation of Israel’s war in Gaza and strikes against Qatar and Iran—and discussed cooperation across multiple sectors, including trade and tourism. Concrete steps have already been taken to start direct flights between Tehran and Tunis, showcasing that both parties are serious about resuming cooperation.
Saied sees clear political advantage in drawing closer to Tehran. Such alignment would bolster his anti-West narrative and signal to his domestic audience that he is siding with states that defy Western influence. Saied was elected in 2019 on an anti-corruption and anti-imperialist campaign and has insisted over the years that Western-led institutions are imposing “diktats” on Tunisia, i.e., perceived unilateral, coercive demands imposed from abroad that undermine Tunisia’s sovereignty. He is also the staunchest supporter of the Palestinian cause in Tunisian history, having changed the country’s constitution in 2022 to claim that all Jerusalem should be under Palestinian rule—and not just East Jerusalem, as established under the United Nations’ partition plan. Cozying up to Iran, Israel’s biggest enemy in the region, will allow Saied to follow through on his promise to adopt an anti-West regional posture. At a time when signs of mistrust against him are emerging through weekly demonstrations across the country, Saied is doing all he can to hang on to power.
Secondly, Saied’s increased alignment with Tehran will cement his relationship with Algeria, currently the country’s biggest ally. Tunisia’s reliance on Algeria stems from Algiers’ role as its primary provider of financial assistance, energy supplies, and security support at a time when Tunis is increasingly isolated from Western partners. Additionally, Algeria’s own sense of isolation has grown exponentially since Morocco—it’s archrival in the region—signed the Abraham Accords in 2020, normalizing ties with Israel and strengthening its relationship to the West. Since then, Algeria has stepped up its support to Tunis to cement intra-regional alliances. In addition to million-dollar loans, Tunisia and Algeria signed over twenty-seven agreements in the first year alone since Morocco’s signing of the Abraham Accords. More recently, they formalized their military cooperation by signing a new agreement for joint exercises and an increase in information sharing.
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Perhaps more strategically significant to Tunis is the deepening alliance between Algiers and Tehran, with the former seeking new gas investments while the latter looks to increase its footprint in Africa. Visits by high-level Algerian officials to Tehran have steadily increased, and Raisi visited Algiers in March 2024, marking the first official visit by an Iranian president in over fourteen years. The two countries signed several agreements in tourism, trade, and energy. Tunisia’s outreach to Iran suggests it sees value in the growing Tehran–Algiers partnership and seeks to benefit from it, as well by aligning itself with those partners that its main backer, Algeria, is increasingly engaging.
But what does Iran, a regional power situated far from Mediterranean borders, have to gain from a small country such as Tunisia, whose main exports are automobile parts and agricultural products—neither of which brings significant value to Tehran?
For one, Tehran, too, understands the benefits of strengthening ties with Tunis at a time when Tunisia’s relationship with Algeria is strong. With Tehran significantly weakened after two years of wars with Israel and the killing of most of its regional proxy leadership, Tehran is willing to take support wherever it can find it. While Algeria represents a much larger gain, adding Tunisia to the mix is a simple step that requires little overextension of resources. In contrast, Iran gains influence and potential alliances, slowly diminishing its isolation from the world stage.
Secondly, Tunis may represent a safe haven for Iran-supported Hamas operatives. As part of the cease-fire agreement between Hamas and Israel after two years of war, Israel touted the idea of agreeing to a full cease-fire should Hamas leaders be exiled from Gaza. Tunisia’s history is replete with examples of concrete support to Palestinian leadership, including when it hosted Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters from 1983 until the early nineties. The Israeli news channel i24 has reported that talks between Tunis and Tehran have already begun, although the content of these talks largely remains unknown and has not been corroborated by any additional reporting. Against this backdrop, following Israel’s September strike on Qatar, where Hamas’ headquarters currently reside, Iran would benefit from additional countries ready to host Hamas leaders, especially should Qatar begin to lessen its support due to increased US pressure.
Should Tunisia opt toward strengthening relations with Iran, it will have to contend with its allies in the West, especially the United States, considering the large sums of financial and military aid it has received over the years. Following the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, Washington invested heavily in Tunisia’s democratization process including billions in low-interest loans and millions in grants. In recent years, US support has diminished following democratic backsliding in Tunisia, with now only a Foreign Military Financing program in place to help fight off potential al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham operatives in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The United States, too, has something to lose from closer Tunisia–Iran relations. This relationship can shift the balance of power in North Africa to benefit the so-called “axis of upheaval”—China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea. With Russia expanding its presence in Algeria and Libya, and Egypt strengthening its ties with Beijing, only Morocco and Tunisia remain viable pro-West anchors in the region. A tip of this scale will inevitably lead to difficulties in managing US interests in North Africa and the Sahel. For example, it could become an obstacle to counter terrorism efforts and disrupting weapons smuggling routes for Hamas through the Sinai. The Sinai has long been used by Hamas for weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. Any erosion of US intelligence-sharing arrangements and training access in countries such as Tunisia would further weaken efforts to contain these networks, ultimately strengthening transnational smuggling and militant activity across the region.
Alissa Pavia is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program. She was previously associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program.
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Image: Tunisian President Kais Saied receives the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abbas Araqchi Tunisian President Kais Saied receives the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abbas Araqchi, at the Carthage Palace in Tunis, on September 10, 2025. Photo by Tunisian Presidency apaimages Tunis Tunis Tunisia 100925_Tunis_TPO_003 Copyright: xapaimagesxTunisianxPresidencyxxapaimagesxNo Use Switzerland. No Use Germany. No Use Japan. No Use Austria
