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New Atlanticist December 18, 2024

Beyond NATO’s 2 percent threshold: How can Italy meet the challenge?

By Gabriele Natalizia and Matteo Mazziotti di Celso

President-elect Donald Trump’s election victory has reignited concerns among NATO allies in Europe that they could soon feel increased pressure from Washington. If Trump sticks to his campaign promises, then the new US president might not limit himself just to being more assertive in urging allies to fulfill their 2014 Wales commitment—allocating at least 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense. He might, in addition, push allies to raise the threshold, perhaps to 3 percent. This demand would put even greater pressure on allies who continue to fall short of the Defense Investment Pledge. Among these countries, Italy, which is spending 1.5 percent of GDP on defense this year, stands out. 

Yet for the past decade, Italy has largely avoided US criticism for its low defense spending by volunteering to deploy large numbers of troops to NATO and US-led missions abroad. In the next four years, however, it is likely that the NATO cost-sharing debate will only intensify. This will be driven not only by Trump’s recent statements but also by bipartisan support for higher defense spending among US political elites. Vice President-elect JD Vance has notably declared that NATO “cannot be a welfare client” but “must be a real alliance.” Furthermore, raising the threshold beyond 2 percent of GDP would likely garner support from some European allies who already meet or plan to meet the current target, thus placing Italy in an even more difficult position. 

Given this new political context, if Italy is going to maintain its reputation as a valuable contributor to transatlantic security among US policymakers, its troop deployments may not be enough to shield it from criticism—at long last, Rome will need to ramp up its defense spending to match at least the 2 percent target.

Italy’s low defense spending

Rome is a penny-pincher when it comes to defense. Over the past decade, Italy’s defense budget has consistently ranked among the lowest of Europe’s major powers. Since 2014, Italian spending has not surpassed the 1.5 percent of GDP mark. Over the same period, its position in NATO’s defense spending rankings has steadily declined—from seventeenth in 2014 to twenty-sixth today. True, Italy is not the only country to spend sparingly on defense; other nations, such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark, have spent far below 2 percent of GDP since 2014. The difference, however, lies in their recent shift in approach. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, these countries significantly increased their defense budgets, while Italy has notably failed to follow suit.

Italy’s burden-sharing strategy: Troops, not cash

To address US pressure for burden-sharing and maintain its reputation as a loyal ally, Italy has adopted a clever strategy. Instead of boosting its defense budget, Italy has consistently opted to increase its troop contributions to NATO and US-led missions. This approach has allowed Rome to sidestep major increases in defense spending while avoiding criticism from its allies. At the same time, it has kept the military more appealing to a domestic audience that is generally hesitant to enlist.

In the past ten years, the success of this strategy became evident on at least three occasions. The first was in 2014, when the NATO Summit in Wales set the goal for all allies to increase their defense budgets to at least 2 percent of GDP by 2024. At the time, Italy was well short of the benchmark, allocating only 1.14 percent to defense. Instead of dramatically increasing its budget, Italy expanded its contributions to NATO and US-led operations. Between 2014 and 2017, Italy increased its deployment of troops abroad from 4,440 to 7,500 personnel, focusing on missions such as Inherent Resolve, Baltic Air Policing, and Enhanced Forward Presence. The results became evident two years later. When the issue of contributions became a key item on the burden-sharing agenda at the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Italy’s demonstrated willingness to share risks served as a shield against harsh criticism. In an interview during his final year in office in 2016, then US President Barack Obama criticized Paris and Berlin but spared Rome, accusing the former two nations of being “free riders” on Euro-Atlantic security.

