How is NATO currently postured to deter and defend against the threat of Russian aggression on NATO territory? In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Alliance has taken steps to strengthen deterrence and defence along its eastern flank, including the deployment of enhanced forward presence (EFP) battalion battlegroups to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, in addition to those already present in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. At the Madrid summit in March 2022, heads of state and government also expressed an intention to increase these formations to brigade size “when and where required.” In addition to the brigade combat team posted in Poland on a rotational basis, the United States deployed a second, along with a divisional headquarters and support troops, in Central and Eastern Europe for a total increase of some 20,000 troops. Allies have also continued to increase defense spending, with European members and Canada achieving an overall spend rate of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for the first time in 2024. Those states most threatened, including Poland, Romania, the Baltic states, and the Nordic nations, are well above 2 percent, while the accession of Finland and Sweden significantly enhance NATO’s defence posture in the east and north. Finally, allies agreed in Madrid to a new NATO Force Model designed to achieve higher readiness levels, while at the Vilnius Summit in 2023 approval was granted to prepare regional defense plans to further enhance Alliance security.
At the present time, Russian ground and air forces are fully committed in Ukraine and aggression against NATO member states appears unlikely. Accordingly, the measures cited above seem adequate. However, should Ukraine subside into yet another frozen conflict (as in Georgia and Moldova), the Russian military will rearm and reequip its formations. Putin has on many occasions made clear his intentions to recover territories formerly belonging to the Russian empire:
The concept of the “Russian World” allows Putin to regard any territories that were once ruled by or claimed to be ruled by a Russian regime as Russia’s “historical territories,” which include Poland and the Baltic states. Putin may elect to “protect” people the Kremlin describes as Russian “compatriots” in these claimed “historic territories” at the time of his choosing by replicating similar narratives he used to invade Ukraine.
Given repeated Russian aggression in Europe, and the reality of the largest conflict since 1945 right on NATO’s doorstep, the Alliance must take the Russian threat seriously. In the most likely case, a Russian invasion of the Baltic states in the next three to five years, how well is NATO positioned to respond?
Russian forces likely to participate in this scenario are a reconstituted 1st Guards Tank Army, stationed in western Russia with three heavy divisions and two independent heavy brigades, supported by strong artillery, air defense, electronic warfare, and aviation contingents plus a Russian airborne division based in Pskov—just across the Estonian border. Unlike most NATO militaries, these formations possess significant combat experience. Their close proximity to the Baltic region, and the presence of a strong (and nuclear-armed) Kaliningrad garrison well in the rear of defending forces, provide strong advantages.
Here the current and projected level of readiness across NATO must give pause. So far, increased defense spending has not translated into marked increases in readiness. The Baltic states themselves field small militaries with no tanks or combat aircraft. Weak in air defense and artillery, they depend on rapid reinforcement from allies. Here, readiness and capability gaps limit the ability of NATO to respond. So far, NATO forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have not been increased to brigade strength. The NATO battlegroups posted in the three Baltic states, while important indicators of Alliance resolve, are trip-wire forces with limited combat power. To some extent, NATO airpower will be limited by the formidable air-defense bastions located in Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg, while Russian anti-ship missiles based ashore in Kaliningrad and afloat with the Baltic Fleet will constrain NATO naval operations in the Baltic Sea.
While the United States might manage to deploy perhaps a single division to Estonia in thirty days, major powers like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy cannot move ready forces in divisional strength there in less than sixty to ninety days—far too slow to affect the outcome. Close neighbors Poland, Sweden, and Finland possess competent militaries but lack power-projection capabilities and will be concerned to defend their own territory. (It is some 1,000 kilometers from Warsaw to Narva, Estonia.) Shortfalls in military mobility, theater air and missile defense, long-range fires, electronic warfare, and stocks of fuel, precision-guided munitions, and artillery ammunition are cause for concern. Given the high casualties seen in Ukraine, the lack of reserves across the Alliance are another serious vulnerability.
These disabilities are well known to both Russian and NATO planners. What can NATO do in the near term to address them?
The first step must be to upgrade NATO EFP forces in threatened areas from battalion to brigade strength, with appropriate enablers. Next, NATO should assist threatened states in upgrading their military forces, both in size and capability, to include tanks, artillery and air defense. Theater air and ballistic missile defense must assume high priority, as Russia will certainly attempt to interdict the arrival of NATO reinforcements. An urgent necessity is fielding effective counter-drone defenses at scale, a clear lesson from the conflict in Ukraine. Across the Alliance, member states must strive to improve readiness to meet the demanding timelines called for in the New Force Model—up to 100,000 troops “ready to move” in ten days. Military mobility has been flagged as a major concern for years; it must be tackled with urgency to remove bureaucratic obstacles and upgrade transportation infrastructure. “Below the line” capabilities such as ammunition, spare parts, fuel, and combat replacements require serious attention.
All of these will require sustained support in capitals from parliamentarians and heads of state and government. The economic and military capacity is there, along with strong political communities and institutions, and decades of collective cooperation in pursuit of shared interests and values. In question is the most valuable strategic commodity of all—the political will to build a stronger and more secure Europe. If that is present, effective deterrence and defense is assured.
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.
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Image: Soldiers provide security during Dragon 24, a NATO training event, at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, March 11, 2024. The exercise highlights NATO's allied military cooperation and movement capabilities. Photo credit: Army Spc. Brett Thompson.