The second occasion was during Trump’s first term, which brought renewed urgency for policymakers in Rome to address defense spending. This time, thanks to favorable economic conditions, the COVID-19 pandemic (which temporarily reduced Italy’s GDP), and the push from Defense Minister Lorenzo Guerini, Italy indeed managed to raise the share of GDP allocated to defense, bringing it back to levels seen before the 2008 global financial crisis. By the end of 2020, defense spending had reached 1.59 percent of GDP. However, despite this increase, Italy still ranked low on the list of contributing countries, as most allies were simultaneously boosting their defense budgets. Once again, the cornerstone of Italy’s strategy to avoid criticism was a further increase of its contributions to NATO and US-led operations. During Trump’s first term, Italy’s troop contributions to NATO missions expanded further, with nearly 9,500 troops deployed abroad—an increase of roughly two thousand personnel. Some sources indicate that Italy received a private warning letter from the Trump administration for being “noncompliant.” But once again, public criticism was avoided. Instead, Trump directed his ire at Germany.

The third and most recent occasion when Italy had to respond to calls for increased defense spending came with the onset of the war in Ukraine. Once more, rather than significantly boosting defense spending, which remained stagnant after adjusting for inflation, Italy once again increased its contributions to allied missions, particularly on NATO’s eastern flank. By 2024, Italy had authorized twelve thousand troops for deployment abroad, making it the second-largest contributor to NATO and US-led operations. Combined with the unveiling of the Mattei Plan and heightened Italian involvement in the Indo-Pacific, this approach has at least partially met Washington’s expectations, closely aligning Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government with the White House on key international issues.

The numbers don’t lie

In Trump’s second term, however, Rome will likely find itself in a more difficult position. It has exhausted the golden ticket that kept it ahead in the burden-sharing game for the past decade. With the current resources available to the Italian Armed Forces, including personnel, equipment, and materials, further expansion of already substantial overseas contingents would be unsustainable. As both former Chief of the Defense Staff Giuseppe Cavo Dragone and the current Chief of the Army Staff Carmine Masiello have noted, Italy’s armed forces are overstretched and struggling to maintain their current operational tempo. This challenge arises not only from the insufficient number of personnel to handle both international and domestic missions, such as Operation Strade Sicure (which is set to continue for another three years with 6,800 personnel) but also from the aging average of military personnel, which complicates their deployment due to health- and family-related constraints. Italy, in other words, won’t be able to easily ramp up the number of troops deployed abroad any further.

In this context, Rome faces two options. The first is to hope the Trump administration adopts a less stringent stance on cost-sharing than the one outlined during his campaign. Alternatively, Italy might once again seek an exception, leveraging the favorable alignment in US-Italian relations. The current harmony stems from political compatibility between the White House and Palazzo Chigi and from close ties between Meloni and Elon Musk, who is expected to play an influential role in the Trump administration. However, basing strategic ties on inherently volatile personal relationships is risky and would likely need to be offset by significant concessions to Trump, a president known for his transactional approach to politics.

A more ambitious and forward-thinking approach would be for Italy to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP. Should the 3 percent target materialize, it would likely be set for 2030 or after. In the immediate years ahead, Rome could still maintain its dual-track strategy, striving to reach the former 2 percent threshold while continuing its tradition of outsized contributions to NATO and US-led operations. While meeting the 2 percent target might mitigate any immediate US pressure on Italy, it could also ignite domestic dissent. According to public opinion polls, many Italians are opposed to their government increasing defense spending. As the government enters the latter part of its term, a politically contentious decision may prove difficult. Nevertheless, as the policy discussion around NATO burden-sharing has made clear, if Italy is going to continue to maintain its favorable view among US policymakers, it will need to contribute more to its own defense, not just through troop deployments but through defense spending, as well.


Gabriele Natalizia is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also an associate professor of international relations at the Department of Political Science at Sapienza University of Rome and director of the Centro Studi Geopolitica.

Matteo Mazziotti di Celso is a Research Fellow at the Centro Studi Geopolitica, where he coordinates the Italy/Europe desk, and a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Genoa. He is also an adjunct professor of international relations at the American University of Rome and a junior associate fellow at the NATO Defence College.

Further reading

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Image: An Italian Soldier awaits the start of the final training exercise for Operation Rehearsal Exercise Level II at Djakova Air Base in Djakova, Kosovo, September 5, 2021.